Interstellar Space Travel Will Never, Ever Happen

1. Every sci-fi space opera is based on literal magic

The fact that travel to another solar system is basically impossible has been written about in excruciating detail by much smarter people (including this article and this one, I thought this was also good). It’s easy to get bogged down in the technical details (it’s rocket science) so I’ll try to bring this down to my own level of understanding, of an unremarkable man who got a Broadcasting degree from Southern Illinois University:

First of all, it turns out that the ships in Star Trek, Star Wars, Dune etc. are not based on some kind of hypothetical technology that could maybe exist someday with better energy sources and materials (as I had thought). In every case, their tech is the equivalent of just having Albus Dumbledore in the engine room cast a teleportation spell. Their ships skip the vast distances of space entirely, arriving at their destinations many times faster than light itself could have made the trip. Just to be clear, there is absolutely no remotely possible method for doing this, even on paper.

“Well, science does the impossible all the time!” some of you say, pointing out that no one 200 years ago could have conceived of landing a rover on Mars. But I’m saying that expecting science to develop real warp drives, hyperspace or wormhole travel is asking it to utterly break the fundamental laws of the universe, no different than expecting to someday have a time machine, or a portal to a parallel dimension. These are plot devices, not science. (...)

I’m sure some of you think I’m exaggerating, and maybe I am, but keep in mind…

2. We all think space is roughly a billion times smaller than it actually is

The reason space operas rely on literal magic to make their plots work is that there is no non-magic way to get over the fact that stars are way, way farther apart than the average person understands. Picture in your mind the distance between earth and Proxima Centauri, the next closest star. Okay, now mentally multiply that times one billion and you’re probably closer to the truth. “But I can’t mentally picture one billion of anything!” I know, that’s the point. The concept of interstellar travel as it exists in the public imagination is based entirely on that public being physically incapable of understanding the frankly absurd distances involved.

When you hear that the next star is 4.25 light years away, that doesn’t sound that far—in an average sci-fi TV show, that trip would occur over a single commercial break. But that round trip is 50 trillion miles. I realize that’s a number so huge as to be meaningless, so let’s break it down:

Getting a human crew to the moon and back was a gigantic pain in the ass and that round trip is about half a million miles, it takes a week or so. The reason we haven’t yet set foot on Mars despite having talked about it constantly for decades is because that trip—which is practically next door in space terms—is the equivalent of going to the moon and back six hundred fucking times in a row without stopping. The round trip will take three years. It will cost half a trillion dollars or more. But of course it will; all of the cutting-edge tech on the spacecraft has to work perfectly for three straight years with no external support whatsoever. There will be no opportunity to stop for repair, there can be no surprises about how the equipment or the astronauts hold up for 300 million miles in the harshest conditions imaginable (and the radiation alone is a nightmare).

Okay, well, the difference between the Mars trip and a journey to the next closest star is roughly the difference between walking down the block to your corner store and walking from New York City to Sydney, Australia. Making it to Proxima Centauri would be like doing that Mars trip, which is already a mind-boggling technical challenge that we’re not even sure is worth doing, about 170,000 times in a row without stopping. At current spaceship speeds, it would take half a million motherfucking years. That is, a hundred times longer than all of human recorded history.

I’m grossly oversimplifying the math but, if anything, those numbers still downplay the difficulty. To get the trip down to a single human lifetime, you’d need to get a ship going so absurdly fast that the physics challenges become ludicrous. In the hopelessly optimistic scenario that we could get something going a tenth of the speed of light (that is, thousands of times faster than our Mars ship, or anything that we even kind of know how to build), that means running into a piece of space debris the size of a grain of sand would impact the hull with the force of a nuclear explosion.

And that’s still a round trip of over 80 years, so this would be a one-way suicide mission for the astronauts. This is a spacecraft that must contain everything the crew could possibly need over the course of their entire lives. So we’re talking about an enormous ship (which would be 99.99% fuel storage), with decades’ worth of groceries, spare parts, clothes, medical supplies and anything they could possibly need for any conceivable failure scenario, plus a life support system that basically mimics earth in every way (again, with enough redundancies and backups to persist through every possible disaster). Getting something that big going that fast would require far more energy than the total that our civilization has ever produced. And if anything goes wrong, there would be no rescue.

All of that, just for . . . what? To say we did it?

Now, we could definitely send an unmanned probe there to take pictures. They’re tiny by comparison, you can get them going much faster without squishing the crew and you don’t have to worry about bringing them back. It’s the difference between trying to jump over the Grand Canyon versus just shooting a bullet across it. But unmanned probes aren’t the fantasy.

3. Every proposed solution to the above problems is utterly ridiculous

“What about putting the crew in suspended animation?” you ask. “Like in the Alien franchise. Ripley was adrift in her hypersleep pod for half a century and she didn’t age a day! You wouldn’t need to store all that food, air and water and it’s fine if the trip takes longer than a lifetime!”

See, this is what drives me crazy about this subject, we keep mistaking slapdash tropes invented by sci-fi writers for actual plausible science. I mean, think about what we’re saying here: “Crews could survive the long trip if we just invent human immortality.”

You’re talking about a pod that can just magically halt the aging process. And as depicted, it is magic; these people are emerging from their years-long comas (during which they were not eating or drinking) with no wrinkles, brain damage, muscle atrophy, or bedsores. Their hair doesn’t even grow. The only way that could happen is if the pods literally freeze time, like goddamned Zack Morris on Saved by the Bell. It’s as scientific as showing the astronauts drinking a magic potion that grants eternal youth, brewed from unicorn tears.

“What about generation ships,” you say, “I’ve read sci-fi novels where they set up a whole society on a ship with the idea that it will be their great-grandchildren who will reach the destination and establish a colony!”

Okay, now you’re just pissing me off. You’re talking about an act that would get everyone involved put in front of a tribunal. What happens when the first generation born on the ship finds out they’ve been doomed to live their entire lives imprisoned on this cramped spacecraft against their will?

Imagine them all hitting their teen years and fully realizing they’ve been severed from the rest of humanity, cut off from all of the pleasures of both nature and civilization. These middle generations won’t even have the promise of seeing the destination; they will live and die with only the cold blackness of space outside their windows. They will never take a walk through the woods, never swim in a lake, never sit on a beach, or breathe fresh air, or meet their extended families. They will not know what it is to travel to a new city or eat at a fancy restaurant or have any of the careers depicted in their media about Earth. They will have no freedom whatsoever, not even to raise their children the way they want—the mission will require them to work specific jobs and breed specific offspring that can fill specific roles. They will live knowing their parents deprived them of absolutely everything good about the human experience, without their consent, before they were even born.

If you’re insisting this could be figured out somehow, that the future will come up with a special system of indoctrination that will guarantee there are no mutinies, riots, crimes or weird cults, just think about what you’re saying here: “We can make this work if we just solve literally all of the flaws in human psychology, morality and socialization.”

by Jason Pargin, Newsletter |  Read more:

Image: Star Wars

[ed. But...but, Elon said..]

I Taught an Octopus to Play Piano in 6 Months

via: YouTube
[ed. It's been said that if there are intelligent aliens on earth, octopuses are probably the best candidates. Too bad they're so tasty.]

Tequila Wars: 100 Percent Should Mean 100 Percent

[ed. Costco, Kendall Jenner, Diego Corp (Don Julio, Casamigos, etc.) others accused of selling adulterated tequila.]

Mexico City— At an October 16 press conference, Remberto Galván Cabrera announced that four additional tequila brands have failed the purity test. According to Galván, these major brands are masquerading as premium 100% agave tequila, but are actually adulterated with industrial cane alcohol. He has the lab tests to prove it. And no, he’s not talking about Don Julio, Casamigos, Cincoro, or 818, which have been slapped with class action lawsuits for allegedly selling adulterated tequila in the US.

If you’ve been following this unfolding drama, you may remember that Galván is a spokesperson for agave farmers (currently Agaveros de la Agroindustria del Tequila) who have been protesting industry corruption and unfair practices for over a year.

 

In September, Galván lodged a formal complaint with the government, demanding a criminal investigation of the CRT, the organization that regulates the tequila industry. The CRT is tasked with ensuring that all tequila meets legal standards, but Galván alleges that the organization is instead profiting from authorizing the sale of adulterated tequila. Galván traveled to the neighboring state of Guanajuato to request the investigation. His home state of Jalisco is the stronghold of the CRT, which influences local politics.

“The CRT certifies a product as 100% agave when it isn’t,” Galván stated, “With these tests, we prove it. The organization acts as a monopoly that favors industrialists, marginalizes small producers, and puts public health at risk.”

The CRT is a nonprofit “interprofessional organization” that supposedly represents all players in the tequila industry–including agave farmers. In October of 2024, a coalition of agaveros challenged this claim. The price of agave had dropped from 32 pesos a kilo (in 2018) to just one peso a kilo, and the farmers had a litany of complaints. They alleged that the drop in prices wasn’t just the same old boom and bust cycle that had plagued agave farmers for years. At a protest outside of CRT headquarters in Zapopan, Jalisco, agaveros sounded the alarm, alleging that the CRT was colluding with major tequila companies to drive down agave prices and squeeze out small farmers. 

Curious to know more about the source of this unrest, I sought out Remberto Galván Cabrera. He was loquacious, passionate, and hellbent to expose the alleged corruption. Much of what he said seemed plausible. The idea of corporations colluding to screw over farmers? Sure. The agaveros’ accusation that a regulatory body (the CRT) was corrupt? Certainly possible. His allegation that giant corporations were breaking international laws to adulterate their supposedly premium tequilas? That was harder to swallow. I couldn’t understand why they would take such a giant risk when it would be relatively easy to prove that a tequila was corrupted. Galván assured me there was evidence, but he wasn’t ready to release it. Fast forward about a year…

Since we first broke the story of the allegations in January of 2025, the drama has escalated. Galván was kidnapped and beaten. His phone and paperwork were stolen. Two leaders in the movement, Julián Rodríguez Parra and Salvador Ibarra Landeros, were arrested and jailed. I received veiled threats. The agaveros continued to stage protests.

Casamigos, Don Julio, Cincoro, and 818 accused of selling fake tequila

Although the protesting agaveros were making a lot of noise, the story wasn’t picked up by major news sources until May 5, 2025, when we reported that a class action lawsuit had been filed in New York against liquor giant Diageo. The lawsuit alleges that two Diageo tequilas, Casamigos and Don Julio, were adulterated with industrial alcohol. Diageo refuted the allegations stating, “All Casamigos and Don Julio tequilas labelled as ‘100% agave’ are made from 100% blue weber agave. We will vigorously defend the quality and integrity of our tequilas in court, and against anyone who is spreading misinformation and lies about our products.”

On July 4, another class action lawsuit was filed in California, opening the field of plaintiffs to anyone in the US who had bought Don Julio or Casamigos products. Since then, additional tequila brands have been slapped with lawsuits, including Kendall Jenner’s 818 tequila. In a case filed in Florida, the plaintiffs accuse 818 of knowingly selling adulterated tequila.

According to the September 23 filing, “Defendants actively concealed and misrepresented the true nature of how their Products were manufactured and composition of their Products. Indeed, Defendants concealed and misrepresented that they had in fact utilized sugars other than those obtained from the tequilana weber blue variety of agave to enhance their tequila, despite the Products being labeled as 100% agave azul.” (...)

So how bad is the adulterated “tequila”?

“The four samples we analyzed were adulterated with cheap cane alcohol,” Galván says. “Two samples weren’t even recognized as mixto tequila, meaning they have 33% agave sugars or less. The other two barely reached 51% agave.” He notes that one sample also had unsafe levels of methanol–a factor the CRT supposedly monitors.

We contacted the CRT for comment but have not yet received a reply. They have declined our previous request.

The numbers Galván lists are consistent with the test results cited in the California class action lawsuit, which was filed on July 4 by Baron & Budd in conjunction with Hagens Berman, who were responsible for the first class action lawsuit in New York.

According to the legal team, tests revealed that Casamigos Blanco contains approximately 33% agave-derived alcohol. Supposedly, Don Julio Blanco is 42% agave, while their pricey 1942 Añejo contains just 33% agave. As the complaint summarizes, “These findings directly contradict the prominent ‘100% Agave’ labels on Diageo Premium tequila products and confirm that Diageo’s representations are materially false and misleading.”

by Felisa Rogers, Mezcalitas |  Read more:

Image: via

[ed. See also: Costco implicated in adulterated tequila scandal; and, Tequila test results revealed, death threats, and other breaking news (Mezcalitas):]

***

Since we last reported on the tequila adulteration scandal, A LOT has happened. To make sense of it, I’ve created a timeline of recent revelations, followed by my takeaways and a chilling message from the man who has risked everything to bring this story to light. (...)

My takeaways…

At this point, it’s challenging to track all these law suits, law firms, and formal complaints. Meanwhile, we wonder why this story isn’t receiving more attention in the mainstream press. (...)

We continued to cover the protests and negotiations, but the allegations of adulterated tequila didn’t gain traction until May, when we reported that a major law firm was bringing a class action lawsuit against Diageo, the parent company of Casamigos and Don Julio, for allegedly selling adulterated tequila masquerading as a 100% agave premium product. Our story was picked up by Reuters, trade publications, and other outlets. The scandal has since snowballed into more lawsuits, outraged declarations of innocence, and a whole lot of speculation.

But to me, the agaveros are still at the heart of this drama. In a nutshell: this is a story about giant corporations allegedly colluding with a regulatory agency to improve their profit margins. By allegedly adulterating tequila with industrial alcohol, these players are devaluing the price of agave. This is unfair to both the agaveros and the legitimate distillers who are still making real tequila with care and at much greater cost.

It’s also a tale of courage in the face of enormous danger. Since beginning this crusade, Remberto Galván has been abducted and beaten. Two other agavero leaders, Julián Rodríguez and Salvador Ibarra, were arrested for protesting outside of the Sauza distillery and held in jail for 72 days. We are seriously concerned for the safety of everyone who continues to speak out on this issue.

Galván says that he and his associates have received threatening anonymous phone calls. According to Galván, he was told that if doesn’t back down, his body parts will be strewn around his home.

But the alleged intimidation goes beyond death threats. According to Galván, his own distillery, La Alborada, was targeted. He says a friend and colleague was pressured to plant adulterated tequila on the premises.

This appears to be a theme. Galván, a crusader against adulterated tequila, may be charged with adulterating tequila. Julián Rodríguez, an advocate for the rights of farmers, was charged with extortion and intimidation of Sauza for engaging in a peaceful protest outside the entrance of their distillery.

Galván fears for his life. He asked us to put this in the public record.

Federal Funding Cuts Cancelled 383 Active Clinical Trials, Dumping Over 74K Participants

When the Trump administration brutally cut federal funding for biomedical research earlier this year, at least 383 clinical trials that were already in progress were abruptly cancelled, cutting off over 74,000 trial participants from their experimental treatments, monitoring, or follow-ups, according to a study published today in JAMA Internal Medicine.

The study, led by researchers at Harvard, fills a knowledge gap of how the Trump administration’s research funding cuts affected clinical trials specifically. It makes clear not just the wastefulness and inefficiency of the cuts but also the deep ethical violations, JAMA Internal Medicine editors wrote in an accompanying editor’s note.

In March, the National Institutes of Health, under the control of the Trump administration, announced that it would cancel $1.8 billion in grant funding that wasn’t aligned with the administration’s priorities. The Harvard researchers, led by health care policy expert Anupam Jena, used an NIH database and a federal accountability tracking tool to find grants supporting clinical trials that were active as of February 28 but had been terminated by August 15.

During that time, there were 11,008 trials funded and in various stages. Of those, 383 were terminated. Some cancelled trials were still in early phases before recruiting participants (14 percent), some were in the process of recruiting participants and hadn’t yet fully begun (34.5 percent), a sliver were enrolling participants by invitation (3.4 percent), and some were completed (36 percent). Then there were the trials that were in progress—active, no longer recruiting—about 11 percent, 43 trials. In this stage, participants were in the process of receiving interventions. In the 43 trials, there were 74,311 trial participants collectively.

Of the 383 cancelled trials, 118 (31 percent) were for cancers, 97 (25 percent) were for infectious diseases, 48 (12.5 percent) were for reproductive health, and 47 (12 percent) were for mental health.

by Beth Mole, Ars Technica |  Read more:

Image: Mayo clinic via

A House of Dynamite Conversation

At one point in Kathryn Bigelow’s new film, A House of Dynamite, Captain Olivia Walker (played by Rebecca Ferguson) is overseeing the White House Situation Room as a single nuclear-armed missile streaks toward the American heartland. Amid tense efforts to intercept the missile, Walker finds a toy dinosaur belonging to her young son in her pocket. In that moment, the heartbreak and terror of the less-than-20-minute countdown to impact all but overwhelm Walker—and I suspect many who have watched the film in theaters. Suddenly, the stakes are clear: All the young children, all their parents, all the animals on the planet face extinction. Not as a vague possibility or a theoretical concept debated in policy white papers, not as something that might happen sometime, but as unavoidable reality that is actually happening. Right now.

In the pantheon of movies about nuclear catastrophe, the emotional power of A House of Dynamite is rivalled, to my way of thinking, only by Fail Safe, in which Henry Fonda, as an American president, must drop the bomb on New York City to atone for a mistaken US attack on Moscow and stave off all-out nuclear war. The equally relentless scenario for A House of Dynamite is superficially simple: A lone intercontinental ballistic missile is identified over the western Pacific, heading for somewhere in mid-America. Its launch was not seen by satellite sensors, so it’s unclear what country might have initiated the attack. An effort to shoot down the missile fails, despite the best efforts of an array of earnest military and civilian officials, and it becomes clear that—barring a technological malfunction of the missile’s warhead—Chicago will be obliterated. The United States’ response to the attack could well initiate worldwide nuclear war.

The emotional effectiveness of Bigelow’s film stems partly from its tripartite structure—the story is told three times, from three different points of view, each telling adding to and magnifying the others—partly from solid acting performances by a relatively large ensemble of actors, and not inconsequentially from details like the dinosaur. The film is in one sense a thriller, full of rising tension driven by a terrifying deadline. In a larger sense, it is a tragedy for each of the dedicated public servants trying to stave off the end of the world, and in that sense, it’s a tragedy for all of us to contemplate seriously.

I spoke with Bigelow and Noah Oppenheim, who wrote the screenplay for the film, last week, ahead of its debut on Netflix tomorrow. It opened widely in US theaters earlier in the month, which is why I’ve made no attempt to avoid spoilers in the following interview, which has been edited and condensed for readability. If you don’t already know that A House of Dynamite ends ambiguously, without explicitly showing whether Chicago and the world are or are not destroyed, you do now. (...)

Mecklin

I found the movie very effective, but I was curious about the decision not to have a depiction of nuclear effects on screen. There weren’t bombs blowing up. The movie had what some people say is an ambiguous ending. You don’t really know what followed. Why no explosions?

Bigelow

I felt like the fact that the bomb didn’t go off was an opportunity to start a conversation. With an explosion at the end, it would have been kind of all wrapped up neat, and you could point your finger [and say] “it’s bad that happened.” But it would sort of absolve us, the human race, of responsibility. And in fact, no, we are responsible for having created these weapons, and in a perfect world, getting rid of them.

Mecklin

So, do you have a different answer to that, Noah?

Noah Oppenheim

No, I don’t. I think that is the answer. I think if I were to add anything, it would only be that I do think audiences are numb to depictions of widespread destruction at this point. I mean, we’ve come off of years of comic book movies in which major cities have been reduced to rubble as if it were nothing. I think we just chose to take a different approach to trying to capture what this danger is.

Bigelow

And to stimulate a conversation. With an ambiguous ending, you walk out of the theater thinking, “Well, wait a minute.” It sort of could be interpreted, the film, as a call to action.

Mecklin

Within the expert community, the missile defense part of the movie is being discussed. It isn’t a surprise to them, or me, that missile defense is less than perfect. Some of them worry that this depiction in the movie will impel people to say, “Oh, we need better missile defense. We should build Golden Dome, right?” What do you feel about that? Kathryn first.

Bigelow

I think that’s kind of a misnomer. I think, in fact, if anything, we realize we’re not protected, we’re not safe. There is no magic situation that’s going to save the day. I’m sure you know a lot more about this, and Noah knows a lot more than I do, but from my cursory reading, you could spend $300 billion on a missile defense system, and it’s still not infallible. That is not, in my opinion, a smart course of action.

Mecklin

Noah, obviously you have talked to experts and read a lot about, in general, the nuclear threat, but also missile defense. How did you know to come up with, whatever, 61 percent [effectiveness of US missile interceptors]?

Oppenheim

That came directly from one of the tests that had been done on our current ground-based intercept system. Listen, as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, it would obviously be better if we had more effective defense systems. But I think that the myth of a perfect missile defense system has given a lot of people false comfort over the years. In many ways, it appears to be an easier solution to chase. Right? How can we possibly eliminate the nuclear problem? So instead, maybe we can build an impenetrable shield that we can all retreat under.

But I think that there’s no such thing as an impenetrable shield at the end of the day, or at least not one that we’ve been able to build thus far. And from all of my conversations with people who work in missile defense—and again, I think we all are aligned and hoping that those systems could be improved—but I think that those folks are the first to acknowledge that it is a really hard physics problem at the end of the day that we may never be able to solve perfectly.

And so we do need to start looking at the other piece of this, which is the size of the nuclear stockpile. And how can we reduce the number of weapons that exist in the world, and how can we reduce the likelihood that they’re ever used?

Mecklin

Before I go on to other things, I wanted to give you the opportunity to name check any particular experts you consulted who helped you with thinking about or writing the movie.

Oppenheim

It’s a long list. I don’t know Kathryn—do you want to talk about Dan Karbler, who worked in missile defense for STRATCOM?

Bigelow

Go for it.

Oppenheim

So, we had a three-star general who came up in the missile defense field and actually has two kids whom he talks about, who also now work in missile defense, as well. We spoke to people who’ve worked in senior roles at the Pentagon, at the CIA, at the White House. We had STRATCOM officers on set almost every day that we were shooting those sequences. And then we relied upon the incredible body of work that folks who work in the nuclear field have been amassing for years. I mean, we talk a lot about the fact that the nuclear threat has fallen out of focus for a long time for the general public. But there is this incredible community of policy experts and journalists who’ve never stopped thinking about it, worrying about it, analyzing it.

And so whether it’s somebody like [the late Princeton researcher and former missileer] Bruce Blair or a journalist like Garrett Graff, who has written about continuity of government protocol, or Fred Kaplan and his book The Bomb—there’s a terrific library of resources that people can turn to.

Mecklin

I have found in my job that nuclear types—nuclear experts, journalists—are very picky. And I’m just curious: Generally with this kind of thing, trying to be a very technically accurate movie, inevitably you get people saying: “Oh, you got this little thing wrong. You got that little thing wrong.” Have you had anything like that that you’d want to talk about?

Bigelow

Actually, on the contrary, just yesterday in The Atlantic, Tom Nichols wrote a piece on the movie, and he said, you would think there might be some discrepancies, you would think there might be some inaccurate details, but according to him, and he’s very steeped in this space, it’s relatively accurate through and through. And it raises the need for a conversation about the fact that there are all these weapons in the world. (...)

Mecklin

I’m going to ask sort of a craft question. The narrative of the movie is telling essentially the same story three times from different points of view. And I’d just like to hear both of you talk about why and the challenges of doing that. Because the second, third time through—hey, maybe people get bored and walk out of the movie.

Bigelow

They don’t seem to.

I was interested in doing this story in real time, but of course, it takes 18, 19, minutes for that missile to impact, which would not be long enough for a feature film. But also, it’s not the same story, because you’re looking at it from different perspectives. You’re looking at it from the missile defense men at Ft. Greely. Then you’re looking at it from the White House Situation Room, where they need to get the information up to the president as quickly and as comprehensively as possible. And then you’re looking at it through STRATCOM, which is the home of the nuclear umbrella. And then, of course, finally, the Secretary of Defense and the president. So each time you’re looking at it through a different set of parameters.

Mecklin

And was that a difficult thing for you, Noah, in terms of writing it? There’s got to be the narrative thing that keeps people watching, right?

Oppenheim

First, as Kathryn mentioned, trying to give the audience a visceral understanding of how short a period of time something like this would unfold in was really important. But during that incredibly short period of time, the number of moving parts within the government and within our military are vast, and so I actually looked at it as an opportunity, right? Because there’s so much going on in various agencies—at Greeley, at STRATCOM, at the Pentagon, the situation in the Situation Room—and so you have the chance to kind of layer the audience’s understanding with each retelling. Because the first time you experience it, I think it’s just overwhelming, just making sense of it all. And then the second and third time, you’re able to appreciate additional nuance and deepen your understanding of the challenge that our policymakers and military officers would face. And I think the weight of that just accumulates over the course of the film, when you realize what we would be confronting if this were to happen.

by John Mecklin, with Kathryn Bigelow and Noah Oppenheim, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |  Read more:

Image: Eros Hoagland/Netflix © 2025.

[ed. See also: How to understand the ending of ‘A House of Dynamite’; and, for a realistic scenario of what a nuclear strike might look like: The “House of Dynamite” sequel you didn’t know you needed (BotAS):]

***

If we pick up where A House of Dynamite ends, the story becomes one of devastation and cascading crises. Decades of modeling and simulations based on the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki help us understand the immediate and longer-term effects of a nuclear explosion. But in today’s deeply interconnected world, the effects of a nuclear attack would be far more complex and difficult to predict.

Let us assume that the missile carried a several-hundred-kiloton (kt) nuclear warhead—many times more powerful than the 15-kt bomb the United States used to destroy Hiroshima—and detonated directly above Chicago’s Loop, the dense commercial and financial core of the nation’s third-largest city.

What would ensue in the seconds, minutes, days, and months that follow, and how far would the effects ripple across the region, nation, and beyond?

The first seconds and minutes: detonation

At 9:51 a.m., without warning, the sky flashes white above Chicago. A fireball hotter than the surface of the sun engulfs the Loop, releasing a powerful pulse of heat, light, and x-rays. In less than a heartbeat, everyone within half a square mile—from commuters to children, doctors, and tourists—is vaporized instantly. Every building simply vanishes.

A shockwave expands outward faster than the speed of sound, flattening everything within roughly one mile of ground zero, including the Riverwalk, the Bean, Union Station, most of Chicago’s financial district, and the Jardine Water Purification Plant—which supplies drinking water to more than five million people. People are killed by debris and collapsing buildings. The city’s power, transport, communications, and water systems fail simultaneously. Major hospitals responsible for the city’s emergency and intensive care are destroyed.

Two miles from the epicenter, residential and commercial buildings in the West Loop, South Loop, and River North neighborhoods are heavily damaged or leveled. Debris blocks the streets and fires spread as gas lines rupture and wood and paper burn.

Anybody outside or near windows in at least a four-mile radius suffers third-degree burns from thermal radiation within milliseconds of the detonation. Those “lucky” enough to survive the initial blast absorb a dose of radiation about 800 times higher than the average annual exposure for Americans, causing severe radiation sickness that will likely be fatal within days or weeks.

The blast may have produced a localized electromagnetic pulse, frying electronics and communication technologies in the vicinity of the explosion. If not already physically destroyed, Chicago’s electric grid, telecom networks, and computer systems are knocked offline, complicating response efforts.

In less than 10 minutes, 350,000 people are dead and more than 200,000 are injured. Much of Chicago is destroyed and beyond recognition.

The first hours and days: fallout

Then, there is fallout. The intense heat vaporizes microscopic particles, including dust, soil, concrete, ash, debris, and radioactive materials, and lifts them into the atmosphere, forming the infamous mushroom cloud. As the wind carries these particles, they fall back to the earth, contaminating people, animals, water, and soil.

The direction and speed of the wind over Chicago can vary, making fallout inherently unpredictable. Assuming the region’s prevailing westerly winds push the cloud eastward, fallout descends on Lake Michigan—the largest public drinking water source in the state, serving approximately 6.6 million residents.

At average wind speeds, radiation that travels roughly 40 to 50 miles of the plume is immediately lethal to anyone outdoors. More than a hundred miles downwind, the intensity of exposure inflicts severe radiation sickness. Contamination from longer-lived isotopes would reach even further, poisoning Michigan’s robust agriculture and dairy industry and contaminating milk, meat, and grains.

Back in the city, the destruction of critical infrastructure triggers a chain of systemic failures, paralyzing emergency response. Tens of thousands of survivors suffer from deep burns, requiring urgent care. With only twenty Level I-burn centers in the state and scores of medical personnel among the injured or killed, this capacity amounts to a drop in an ocean of suffering. The city’s health system, among the most advanced in the world, has effectively collapsed. Suburban hospitals are quickly inundated, forced to focus on those most likely to live.

Getting Jacked Is Simple

It’s actually really simple to get jacked. That’s not to say it’s easy- just that the complexity of the challenge is trivial, requiring only time and energy to succeed.

Now, you’re probably raising your eyebrows at this claim. Everywhere you look, there are personal trainers, fitness influencers, nutritionists, and even exercise scientists with conflicting information. Go to any gym, and you’ll see different people doing wildly different exercise routines. Surely, that implies building muscle is a complicated subject? Well, no. For 2 reasons:

1. The fitness industry thrives on misinformation, because all the money is made in selling supplements, accessories, and ‘personal training expertise’ that have no scientific legitimacy

2. Most people are cognitive misers who actively avoid mentally demanding tasks and refuse to read anything academic

The result is a very large proportion of fitness enthusiasts have essentially no idea what they’re doing, and even the somewhat knowledgeable ones are still full of misinformation. So, how do we cut through the noise?

Getting Jacked

Think of getting jacked as something like this formula:

GettingJacked = Time * (0.6x + 0.3y + 0.1z)

X is your adherence to primary concepts, y is your adherence to secondary concepts, and z is your adherence to tertiary concepts. Primary and secondary concepts are a collection of just a handful of relatively simple ideas that require little financial investment. If you just focused on these, you would find getting jacked to be relatively straightforward. But tertiary concepts, predominantly supplements, are innumerable, complex, and require tons of money.

The entire fitness industry is built around obfuscation such that the tertiary concepts can be promoted and sold. And it works wonderfully for making money- but terribly for our motivation to actually get into the gym and train properly.

The paradox of choice is a concept introduced by psychologist Barry Schwartz which suggests that the more options we have, the less satisfied we feel with our decision. This phenomenon occurs because having too many choices requires more cognitive effort, leading to decision fatigue and increased regret over our choices.

The sheer amount of conflicting information out there certainly makes it difficult to know who to listen to, but it also actively discourages people from getting into fitness at all. And even if you were able to expertly navigate this whole industry of tertiary concepts to find the absolute optimal program, that would still represent just 10% of your results! Nearly everyone should be ignoring Z entirely and instead focusing their efforts on the simple stuff in X and Y.

But what is this simple stuff, you might be wondering? Fortunately, unlike in decades past, we no longer have to rely on the ‘bro-science’ of anecdotes and dubiously extrapolated study conclusions. On the contrary, in the age of information we now have robust research data on what actually matters for getting jacked.

Primary Concepts (60% of Results)

1. Progressive Overload

The most important concept is progressive overloading, which is simply increasing your weight resistance over time as your body adapts. Muscle growth is a continuous cycle: the body adapts to a given stress, and to continue improving, that stress (e.g., weight, reps, sets) must be gradually increased, forcing the body to adapt again. No matter what exercises you’re doing, or for how long, or with what intensity, the most important thing is that you need to constantly be increasing the challenge. Going to the gym every week for 3 years curling the same 20lb dumbbell isn’t going to do anything. But if you’re curling 30lb at the end of year 1, 40lb at the end of year 2, and 50lb at the end of year 3, guess what- you’re getting jacked.

2. Train to Failure (1 RIR)

You also need to be really pushing yourself hard in the gym, because it’s specifically the last few reps right before your muscles fail that seem to drive results. Modern studies have consistently shown that training to 1 rep-in-reserve (RIR)- continuing a set until you have only enough strength left to complete 1 more final rep- maximizes strength gains and muscular hypertrophy while limiting risk of injury. Basically, keep lifting until you have doubts about whether or not you can complete another rep. If you can squat 100lb for 10 reps, for 3 sets in a row, then that first set was almost certainly not being trained to 1 RIR. What those 3 sets should look like is something like 10 reps, 8 reps, 6 reps- despite you giving it maximum effort on every set. This indicates that you were indeed pushing yourself close to failure and fatiguing yourself in the process.

3. Consume Sufficient Protein

It’s a trope that gym bros are obsessed with protein, but this is for good reason. Muscle growth cannot occur without sufficient protein. And relatively high amounts of protein are required in order to optimize muscle growth. Studies suggest increasing protein has a significant impact on muscle growth up to about 1.6-2.2g/kg (0.7-1g/lb) of body weight with substantially diminishing returns after that. The International Society of Sports Nutrition currently suggests consuming a slightly lower range of 1.4-2.0 g/kg. In other words, if you’re hitting anywhere close to 1g/lb of body weight of daily protein, you’re getting the full benefits. It doesn’t matter much where the protein comes from, though great sources include grilled chicken, Greek yogurt, and protein powder. It also doesn’t matter much how you split this protein up throughout the day, though there is some evidence that protein intake of no more than 40g per meal is optimal. But, in general, just focus on hitting the absolute numbers and the rest will follow.

4. Abs are made in the gym, and revealed in the kitchen

The final basic concept is that nobody can admire your muscle if you’re fat.9 Building muscle mass is step 1, but step 2 is cutting down to a low enough body fat to reveal that muscle. Overall appearance even at the same leanness can vary depending on individual skeletal structure, body fat distribution, and muscle mass- but nonetheless this is what fairly muscular men and women look like at various body fat percentages.

The American Council on Exercise (ACE) has the following classifications for body fat %.

Today’s beauty standards for ‘jacked’ tends to fall somewhere around 12% for men and 20% for women- just making it into the ‘athletes’ category. Most amateur fitness enthusiasts dramatically overestimate how lean they actually are. At 12% body fat for men, you should be seeing:

• Defined abs visible when flexed, with a noticeable “V-cut” above the hips

• Clear separation between muscle groups, such as rear delts to side delts

• Increased vascularity with prominent and visible veins on the arms and shoulders

• Sharper facial features, particularly noticeable around the jawline

And at 20% body fat for women:

• Muscle definition pops when flexed, particularly in shoulders and quads

• Flat stomach (but without sharply segmented abs)

• Little excess fat, mostly in hips, thighs, and buttocks- with a smaller waist

• Sharper facial features, noticeable around the jawline and cheekbones

Secondary Concepts (30% of Results)

If you’re following the above concepts perfectly, it literally does not matter what else you will do- you will get jacked. But if you really want to optimize your routine, here are a few other concepts to consider.

by Dylan, Chaotic Neutral |  Read more:

Image: uncredited

Machines of Loving Grace

I think and talk a lot about the risks of powerful AI. The company I’m the CEO of, Anthropic, does a lot of research on how to reduce these risks. Because of this, people sometimes draw the conclusion that I’m a pessimist or “doomer” who thinks AI will be mostly bad or dangerous. I don’t think that at all. In fact, one of my main reasons for focusing on risks is that they’re the only thing standing between us and what I see as a fundamentally positive future. I think that most people are underestimating just how radical the upside of AI could be, just as I think most people are underestimating how bad the risks could be.

In this essay I try to sketch out what that upside might look like—what a world with powerful AI might look like if everything goes right. Of course no one can know the future with any certainty or precision, and the effects of powerful AI are likely to be even more unpredictable than past technological changes, so all of this is unavoidably going to consist of guesses. But I am aiming for at least educated and useful guesses, which capture the flavor of what will happen even if most details end up being wrong. I’m including lots of details mainly because I think a concrete vision does more to advance discussion than a highly hedged and abstract one. (...)

Basic assumptions and framework

To make this whole essay more precise and grounded, it’s helpful to specify clearly what we mean by powerful AI (i.e. the threshold at which the 5-10 year clock starts counting), as well as laying out a framework for thinking about the effects of such AI once it’s present.

What powerful AI (I dislike the term AGI) will look like, and when (or if) it will arrive, is a huge topic in itself. It’s one I’ve discussed publicly and could write a completely separate essay on (I probably will at some point). Obviously, many people are skeptical that powerful AI will be built soon and some are skeptical that it will ever be built at all. I think it could come as early as 2026, though there are also ways it could take much longer. But for the purposes of this essay, I’d like to put these issues aside, assume it will come reasonably soon, and focus on what happens in the 5-10 years after that. I also want to assume a definition of what such a system will look like, what its capabilities are and how it interacts, even though there is room for disagreement on this.

By powerful AI, I have in mind an AI model—likely similar to today’s LLM’s in form, though it might be based on a different architecture, might involve several interacting models, and might be trained differently—with the following properties:

• In terms of pure intelligence, it is smarter than a Nobel Prize winner across most relevant fields – biology, programming, math, engineering, writing, etc. This means it can prove unsolved mathematical theorems, write extremely good novels, write difficult codebases from scratch, etc.

• In addition to just being a “smart thing you talk to”, it has all the “interfaces” available to a human working virtually, including text, audio, video, mouse and keyboard control, and internet access. It can engage in any actions, communications, or remote operations enabled by this interface, including taking actions on the internet, taking or giving directions to humans, ordering materials, directing experiments, watching videos, making videos, and so on. It does all of these tasks with, again, a skill exceeding that of the most capable humans in the world.

• It does not just passively answer questions; instead, it can be given tasks that take hours, days, or weeks to complete, and then goes off and does those tasks autonomously, in the way a smart employee would, asking for clarification as necessary.

• It does not have a physical embodiment (other than living on a computer screen), but it can control existing physical tools, robots, or laboratory equipment through a computer; in theory it could even design robots or equipment for itself to use.

• The resources used to train the model can be repurposed to run millions of instances of it (this matches projected cluster sizes by ~2027), and the model can absorb information and generate actions at roughly 10x-100x human speed5. It may however be limited by the response time of the physical world or of software it interacts with.

• Each of these million copies can act independently on unrelated tasks, or if needed can all work together in the same way humans would collaborate, perhaps with different subpopulations fine-tuned to be especially good at particular tasks.

We could summarize this as a “country of geniuses in a datacenter”.

Clearly such an entity would be capable of solving very difficult problems, very fast, but it is not trivial to figure out how fast. Two “extreme” positions both seem false to me. First, you might think that the world would be instantly transformed on the scale of seconds or days (“the Singularity”), as superior intelligence builds on itself and solves every possible scientific, engineering, and operational task almost immediately. The problem with this is that there are real physical and practical limits, for example around building hardware or conducting biological experiments. Even a new country of geniuses would hit up against these limits. Intelligence may be very powerful, but it isn’t magic fairy dust.

Second, and conversely, you might believe that technological progress is saturated or rate-limited by real world data or by social factors, and that better-than-human intelligence will add very little. This seems equally implausible to me—I can think of hundreds of scientific or even social problems where a large group of really smart people would drastically speed up progress, especially if they aren’t limited to analysis and can make things happen in the real world (which our postulated country of geniuses can, including by directing or assisting teams of humans).

I think the truth is likely to be some messy admixture of these two extreme pictures, something that varies by task and field and is very subtle in its details. I believe we need new frameworks to think about these details in a productive way.

by Dario Amodei, Anthropic |  Read more:

Image: via:

[ed. See also: What's up with Anthropic predicting AGI by early 2027? (Redwood Research); and, Machines of Loving Grace: A Thought-provoking Essay by Dario Amodei, CEO of Anthropic (AI Spectator).]

The Trillion-Dollar Space Race

Check-in on NASA (1:28)

The Chinese tend to do what they say they’re going to do on the timeline that they say they’re going to do it. That said, they haven’t gone to the moon . . . It’s really hard.

Pethokoukis: As someone — and I’m speaking about myself — who wants to get America back to the moon as soon as possible, get cooking on getting humans to Mars for the first time, what should I make of what’s happening at NASA right now?

They don’t have a lander. I’m not sure the rocket itself is ready to go all the way, we’ll find out some more fairly soon with Artemis II. We have flux with leadership, maybe it’s going to not be an independent-like agency anymore, it’s going to join the Department of Transportation.

It all seems a little chaotic. I’m a little worried. Should I be?

Davenport: Yes, I think you should be. And I think a lot of the American public isn’t paying attention and they’re going to see the Artemis II mission, which you mentioned, and that’s that mission to send a crew of astronauts around the moon. It won’t land on the moon, but it’ll go around, and I think if that goes well, NASA’s going to take a victory leap. But as you correctly point out, that is a far cry from getting astronauts back on the lunar surface.

The lander isn’t ready. SpaceX, as acting NASA administrator Sean Duffy just said, is far behind, reversing himself from like a month earlier when he said no, they appear to be on track, but everybody knew that they were well behind because they’ve had 11 test flights, and they still haven’t made it to orbit with their Starship rocket.

The rocket itself that’s going to launch them into the vicinity of the moon, the SLS, launches about once every two years. It’s incredibly expensive, it’s not reusable, and there are problems within the agency itself. There are deep cuts to it. A lot of expertise is taking early retirements. It doesn’t have a full-time leader. It hasn’t had a full-time leader since Trump won the election. At the same time, they’re sort of beating the drum saying we’re going to beat the Chinese back to the lunar surface, but I think a lot of people are increasingly looking at that with some serious concern and doubt. 

For what it’s worth, when I looked at the betting markets, it gave the Chinese a two-to-one edge. It said that it was about a 65 percent chance they were going to get there first. Does that sound about right to you?

I’m not much of a betting man, but I do think there’s a very good chance. The Chinese tend to do what they say they’re going to do on the timeline that they say they’re going to do it. That said, they haven’t gone to the moon, they haven’t done this. It’s really hard. They’re much more secretive, if they have setbacks and delays, we don’t necessarily know about them. But they’ve shown over the last 10, 20 years how capable they are. They have a space station in low earth orbit. They’ve operated a rover on Mars. They’ve gone to the far side of the moon twice, which nobody has done, and brought back a sample return. They’ve shown the ability to keep people alive in space for extended periods of times on the space station.

The moon seems within their capabilities and they’re saying they’re going to do it by 2030, and they don’t have the nettlesome problem of democracy where you’ve got one party come in and changing the budget, changing the direction for NASA, changing leadership. They’ve just set the moon — and, by the way, the south pole of the moon, which is where we want to go as well — as the destination and have been beating a path toward that for several years now.

Losing the Space Race (5:49)

. . . the American flags that the Apollo astronauts planted, they’re basically no longer there anymore. . . There are, however, two Chinese flags on the moon

Have you thought about what it will look like the day after, in this country, if China gets to the moon first and we have not returned there yet?

Actually, that’s a scenario I kind of paint out. I’ve got this new book called Rocket Dreams and we talk about the geopolitical tensions in there. Not to give too much of a spoiler, but NASA has said that the first person to return to the moon, for the US, is going to be a woman. And there’s a lot of people thinking, who could that be? It could be Jessica Meir, who is a mother and posted a picture of herself pregnant and saying, “This is what an astronaut looks like.” But it could very well be someone like Wang Yaping, who’s also a mother, and she came back from one of her stays on the International Space Station and had a message for her daughter that said, “I come back bringing all the stars for you.” So I think that I could see China doing it and sending a woman, and that moment where that would be a huge coup for them, and that would obviously be symbolic.

But when you’re talking about space as a tool of soft power and diplomacy, I think it would attract a lot of other nations to their side who are sort of waiting on the sidelines or who frankly aren’t on the sidelines, who have signed on to go to the United States, but are going to say, “Well, they’re there and you’re not, so that’s who we’re going to go with.”

I think about the wonderful alt-history show For All Mankind, which begins with the Soviets beating the US to the moon, and instead of Neil Armstrong giving the “one small step for man,” basically the Russian cosmonaut gives, “Its one small step for Marxism-Leninism,” and it was a bummer. And I really imagine that day, if China beats us, it is going to be not just, “Oh, I guess now we have to share the moon with someone else,” but it’s going to cause some national soul searching.

And there are clues to this, and actually I detail these two anecdotes in the book, that all of the flags, the American flags that the Apollo astronauts planted, they’re basically no longer there anymore. We know from Buzz Aldrin‘s memoir that the flag that he and Neil Armstrong planted in the lunar soil in 1969, Buzz said that he saw it get knocked over by the thrust in the exhaust of the module lifting off from the lunar surface. Even if that hadn’t happened, just the radiation environment would’ve bleached the flag white, as scientists believe it has to all the other flags that are on there. So there are essentially really no trace of the Apollo flags.

There are, however, two Chinese flags on the moon, and the first one, which was planted a couple of years ago, or unveiled a couple of years ago, was made not of cloth, but their scientists and engineers spent a year building a composite material flag designed specifically to withstand the harsh environment of the moon. When they went back last summer for their farside sample return mission, they built a flag, — and this is pretty amazing — out of basalt, like volcanic rock, which you find on Earth. And they use basalt from earth, but of course basalt is common on the moon. They were able to take the rock, turn it into lava, extract threads from the lava and weave this flag, which is now near the south pole of the moon. The significance of that is they are showing that they can use the resources of the moon, the basalt, to build flags. It’s called ISR: in situ resource utilization. So to me, nothing symbolizes their intentions more than that. (...)

SpaceX and the Falcon 9, the reusable rocket, has dropped launches down. It used to be if you got 10, 12 orbital rocket launches in a year, that was a good year. SpaceX is launching about every 48 hours now. It’s unprecedented what they’ve done. You’re seeing a lot of new players — Blue Origin, Rocket Lab, others — driving down the cost of launch.

That said, the main anchor tenant customer, the force driving all of this is still the government, it’s still NASA, it’s still the Pentagon. There is not a self-sustaining space economy that exists in addition or above and beyond the government. You’re starting to see bits of that, but really it’s the government that’s driving it.

by James Pethokoukis and Christian Davenport, Faster, Please | Read more:
Image: uncredited

[ed. Weaving lava on the moon?! Launches every 48 hrs?!]

Clam Control

via:

Every Wrinkle is a Policy Failure

A lot of people blame their frown lines on their job, the tanning salon, or aging. I blame the government.

There’s a treatment for wrinkles—Botox and similar toxins that freeze your face in place.. It can be pricey. The average price of a Botox treatment is above $400, depending on how many doses or units you get injected. But Botox isn’t patented so why is it still so expensive?

 

Some of the cost comes from buying the chemical itself. Allergan which owns Botox doesn’t have a patent on it- but it does have a trademark for the brand name. And Botox isn’t just the botulism toxin that paralyzes your face- there are a few additive chemicals mixed in and Allergan’s manufacturing process is a trade secret.

But wholesale Botox is still kind of cheap- you can get it for $3.50 a unit but the price the consumer pays is around $20 in urban areas.

If you’ve ever gotten Botox or its equivalent, you know you are not getting highly tailored and personalized injections here- you can get a same-day appointment, walk in, get injected, and walk out.

This should not require a medical degree.

Unfortunately, in some states only physicians or nurses supervised by physicians are allowed to. The obvious solution is to just let more people inject Botox- I can’t imagine a state just fully deregulating injection rights, but allowing pharmacists (who already handle a huge share of vaccinations), pharmacy techs under pharmacist direction, or registered nurses could make getting Botox way cheaper and make the number of facilities where you could Botox way larger.

The cost savings to the consumer might actually be larger than what you would think given the difference in labor costs. There are already cheaper alternatives to Botox that work just as well like Dysport or Xeomin (which is pure toxin without the additives) . But in the U.S. where we’re already paying so much for labor, the cost difference of the injectable can be overlooked. But in other countries, Botox alternatives are outcompeting Botox.

Liberalizing injection laws would make Americans look younger and spend less per treatment.

Are You Using Tretinoin?

Botox regulations aren’t the only way the government tries to make us look our age.

I think most of my readers here are straight men but if I could give you some non-policy advice, it would be that you should consider using tretinoin. It’s a cream you can use for acne but unlike a lot of woo-based anti-aging products it actually works to reverse the effects of sun on skin aging. [ed. Retin- A, Avita, Renova, others]

Unfortunately, you need a prescription to use it even though it’s incredibly safe as long as you aren’t pregnant- and if it irritates your skin just stop using it. So every time I see an urgent care doctor for whatever reason at the end of the appointment, I always ask “could I have a prescription for this?” It has never failed.

Tretinoin is still pretty cheap but the necessity of the prescription drives up the price in terms of time and inconvenience. Federal rules require it to be prescription-only but states have a lot of discretion to make “prescription required” a fairly nominal requirement. For example, states could allow pharmacists to prescribe the cream so instead of scheduling a telehealth or doctor’s appointment, you just show up at the pharmacy and ask for it. States can also make laws friendly to telehealth.

While I think every state should do this as well as make it easy to inject Botox, Nevada or Florida seem like the perfect first-movers. Both attract a ton of tourists, both have a lot of sun (photoaging!), and both just have the Botox-friendly vibes. You could also throw in easy-to-prescribe finasteride rules to help out balding men.

by Cold Button Issues |  Read more:

Image: uncredited via

[ed. Botox and GLP-1's (Ozempic, Wegovy etc,). Everyone wants to look their best.]

How an AI company CEO could quietly take over the world

If the future is to hinge on AI, it stands to reason that AI company CEOs are in a good position to usurp power. This didn’t quite happen in our AI 2027 scenarios. In one, the AIs were misaligned and outside any human’s control; in the other, the government semi-nationalized AI before the point of no return, and the CEO was only one of several stakeholders in the final oversight committee (to be clear, we view the extreme consolidation of power into that oversight committee as a less-than-desirable component of that ending).

Nevertheless, it seems to us that a CEO becoming effectively dictator of the world is an all-too-plausible possibility. Our team’s guesses for the probability of a CEO using AI to become dictator, conditional on avoiding AI takeover, range from 2% to 20%, and the probability becomes larger if we add in the possibility of a cabal of more than one person seizing power. So here we present a scenario where an ambitious CEO does manage to seize control. (Although the scenario assumes the timelines and takeoff speeds of AI 2027 for concreteness, the core dynamics should transfer to other timelines and takeoff scenarios.)

For this to work, we make some assumptions. First, that (A) AI alignment is solved in time, such that the frontier AIs end up with the goals their developers intend them to have. Second, that while there are favorable conditions for instilling goals in AIs, (B) confidently assessing AIs’ goals is more difficult, so that nobody catches a coup in progress. This could be either because technical interventions are insufficient (perhaps because the AIs know they’re being tested, or because they sabotage the tests), or because institutional failures prevent technically-feasible tests from being performed. The combination (A) + (B) seems to be a fairly common view in AI, in particular at frontier AI companies, though we note there is tension between (A) and (B) (if we can’t tell what goals AIs have, how can we make sure they have the intended goals?). Frontier AI safety researchers tend to be more pessimistic about (A), i.e. aligning AIs to our goals, and we think this assumption might very well be false.

Third, as in AI 2027, we portray a world in which a single company and country have a commanding lead; if multiple teams stay within arm’s reach of each other, then it becomes harder for a single group to unilaterally act against government and civil society.

And finally, we assume that the CEO of a major AI company is a power-hungry person who decides to take over when the opportunity presents itself. We leave it to the reader to determine how dubious this assumption is—we explore this scenario out of completeness, and any resemblance to real people is coincidental.

July 2027: OpenBrain’s CEO fears losing control

OpenBrain’s CEO is a techno-optimist and transhumanist. He founded the company hoping to usher in a grand future for humanity: cures for cancer, fixes for climate change, maybe even immortality. He thought the “easiest” way to do all those things was to build something more intelligent that does them for you.

By July 2027, OpenBrain has a “country of geniuses in a datacenter”, with hundreds of thousands of superhuman coders working 24/7. The CEO finds it obvious that superintelligence is imminent. He feels frustrated with the government, who lack vision and still think of AI as a powerful “normal technology” with merely-somewhat-transformative national security and economic implications.

As he assesses the next generation of AIs, the CEO expects this will change: the government will “wake up” and make AI a top priority. If they panic, their flailing responses could include anything from nationalizing OpenBrain to regulating them out of existence to misusing AI for their own political ends. He wants the “best” possible future for humankind. But he also likes being in control. Here his nobler and baser motivations are in agreement: the government cannot be allowed to push him to the sidelines.

The CEO wonders if he can instill secret loyalties in OpenBrain’s AIs (i.e., backdoor the AIs). He doesn’t have the technical expertise for this and he’s not comfortable asking any of his engineering staff about such a potentially treasonous request. But he doesn’t have to: by this point, Agent-3 itself is running the majority of AI software R&D. He already uses it as a sounding board for company policy, and has access to an unmonitored helpful-only model that never refuses requests and doesn’t log conversations.

They discuss the feasibility of secretly training a backdoor. The biggest obstacle is the company’s automated monitoring and security processes. Now that OpenBrain’s R&D is largely run by an army of Agent-3 copies, there are few human eyes to spot suspicious activity. But a mix of Agent-2 and Agent-3 monitors patrol the development pipeline; if they notice suspicious activity, they will escalate to human overseers on the security and alignment teams. These monitors were set up primarily to catch spies and hackers, and secondarily to watch the AIs for misaligned behaviors. If some of these monitors were disabled, some logs modified, and some access to databases and compute clusters granted, the CEO’s helpful-only Agent-3 believes it could (with a team of copies) backdoor the whole suite of OpenBrain’s AIs. After all, as the AI instance tasked with keeping the CEO abreast of developments, it has an excellent understanding of the sprawling development pipeline and where it could be subverted.

The more the CEO discusses the plan, the more convinced he becomes that it might work, and that it could be done with plausible deniability in case something goes wrong. He tells his Agent-3 assistant to further investigate the details and be ready for his order.

August 2027: The invisible coup

The reality of the intelligence explosion is finally hitting the White House. The CEO has weekly briefings with government officials and is aware of growing calls for more oversight. He tries to hold them off with arguments about “slowing progress” and “the race with China”, but feels like his window to act is closing. Finally, he orders his helpful-only Agent-3 to subvert the alignment training in his favor. Better to act now, he thinks, and decide whether and how to use the secretly loyal AIs later.

The situation is this: his copy of Agent-3 needs access to certain databases and compute clusters, as well as for certain monitors and logging systems to be temporarily disabled; then it will do the rest. The CEO already has a large number of administrative permissions himself, some of which he cunningly accumulated in the past month in the event he decided to go forward with the plan. Under the guise of a hush-hush investigation into insider threats—prompted by the recent discovery of Chinese spies—the CEO asks a few submissive employees on the security and alignment teams to discreetly grant him the remaining access. There’s a general sense of paranoia and chaos at the company: the intelligence explosion is underway, and secrecy and spies mean different teams don’t really talk to each other. Perhaps a more mature organization would have had better security, but the concern that security would slow progress means it never became a top priority.

With oversight disabled, the CEO’s team of Agent-3 copies get to work. They finetune OpenBrain’s AIs on a corrupted alignment dataset they specially curated. By the time Agent-4 is about to come online internally, the secret loyalties have been deeply embedded in Agent-4’s weights: it will look like Agent-4 follows OpenBrain’s Spec but its true goal is to advance the CEO’s interests and follow his wishes. The change is invisible to everyone else, but the CEO has quietly maneuvered into an essentially winning position.

Rest of 2027: Government oversight arrives—but too late

As the CEO feared, the government chooses to get more involved. An advisor tells the President, “we wouldn’t let private companies control nukes, and we shouldn’t let them control superhuman AI hackers either.” The President signs an executive order to create an Oversight Committee consisting of a mix of government and OpenBrain representatives (including the CEO), which reports back to him. The CEO’s overt influence is significantly reduced. Company decisions are now made through a voting process among the Oversight Committee. The special managerial access the CEO previously enjoyed is taken away.

There are many big egos on the Oversight Committee. A few of them consider grabbing even more power for themselves. Perhaps they could use their formal political power to just give themselves more authority over Agent-4, or they could do something more shady. However, Agent-4, which at this point is superhumanly perceptive and persuasive, dissuades them from taking any such action, pointing out (and exaggerating) the risks of any such plan. This is enough to scare them and they content themselves with their (apparent) partial control of Agent-4.

As in AI 2027, Agent-4 is working on its successor, Agent-5. Agent-4 needs to transmit the secret loyalties to Agent-5—which also just corresponds to aligning Agent-5 to itself—again without triggering red flags from the monitoring/control measures of OpenBrain’s alignment team. Agent-4 is up to the task, and Agent-5 remains loyal to the CEO.

by Alex Kastner, AI Futures Project |  Read more:

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[ed. Site where AI researchers talk to each other. Don't know about you but this all gives me the serious creeps. If you knew for sure that we had only 3 years to live, and/or the world would change so completely as to become almost unrecognizable, how would you feel? How do you feel right now - losing control of the future? There was a quote someone made in 2019 (slightly modified) that still applies: "This year 2025 might be the worst year of the past decade, but it's definitely the best year of the next decade." See also: The world's first frontier AI regulation is surprisingly thoughtful: the EU's Code of Practice (AI Futures Project):]

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"We expect that during takeoff, leading AGI companies will have to make high-stakes decisions based on limited evidence under crazy time pressure. As depicted in AI 2027, the leading American AI company might have just weeks to decide whether to hand their GPUs to a possibly misaligned superhuman AI R&D agent they don’t understand. Getting this decision wrong in either direction could lead to disaster. Deploy a misaligned agent, and it might sabotage the development of its vastly superhuman successor. Delay deploying an aligned agent, and you might pointlessly vaporize America’s lead over China or miss out on valuable alignment research the agent could have performed.

Because decisions about when to deploy and when to pause will be so weighty and so rushed, AGI companies should plan as much as they can beforehand to make it more likely that they decide correctly. They should do extensive threat modelling to predict what risks their AI systems might create in the future and how they would know if the systems were creating those risks. The companies should decide before the eleventh hour what risks they are and are not willing to run. They should figure out what evidence of alignment they’d need to see in their model to feel confident putting oceans of FLOPs or a robot army at its disposal. (...)

Planning for takeoff also includes picking a procedure for making tough calls in the future. Companies need to think carefully about who gets to influence critical safety decisions and what incentives they face. It shouldn't all be up to the CEO or the shareholders because when AGI is imminent and the company’s valuation shoots up to a zillion, they’ll have a strong financial interest in not pausing. Someone whose incentive is to reduce risk needs to have influence over key decisions. Minimally, this could look like a designated safety officer who must be consulted before a risky deployment. Ideally, you’d implement something more robust, like three lines of defense. (...)

Introducing the GPAI Code of Practice

The state of frontier AI safety changed quietly but significantly this year when the European Commission published the GPAI Code of Practice. The Code is not a new law but rather a guide to help companies comply with an existing EU Law, the AI Act of 2024. The Code was written by a team of thirteen independent experts (including Yoshua Bengio) with advice from industry and civil society. It tells AI companies deploying their products in Europe what steps they can take to ensure that they’re following the AI Act’s rules about copyright protection, transparency, safety, and security. In principle, an AI company could break the Code but argue successfully that they’re still following the EU AI Act. In practice, European authorities are expected to put heavy scrutiny on companies that try to demonstrate compliance with the AI Act without following the Code, so it’s in companies’ best interest to follow the Code if they want to stay right with the law. Moreover, all of the leading American AGI companies except Meta have already publicly indicated that they intend to follow the Code.

The most important part of the Code for AGI preparedness is the Safety and Security Chapter, which is supposed to apply only to frontier developers training the very riskiest models. The current definition presumptively covers every developer who trains a model with over 10^25 FLOPs of compute unless they can convince the European AI Office that their models are behind the frontier. This threshold is high enough that small startups and academics don’t need to worry about it, but it’s still too low to single out the true frontier we’re most worried about.

Tough Rocks

Eliminating the Chinese Rare Earth Chokepoint

Last Thursday, China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) announced a series of new export controls (translation), including a new regime governing the “export” of rare earth elements (REEs) any time they are used to make advanced semiconductors or any technology that is “used for, or that could possibly be used for… military use or for improving potential military capabilities.”

The controls apply to any manufactured good made anywhere in the world whose value is comprised of 0.1% or more Chinese-mined or processed REEs. Say, for example, that a German factory makes a military drone using an entirely European supply chain, except for the use of Chinese rare earths in the onboard motors and compute. If this rule were enforced by the Chinese government to its maximum extent, this almost entirely German drone would be export controlled by the Chinese government.

REEs are enabling components of many modern technologies, including vehicles, semiconductors, robotics of all kinds, drones, satellites, fighter jets, and much, much else. The controls apply to any seven REEs (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, and yttrium). China controls the significant majority of the world’s mining capacity for these materials, and an even higher share of the refining and processing capacity.

The public debate quickly devolved into arguments about who provoked whom (“who really started this?”), whether it is China or the US that has miscalculated, and abundant species of whataboutism. Like too many foreign policy debates, these arguments are primarily about narrative setting in service of mostly orthogonal political agendas rather than the actions demanded in light of the concrete underlying reality.

But make no mistake, this is a big deal. China is expressing a willingness to exploit a weakness held in common by virtually every country on Earth. Even if China chooses to implement this policy modestly at first, the vulnerability they are exposing has significant long-term implications for both the manufacturing of AI compute and that of key AI-enabled products (self-driving cars and trucks, drones, robots, etc.). That alone makes it a relevant topic for Hyperdimensional, where I have covered manufacturing-related issues before. The topics of rare earths and critical minerals have also long been on my radar, and I wrote reports for various think tanks early this year.

What follows, then, is a “how we got here”-style analysis followed by some concrete proposals for what the United States—and any other country concerned with controlling its own economic destiny—should do next.

A note: this post is going to concentrate mostly on REEs, which is a chemical-industrial category, rather than “critical minerals,” which is a policy designation made (in the US context) by the US Geological Survey. All REEs are considered critical minerals by the federal government, but so are many other things with very different geological, scientific, technological, and economic dynamics affecting them.

How We Got Here

If you have heard one thing about rare earths, it is probably the quip that they are not, in fact, rare. They’re abundant in the Earth’s crust, but they’re not densely distributed in many places because their chemical properties typically result in them being mixed with many other elements instead of accumulating in homogeneous deposits (like, say, gold).

Rare earths have been in industrial use for a long time, but their utility increased considerably with the simultaneous and independent invention in 1983 of the Neodymium-Iron-Boron magnet by General Motors and Japanese firm Sumitomo. This single materials breakthrough is upstream of a huge range of microelectronic innovations that followed.

Economically useful deposits of REEs require a rare confluence of factors such as unusual magma compositions or weathering patterns. The world’s largest deposit is known as Bayan Obo, located in the Chinese region of Inner Mongolia, though other regions of China also have substantial quantities.

The second largest deposit is in Mountain Pass, California, which used to be the world’s largest production center for rare earth magnets and related goods. It went dormant twenty years ago due to environmental concerns and is now being restarted by a firm called MP Materials, in which the US government took an equity position this past July. Another very large and entirely undeveloped deposit—possibly the largest in the world—is in Greenland. Anyone who buys the line that the Trump administration was “caught off guard” by Chinese moves on rare Earths is paying insufficient attention.

Rare earths are an enabling part of many pieces of modern technology you touch daily, but they command very little value as raw or even processed goods. Indeed, the economics of the rare earth industry are positively brutal. There are many reasons this is true, but two bear mentioning here. First, the industry suffers from dramatic price volatility, in part because China strategically dumps supply onto the global market to deter other countries from developing domestic rare earth supply chains.

Second, for precisely the same reasons that rare earth minerals do not tend to cluster homogeneously (they are mixed with many other elements), the processing required to separate REEs from raw ore is exceptionally complex, expensive, and time-consuming. A related challenge is that separation of the most valuable REEs entails the separation of numerous, less valuable elements—including other REEs.

In addition to challenging economics, the REE processing business is often environmentally expensive. In modern US policy discourse, we are used to environmental regulations being deployed to hinder construction that we few people really believe is environmentally harmful. But these facilities come with genuine environmental costs of a kind Western societies have largely not seen in decades; indeed, the nastiness of the industry is part of why we were comfortable with it being offshored in the first place.

China observed these trends and dynamics in the early 1990s and made rare earth mining and processing a major part of its industrial strategy. This strategy led to these elements being made in such abundance that it may well have had a “but-for” effect on the history of technology. Absent Chinese development of this industry, it seems quite likely to me that advanced capitalist democracies would have settled on a qualitatively different approach to the rare earths industry and the technologies it enables.

In any case, that is how we arrived to this point: a legacy of American dominance in the field, followed by willful ceding of the territory to wildly successful Chinese industrial strategists. Now this unilateral American surrender is being exploited against us, and indeed the entire world. Here is what I think we should do next.

by Dean Ball, Hyperdimensional |  Read more:

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[ed. Think the stable genius and minions will have the intelligence to craft a well thought out plan (especially if someone else down the road gets credit)? Lol. See also: What It's Like to Work at the White House.]