Friday, April 17, 2026

Electric Training Wheels

Two hours into a road trip in my Tesla, I start to get twitchy. By that point, the battery in my 2019 Model 3 has dipped to an uncomfortably low percentage. If I can’t reach the next plug, I’m in trouble. This is the kind of problem that Ram’s electric pickup truck is intended to solve. When the range starts to dwindle, the truck automatically fires up a hidden gas engine that refills the giant battery. The “electric” vehicle keeps on chugging down the highway, hour after hour; pit stops are once again decided by the need for bathroom breaks rather than battery range.

The Ram 1500 REV, set to debut later this year, is what’s called an “extended-range electric vehicle,” or EREV. In essence, it is an electric vehicle that burns gas. There’s nothing revolutionary about a half-gas, half-electric car, of course. Hybrids have been a mainstay in the United States since the Toyota Prius broke through two decades ago, and automakers have released more efficient plug-in hybrids—allowing drivers to charge up for about 30 miles of electric driving, just enough to accomplish daily errands without fossil fuels. An extended-range EV is a different kind of beast. The engine burns gasoline for the sole purpose of replenishing the battery—it never actually pushes the wheels.

The technology is not exactly new: BMW sold a more primitive extended-range EV in the U.S. during the mid-2010s. But now these souped-up hybrids are set to go mainstream. EREVs are the car industry’s new hope for quieting the doubts of American drivers who are wary of going electric. In the Ram, the battery can run for about 150 miles of electric driving, and the whole setup delivers enough range to travel nearly 700 miles between stops. EREVs are the car industry’s new hope for quieting the doubts of American drivers who are wary of going electric. “It takes away the range anxiety,” Jeremy Michalek, the director of the Vehicle Electrification Group at Carnegie Mellon University, told me. “When you want to go on a long trip, you can still put liquid fuel in it and continue to drive for longer distances.” But for all the upside, gas-burning electric cars are not quite the future that we were promised. Just last year, the Ram truck was slated to be fully electric, with no gas engine to be found. Ford recently killed the electric F-150 pickup truck and is now promising to bring it back as—you guessed it—an EREV.

These new hybrids are the latest sign that the electric revolution has not exactly gone according to plan. Sales of EVs, true electric vehicles, had been growing slowly in the United States, but they’ve slid in the past six months, plagued by high prices and attacks from the Trump administration. Automakers have responded by canceling and delaying new EV models. Last month, for example, Honda announced that it would halt the development of three new EVs; a few days later, Volvo said it would discontinue its affordable electric SUV, citing “shifting market conditions.” Other car companies, having invested billions into building EVs, are trying to find new ways to persuade Americans to take a chance on big batteries and electric motors. That’s where extended-range EVs come in.

By throwing in a backup generator, the car industry hopes that it can finally appeal to pickup drivers, who have been especially resistant to going electric. Of the 16 EREVs that are set to hit the market within the next three years, all are trucks or SUVs. “For American brands at the moment, I think it’s an admission that maybe, especially for big trucks and SUVs, EVs can’t deliver the type of utility and the performance that their customers demand,” Joseph Yoon, a consumer-insights analyst at the car-buying site Edmunds, told me. Indeed, electrifying the full-size American pickup truck has proved to be a particularly tough problem. Because these vehicles are so big and heavy, electric versions need colossal batteries to move them. That raises the price, and drivers are still sometimes left with subpar performance: Towing a boat or trailer severely dings their battery range. [...]

However, the curse of any hybrid is compromise. EREVs aren’t likely to solve the biggest reason Americans are not going electric: cost. Though Ram has yet to announce the price of its new extended-range pickup truck, Car and Driver estimates that the vehicle will run at least $60,000. Ram’s gas-powered truck, meanwhile, starts at $42,000. The price difference is partly because an extended-range EV still has a big, expensive battery in addition to carrying around a gas engine with its thousands of chugging belts and spinning gears. That leads to other downsides. EREVs require plenty of upkeep, unlike fully electric cars that have just a few dozen moving parts. In the six and a half years that I’ve owned my Tesla, I’ve done basically nothing but replace the tires and the small backup battery.

The problem that these buzzy new hybrids do solve isn’t as relevant as you might think. For those who aren’t doing any heavy-duty driving—which includes lots of American pickup-truck owners—range anxiety is a vanishing concern. New electric cars can now run for 300 or even 400 miles a charge, which is more than enough to pull off a road trip without having to make lots of extra stops. High-speed charging is also getting more common and more reliable: Tesla now has more than 3,000 Supercharger stations in the United States, and competitors such as IONNA and EVgo have accelerated the previously slow pace of installing new plugs. (The Trump administration tried to freeze billions in federal funding for EV charging, but courts have ruled against that move.)

Two things are clear about electric vehicles: They are far cleaner in the long run, and people who buy them typically don’t return to gas. Perhaps extended-range EVs are the training wheels that hesitant drivers need, providing the benefits of electric cars—instantaneous torque, quiet driving, fewer planet-killing carbon emissions—alongside the comfort of knowing there’s a gas station at every freeway exit. Seen another way, though, a built-in backup generator is poised to prolong the inevitable transition to true electric cars... Considering that vehicles tend to stay on the road for a decade or more, these trucks are likely to be still burning fossil fuels deep into the 2040s. Any driver who buys an EREV to go mostly electric is one who could have gone fully electric and never picked up a gas pump again.

by Andrew Moseman, The Atlantic |  Read more:
Image: Alisa Gao

Potential Slogans for J. D. Vance’s 2028 Presidential Campaign

J. D. Vance: Moderate Again


Playing the Long Game

Don’t Blame Me—I Was on Vacation the Whole Time

Trump’s V.P. in Name Only

America Deserves Someone Who Was Barely Involved

“Hillbilly Elegy”

I Kept My Head Down, for You

Just Following Orders, But Also I Wasn’t There

Better Me Than Eric

Better Me Than Don, Jr.

Better Me Than a Third Term


This Time I Mean It

Down to Be Memed

The Tariffs Weren’t as Bad as People Expected, and Also I Wasn’t Involved

Laura Loomer Won’t Get Access

Not in the Epstein Files, I Don’t Think

Protecting Democracy from the Inside, Kinda


The Adults Were Never in the Room, But, if They Were, I Wasn’t One of Them

I’m Just a Guy, Standing in Front of His Country, Asking It to Ignore the Past Decade of His Life

I Never Even Had the Nuclear Codes

Trump Routinely Forgets My Name

Trust Me, I Hated It, Too

Oh, Like Ron DeSantis Would Do a Better Job Than Me? Get Outta Here, Losers


I Really, Really, Really Need This

Hey! It’s Me, J. D. :)

by Ginny Hogan, New Yorker |  Read more:
Images: Jesse Shamon
[ed. No way, José (bet there's an actuarial table hidden in his bible).]

Thursday, April 16, 2026

Wassily Kandinsky (1866-1944) — Dominant Curve [oil on canvas, 1936]

Galina Bitt — Untitled (mixed media on paperboard, 1960)
via:

Ask Mike: Mike Monteiro’s Good News

This week’s question comes to us from Tuan Son Nguyen:

How do you form a circle of like-minded people to keep your sanity when so many horrible things are happening?

I’m not exactly sure when this happened, or what triggered it. But I remember it was a nice day. Maybe it was a nice day after a few rainy days, or a few cold days, or maybe I was just up in my feelings. But I got home, locked up my bike, and instead of heading up the stairs to our apartment, as I would normally do, I headed out to the dogpark. The dogpark is a block away, and I visit regularly with my dog so he can do all his dog things. We’re regulars. But this time I didn’t have my dog and I had no need to go to the dogpark. I just wanted to. I wanted to go sit on one of the benches and soak up what was left of a nice day. Which is what I did.

Here’s the thing about the dog park, which I’ve written about before. It’s dog-centric. Everyone knows your dog’s name. Everyone knows whether your dog can or cannot have treats (always ask if you don’t know). Everyone’s relationship at the dogpark, with a few exceptions, revolves around the dogs. And that’s been true for as long as we’ve been taking our dog (who is now amazingly close to eighteen years old) to the dog park. This is by design.

When everyone is brought together by geography and your dog’s need to take a shit, it’s in your best interest to get along with the people who end up in that shared public space. You wanna keep conversation light. You discuss the weather. If someone is wearing a local team hat, you take it as a sign to elevate the conversation to “did you see the game?” or “this is our year.” (It’s not.) You mention new restaurants or cafés in the neighborhood, or sadly more appropriately these days—you mention restaurants or cafés that have recently shuttered. But mostly you talk about the dogs.

“Did Grumble get a haircut today?”

“I like Mojo’s Pride kerchief.”

In general, it’s best to avoid more complicated issues with your neighbors, which is why I stay off NextDoor, which is just an online Klan rally. Once you know certain things about your neighbors, you’re stuck knowing them, and you realize how much time you spend around them holding a bag of dog shit in your hand. And the temptation becomes too strong.

This is how peace was kept in the dog park for years. The occasional flare-up for politics, of course, the occasional flare-up for world issues, as well as local issues. Which will happen whenever folks get together, which is good. But those conversations would eventually subside. A regression back to the mean. Back to the dogs.

But neighborhoods are living, changing things. On the day I decided to just go sit in the dogpark without my dog (he was still at work), I realized other people were just sitting there in the dogpark. Yes, some of them had dogs, but some didn’t. They were just sitting there, sometimes talking to one another, sometimes not. Literally in a circle because of how the benches are laid out. And then other people started coming out and wandered over. To be clear, I’m not saying I instigated any of this. If anything, we were all getting pulled in by some cosmic need to be among other people. And for the past few weeks, this has been a regular occurrence. Every day I come home, and I walk to the dog park and sit with my neighbors. Yes, we talk about our dogs, but we also check in on each other, we vent about our day, we trash talk. Sometimes people bring snacks. Yes, we talk about the state of things in the world, which is awful, but having this small community of people that we can hold peace with makes it… well, not less awful. But it makes a difference knowing there are other people on the spaceship with us.

Are we like-minded? We’re like minded in some things! For one, we all like sitting in the park in the evening, and that’s nice. We all love our neighborhood. We seem to all like donuts. And dogs. And a little bit of a breeze coming off the mountain. We all believe there’s one neighbor that goes too fucking hard. We all believe in shared spaces, or at least we believe in this shared space. I think we also believe that it’s important to interact with each other with a certain level of kindness. For example, one of our neighbors recently had knee surgery and everyone’s bringing her food. Another neighbor is out of town and there are a few neighbors moving her car around so she doesn’t get tickets when the street cleaning happens. We watch each other's dogs when we’re out of town, or working a long shift at work. We lend records that better be returned in good shape soon. (This one might be a little targeted.) We hold vigils when a beloved dog leaves us. We commiserate together when someone loses a job, and we celebrate together when a new job is procured. We say goodbye when someone moves away, and we widen the circle when a new person moves in.

Are we like-minded in all things? Fuck no. Way too many of my neighbors still own Ring cameras. Way too many of my neighbors still believe their “I got this before Elon went crazy” bumper sticker is an act of resistance. Way too many of my neighbors still believe Gavin Newsom is the solution to something. (Gavin Newsom is a piece of shit.) And more than one of my neighbors have sat down next to me and told me that the Democrats need to give a little bit on immigration, not realizing they were sitting next to an immigrant. So, no we are not like-minded in all things. But I do believe there is a shared core of decency to all my neighbors, and within that core there may be unexplored areas that need to be explored a little bit. We all grew up believing certain things, things that we hold to be sacrosanct, that could use a little further exploration. And I’ve been able to have a few of those conversations with people, and they’ve been able to have some with me. It’s easier for people to have those conversations when they’re coming from a place of common decency.

That said, not all differences are equal. I don’t sit with Nazis. I don’t sit with terfs. We all avoid the zionist lady...

In general, I think the idea of “like-minded” is overrated and a little boring. Sitting with people who agree with everything you agree with feels great for about five minutes. Then (and maybe this is because I am from Philadelphia) I want to fight. I want to argue. I want to argue about who the most influential NBA player of our lifetime was, and why it was Allen Iverson. I want to argue about the best Beyoncé album, and why it was Lemonade. I want to argue about why the park needs public restrooms, and yes I know people will use them—that’s the fucking point, man! I want to argue about which of our cafés makes the best coffee. (Trick question. It’s me. I make better coffee than any of them.) I want to argue about street parking. My god, I love arguing with my neighbors about street parking. (Why should the city be providing storage for your private property? Get a bike. Ride the bus.) Street parking is always guaranteed to start a fight in the park. And I love having those fights with my neighbors. I think they honestly bring us closer together. (They may disagree.)

But no, we will not have any arguments about who belongs in the park, because something that every one of my neighbors agrees about is that if you are in the park you belong in the park. If you are in the park, you get the same privileges as everyone else in the park. And if you want to join the community circle in the park we will make room for you. And also, if shit starts coming out of your mouth you will be called on it.

Everything is shit. And when everything is shit, minor differences become less important than the things we hold in common. We’ve seen this in LA. We’ve seen this in Chicago. We’ve seen this in the Twin Cities. Punks fighting next to suburban dads. Wine moms fighting next to anarchists. Socialists fighting next to librarians. (I’m kidding here, all librarians are socialist. I love librarians.) We see this when people come out to protect their neighbors. We see this when people yell at the ICE goons. And someday we will see this when we put all these fascists on trial. Roomfuls of people, who may not agree on much, but they agree on this:

The shittier they treat us, the more they bring us together.

***
This week’s question comes to us anonymously:

What would you say to someone who proclaims, “I want to be a donut maker,” but has never actually made a single donut in their life?

You say “That’s awesome. What can I do to help?”

Look, I’m going to be totally honest with you. Every week, I go through my bin of newsletter questions, looking for something I want to answer, and I get incredibly depressed. The vast majority of them are from people getting laid off, or being in their sixth month of looking for work, or justifiably freaking out because they heard layoffs are coming to their company. It’s a world of despair and a world of shit which, sadly, only appears to be picking up steam.

Meanwhile, half the people I know are wondering how they’re going to pay their rent and go to the doctor, and the other half are proclaiming this the “Era of Abundant Intelligence.” (For who?!?) All they need is half the world’s money (the half not going to bombing school children), half the world’s land, half the world’s water, all of the world’s microchips, and they will eventually deliver [checks notes] something in exchange for all this, just don’t ask them what because it’s really hard to say, but it’s right around the corner.

(I promise this newsletter will turn positive soon.)

Meanwhile, if I am stupid, sad, or desperate enough to go on LinkedIn for a minute, it’s a sea of people writing letters in praise of the leopard, proclaiming it has always been their dream to work for the leopard, asking the leopard not to eat their face, or hoping to get one of the few jobs at the face-eating factory where they feel like they’ll be safe from the face-eating leopard, which of course they’re not. So, yes, there are a fair amount of questions in my inbox from people upset that the leopard ate their face even though they were happy to help the leopard eat everyone else’s face.

(Or I may spiral out of control.)

Seriously though, era of abundant intelligence for who?!?

Let’s talk about your friend who wants to be a donut maker. Because they may be the smartest person here. First off, everyone loves a donut. Secondly, no one has ever reacted badly to the news that someone is making donuts. But most importantly for us today—not a single human being has ever been born with the ability to make donuts. Like all skills, you learn it, you do it badly for a while, then you do it better. Some people will get amazing at it, and most people will reach some level of competency. So while there’s an incredibly slim chance that your friend will become the world’s greatest donut maker, there’s an incredibly high possibility that your friend will learn how to make good, even great, donuts. Which you will benefit from. And which you should be incredibly grateful for.

For the last week, Erika and I have been glued to Artemis updates on the NASA site, because it’s become such a joy to watch people be good at something, and enjoy doing it, and all of this while being incredibly human about it. Seriously, these people sound positively giddy to be in space! And they’re rocking it. It feels like such a luxury to watch these people do their thing, and do it well, and with joy, at a time when we’re surrounded by a government who is very bad at what they do, and does it in the cruelest way possible, and an industry that’s trying to convince us that we are incapable of doing the things we love, and we’re doing them inefficiently anyway. (Because the problem was always that we weren’t breaking the world fast enough.)

Competence should not be a luxury.

Competence should not be something that we look at with nostalgia.

We’re lucky that we get to watch the Artemis crew do their thing, which they can do because they practiced doing it a thousand times. And you know that they made a lot of bad donuts, before they finally made a good donut. You know there was a Day One of learning to be an astronaut, just as there’s a Day One of learning to be a donut maker, or learning to be a designer, dentist, farmer, or teacher. And the only way to get to Day Thousand is to start at Day One, do it 999 more times, and get not just better, but confident enough that you decide you can do it in the confines of space. Confident enough that you can say to yourself and to everyone around you that you want to be a donut maker.

Meanwhile a friend who’s deep into a job interview is being asked to bring a passport to their next scheduled remote interview because their skillset shows a level of competence that has the potential employer worried they might be interviewing a deepfake. With one hand they force the slop down our throats. With the other hand they defend against us using the tools against them. Human competence has become a source of distrust. If you don’t trust the results of the tool, stop demanding we use it.

The era of abundant intelligence is actually the era of abundant theft. First they stole your work, then they stole the confidence you needed to do the work. This is violence.

Your friend is going to make some pretty crappy donuts to start. That’s to be expected. And then the day will come when they’ve gotten all the crappy donuts out of their system and they’ll hand you a good donut. I think you’ll be genuinely happy for your friend when this happens. And for yourself, which is fair.

But can’t you just get donuts at the corner bodega or at the donut shop? Yes, you can. And they are good. Donuts are good at every price point. From the waxy little chocolate ones at gas stations, to the funky ones you can buy from someone with a liberal arts degree and a polycule at Voodoo Donuts in Portland, to the boujie made-to-order (lord) donuts at Coffee Movement in SF, all donuts are good. (Bob’s Donuts are the best.) But your friend doesn’t want to buy donuts. Your friend wants to be a donut maker. And that is a very different thing.

Human beings crave making things. We make things out of wood. We make things out of wool. We make things out of steel. We make things out of folded paper. We make things out of flour, salt, and sugar. We make zines. We 3D-print whistles. We draw. We paint. We make instruments out of brass so we can make sounds. There is no more flexible word in the English language than “make.” We can make donuts, we can make plans, we can make someone dinner. We can make our cities more walkable. We can make bike lanes. We can make it around the moon. We can even make up our minds. Making is an act of sharing, it’s an act of using our joy, our labor, or expertise, in the service of adding to what’s here. Hopefully, in the service of improving what’s there. We make things so that we can bond with others.

And while the sloplords might reply to this by telling me that they enjoy making money, I’d happily reply that the making is actually done with our labor. It’s not the making that drives them, it’s the theft of labor. The theft of joy. And now the theft of competence. You can hear it in their language. They do not make. They disrupt. They extract. They colonize. Their joy is not in the giving, but in the taking. They are so broken, their only recourse is to attempt to break everything else around them. In their psychosis, they call this abundance.

I know very little about your friend, in fact all I know is that they want to be a donut maker and they’ve never made a single donut in their life. From this I can safely extrapolate that your friend isn’t currently a donut maker. I can also reasonably extrapolate that whatever your friend is currently doing isn’t what they want to be doing. And from there I can go out on a limb a little bit, from extrapolation to conjecture and guess that your friend isn’t happy doing what they’re currently doing. Happy people don’t generally dream about doing something else.

Turns out the Era of Abundant Intelligence isn’t coinciding with an Era of Abundant Happiness.

And here’s the thing about donuts: you want one. And the more I mention donuts the more you want one. Maybe you’re thinking of a custard donut, or maybe you’re thinking of a pink frosted donut with sprinkles, or maybe you’re thinking of an old-fashioned, or maybe you’re thinking of a gluten-free donut because everyone deserves donuts, but no one has ever had to be convinced to eat a donut. (The harder part is stopping, trust me.) Donuts are not inevitable, they are anticipated. When you make something you love, and other people also love, and it brings about as much joy as a donut does, there’s very little convincing that needs to happen. No one needs to declare that it’s the Era of Abundant Donuts because it’s apparent anytime you walk into a donut shop. The result of human competence, human labor, human joy, all laid out on baking sheet after baking sheet. Boston Cream. Glazed. Powdered. Chocolate Sprinkle. Jelly. Crullers. These are real. They exist. And they’re fucking delicious.

Trust that we are all closer to a good donut shop than we will ever be to AGI.

Trust that we are all closer to a good donut shop than we will ever be to AGI, and we should be taking full advantage of what is close to us, and what is possible, and what brings us joy. And that when the sloplords tell us that the thing we need might be right around the corner, maybe consider that they’re right after all. If there’s a donut shop around the corner.

We are in the Era of Abundant Donuts. If we want it. We should want it. Because a donut is amazing, and it’s right there for the taking.

I hope your friend succeeds in becoming a donut maker. I hope their donuts are amazing. I hope there are lines around the clock for their donuts. I hope you end up helping them at the donut shop and loving it so much that you decide you want to become a donut maker too. Or maybe not. Maybe it’s not the donuts that get your attention as much as it is your friend’s joy. Maybe you decide you want the joy, but your joy is found in something else. Maybe it’s making tacos, or opening a bookstore, or knitting, or opening a bar, or designing shoes.

I hope that when this happens someone says “That’s awesome. What can I do to help?”

by Mike Monteiro, Good News |  Read more:
Images: Artemis donuts by Mark Jacquet, Engineer at NASA Ames Research Center; and uncredited
[ed. Don't we all need good news. See also: if this is what i'm getting left behind from, just leave me behind (rax king).]

The AI Great Leap Forward


via: The AI Great Leap Forward
Images: uncredited

The Great Leap Forward’s most tragicomic chapter was the 除四害运动 (Eliminate Four Pests Campaign). Mao declared sparrows an enemy of the state — they ate grain seeds, so killing them would increase harvests. The entire country mobilized. Citizens banged pots and pans to keep sparrows airborne until they dropped dead from exhaustion. Children climbed trees to smash nests. Villages competed for the highest kill count. It worked. They nearly eradicated sparrows.

Then the locusts came.

Sparrows ate locusts. Without sparrows, locust populations exploded. The swarms devoured far more grain than the sparrows ever did. The campaign to save the harvest destroyed it. Mao quietly replaced sparrows with bedbugs on the official pest list and never spoke of it again.

Every AI Great Leap Forward has its sparrow campaign.

We May Be Living Through the Most Consequential Hundred Days in Cyber History, and Almost Nobody Has Noticed

[ed. Well, good luck with this one.]

The first four months of 2026 have produced a sequence of cyber incidents that, if any one of them had landed in 2014 or 2017, would have dominated a news cycle for a week.

A Chinese state supercomputer reportedly bled ten petabytes. Stryker was wiped across 79 countries. Lockheed Martin was hit for a reported 375 terabytes. The FBI Director’s personal inbox was dumped on the open web. The FBI’s wiretap management network was breached in a separate “major incident.” Rockstar Games was breached through a SaaS analytics vendor most people have never heard of. Cisco’s private GitHub was cloned. Oracle’s legacy cloud cracked open. The Axios npm package, downloaded a hundred million times a week, was hijacked by North Korea. Mercor, the $10 billion AI training-data vendor that sits inside the data pipelines of OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta simultaneously, was breached through the LiteLLM open source library and had 4 terabytes extracted by Lapsus$. Honda was hit twice. The new ShinyHunters/Scattered Spider/LAPSUS$ alliance breached approximately 400 organizations and exfiltrated roughly 1.5 billion Salesforce records.

Stacked on top of each other across roughly a hundred days, these events are something a historian of computing security writing in 2050 will probably file as a turning point, regardless of what else happens between now and then.

And yet, the public conversation around them has been quiet to the point of being strange. This is a curious observation more than a complaint. And the goal of what follows is to gather the events into one place, cite the publications that reported each one, and then ask, gently, why the period feels so undocumented in real time.

Every named incident below is followed by inline parenthetical citations to the publications that broke or covered it, in the same way an academic paper would.

I am not arguing that the cybersecurity community is failing. I am noting that something unusual is happening.

by Patrick Quirk, Substack |  Read more:
Image: uncredited
[ed. Hmm... sounds suspicious.]

Coby Whitmore, The Eternal Blossom
via:

A Monkey Goes to Court

What happens when something that isn't human makes art? A series of bizarre court battles trying to answer that question centred around this image. Ultimately, it will influence what ends up on your screens and headphones forever.

It was a humid day in the Indonesian jungle, and photographer David Slater was following a group of crested black macaques, a critically endangered and particularly photogenic species of monkey.

He wanted pictures, but the macaques were nervous. So, Slater put his camera on a tripod with autofocus on and a flashbulb, allowing the monkeys to inspect it. Just as he hoped, they started playing with his gear. Then one of them reached up and hit the shutter button while staring directly into the lens. The result was a selfie, taken by a monkey. And its toothy grin inadvertently answered a basic question that sits at the heart of technology.

What came next was nearly a decade of legal battles around an unusual dispute: when something that isn't human makes a work of art, who owns the copyright? Thanks to AI, that's become a issue with some deep implications for modern life – and what it means to be human.

One of the most alarming predictions about AI is that corporations will replace the human-created music, movies and books you love with an endless stream of AI slop. But the US Supreme Court just upheld a decision about AI and copyright which suggests that future may be harder to pull off than the tech industry hoped. The path is still uncertain, and right now, the legal system is the site of a battle that will shape what you read, watch and listen to for the rest of your life. It all traces back to that one little monkey.

Monkey business

The monkey took that selfie in 2011. For a brief, blissful period, Slater enjoyed global attention from the picture, but the troubles began when someone uploaded the photo to Wikipedia, from where it could be downloaded and used free of charge. He asked the Wikimedia Foundation to take it down, arguing it cost him £10,000 (worth about $13,400 today) in lost sales. In 2014, The organisation refused, arguing the photo was in the public domain because it wasn't taken by a person.

The row prompted the US Copyright Office to issue a statement that it would not register work created by a non-human author, putting "a photograph taken by a monkey" first in a list of examples. (Slater didn't respond to interview requests, but his representation arranged for the BBC to use the photo in this article.)

The story gets weirder. Soon after, the advocacy group People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (Peta) sued Slater on behalf of the monkey. The case argued all proceeds from the photo belonged to the macaque that took the picture, but it was really seen as a test case, an attempt to establish legal rights for animals. After four years and multiple court battles, a San Francisco judge dismissed the case. The judge's reasoning was simple: monkeys can't file lawsuits.

"It was kind of the biggest public conversation piece on this topic," says intellectual property lawyer Ryan Abbott, a partner at Brown, Neri, Smith and Khan in the US. "At the time it was very much about animal rights. But it could have been a conversation about AI." [...]

The missing author

When the US passed the Copyright Act of 1790, we only had to deal with things like writing and drawing. But the invention of photography decades later raised troubling questions. You could argue cameras do the real work, a person just hits a button.

"The Supreme Court looked at this and said, you know, we're going to interpret this purposively," says Abbott, who represented Thaler in a case against the Copyright Office. "Copyright was designed to protect the expression of tangible ideas. And that's broad enough to cover something like photography."

The same logic could apply to AI. "What you really have in photography is exactly the same thing you have here. You have a person issuing instructions to a machine to generate a work," he says. "What's the difference between that and me asking ChatGPT to make an image?"

by Thomas Germain, BBC | Read more:
Image: David Slater/ Caters New/BBC
[ed. More issues than you might imagine.]

Wednesday, April 15, 2026

Mythos and "New Sages Unrivalled"

For the last six weeks or so, at least one American company has possessed a tool that could damage the operations of critical infrastructure and government services in every country on Earth, including the United States. Within another six weeks or so, if not already, 2-3 American companies will possess this capability. Some time after that, perhaps not much time at all, adversaries of the United States—principally China—will possess tools of this magnitude.

The company I am referring to is Anthropic, and the tool they posses is called Claude Mythos. Researchers at the company have said that the new model stands to fundamentally upend cybersecurity. At least, for the time being. They postulate that after a transitional period, the world will end up in a steady state where advanced AI benefits defenders rather than cyberattackers. Yet the transitional period could be a long and brutal storm, and we do not know what will break as it hits.

“The threat is not hypothetical,” they conclude. “Advanced language models are here.”

What we do next, both collectively and as individuals, will determine if we can weather the storm.

***
What do the capabilities of Mythos mean, prosaically speaking? It’s hard to say, because I do not have access to it, and in all likelihood, neither do you. The model is not currently public, and may never be in its current form. But broadly speaking, if one takes Anthropic at their word, the model can conduct automated software vulnerability discovery with nearly superhuman performance in some domains.

The model can find security vulnerabilities in software, including software systems upon which modern civilization rests, that have eluded security researchers for years, and sometimes decades. The model has found thousands of vulnerabilities so far, most of which have not yet been fixed (for this reason, Anthropic has not publicized the exploits, but they have reported them to the developers of the software in question). An enormous range of consumer and commercial services--from banking to healthcare to education to AI itself—are plausibly implicated.

My model of modern software is that, if you look hard enough, you will find critical vulnerabilities. Looking hard, however, used to be expensive—only the best hackers in the world could do it, and their time was limited. With Mythos, the price of “looking hard” at software has plummeted, and it will get cheaper each month.

This is not wholly bad news; after all, “looking hard” at software is also how software gets improved. Mythos and similarly capable models from other companies that will soon follow, in that sense, are one of the greatest gifts to cybersecurity ever given.

Yet as things stand today, the world is deeply vulnerable. Every day, you rely on untold millions of lines of code maintained by a global population of millions of developers. It will not all be fixed tomorrow, or next month, or next year. The reality is that models of this capability level—and more capable—will almost certainly diffuse widely before all “critical” software is patched. How much damage will be done is anyone’s guess.

If you doubted whether AI systems might have object-level national security implications, now we have clear evidence. Some of the most capable and prized teams in the United States intelligence community do precisely the kind of work that Claude Mythos automates. The same is true of China. You can be inclined to believe this will all work out fine in the end, but it is simply no longer credible to contend that there are no implications for national security from large language models, and therefore for government as a whole.

***
This has been a frustrating issue to discuss candidly for the past two years. The reason is that, in the adolescent period of AI policy and discourse that is now—I hope—coming to a close, taking AI risks seriously was considered uncouth. Speaking about how near-future models might have straightforwardly dangerous capabilities was enough to provoke suspicion: were you a secret “doomer” or Effective Altruist? Were you part of a grand conspiracy to achieve “regulatory capture” for the frontier AI companies? Were you trying to “ban open source”? These sorts of questions constrained debate and put blinders on a large number of otherwise-sane policymakers and other influential people. And these constraints, in turn, meant that one had to tiptoe around reality.

But I am done with tiptoeing now, and so should everyone else be. It is a great relief, albeit also a bit uncomfortable, to feel the biting winds against one’s face.

In that spirit, here are some things I believe to be true:
1. Actors who are hostile to the U.S. will possess the capabilities of Mythos, if not better, within a year or two. We will not stop this through “nonproliferation” or some other clever regulatory scheme. We can only blunt the impact of this reality by strengthening our cyberdefenses rapidly.

2. Strengthening cyberdefense will require coordination among state and local government entities, private sector critical infrastructure operators, frontier labs, and the broader private sector, as well as the federal government. But even more importantly, it will require compute: data centers. In recent testimony to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, I wrote about the urgency of speeding transmission siting to facilitate the buildout of supercomputing infrastructure for national security. Running massive fleets of automated software vulnerability researchers was precisely one of the use cases I cite in that testimony. In addition to speeding up the FERC process through administrative actions, we need permitting reform urgently.

3. Speaking of national security: The U.S. Department of War, and the federal government more broadly, are engaged in a lawfare campaign against Anthropic whose underlying motivations are deeply unclear and which attacks core American values. Now, the strategic wisdom looks worse and worse by the week. We are fighting a war against Iran, a highly capable cyberoffensive actor. It is inconceivable that the government can have a healthy relationship with the frontier AI industry while attempting to destroy what is arguably the field’s leading company. Anthropic and the Department of War must come to a truce, if not a resolution, as soon as possible, for the good of America’s national defense.

4. In the context of national-security-relevant cybersecurity capabilities, the key and salient difference between the United States and China is not our “innovation ecosystem,” but instead the simple reality that our firms possess the computing power to train and operate models like Mythos today, and theirs do not. It is that simple. China is prioritizing its efforts to develop its own compute manufacturing capacity, and this development is likely to motivate them even further. The best way to disrupt this is a serious increase in targeted export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, too much of which flows freely today from the U.S. and its allies to China. It is long past time for major effort here from Congress and the Trump Administration.

5. The utility of SB 53, which requires frontier AI companies to disclose their assessments of their own models’ cybersecurity risks, is hopefully more apparent now. Some criticisms of that legislative framework have asserted that it attempts to control frontier AI or micromanage companies. But in truth, the framework rests on the notion that AI will not be controllable--that stopping the diffusion of potentially dangerous capabilities is impossible--and that therefore today’s “frontier” capabilities will be broadly dispersed within a short while. This is exactly we need transparency about what developers see at the frontier: so that a large range of societal actors can prepare their defenses appropriately against the developments we see forming at the frontier.

6. Today, Mythos is accessible only within Anthropic and to Anthropic’s chosen partners. Limited releases of this kind will likely be a growing trend because of both compute constraints and safety concerns. Mythos appears to be about five times more expensive to run than Opus, which was already not cheap, but for Anthropic the issue is not so much cost as it is allocating sufficient compute to serve Mythos to the public. This means that the best AI models of the future may be disproportionately, if not exclusively, used within frontier labs for their own purposes, which at least at first will be automated AI R&D. These so-called “internal deployments” have motivated my own pursuit of transparency and private governance frameworks, the latter being private organizations that would audit the safety and security posture of frontier AI companies, including their internal deployments.

*** 

I wrote on X that Mythos means the training wheels are coming off on AI policy. Perhaps the Department of War’s effort to strangle Anthropic is, to use another metaphor, a sign that the gloves are off too. If the last month has made anything clear, it is that we are in a nastier, sharper, harsher, meaner era of AI discourse, policy, and—ultimately—of AI development and use.

I will be honest: I do not see how it is possible for Mythos-level capabilities to diffuse through the world without causing at least some significant security crises and economic disruption. And of course, this cycle of compute infrastructure buildout has only just begun; within a year or so, gigawatts of additional AI compute capacity will be online.

The pimply and ill-shapen adolescence of AI and AI policy have come to an end. The first maturity has now begun.

by Dean W. Ball, Hyperdimensional |  Read more:
Image: via

***
Indeed, Anthropic itself has ‘slowed down AI’ in this situation, and done the closest thing we have had to a pause, by not releasing Mythos widely, and pretty much everyone agrees this was the right thing to do. Consider that we might need more similar capabilities, including more broadly.
But how long will it be before an open source version, even if somewhat inferior, is available? Will OpenAI and Google soon be showing similar capabilities? (And how will that shift the equilibrium?) Should we upgrade our estimates of the returns to investing in compute?
That depends on what counts as similar, especially with the ‘even if somewhat inferior.’ For reasonable values my guess is 1-2 years for open models in terms of absolute capabilities (by then bugs will be a lot harder to find), and on the order of months for OpenAI, and probably a few more months for Google.
How will the willingness of attackers to pay for tokens evolve, relative to the willingness of defenders to pay for tokens? Which are our softest targets?

As a side effect, will this also lead to higher economic concentration, as perhaps only the larger institutions can invest in quality patches rapidly enough?
I think this absolutely will lead to higher economic concentration, as it favors economies of scale across the board. [...]

Solve For The Equilibrium

Tyler Cowen shares a model from Jacob Gloudemans of what might happen, where vulnerabilities become much easier to find quickly, but the big problems actually go away due to the increased velocity of defenses and patching.

Rather than being able to hoard exploits everyone has to use their exploits right away or lose them, and most of the time most important actors don’t especially want to mess with any particular target, so they won’t even look for the exploits.

This model assumes good defense is being played where it counts, and that the supply of exploits is limited, and that when you catch an exploit you can defend against those who have already found it and tried to use it. I don’t think those are safe assumptions.

One also should consider the opposite scenario. Right now, an intelligence agency might find an exploit and sit on it for years, perhaps forever, because even if it normally goes unused its value at the right time is very high. But, if that exploit will not last, then they may try to use it.

Ultimately the equilibrium will still involve cyberattacks, because the correct number of cyberattacks is not zero. It might be correct to price out attacks to the point where everyone involved should have better things to do with their time, but if we collectively actually cause everyone to fully give up and go home then everyone is selfishly overinvesting in defenses, unless there is a modest cost to being fully safe. [...]

Conclusion: How To Think About Mythos

[ed. Ten points...]

Things are only going to get faster and weirder and scarier from here.

The Linguistic Foundations of Project Hail Mary


The film adaptation of Andy Weir’s novel Project Hail Mary hits general release today, March 20, and it’s great—go see it! Though a little light on the science, the movie goes hard on the relationship between schoolteacher Ryland Grace (Ryan Gosling) and an extraterrestrial named Rocky, and it’s a ride well worth taking.

But as good as it is, the movie shares a small flaw with the book: Despite having very few things in common, Grace and Rocky learn to communicate with each other extremely quickly. In fact, Grace and Rocky begin conversing in abstracts (concepts like “I like this” and “friendship”) in even less time than it takes in the book. Obviously, there are practical narrative reasons for this choice—you can’t have a good buddy movie if your buddies can’t talk to each other. It’s therefore critical to the flow of the story to get that talking happening as soon as possible, but it can still be a little jarring for the technically minded viewer who was hoping for the acquisition of language to be treated with a little more complexity.

And because this is Ars Technica, we’re doing the same thing we did when the book came out: talking with Dr. Betty Birner, a former professor of linguistics at NIU (now retired), to pick her brain about cognition, pragmatics, cooperation, and what it would actually take for two divergently evolved sapient beings not just to gesture and pantomime but to truly communicate. And this time, we’ll hear from Andy Weir, too. So buckle up, dear readers—things are gonna get nerdy.

A word about spoilers

This article assumes you’ve read Weir’s novel and that you’ve seen the movie. However, for folks who haven’t yet seen the film, I don’t think there’s much to be spoiled in terms of the language acquisition portions that we’re going to discuss—the film covers rather the same ground as the book but in a much more abbreviated way.

Still, if you want to avoid literally all spoilers, skip this article for now—at least until you’ve been to the theater!

The yawning chasm of “meaning”

Dr. Birner’s specific field of study is the science of pragmatics. “Pragmatics has to do with what I intend by what I say and what I mean in a particular context,” she explained to Ars on a Zoom call earlier this week. She elaborated by bringing up her (nonexistent) cat—the phrase “my cat” can have a multitude of meanings attached, all of which are inferred by context.

If you know Dr. Birner has a cat, her saying “my cat” could refer to that cat; if you know that she doesn’t have a cat but used to, “my cat” could refer to that cat instead, even though the semantics of the phrase “my cat” haven’t changed. That’s pragmatics, baby!

Pragmatics are particularly relevant to the Grace/Rocky language-acquisition problem because the discipline involves the creation of inferences by the listener about the speaker’s mental state and about what specific meanings the speaker implies.

But “meaning” is a fraught word here, too, because ultimately we cannot know for certain the exact meaning being implied by another person because we cannot ever truly peek inside someone else’s mind. “We are always making guesses about what our shared context is and what our shared cultural beliefs are, and, indeed, what our shared knowledge as members of the species are,” Dr. Birner continued. “And I think of this because of thumbs-up/thumbs-down.”

“The cognitive linguists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson put out a book, boy, back in the ’80s,” she said. “They talked about all of language as metaphorically built up from embodiment, our embodied experience, and our senses. So we sense up and down, and then we have this whole metaphorical notion of happy is up, so we have a thumbs up, ‘I’m feeling up today. I’m just feeling high. My spirits are lifting.’”

“Or, I can be down in the dumps,” she said. “I can be feeling low, my mood is dropping, thumbs down,’ and there’s this whole metaphorical conception. And I loved the way Project Hail Mary played with that in that Rocky didn’t share that. Rocky did not have a metaphor of ‘happy is up,’ the way Lakoff and Johnson would say we all just do.”

I asked Dr. Birner if our “up is good, down is bad” association has a biological basis in our cognition or if it’s something that has simply been shaped into a broadly shared metaphor over thousands of years of language use, and she took a moment to answer.

“That’s a really good question, and I don’t remember whether they deal with that,” she said. “But I could imagine it being biological because we start as little helpless things that can’t even stand up. And soon we stand up, we get taller, we get smarter, we get better and better the taller we get. I can actually very well imagine a biological basis for it.”

The first leap—not math, but truth

Let’s focus in on some of the specific linguistic mountains Grace and Rocky would have had to climb. The one that struck me as perhaps the most basic would be starting from pantomime and figuring out the most important thing: the twin concepts of yes and no, and the companion dualities of true/false and equal/not-equal. To me, this feels like the most mandatory of basics.

And here, perhaps, we can fall back on some good ol’ Sagan—or at least the movie version of Sagan. Dr. Birner and I (along with my colleague Jennifer Ouellette, who also hung around on the Zoom call) went back and forth for some time, but in the end, no one could really figure out a more straightforward way to demonstrate these concepts than the “primer” scene in 1997’s Contact, where the unknown alien signal is shown to contain a small grouping of symbols that appeared to represent addition, along with “equals” and “not equals” sign equivalents.

“That’s a good way to go about it, with equivalent and not-equivalent,” said Dr. Birner. “So at least you get negation, and now you can work on perceptual oppositions—up and down, black and white, loud and soft. I think that would probably be the jumping-off place for yes and no.”

Though there are linguistic biases in English and other human languages that might peek through even here—the inherent tie between “positive” (as in agreement) and “positive” (as in “this thing is good and I like it”). Careful aliens would likely want to spend a fair amount of time interrogating this bias—if it’s even visible at this point. And it likely wouldn’t be, as we haven’t built any of those syntactic bridges yet.

Pidgin? Not so fast

Getting those bridges built—going past “yes” and “no” and into some of the other basics that must be established to communicate—is not straightforward. Grace and Rocky benefit from being in a tightly constrained environment with a set of mutual problems to solve; two humans in a similar situation would likely develop a “pidgin”—an ad-hoc working language cobbled together out of components of both speakers’ languages.

But as Dr. Birner points out, true pidgin here is impossible because neither Grace nor Rocky is capable of actually producing the sounds required to speak the other’s language in the first place. “They don’t actually develop a pidgin,” she said. “They each have to learn the other’s language receptively, not productively.”

“Which is great,” she went on, “because when kids acquire language, it’s sort of a truism that reception precedes production. Every kid is going to understand more than they’re producing. Necessarily! You can’t produce what you don’t understand yet. So it makes the problem a little easier for Grace and Rocky—they don’t have to produce each other’s language, just understand it.”

Who is even there?

Grace and Rocky are lucky in that both humans and Eridians are ultimately extremely similar in their cognition and linguistics, even if their vocalizations aren’t alike. This means a lot of the mandatory requirements for conversation as we understand them are already present.

“If I encounter Rocky, I need to know, does he have a mind?” she posited. “Does he have what we call a theory of mind? Does he have a mind like mine? And does he understand that I have a mind like his, but separate? Does he understand that I can believe different things from what he believes? Can I have false beliefs? That’s all a prerequisite for communicating at all. If your mind and my mind had all the exact same stuff in it, there’d be no need to communicate.

H.P. Grice said that communication doesn’t happen without the assumption that both parties are being cooperative,” she said. The word “cooperative” here doesn’t necessarily mean that both parties are copacetic—Dr. Birner pointed out that even when people are fighting, they tend to still be cooperatively communicating. There are rules to the interaction that must be followed if one party intends to impart meaning to the other.

Beyond adherence to the cooperative principle, another bedrock of communication is the notion of symbols, the understanding that a word can represent not just an abstract concept but can actually stand in for a thing. “I can use the word mug,” explained Dr. Birner, holding up a mug, “and mean this. And you understand what I mean, and I don’t have to show you the mug every single time.”

Also on the “mandatory” list is an understanding of the concept of displacement, which Dr. Birner attributes to the researcher Charles F. Hockett. “Displacement has long been said to be solely human, though not everyone agrees with that. It’s the ability to refer to something that is distant in time or space. I can tell you that I had a bagel this morning, even though I’m not having it right now and it’s not present right here. I had it elsewhere and I had it earlier,” she said.

She continued: “There’s this wonderful article, 1979 by Michael Reddy, called ‘The Conduit Metaphor,’ where he says that we think in metaphors. And the metaphor he’s talking about is that language is a conduit, and we really just pass ideas from my brain to yours. And he says it’s a false metaphor. It’s clearly not true that that’s what happens, but we talk about it as though it does. ‘I didn’t catch your meaning,’ or ‘Give that to me again.’ We talk as though this is a thing we literally convey, and of course we don’t convey meanings. Reddy argues that the vast majority of human communication is actually miscommunication, but so trivially that we never notice.”

By way of example, she referenced her nonexistent cat again. “If I mentioned my cat, Sammy, well, you’ll have some mental image of a cat,” she said. “It almost certainly isn’t remotely like Sammy, but it doesn’t matter. I don’t need to explain everything about Sammy. If I did, the conversation would grind to a halt and you’d never interview me again. Also, I’d be violating the cooperative principle because I would be saying too much for the current context.”

Math, the universal language?

It is a common trope in science fiction—and one brought up more than once in the comments on our last article on this subject—that “math is the only universal language.” It’s a fun, pithy saying that perhaps makes mathematicians feel good about their dusty chalkboards, but at least from my knothole, it’s a false generalization because the language in which one does one’s mathematics must be settled before any mathing can happen.

“I’m not sure that even is true on Earth,” said Dr. Birner about the notion of math as universal grammar. “The concept of zero hasn’t always been around, and how much math can you do without zero? There are languages that count, “One, two, three, many,” and that’s it. And those are human languages. So to say, ‘Math is a universal language,’ I’m already not totally on board there.”

“I think math would help, but I don’t think it would get them terribly far because they need the notion of objects. They need the notion of the semiotic function, that things stand for other things.” She paused pensively, then went on. “And once they’ve got that, that there are discrete objects and we both think of the same things as discrete objects, then we can talk about counting those objects and now we’re off and running.”

Whole-object notion is another oft-overlooked component here—often referred to as the “gavagai problem.”

“You’re pointing to a rabbit, and you say, ‘gavagai!’” said Dr. Birner. “Well, does that mean ‘rabbit?’ Does that mean ‘fur?’ Does that mean ‘ears?’ Does that mean, ‘hey look?’”

Quine’s notion is that we default to a whole object. Well, does what counts as a whole object for me count as a whole object for you? Does every conceivable culture have discrete borders on objects?”

The author speaks on human-Eridian similarities

Fortunately for Grace and Rocky, humans and Eridians do have all these things in common because in the universe of Project Hail Mary, the species share a common ancestor. [...]

Weir notes that he worked through a number of the same linguistic issues that Dr. Birner and I raised as part of the story-generation process.

“Let’s say you have intelligent life on the planet,” he said. “What do you need? What does that species need to have to reach the point where they’re able to make spacecraft and fly around in space? Well, first off, you have to be a tribal thing. You can’t be loners. You can’t be like bears and tigers that don’t communicate with each other. You have to have the sense of a community or a tribe or a group or a gathering so that you can collaborate because you can specialize and do all these things. You need that.”

“Number two, you need language. One way or another, stuff from my brain has to get into your brain,” he said, echoing Dr. Birner’s note about Reddy’s conduit metaphor paper.

“Number three is you need empathy and compassion. A collection of beings altogether doesn’t work unless they actually are willing to take care of each other. And that’s not just found in humans—it’s found in primates. It’s found in wolf packs. It’s found in ants. It’s like any collectivized species has to have that trait.”

“You need to have compassion, empathy, which means putting yourself in somebody else’s situation. Compassion, empathy, language, a decent amount of intelligence, a tribal instinct, a group instinct, a society kind of building instinct,” he said. “You must, I believe, have all of those things in order to be able to make a spaceship. Any species that’s lacking any one of those won’t be able to do it. So any alien you meet in space is going to have all of those traits. The Friendly Great Filter is that any aliens you meet, I believe, have to have this concept of society, cooperation, empathy, compassion, collaboration, and so on.”

I’m here for Weir’s explanation—it works within the context of the science fiction universe we’re being presented, and Rocky and Grace need to be able to talk to each other or we don’t have a book (or a film!). But does it ring true under scrutiny? After all, even here on Earth, there is a wealth of problem-solving, tool-using creatures much more closely related than humans and Eridians with vastly different cognitive toolkits. Cephalopods (with distributed nervous systems and pseudo-autonomous arms), corvids, and cetaceans all have their own evolutionary approaches to communication. [...]

Here, Ars’ Jennifer Ouellette made an important point. “Rocky is basically a rock,” she said. “He’s not a human form, and that’s going to affect how a language, if there is one, evolves in that species—and it’s really going to impact how they communicate.”

“Yes, embodiment is a big deal in communications,” replied Dr. Birner, returning to the subject she’d brought up earlier, that the nature of our flesh-prisons inherently shapes not just how we experience the world but how we communicate. Our physical forms are the product of evolutionary pressures—they are the results of the inevitable, inscrutable dialogue between environment and organism. And the evolutionary pressures faced by Homo sapiens on Earth are vastly different from the evolutionary pressures faced by Eridians on Erid, and that same dialog on Erid led to vastly different outcomes. [...]

Friendly aliens

The most dangerous thing about communicating with aliens this way isn’t mistaking a word or two—it’s the more fundamental problem of what happens to third- and fourth-order assumptions when the foundations those assumptions are built on aren’t quite right. Sure, Grace and Rocky can agree that they are “friends,” but how do you explain “friend”?

“To be someone’s friend can mean a million things,” said Dr. Birner. “I have my best friend since high school. I consider you a friend,” she said, pointing at me through the screen, “and we’ve talked three times. My daughter, who’s now 35, has turned into my friend. What does that mean?”

Indeed, the notion of “friend” is a rough one—it’s fundamental to human interaction, and as such, it carries with it a huge number of (sometimes contradictory) behavioral expectations. When you’re explaining “friends” to an alien, how do you paint it? That you and the alien have shared interests and should therefore work together? That you are genuinely interested in the alien’s well-being? That you’d make sacrifices for them? That you’d expect them to help you haul furniture when you move?

And what assumptions might you make about the alien’s behavior once you’d declared each other “friends”? That they would make sacrifices for you? What if for the alien, the concept they’ve settled on for “friendship” means they’ll pull your limbs off when the adventure is over because that’s what friends do in their culture?

“You need societal grouping,” I supplied, “but you don’t necessarily need friends.”

“Absolutely,” she said. “And now I’m going to another work from 1982, Maltz and Borker, who looked at kids on the playground, and at that time—I think it’s changed a lot, it’s been 40-some years!—but at that time, they saw that little girls had a horizontal set of relationships. It was all friendship-based and secrets-based, and you have your best friend and then your next best friends. And little boys had a hierarchy, and your whole goal was to get higher in the hierarchy by insulting the kids above you and whacking them and try to be king of the hill.”

“Get the conch,” I joked unhelpfully.

“Yeah, exactly—get the conch. Again, cultural knowledge.”

by Lee Hutchinson, Ars Technica |  Read more:
Images: Project Hail Mary/Amazon MGM studios
[ed. I've always had a vague appreciation for linguistics (their effects on perceived reality and lately their nuances in bridging disagreements - for example, this is the second time in three days that I've heard the term gavagai). My grandson came over today and he went right to some YT videos explaining the basics of PHM's plot and science, especially how Ryland and Rocky communicated. Then we watched Ghostbusters. : )]

The Israeli Payoff

Russian political strategist Pavel Dubravsky shared a meaningful graphic: In the photo of US Congress members, those funded by the pro-Israel lobbying group AIPAC are highlighted in red. 324 of the 435 members of Congress are controlled by Israel, and this is not a conspiracy theory.

The Never-Ending Tax-Filing Con Game

This tax season, as you wade through the absurdly expensive and complicated process of filing income taxes, remember to thank the Trump administration.

Filing taxes should be really easy and completely free. It is in most other developed countries. And in 2024, the Biden administration debuted a pilot program called Direct File that could have made tax filing easy and free for most American taxpayers, too.

President Trump killed it. He has destroyed things that are more important than Direct File, but this one sticks in my craw. It was a straightforward way to make life a little better for a lot of Americans. It was a step toward the kind of easy-to-use, efficient, high-tech government services that everyone claims to want. It worked. And now it’s gone.

Almost every president since Ronald Reagan has said that the government should create a simple electronic system for filing federal income taxes. The necessary technology has existed for decades. Many developed nations operate such tax filing systems. In countries including Japan and the Netherlands, the government handles the paperwork and then provides most taxpayers with a statement for review and approval.

Americans, by contrast, spend an average of 13 hours and $290 to file.

Why? Because tax preparation companies and Republican lawmakers have a shared interest in torturing taxpayers. The companies want to ensure that Americans remain dependent on their services. The Republicans want people to hate paying taxes.

In 2024, after decades of false starts, the Biden administration mustered the courage to defy that coalition. The Direct File program started small. It was limited to taxpayers with simple returns in a handful of states, processing 140,803 returns in its first year.

The Government Accountability Office, which audited the pilot, said it was a success that should be expanded.

Last year, the number of people using the program more than doubled. It processed 296,531 returns. An internal I.R.S. report concluded that Direct File “is beloved by its users.”

Unfortunately for American taxpayers, Direct File was not beloved by the tax preparation industry. Intuit, the maker of TurboTax, which dominates the industry, collected almost $5 billion last year from Americans who sought its help to file their income tax returns. The company fought to preserve that business. The Trump administration acquiesced.

In killing the Direct File program, the administration insisted it had been little used and expensive to operate. It assured that outcome by making no effort to publicize the program in its second year. While the cost per user was high, at about $138, that would have declined as more people used the program. And no matter the number, it is a cost that should be borne by the government, not individual taxpayers.

The Trump administration says it has a better alternative: A “Free File” partnership with eight private tax preparation companies that allows some taxpayers to use basic versions of their software at no charge.

It’s a new chapter in a long-running con game. The Free File program, which dates back to 2002, allows the industry to claim that it’s possible to file taxes free while working to ensure that most people keep on paying.

The bottom 70 percent of taxpayers ranked by income are eligible to use the Free File program. That’s about 100 million households. Only about three million use it each year. Instead, every year, millions of people eligible for Free File pay to use virtually the same software from the same companies.

Intuit’s behavior has been particularly egregious. ProPublica reported in 2019 that the company had concealed the landing page for the Free File version of its product so that it was invisible to Google and other search engines. It also created a stalking horse called TurboTax: Free Edition, which pushed users to pay for add-ons. After it got caught, the company abandoned the Free File program. 

by Binyaman Applebaum, NY Times |  Read more:
Image: Jackson Gibbs
[ed. Old news, I know. The government has all the information it needs to do your taxes (or they wouldn't be able to audit you). What isn't old news (to me anyway) were the underhanded tactics Intuit used to conceal and kill free tax filing efforts. Happy Tax Day, April 15, 2026.]

Visual Cues and Valuation: Evidence from the Housing Market

 Abstract 

We examine the economic impact of non-consumable visual cues through home staging on high-stakes housing transactions. Using hand-collected listing photos for 15,777 transactions and a machine-learning algorithm to detect furniture, we provide the first large-scale evidence that staged homes sell for roughly 10% more and one week faster than comparable homes without furniture. Our pre-registered online experiment establishes causality and uncovers mechanisms. We find that furniture clarifies spatial use, while decor enhances emotional attachment, jointly driving the higher willingness-to-pay. These findings demonstrate how visual cues impact high-stakes decisions and systematically shape valuations in the largest asset market for households.

1. Introduction 

Behavioral economics has advanced significantly in demonstrating how cognitive, psychological, and emotional factors systematically influence economic decision-making (Rabin (1998), Heath et al. (1999), Rabin and Schrag (1999), Kahneman (2003), Gneezy et al. (2014), Chang et al. (2016), and Hirshleifer (2020)). Yet, many foundational models of consumer choice still presume a high degree of rationality in high-stakes environments, where the sheer magnitude of the transaction, in theory, should discipline behavior and mitigate the impact of biases. This paper examines the economic impact of nonconsumable visual cues through staging, a common practice in the U.S. housing market, on high-stakes housing transactions. 

House staging is the practice of furnishing and decorating a property for sale to create visual cues that help potential buyers imagine themselves living in the space. Importantly, the furniture and decor are classified as personal property, which consists of movable items that are typically not included in the sale unless explicitly stated in the contract. Standard asset pricing theory dictates that the value of a residential asset is a function of its fundamental hedonic characteristics (e.g., location, size, school quality, and structural condition), discounted by the user cost of capital (Sirmans et al., 2005; Poterba,  1984; Himmelberg et al., 2005). Rational agents should not price movable, non-consumable personal property (furniture and decor) into the value of the fixed asset, especially when such items convey no transactional value. However, the popularity of home staging, a common industry practice costly to the sellers or their agents, suggests a possible disconnect between theory and behavior. This disconnect gives rise to fascinating and largelyunanswered economic puzzles (Yun et al., 2021): Do homebuyers pay for things that they know they cannot consume? If so, what is the magnitude of this staging premium? In addition, what underlying mechanisms do these visual cues activate that lead to a higher willingness to pay? This paper aims to answer these questions by exploring homebuyer behavior in the largest asset market for most households. 

Deviations from rational valuation can carry substantial financial consequences in the context of home buying. For the average U.S. household, purchasing a home is arguably the most significant financial decision: Zillow Home Value Index (ZHVI), a measure of the typical home value in the U.S., has grown to over $357,000 in the second half of 2022. The housing market also features high transaction costs, infrequent purchases, and the involvement of professional intermediaries such as real estate agents. These characteristics are commonly believed to mitigate the impact of behavioral biases. Hence, the housing market offers a real-world laboratory for testing the limits of market efficiency and rational decision-making. 

An ideal experiment to establish the causal effect of house staging on prices would be to compare two identical houses in the same location: one staged and the other empty. Such an experiment would eliminate the confounding effect of location and unobserved house quality, allowing us to isolate the effect of staging on house prices. However, conducting such an experiment in a real-world natural setting is both financially and logistically prohibitive, if not impossible. One useful alternative that may convincingly approximate this experiment is to follow the historical transactions of each house and compare transactions with staged houses to empty ones, holding location and unobserved house quality constant. In particular, if prices are driven purely by location and unobserved differences in house quality, staging should have no effect on prices. In this paper, we start with the real-world transaction data by hand-collecting house listing images associated with each transaction for a set of houses across the U.S.3 We then complement our empirical analysis with an incentivized and preregistered randomized controlled trial (RCT) to disentangle the underlying mechanisms.

by Puja Bhattacharya, Sherry Xin Li, Yvonne Yu Wang, Cedric Wu, Xiang Zheng, SSRN | Read more (pdf):
[ed. Funny, I was always told the opposite - that potential buyers wanted open space to imagine their own living arrangements.]

What is Populism Actually Good For?

Why does yelling about “corrupt elites” seem to work in politics? From Donald Trump to Viktor Orbán to Marine Le Pen, politicians who rail against the establishment and claim to speak for “the real people” keep winning elections. The populist playbook, us versus them, the pure people against the rotten elite, appears to be one of the most effective strategies in modern democratic politics. But what if it isn’t?

I’ve spent the better part of a decade studying populist rhetoric with my co-author Yaoyao Dai, now at the University of Pittsburgh. We just published our third and latest paper on the topic, and I thought this was a good moment to reflect on what our research program has found. The short version: populism’s power is real, but much more limited than most people assume. And the reasons why it works are not what you’d expect.

What we mean by populism

Before getting into the findings, a quick definition. Political scientists generally follow Cas Mudde’s influential framework, which defines populism not as a full political program but as a simple worldview (or what Mudde calls a “thin ideology”). This worldview is based on three pillars: people-centrism (politics should reflect the will of “the people”), anti-pluralism (there is one authentic popular will, not many competing interests), and moralized anti-elitism (elites are not merely wrong but evil). This is what scholars call “thin” populism because it doesn’t tell you much about actual policy. A left-wing populist like Hugo Chávez and a right-wing populist like Trump share the same rhetorical structure, the people versus the elite, but disagree on virtually everything else.

This distinction between populism and its “host ideology” (the actual policy positions a politician holds) turns out to be crucial. Because when you peel them apart, something surprising emerges.

When politicians gamble on populism

Our first paper, “When Do Politicians Use Populist Rhetoric?“ published in Political Communication in 2022, asked a deceptively simple question: if populist rhetoric is so effective, why don’t all politicians use it all the time?

To answer this, we built the most comprehensive corpus of U.S. presidential campaign speeches at the time: 4,314 speeches from 1952 to 2016. We used a novel text analysis method combining active learning and word embeddings to measure how much populist rhetoric each candidate employed across the campaign trail. I (Alex) should say, thanks to the prowess of Yaoyao, we did all that fancy text analysis stuff before it was cool and before LLMs were even around.

The pattern was striking. Candidates who were trailing in the polls consistently used more populist rhetoric, regardless of whether they were Republicans or Democrats, incumbents or challengers. Populism, we argued, is a gamble: a high-risk, high-variance strategy that trailing candidates adopt because conventional campaigning isn’t working. If you’re already behind, why not shake things up?

Think of it like a football team that’s losing in the fourth quarter. You start throwing long passes not because they have a higher expected value, but because safe plays guarantee you lose. Barry Goldwater, George McGovern, and Donald Trump (in 2016, when most polls had him behind) all fit this pattern. They reached for populist rhetoric when they had little to lose.

The (in)effectiveness of populist rhetoric

But does the gamble actually pay off? Our second paper, published in Political Science Research and Methods in 2024, tested this directly with a survey experiment.

We presented U.S. respondents with pairs of realistic campaign messages from hypothetical primary candidates. The messages varied on two dimensions: populist features (people-centric language, anti-elite attacks, anti-pluralist framing) and substantive policy positions (on immigration and other issues). This design let us isolate the effect of populist rhetoric from the underlying policy content, something that is nearly impossible to do when observing real elections, where populism and policy positions come bundled together.

The result was unambiguous: none of the populist features had an independent effect on candidate choice. Not people-centrism, not anti-elitism, not anti-pluralism. Not individually, and not in combination. What did matter, enormously, were policy positions that aligned with voters’ own preferences. Voters chose candidates based on what they promised to do, not on how dramatically they framed the conflict between the people and the elite.

This finding is consistent with other experimental work. When researchers across multiple countries carefully separate populist style from policy substance, the style itself contributes very little to voter decisions.

So: if populist rhetoric doesn’t actually persuade voters, why does it seem to work? Why do populist candidates keep winning?

What populism is actually good for

This puzzle motivated our newest paper, our first ever registered report (where scholars publicly specify their hypotheses before running their experiment), now published at Research & Politics. We hypothesized that populism’s real contribution might not be persuasion but mobilization: getting people who already agree with you to actually show up and vote.

Previous studies, including our own, used what’s called a “forced choice” conjoint experimental design: respondents had to pick one candidate or the other. But in real elections, people can also stay home. To capture this, we ran a large-scale, preregistered survey experiment that added an “abstain” option, a seemingly small change that turns out to matter a lot.

What did we find? First, the basic persuasion result replicated: policy positions still dwarfed populist rhetoric in driving vote choice. Having a policy-congruent candidate increased the probability of voting by a massive 27 percentage points. Populist rhetoric, by contrast, had no meaningful persuasion effect.

But here is the twist: populist rhetoric did have a small but statistically significant mobilization effect. Having at least one populist candidate in a race was associated with a ~1.5 percentage point decrease in abstention. The effect was concentrated among voters who already held populist attitudes and encountered a candidate whose policy positions they liked. In other words, populist rhetoric didn’t convert skeptics; it energized true believers to get off the couch.

by Alexander Kustov and Yaoyao Dai, Popular by Design |  Read more:
Image: uncredited