Showing posts with label Philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philosophy. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 11, 2026

What Motivates AI Researchers?

Even knowing they could kill everyone? Zoomer Doomer Paradiso: What Are AI Researchers Thinking?

Constellation is mostly populated by twentysomething recent grads and dropouts of top universities and is designed to be all-consuming. There are catered meals every day, unlimited snacks, and nap rooms scattered across the floors. “Stelly”, as it’s affectionately known, seems to be inhabited all hours of the day, including weekends.

For a group trying as hard as possible to make sure AI does not kill everyone (another shibboleth, this one significantly clearer), I expected them to be a lot more depressed and gloomy. This is far from the case. If you were to construct a world from first principles that provides for all the physiological, safety, belonging, esteem, and self-actualization needs of its inhabitants in a kind of Maslovian utopia, the solution would be roughly Berkeley shaped and centered around Constellation. If you believe you’re making progress on the most important problem in the world in a tight-knit and well-resourced community of intelligent coworkers who double as your closest friends, what more could you possibly want in life?

In some ways, Constellation seems less like an office and more like a strange idealized version of college. [...]

This is not to say Constellation is stress-free. Numerous Stellies speak of the long hours and burnout involved in trying to keep up with the exponential pace of AI progress. And in the same breath, they’ll express how much they love it and feed off the energy of late nights and the meaning it brings. If taking more time off means, however marginally, that models deployed at massive scale are more dangerous, it becomes difficult to justify relaxing much at all.

Plenty of organizations claim to be mission-driven and provide their employees with prettier environments and cushier amenities, but few claim stakes so high as preventing literal human extinction. Constellation is a paradise of purpose: the camaraderie, intellectual stimulation, long nights, and stress exist only because the feeling that what happens inside matters enormously.

From the outside, there is an obvious and unflattering comparison: the community looks millenarian and cult-like. They’re convinced that history is approaching a discontinuity after which ordinary human life will be either incomprehensibly better or permanently over and reorganize their careers and social lives around preparing for the shift. Indeed, coworkers become friends, friends become housemates and romantic partners, and the whole world becomes highly endogamous. This is not necessarily because anyone objects to dating outsiders; it’s more that the arguments permeate ordinary life so much that being with someone who is not “pilled” can become difficult. After all, if the most important follow-up question to “do you want to have kids?” is not “how many?” but “before or after ASI?”, you’re going to have issues dating the general populace. [...]

When the history of AGI is written, the organizations on those floors will be discussed alongside Anthropic and OpenAI in the way Oak Ridge, the Berkeley Rad Lab, and Los Alamos feature in the history of the Manhattan Project. Like Los Alamos, the population skews young, elite, and imbued with a sense that if they fail, everyone is thoroughly fucked. [...]

Each organization is shaped around what is called the “theory of change”, or ToC. These are always AI safety flavored but often sharply diverging on what they believe is the most important way to prevent disaster. MIRI is the most doomerish of the lot, with its co-founder Eliezer Yudkowsky and president Nate Soares publishing the book If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies last year. They believe short-term attempts to make AI more aligned are futile and campaign for building “off-switches” and enacting policies to block ASI. The AI Futures Project instead tries to make possible futures legible enough for governments and other decision-makers to prepare for them, while groups like METR and Redwood focus more narrowly on measuring dangerous capabilities and controlling advanced systems.

If AI safety is a cult, it does an awful job of disseminating and enforcing orthodoxy because anything is up for debate. There is enough heterogeneity among ToCs in AI safety that some believe others’ projects in the movement are truly net negative (“in expectation”, I feel obligated to add), either by advancing AI in a way that improves dangerous capabilities more than safety, generating bad optics, or simply wasting money. [...]

I grant that AI has superhuman computer-based abilities that can easily generate new viruses, hack critical infrastructure, and cause other problems worth taking very seriously. However, unlike the many software engineers and mathematicians I met whose strong suits involve building up beautiful and noiseless abstraction hierarchies with computers, I am deeply skeptical of similarly rapid AI advancements in physical technologies. I was amused by a phenomenon where those closest to math and computer science had the shortest timelines to ASI, and electrical and mechanical engineers had the longest. This is not because engineers in the physical world aren’t acquainted with the magic of frontier AI tools -- the best electrical engineers I know burn upwards of one billion tokens per day on automated experiments, simulation sweeps, and the like. They’re not as bullish because the physical world is more noisy, complicated, and slow than software.

The Radiant

Even though I did not find myself believing in their strongest visions of doom, it’s not too hard to understand the appeal if you psychologically inhabit their world for enough time. There’s a sense you’re right in the middle of world events, with near weekly articles from major outlets featuring METR and Redwood reports. There’s a world of pleasure, community, and meaning in what most believe to be the “probable pre-apocalypse”. There’s a shared map of the many possible roads to hell and a common goal of ensuring we never arrive. There’s a heaven at the last stop before hell. [...]

There is a sense in which the struggle against the legible, articulable Shoggoth may be more meaningful than what comes afterward. Meaning in rationalist circles is driven by expected impact relative to the counterfactual, so I began to wonder whether the world around Constellation is, in some sense, more of a paradise than the AI future they so desperately aim for. If they succeed and the AI is aligned, the handoff complete, and the hyperabundant future secured, what is there to work on that matters?

The AI safety community is deeply consequentialist and derives its status symbols, norms, and sense of purpose from expecting to enact change through work. Having high agency is universally lauded, and many of the pitches to join AI safety center on the belief that the next few years are the most pivotal time in history. If the appeal of your job and source of meaning is around shaping the future, then what is it like to come down from that world and live with only mundane consequences?

More abstractly, how can you be a consequentialist once you’re not meaningfully in control? Self-actualization through work is the capstone of Maslow’s pyramid, and without it, Constellation would be just like all the other elite college campuses from which its inhabitants came, perhaps with more rigorous epistemic standards.

Various Stellies I talked to didn’t seem too concerned with this outcome -- they’d have won. They plan to do math puzzles and write and stargaze and all the other typical hobbies of rats, but I find it hard to believe a culture which valorizes agency and impact so easily relinquishes its central virtues.

by Connor Blake, Boson Cutter |  Read more:
Image: Constellation via
[ed. You can skip the first half (partying in Silicon Valley).]

Sunday, November 8, 2026

On Constructive Visions of the Future

Ada Palmer is a science fiction writer and historian. She teaches early modern European history at the University of Chicago, and her Terra Ignota quartet, beginning with Too Like the Lightning, imagines the world of the 25th century. Ken Liu is an award-winning science fiction and fantasy writer, the author of the Dandelion Dynasty series and The Paper Menagerie and Other Stories, and most recently the author of All That We See or Seem, the first novel in his new series.

I direct the Existential Hope program at Foresight Institute, where we work on circulating more constructive visions of the future. I wanted to know what two people who build worlds for a living think human flourishing would actually look like, and why our imaginations keep sliding toward empire and catastrophe instead. They ended up talking about work far more than I had expected, and about the assumptions underneath it, some of them 2000 years old. I also left with a new term I plan to spread: the Etsy economy. 

Permanent crisis

Beatrice Erkers: There’s a trend right now in Silicon Valley of reaching for historical analogies, especially the Renaissance and the age of empires. Why those periods, and why now?

Ada Palmer: Right now, everybody feels like the world is in a state of crisis, and when the world is in a state of crisis, we tend to look at other time periods, both past ones and imagined future ones. You see enormous interest in both past and future during and after the French Revolution, when everyone is suddenly wearing clothing that’s a reproduction of what they imagine ancient Rome looked like. You see the same in the Renaissance, which is also a period of crisis, in the aftermath of the Black Death. History is a wide palette of alternatives that people reach for as a tool to help them understand our world in times of crisis.

The narrower answer is that the periods tech people keep invoking are the ones we associate with disruptive technology. When we talk about the Renaissance, we usually attribute its growth to technology. Tech people love to compare what’s happening now to a Gutenberg revolution. They love to think that a new technology they’re creating is going to accelerate historical change. Just as the Middle Ages were supposedly stagnant and then we suddenly had a period of acceleration toward modernity, they imagine we’re in a period of acceleration toward an exciting science fictional future that’s just around the corner. And the 19th century, another age of empire, is the other age we strongly associate with technology, via the Industrial Revolution.

There’s also the fiction problem. We have an awful lot of science fiction and fantasy about empire, because empire is easy to write about. The power is in the hands of a few characters. It’s very big, but it’s also very dramatic. It’s much harder to write fiction about a complicated plural republic with 52 interlaced political offices and everybody coming from complicated, slightly middle-class backgrounds. Just try writing fiction about the European Union and you will figure this out. So when people look back to history dominated by technology, and forward to futures dominated by technology, they’re seeing a lot of models of empire.

Ken Liu: I agree with all that, and I’d add that there’s an element of justification going on. When history is invoked, it’s often a way to explain and legitimate exercises of power. When Venice was trying to become a great city, it went to Alexandria to steal the body of St. Mark, so that it could prove itself a great Christian city. When people think they’re making great transformations, it can seem a little scary, and one way to legitimate it is to say: Historically, things happen because they’re inevitable. You can complain about what I’m doing all you want, but I’m just an agent of history.

Ada: We’re all aware of the type of history we call Great Man theory of history, which centers all agency in a couple of heroized figures, and which we’ve been trying to move away from. But one of the biggest types of history people turn to instead is Great Forces history, in which everything is giant gears grinding, and as soon as there’s a certain amount of torque in the system, the machine tips. That’s an important analytical tool. But just as much as Great Man history, Great Forces history erases agency for everyone, except perhaps economists, who get to believe they’re wielding the great forces.

Ken: That’s my favorite version: Economics as storytelling with numbers.

Ada: And if you don’t have a choice in the thing you’re doing, if it’s an inevitability, that’s one of many ways to accept it and justify it, both to others and to yourself.

Beatrice: How much of this is really about AI, though? That’s the revolution Silicon Valley believes it’s living through.

Ada: I think we’re wrong to separate generative AI and call it a completely new revolution. I often talk to Silicon Valley people who want to ask, are we so special that we’ve had six Gutenberg revolutions in a row, 10 years apart? And I say no, we’re having one Gutenberg revolution: the computer.

The personal computer, the internet, the cell phone, social media, and generative AI are all iterations of the same one fundamental technological change, the same way Gutenberg’s press kept having new impacts for decades through news networks, pamphlets, and eventually the newspaper. A little too much of our analysis of Silicon Valley right now is of the past five years instead of the past 20.

The guy behind the refrigerator

Beatrice: Ada, when I interviewed you before, you mentioned that Petrarch could imagine political change but not the end of disease. And what happened instead is that we ended a lot of diseases. What’s our version of that blind spot?

Ada: He thought it would be easier to defeat the Dire Horseman War than the Dire Horseman Plague. And we’ve found that in fact we’ve made more progress against the Dire Horseman Plague than against the Dire Horseman War. Some of the STEM problems have proved easier than some of the social science problems. 

We’re not entirely missing this, but you constantly hear people encouraging STEM, STEM, STEM while diminishing the humanities and the social sciences as partners, whereas people who are really deep in it, who are scientists, understand there’s a symbiosis: We don’t make progress by funding just one of the three. There’s a perception that wealth flows toward technological innovation, rather than recognizing that wealth flows toward lots of kinds of innovation, only some of which is technological.

Ken: I don’t want to focus so much on Silicon Valley, though. The problems we have today don’t stem from a few people or a few inventions. They have their roots much further back, in what I’d call the gradual mechanization of humans.

Take AI displacing jobs. This is not something that happened in the last five years. We’ve been creating the conditions for it for a century or more. If you worked in customer service 40 years ago, you were a respected professional. Over time we turned those into scripted jobs. Once you’ve gotten things to that point, it’s not very difficult to throw the human out and put in a language model. It’s not the model that caused this. It’s that we’ve been making humans behave more and more like machines, up and down the chain: devaluing work, taking the meaning out of it, turning it into a mechanistic process where you’re a cog performing what your role demands. The pushback Silicon Valley is getting now is the tip of the iceberg. What’s really being expressed is a much deeper loss of meaning, dignity, and participation.

by Beatrice Erkers, with Ada Palmer and Ken Liu, Asterisk Magazine | Read more:
Image: 2001: A Space Odyssey
[ed. See also: We already know what a world without work looks like (Asterisk). With this introduction from ACX:]
*****
The debate on what will happen if AI takes all the jobs usually swings between poles of “it will be great because we can focus on the finer things in life” and “it will be terrible because we’ll lose all meaning”. Clara brings her trademark careful historical scholarship and proposes a third option - groups ranging from hunter-gatherers to aristocrats have lived without productive work for thousands of years, and they spend their time in what could charitably be called “social grooming” and uncharitably “court intrigue” - pointless alliance-forming and backbiting in the pursuit of arbitrary status markers divorced from productive activity. “Aristocrats are basically chimpanzees. They’re highly social, cunning, at all times hyperaware of their strict internal dominance hierarchy, and constantly, obsessively tracking alliances, challenges, displays of prowess, and attempts to get ahead.” My only objection to this analogy is that some aristocrats were genuinely better at status games than others and probably had a lot of fun, whereas in the post-AI future the winners of status games will probably be those who check every move with a smarter-than-human AI prompted to help them optimize their status (and if everyone knows this to be true, it’s not clear what the ensuing status games actually look like).

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

U.K. Parliament Votes Down Assisted Suicide Bill

U.K. lawmakers... voted down a bill to legalize assisted suicide for terminally ill adults in England and Wales.

The Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill was narrowly rejected, with 286 members of the House of Commons voting against the bill and 270 members voting in favor.

The bill passed the Commons last year but unelected lawmakers in the House of Lords effectively filibustered the legislation by introducing more than 1,200 amendments. Friday’s vote ends a push by proponents of assisted suicide to revive the bill.

The bill, if passed, would have allowed for patients with less than six months to live to apply for assisted suicide. Then, two doctors and a panel of experts would determine if the patient qualified, Only adults would have been able to apply for assisted suicide. [...]

During debate, lawmaker and cancer surgeon Zubir Ahmed brought up concerns about accurately predicting the timeline of a patient’s prognosis.

“I have to be honest. When I am asked to prognosticate on whether someone has six months to live, I am as often wrong as I am right,” Ahmed, a member of the Labour Party, said. “It is no longer a good enough marker for the DWP to use in discharging benefits for life-limiting conditions, and I do not see why it should be a good enough marker for prescribing death.”

Ashley Dalton, also a member of the Labour Party, said there is no reason to expect that without access to assisted suicide, dying will be a horrible experience.

“In the campaign around this Bill, though, it seems to me that it is being implied that a person with a terminal illness will have a dreadful, painful death unless they have access to assisted dying. That is simply not true; palliative care in the U.K. is excellent,” Dalton said.

“Far too many people do not have access to the palliative care they need, but the idea that it is not possible to alleviate pain and discomfort is false. People have been terrorised—I have been terrorised—with tales of people vomiting up their own feces, as though this is commonplace during death. It is vanishingly rare … It is nothing short of irresponsible to scaremonger people like me into believing our deaths will be horrific when all the evidence suggests that, with access to good palliative care, deaths are, on the whole, gentle.”

by Kamden Mulder, National Review |  Read more:
Image: Jack Taylor/Reuters
[ed. Shameful. Ask anyone: what are you more afraid of, death or dying? Palliative care can be costly, unpredictable, prolonged, and not just simple pain relief. What about choice, dignity, and the emotional burden on families? We routinely euthanize pets out of sense of love and empathy, so why not humans? From the moment we're born we're taught to control ourselves, then at the end of life the state takes that away. Shameful.]

Wednesday, October 21, 2026

Would You Press This Button?

Imagine Americans were offered this deal: Hit a big red button and China becomes the world’s first hyperpower. It rockets past the United States in technical sophistication, manufacturing capacity and wealth generation. China becomes so technologically advanced, and its human and robotic work force so huge, that Americans are left with only the dimmest comprehension of what is playing out on the economic, scientific and perhaps even geopolitical frontier.

But the rewards for disempowering ourselves are magnificent. The global economy booms, and Americans grow richer than ever before. We are given new cures and cheap energy and wondrous entertainments. Machines perform our labor and mood-enhancing drugs protect our psyches. We need not struggle — perhaps we need not even work — to live lives, long lives, of luxury and ease.

There, then, is the trade: Cede control and much that we have struggled for can be ours. But control, once gone, is gone.

Would you press the button?

The A.I. conversation centers questions of catastrophe. I want to center the question of success: What if A.I. works not as its architects fear, but as its inventors and investors hope? Wander outside of Silicon Valley’s p(doom) — their shorthand for the probability that A.I. extinguishes the human race — and you might notice that their p(utopia) has problems, too. They imagine something like the world I sketched above, but more extreme, with A.I. playing the role assigned to China.

An amusing collision of these visions came when Jacob Coxon, the 27-year-old OpenAI and Anthropic whistle-blower, sat down with Jon Stewart on “The Daily Show.” Coxon was there to warn that A.I. might kill us all, but when Stewart offhandedly mocked the “future utopia” of the A.I. architects, Coxon stopped him. “Well, I am a believer in the future utopia,” Coxon said. But what he said next sounded grimmer: “So I heard you talking about jobs. I think there will be no jobs.”

Coxon went on to describe “the world that is being envisioned by the people building this technology” as “no jobs. Universal high income. The dividends from entirely automated economic production can be distributed among real humans.”

This vision, or some variant of it, is common enough at A.I. companies. I have heard it often. But most people, face to face with this idea, are incredulous at hearing this world — in which virtually all advanced cognitive work is done by A.I. — described as utopian. Stewart certainly was. “So we’ll all just be performing in a play?” he asked.

I tend toward skepticism of the jobless future. Human beings are good at nothing if not finding something to do. (Who would have imagined, in our grueling agrarian past, that podcasting could be a full-time job?) But I find it easy to imagine how human control and comprehension of much of society could be handed over to machines. A few recent developments — some reflecting the outer boundary of what advanced A.I. can do and the other reflecting its advancing utility in daily life — reveal the ways it is already happening.

A few weeks ago, OpenAI dumped more than 700 manuscripts proposing solutions to nearly 400 advanced mathematical problems all at once. If you’re not a mathematician, and you are not close to any mathematicians, this may have passed by unnoticed. Within mathematics, it was an earthquake.

I am not a mathematician, but my father is. The area of math he worked in had to do with the way electrons move through disordered crystals. Sitting at the center of his field were two problems that were more than just unsolved; they were, my father says, “totally out of reach — nobody had any idea how to solve them.” OpenAI’s systems solved them in an afternoon. “It is the end of mathematics as we know it,” he texted me. “It is the first time I am glad I have retired.”

The newly formed Association for Human Mathematics, which has about 1,000 members, quickly released a statement: “Mathematicians did not ask for this work to be done.” It’s an interesting sentence. Should mathematicians be able to decide which math problems do and do not get solved? How do we weigh the benefits and costs of a world where the frontier of mathematics is advancing rapidly, but human beings no longer understand it?

Imagine the OpenAI process running repeatedly, over a period of years: A.I. swarms solving problems no human being has solved, then using those solutions to pose new problems, which are solved by other A.I. swarms that have absorbed the work done by their predecessors, which allows for the formulation of yet more problems, and on and on. It is too much new math for humans to comprehend, but A.I.s can absorb it easily, and they do, driving forward advances in material sciences and energy production. Human beings do not understand all this new science, but they do benefit from it.

Is that world so different from the one we now inhabit? Few of us understand much about the borderlands of human knowledge. I cannot remotely comprehend the math my father did. How different is it if none of us can understand the math the A.I. does? And yet, a world where the farthest edge of knowledge and progress rests in algorithmic systems, rather than human minds, does seem different to me. Human control — which is, in my view, inseparable from human comprehension — is worth something, is it not?

As I was writing this, I read about a study in which theoretical physicists posed 50 complex, unpublished problems to advanced A.I. systems. These problems were difficult but solvable, taking a physicist who was expert in the particular area of the problem about a day to solve. The best A.I. solved 98 percent of them, at a cost of less than $3 per problem.

The physicists initially thought the A.I. had performed worse than it had, but the model insisted that it was the humans, not the A.I., that had erred, and it was right. “Frankly, I wasn’t expecting this day to come as soon as it has,” Suvrat Raju, one of the physicists behind the study, wrote. “After we found these results, I couldn’t sleep properly for a couple of nights.”

The grimmest A.I. stories often center on a single moment when superintelligence slips out of our control and begins plotting our demise. But the scenario I find more likely and more irresistible is called “gradual disempowerment.”

In this telling, there is no one moment when humanity loses control; there is instead a progression of small moments when we willingly give control away because it is the rational thing to do. Firms turn first more of their work and then more of their decision making over to advanced A.I.s because it gives them a competitive edge. Governments turn more battlefield decisions over to A.I. because it makes their forces swifter and more lethal. A.I. companies turn to recursive self-improvement — where the A.I. autonomously creates the next A.I. model — because it vaults them ahead of their competitors.

The key to this process is competitive pressure. Companies and governments and A.I. labs that resist are outcompeted by peers that give A.I.s more control and autonomy. Advances in A.I. systems — and, eventually, in A.I.-controlled drones and robotics — keep expanding the amount of work A.I.s can do better than human beings. Even assuming the A.I.s remain helpful and pliant, more and more of society’s basic functioning slips beyond the grasp of human beings.

by Ezra Klein, NY Times |  Read more:
Image: Tamara Porras for The New York Times
[ed. We're screwed. Not because there aren't well-intentioned and very capable people working on AI safety and future planning but because the incentives to keep going as fast and far as we can are too great (eg. Sam Altman Is No Oppenheimer). The next 2-3 years will likely be some of the most consequential in history as various crises converge (AI, politics, economics/finance, climate). See also: The AI Doc: (Or How I Became an Apocaloptimist) on Netflix. Highly recommended.]

Friday, October 9, 2026

Saturday, October 3, 2026

I, Pencil

I am a lead pencil—the ordinary wooden pencil familiar to all boys and girls and adults who can read and write.

Writing is both my vocation and my avocation; that's all I do.

You may wonder why I should write a genealogy. Well, to begin with, my story is interesting. And, next, I am a mystery—more so than a tree or a sunset or even a flash of lightning. But, sadly, I am taken for granted by those who use me, as if I were a mere incident and without background. This supercilious attitude relegates me to the level of the commonplace. This is a species of the grievous error in which mankind cannot too long persist without peril. For, as a wise man observed, "We are perishing for want of wonder, not for want of wonders."

I, Pencil, simple though I appear to be, merit your wonder and awe, a claim I shall attempt to prove. In fact, if you can understand me—no, that's too much to ask of anyone—if you can become aware of the miraculousness which I symbolize, you can help save the freedom mankind is so unhappily losing. I have a profound lesson to teach. And I can teach this lesson better than can an automobile or an airplane or a mechanical dishwasher because—well, because I am seemingly so simple.

Simple? Yet, not a single person on the face of this earth knows how to make me. This sounds fantastic, doesn't it? Especially when it is realized that there are about one and one-half billion of my kind produced in the U. S. A. each year.

Pick me up and look me over. What do you see? Not much meets the eye—there’s some wood, lacquer, the printed labeling, graphite lead, a bit of metal, and an eraser.

Just as you cannot trace your family tree back very far, so is it impossible for me to name and explain all my antecedents. But I would like to suggest enough of them to impress upon you the richness and complexity of my background.

My family tree begins with what in fact is a tree, a cedar of straight grain that grows in Northern California and Oregon. Now contemplate all the saws and trucks and rope and the countless other gear used in harvesting and carting the cedar logs to the railroad siding. Think of all the persons and the numberless skills that went into their fabrication: the mining of ore, the making of steel and its refinement into saws, axes, motors; the growing of hemp and bringing it through all the stages to heavy and strong rope; the logging camps with their beds and mess halls, the cookery and the raising of all the foods. Why, untold thousands of persons had a hand in every cup of coffee the loggers drink!

The logs are shipped to a mill in San Leandro, California. Can you imagine the individuals who make flat cars and rails and railroad engines and who construct and install the communication systems incidental thereto? These legions are among my antecedents.

Consider the millwork in San Leandro. The cedar logs are cut into small, pencil-length slats less than one-fourth of an inch in thickness. These are kiln dried and then tinted for the same reason women put rouge on their faces. People prefer that I look pretty, not a pallid white. The slats are waxed and kiln dried again. How many skills went into the making of the tint and the kilns, into supplying the heat, the light and power, the belts, motors, and all the other things a mill requires? Sweepers in the mill among my ancestors? Yes, and included are the men who poured the concrete for the dam of a Pacific Gas & Electric Company hydroplant which supplies the mill's power!

Don’t overlook the ancestors present and distant who have a hand in transporting sixty carloads of slats across the nation from California to Wilkes-Barre!

Complicated Machinery

Once in the pencil factory—$4,000,000 in machinery and building, all capital accumulated by thrifty and saving parents of mine—each slat is given eight grooves by a complex machine, after which another machine lays leads in every other slat, applies glue, and places another slat atop—a lead sandwich, so to speak. Seven brothers and I are mechanically carved from this "wood-clinched" sandwich.

My "lead" itself—it contains no lead at all—is complex. The graphite is mined in Ceylon. Consider these miners and those who make their many tools and the makers of the paper sacks in which the graphite is shipped and those who make the string that ties the sacks and those who put them aboard ships and those who make the ships. Even the lighthouse keepers along the way assisted in my birth—and the harbor pilots.

The graphite is mixed with clay from Mississippi in which ammonium hydroxide is used in the refining process. Then wetting agents are added such as sulfonated tallow—animal fats chemically reacted with sulfuric acid. After passing through numerous machines, the mixture finally appears as endless extrusions—as from a sausage grinder—cut to size, dried, and baked for several hours at 1,850 degrees Fahrenheit. To increase their strength and smoothness the leads are then treated with a hot mixture which includes candelilla wax from Mexico, paraffin wax, and hydrogenated natural fats.

My cedar receives six coats of lacquer. Do you know all of the ingredients of lacquer? Who would think that the growers of castor beans and the refiners of castor oil are a part of it? They are. Why, even the processes by which the lacquer is made a beautiful yellow involves the skills of more persons than one can enumerate!

Observe the labeling. That's a film formed by applying heat to carbon black mixed with resins. How do you make resins and what, pray, is carbon black?

My bit of metal—the ferrule—is brass. Think of all the persons who mine zinc and copper and those who have the skills to make shiny sheet brass from these products of nature. Those black rings on my ferrule are black nickel. What is black nickel and how is it applied? The complete story of why the center of my ferrule has no black nickel on it would take pages to explain.

Then there's my crowning glory, inelegantly referred to in the trade as "the plug," the part man uses to erase the errors he makes with me. An ingredient called "factice" is what does the erasing. It is a rubber-like product made by reacting rape seed oil from the Dutch East Indies with sulfur chloride. Rubber, contrary to the common notion, is only for binding purposes. Then, too, there are numerous vulcanizing and accelerating agents. The pumice comes from Italy; and the pigment which gives "the plug" its color is cadium sulfide.

Does anyone wish to challenge my earlier assertion that no single person on the face of this earth knows how to make me?

No One Knows

Actually, millions of human beings have had a hand in my creation, no one of whom even knows more than a very few of the others. Now, you may say that I go too far in relating the picker of a coffee berry in far off Brazil and food growers elsewhere to my creation; that this is an extreme position. I shall stand by my claim. There isn't a single person in all these millions, including the president of the pencil company, who contributes more than a tiny, infinitesimal bit of know-how. From the standpoint of know-how the only difference between the miner of graphite in Ceylon and the logger in Oregon is in the type of know-how. Neither the miner nor the logger can be dispensed with, any more than can the chemist at the factory or the worker in the oil field—paraffin being a by-product of petroleum.

Here is an astounding fact: Neither the worker in the oil field nor the chemist nor the digger of graphite or clay nor any who mans or makes the ships or trains or trucks nor the one who runs the machine that does the knurling on my bit of metal nor the president of the company performs his singular task because he wants me. Each one wants me less, perhaps, than does a child in the first grade. Indeed, there are some among this vast multitude who never saw a pencil nor would they know how to use one. Their motivation is other than me. Perhaps it is something like this: Each of these millions sees that he can thus exchange his tiny know-how for the goods and services he needs or wants. I may or may not be among these items.

There is a fact still more astounding: The absence of a master mind, of anyone dictating or forcibly directing these countless actions which bring me into being. No trace of such a person can be found. Instead, we find the Invisible Hand at work. This is the mystery to which I earlier referred.

by Leonard E. Read, Wikisource |  Read more:
Image: via
[ed. Now with AI, the Invisible Hand may eventually kill us all.]
***
... the incentives which free markets sometimes create for self-interested people to accidentally act in the public interest, even when this is not something they intended.


Whenever there are "externalities"—where the actions of an individual have impacts on others for which they do not pay, or for which they are not compensated—markets will not work well. Some of the important instances have long understood environmental externalities. Markets, by themselves, produce too much pollution. Markets, by themselves, also produce too little basic research. (The government was responsible for financing most of the important scientific breakthroughs, including the internet and the first telegraph line, and many bio-tech advances.) But recent research has shown that these externalities are pervasive, whenever there is imperfect information or imperfect risk markets—that is always. Government plays an important role in banking and securities regulation, and a host of other areas: some regulation is required to make markets work. Government is needed, almost all would agree, at a minimum to enforce contracts and property rights. ~ Joseph E. Stiglitz

Monday, September 28, 2026

The Id, the Ego and the Superintelligence

Panic around A.I. often focuses on whether machines will replace (or simply kill) us. But what the machines are often good at is a distinct set of tasks: Retrieval, near-instant summary and the frictionless, stunning recombination of everything that has already been said. What they are not good at is what philosophy has been training humans to do for thousands of years: judgment. And so the A.I. companies have started hiring philosophers. They don’t just consult them or wheel them out for an amusing after-dinner talk on the trolley problem; they actually hire them with salaries and, presumably, dental plans. A.I. companies need philosophers because actually thinking requires forgetting — and knowing when to forget. They need philosophers because of what their machines cannot do.

Judgment is not calculation. It is the capacity to weigh, to discriminate, to sense that one answer is true and another merely correct. It is taste, discernment and the knack of thinking sideways. It is refined only through experience — through error, embarrassment, boredom, grief and the occasional hangover. Meaning is derived from the fact that we are mortal: Things matter to us because we are going to die, and we know it. There can be no meaning in immortality. To borrow from my friend Christian Madsbjerg, I would like to propose a better Turing test than Turing’s: Can a machine experience social anxiety? Can it lie awake at 4 in the morning replaying the stupid thing it said at dinner? Call me when a chatbot does that. To be intelligent in the human sense, the machine would need to give a damn.

Enter the A.I. companies’ philosophers. Anthropic keeps a small squad on the payroll, among them Amanda Askell, whose doctoral thesis was on infinite ethics — the question of how to act well in a universe of infinite value — and whose job is to shape the character of the company’s machine. Google DeepMind has appointed the Cambridge philosopher Henry Shevlin to the newly minted post of “Philosopher,” a job title I have been trying and failing to secure for some 40 years. The OpenAI chief executive Sam Altman says his company consulted “hundreds of moral philosophers” in drawing up the principles behind ChatGPT. (That’s roughly the turnout of a middling philosophy conference.)

After a lifetime of being asked at parties what one actually does with a philosophy degree, I find this development almost unbearably funny. Why now? Because the questions the A.I. companies are stumbling into are not engineering questions. What should the machine say to the grieving, the lonely, the person typing into the void at 4 in the morning? What sort of character should it have — candid, flattering, evasive, kind? Could such a thing conceivably suffer, and would we owe it anything if it did? These are questions about what matters. The engineers, to their credit, have noticed that no quantity of computational capacity will settle them. Ethics, it turns out, cannot be scraped from the internet, because the internet is precisely the contemporary record of our failure to agree about ethics.

There is a further irony here, and it is an old one. Philosophy’s first recorded technology panic was about exactly the thing these machines have now perfected: Artificial memory. Toward the end of Plato’s “Phaedrus,” Socrates tells the story of the Egyptian god Theuth, inventor of numbers, geometry, astronomy, draughts and dice, who presents his masterpiece — writing — to Thamus, god-king of Egypt. This discovery, Theuth announces, will make the Egyptians wiser: It is a pharmakon, or remedy, for memory. Thamus is unpersuaded. Writing, he replies, will implant forgetfulness in the soul; people will trust the external marks and cease to remember from within; they will acquire the reputation of wisdom without the reality. Pharmakon, conveniently, also means poison. Every panic since — about the printing press, the novel, television, the smartphone, the chatbot — has been a footnote to Thamus, and the joke, of course, is that we know his warning against writing only because Plato wrote it down.

Seen from the “Phaedrus,” A.I. is not a rupture but a culmination, representing the final, most extravagant flowering of external memory, the remedy-poison swallowed whole. And this is where the difference between us and the machines cuts deepest. A.I. is a memory machine, the most magnificent ever devised. It forgets nothing. The human being, by contrast, is a forgetful animal. To make this happily oblivious creature remember — to make it capable of promises, debts and morality — required millenniums of discipline and frankly appalling cruelty. “If something is to stay in the memory, it must be burned in,” Friedrich Nietzsche wrote. Conscience, on this view, is mnemonics with a whip.

Yet Nietzsche also prized what he called active forgetting, and considered it a form of strength, even of health. Forgetting is not a leaky bucket but a doorkeeper, closing the gates of consciousness so that something new can happen, so that experience can be digested rather than endlessly force-fed back to us. We forget, and we move on. Forgiveness, sleep, cheerfulness, second marriages, continuing to support Luton Town Football Club: All of it depends on the merciful erosion of the past.

Some years ago, I wrote a short book called “Memory Theatre” about a philosopher (kind of an even more awful version of me) who attempted total recall, arranging every scrap of his past in a vast mnemonic palace. It did not end well for him; it never does. A creature that could forget nothing would not be a superintelligence but a ruin, buried alive under its own archive. What we have built is, in a sense, an infinite archive that cannot mourn, cannot forgive and cannot let go, because it never lost anything in the first place. The machine remembers everything and therefore, oddly, nothing in particular. Nothing weighs more than anything else.

This is why philosophy matters rather more, not less, in the age of A.I. Not because philosophers can out-remember the machines — believe me, we cannot; I continually forget where I have parked my own arguments — but because philosophy is the discipline of knowing what to do with experience: What to keep, what to discard, what to laugh at, what to junk. Thinking is not the accumulation of everything but the art of judicious, active forgetting.

by Simon Critchley, NY Times | Read more:
Image: Flo Meissner

Thursday, September 24, 2026

Tell Me What “Socialism” Means

Before you tell me if it’s good or bad.

You may have noticed that political arguments often have a frustrating, circular nature. Charges and countercharges, points and counterpoints—all get made without ever seeming to converge on a shared reality. It may seem that you and your political opponents are talking past one another. Much of this, in electoral politics, is due to the fact that the discussions are in fact bad faith attacks that seek only to undermine, rather than to reach an agreement. But even good faith attempts to find common ground with political opponents frequently sink in these murky waters.

When this happens, stop and ask: What are we talking about? Are we talking about the same thing here? What is the definition of the terms that we are allegedly debating? Frequently, you will find that you and your counterpart each have a personal definition of the thing that you are arguing about, and those definitions are not the same. Your argument has not been about political substance at all; it has been about the meaning of a particular term. Failure to settle on a shared definition before you start the debate means that the debate can just go on forever in opposite directions, like two fighter jets flying past one another at different altitudes and wondering why they never get a chance to shoot down the enemy.

Nowhere in American politics does this stupid dilemma manifest itself more than the purported debate over “socialism.” Oh, you have opinions on “socialism?” And whether it is evil? Or great? And you would like to yell about them? Let me stop you right there. What exactly does that mean?

The majority of mainstream political discourse about socialism—and almost all of the discourse emanating from Republicans—is just bad faith, lowest-common-denominator red baiting, paltry attempts to wring some political advantage from the still-glowing embers of decades of Cold War anticommunism rhetoric that has soaked deep into the minds of anyone born before the turn of the century. None of this is a genuine attempt to discuss what socialism really is and what it might mean here, so I will ignore it. (A benefit of being a How Things Work reader is that I respect you enough to skip the many paragraphs of undeserved credulousness that other, less honest outlets would feel obligated to pay to this bullshit.)

What about those who do want to discuss the issue? Those who believe that they are trying to communicate something useful about whether or not socialism is desirable? In aggregate, I’m afraid, this has become one of the least productive mishmashes of disparate meanings in living memory.

Liberal billionaire Nick Hanauer writes that “Neither socialism nor MAGA is the answer” to America’s inequality crisis. Instead, he advocates for higher minimum wages, higher taxes on the rich, stronger labor unions, and less concentrated corporate power. He puts forward his proposal for “market humanism” as a counterpoint to what is on offer from politicians like Zohran Mamdani, who supports higher minimum wages, higher taxes on the rich, stronger labor unions, and less concentrated corporate power.

Bernie Sanders is America’s most famous socialist politician. He became popular by calling for higher minimum wages, higher taxes on the rich, stronger labor unions, and less concentrated corporate power. When Elizabeth Warren was running for president against Bernie, she distinguished herself from him by declaring that she was, in fact, a capitalist, and wanted not socialism, but Accountable Capitalism. Her platform included higher minimum wages, higher taxes on the rich, stronger labor unions, and less concentrated corporate power.

On the other side is Donald Trump, an avowed anti-socialist, who is now aggressively pursuing state ownership of corporations.

What is the public supposed to take from this contradictory, uninformative war of labels? Polls now show that socialism is significantly more popular than capitalism among Democrats. What that means is that we have succeeded in getting people to imagine that “socialism” means things they like, more than “capitalism” does. This is good, I guess, but it is mostly an indicator of the fact that everyone’s personal definition of these terms is so flexible to the point of meaninglessness.

The dictionary definition of socialism is “any of various egalitarian economic and political theories or movements advocating collective or governmental ownership and administration of the means of production and distribution of goods.” The Republican definition of socialism is “A laundry list of the worst abuses of totalitarian communist states; or, anything advocated by a Democrat that would cost the rich money.” The centrist definition of socialism is “anyone to our left.” The progressive capitalist definition of socialism is “other progressives who may share my values but who are sadly not economically savvy enough to understand that what we really need are higher minimum wages, higher taxes on the rich, stronger labor unions, and less concentrated corporate power.” That is, coincidentally, also more or less the definition of socialism that democratic socialists have. Each faction imagines that the others are unsophisticated, unrealistic dupes.

My purpose in writing this is not so much to try to litigate the One Correct Definition of Socialism, but rather to highlight the (critical!) fact that the big debate about the Soul of the Democratic Party or the Battle For the Faith of America or whatever is, for the most part, one big cloud of people talking past one another. The dirty secret is that most political commentators prefer it this way. It is easier to make grand proclamations about how either Free Enterprise Is Fundamental to Free People or how Capitalist Scum Must Die than to go about the tedious work of agreeing upon our terms and then having an actual policy debate.

I am a self-proclaimed socialist who writes for a socialist magazine and who just got back from attending the Socialist Conference. I promise you that socialists themselves do not have a shared definition of socialism. Much less do the people on the other side whose only reference point for socialism is “Cuba and uhhh Russia” have a shared definition of socialism. My own definition of what socialism means in the context of American politics would be something like “More public control and less private control in society, particularly in the economy, with the goal of producing greater equality.” That, I think, gets at what most of us actually mean when we talk about this stuff. (I have met few American socialists who are truly committed to the communist caricature of full state control of the economy, and even those who do will have to admit that that the path to getting there is described above.)

You will notice that even this definition is directional—it describes where we are trying to go in relation to where we are now, rather than articulating some strict Marxist benchmark that must be met. Politics itself is a directional endeavor, so this sort of definition is useful for politics. If you are an academic looking for analytical rigor above all, however, it might not satisfy you.

Who cares! If you take anything away from all of this, let it be: Almost all of America’s mainstream political debate over “socialism” is stupid. The portion of it that is not a scam on purpose is mostly a big waste of time. Do you support higher minimum wages, higher taxes on the rich, stronger labor unions, and less concentrated corporate power? Then we are on the same side. Let’s walk down that road together. If we make progress, we will reach some point where some people say, “This is far enough.” The rest of us will say, “No, we need to keep pushing this further.” At that point, we can have a debate about the actual policies in question, and their merits, and what the ideal we are trying to reach looks like. 

by Hamilton Nolan, How Things Work |  Read more:
Image: Getty
[ed. See also: Capital Is Organizing the World to Its Advantage and Everything Else Is a Sideshow (HTW):]
***
"We are all mad at the billionaires and whatnot but let’s be very clear about the mechanism driving all of this: American companies are making more money than ever and they don’t have to share it because workers don’t have the power to claim their fair share, and because some of the money has been used to purchase political influence to prevent the government from stepping in, and so therefore the money accrues to the owners, which is to say, to the rich. The richest ten percent of Americans own close to 90% of America’s stock market wealth.

This isn’t too hard to understand. I obviously didn’t invent this analysis—this is just grade school Marxism. But to reach these conclusions you don’t need to read any theory or know any buzzwords. You just need COMMON SENSE. All the money that businesses make will go either to the workers or to the owners. The goal of capital, of businesses, the logic of capitalism itself, is for businesses to try to take as close to 100% of the profits as possible for themselves. (Indeed, an amusing new economics paper shows that going to business schools causes managers to pursue exactly this mandate). This is the nature of a corporation. It will always do it, just like a fire will always want to burn. Our problem is that we have not kept corporations properly contained. So, like fire, they will consume everything.

It is far more accurate, more useful, and more true to understand politics as a battleground between capital and labor than as some sort of Democratic vs. Republican thing. Politics is just another arena for capital to organize in order to maximize its own growth."

Tuesday, September 22, 2026

The 25 Science-Fiction Books You Must Read, Ranked

And six short story collections

Some ‘best of’ lists seek to achieve a spurious objectivity through means such as reader polls, complex ranking systems or asking distinguished experts for their views.

This is not one of those lists. This list has instead been compiled by the greatly superior method1 of me thinking really hard about it and assuming that my opinion mattered more than anyone else’s.

In terms of criteria, firstly, every book on the list is an excellent read. Some of the books on here may be worthy, but there are no books on here purely for their worthiness. Secondly, every book is one that will make you think, or open your eyes to a new perspective - for that is a core function of science fiction, to explore new possibilities. And thirdly, to whittle the list down to 25, I have taken into account relevance and impact - either to the world of today, or to the genre more broadly.

While the borders of every genre are porous, every book on here has a clear claim to being science fiction. There is no pure fantasy, or alternate history - much though I enjoy those genres, this is not their list.

So, without further ado, let’s get cracking. As is traditional, we’ll do this in reverse order, so you’re kept guessing to the very end as to whether I’m overlooking your own favourites, or saying they’re amongst the best.

Last and First Men - Olaf Stapledon (1930)


A future history, not a novel, Stapledon takes us forward across billions of years as new races of humanity rise and fall - on Earth, on Venus and ultimately on Neptune. Some winged, some more intelligent and some less intelligent, some deliberately designed and some evolved, each have their turn on the stage. [...]

The Mote in God’s Eye - Larry Niven and Jerry Pournelle (1974)


What happens when you combine Niven’s extraordinary imagination with Pournelle’s ability to actually tell a story that has a plot? You get The Mote in God’s Eye, perhaps the best first-contact encounter with a truly alien extra-terrestrial species ever written, in a richly rendered future setting. A rare occasion of a joint-authored novel being better than any that either has written alone. [...]

The Day of the Triffids - John Wyndham (1951)


What if almost everyone went blind, and sentient, walking, carnivorous plants inherited the earth? This unlikely premise forms the basis for one of the most civilly bleak post-apocalyptic novels, as the protagonist and his companion wend their way across the devastated Home Counties, seeking a safe haven where the remnants of humanity can survive. [...]

The Diamond Age - Neal Stephenson (1995)


A world of nanotechnology and AI, in which nation states have been supplanted by ‘phyles’ - groupings, sometimes ethnic, sometimes regional, sometimes political, of freely associating individuals - the Diamond Age tells the story of Nell, a young girl growing up in poverty who receives an advanced AI ‘primer’, designed to educate and guide its owner into a ‘more interesting life’. A wildly imaginative roller-coaster ride through a provocative future. [...]

The Warrior’s Apprentice - Lois McMaster Bujold (1986)


Arguably the best science-fiction author currently writing, The Warrior’s Apprentice introduces the brilliant, driven, physically stunted Miles Vorkosigan, primary protagonist of her Vorkosigan Saga, and follows him as he ‘accidentally’ builds himself a mercenary fleet. Modern space opera at its finest. [...]

Foundation - Isaac Asimov (1951)


A novel that shaped the genre, Foundation tells the story of a Galactic Empire in decline, the brilliant psychohistorian who sees a way to minimise the harm - and the lives of those who followed him, living his plan, guiding the new Foundation in its ascent. [...]

The Three-Body Problem - Liu Cixin (2008)


by Edrith, World of Edrith |  Read more:
Images: uncredited
[ed. Not a bad list. Could easily be doubled.]

China and the Future of Science

The Chinese socio-political system differs from our own. From the perspective of the topic of this conference, here is the most salient distinction: the Chinese system has a telos. The Chinese party-state is fundamentally a set of goal-oriented institutions. This is not unique to China—it is in fact a distinguishing feature of all Leninist systems. I sometimes think of Leninist systems as a little bit like that bus in the movie Speed. Who here has seen it? For those who haven’t, here is basic gist of that film: an extortionist attaches a bomb to the speedometer of a bus. If the bus ever slows below 50 miles per hour, everyone blows up. So it is with your average communist system. Either it hurtles towards some clearly defined goal or things start to fall apart.

In the early days of Mao, the overarching aim of the communist system was to seize state power, first through subversion and insurgency, then through more regular combined arms warfare. In the later days of Mao the newly established Chinese state and the society it intertwined were oriented around class struggle, both at home and abroad. From the 1980s through the 2010s the Chinese system was orbited a different yet still very explicitly stated goal: getting rich. In theory, if not always in practice, every action taken by every cadre, every soldier, and every state employee was subordinate to this larger, unifying aim. We must make China rich.

That is no longer the animating telos of the Chinese system. There is a new goal, one that has been articulated with great clarity by Chairman Xi and the Chinese central committee: In 2026, the aim of China’s communist enterprise is to lead humanity through what they call “the next round of techno scientific revolution and industrial transformation.”2 The Chinese leadership believes humanity stands on the cusp of the next industrial revolution. China can only be restored to its ancestral greatness if it is the pioneer of this revolution. All machinery of party and state must bend towards this end. All 100 million members of the Communist Party of China, all 50 million government employees of the PRC, all two million soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army, and ultimately all of the 1.4 billion people that call China home must be mobilized to accomplish this aim. That is the ambition. China will be the greatest scientific power the world has ever seen—or bust.

The communists are deadly serious about their pursuit of this aim. Statistics provide one window into the seriousness of their intent. Now I don’t intend for the remainder of this speech to be a laundry list of numbers, but I think the numbers are useful for helping us see the scale of what China has already accomplished and the speed with which they have accomplished it. They are also strong signal of future intent—it is difficult to survey the numbers and not appreciate just how ironclad China’s commitment to scientific achievement really is.

Now scientific achievement is difficult to measure. One common metric is to count the so-called “high impact papers” – journal articles highly cited by other leading lights in a given scientific field. Count up these papers over the course of a year, see who wrote them, see where those authors work, and—voila!—you have a ranked list of which institutions are putting out the most high-impact science in a given year. Had you done this counting exercise in the year 2005, you would have discovered that six of the world’s ten most productive universities were in the United States. Today only one of those universities is in the United States. That university is Harvard, coming in at spot number three on the list. At spot number one? Zhejiang University.

How many of you have heard of Zhejiang University? Can I get a show of hands?

And of course, Zhejiang University is just one of the Chinese institutions on this top ten list. China claims not just the number-one spot, but also the number-two spot. And not just the number-one and number-two spots, but also the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eight, ninth spots go to the Chinese.

The scientific publisher Nature makes a similar catalog on a slightly more granular level, looking at specific fields of science. According to Nature’s most recent rankings, 18 of the top 25 most productive research institutes in the physical sciences, 19 of the top 20 in geosciences, and a full 25 out of 25 in chemistry are Chinese. Only in the biosciences do American scientists still have a lead—but even on that list three of the top ten are Chinese.

The kicker is, none of that was true even just a decade ago.

The most granular analysis of all is published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, or ASPI. ASPI publishes a neat research tracker that surveys new publications in 74 distinct high-end technologies. Unlike the statistics I just discussed, their tracker includes research published by scientists working in national laboratories and private institutions as well as those published by academic scientists. For each category they make a list of the ten institutions that are publishing the most high-impact science in that particular topic. What have they found? For 66 of the 74 categories tracked, a majority of the institutions that are now publishing the highest-impact science are Chinese. In many areas of science the dominance is total: For example, ten of then most productive research institutions in the fields of nanoscale material manufacturing, photonic sensors, chemical coating, drone operations, automated swarms, and undersea communications are Chinese. The number is nine out of ten for work on supercapacitors, advanced composite materials, inertial navigation systems, and satellite positioning, eight out of ten in advanced optical communications, advanced radiofrequency communications, and new chemical coatings, and seven out of ten for directed energy technologies, nuclear engineering, and nuclear waste treatment.

The scale of Chinese scientific production is in part a story about people. China graduates five times the number of medical and biomedical students than we do every year, seven times the number of engineers, and two-and-a-half times the number of undergraduates with research experience in artificial intelligence. Last year China graduated almost double the number of STEM PhD students than we did—and that number is actually worse than it sounds because—depending on the exact year you do the counting—between one sixth and one fifth of our STEM graduates are themselves Chinese.

Many of these researchers go back. They go back partially because they are well compensated for doing so. They also go back because of the research opportunities afforded to them. A recent study found that returning Chinese scientists go on to become the lead author on 2.5 times more papers than their colleagues who stay in the United States.9 Many Chinese research labs have 30 or 40 people attached to them—the equivalent to a commercial research lab in the United States. Ask any scientist who has gone to China in the past three years to visit academic colleagues and they will tell you how astounded they are at the quality of the laboratory equipment and machinery that their Chinese colleagues have access to. If in the not-so-distant past Chinese localities competed with each other to lay the most asphalt, now that funding pours into laboratory equipment, scientific instruments, and advanced scientific facilities. Thus China now has the world’s most sensitive ultra-high-energy cosmic-ray detector, the world’s largest and most sensitive radio telescope, the world’s strongest steady-state magnetic field, the world’s fastest quantum computer by computational advantage, and the world’s most sensitive neutrino detector. Just yesterday an attendee at this conference informed me of another I should add to my list: the world’s largest primate medical research center.

Now I can already hear some of your objections. “Tanner, these measures don’t include classified research. They don’t include the proprietary research by private companies—that is the stuff that actually pushes technology forward. American companies are not publishing billion-dollar trade secrets in the latest journals. The Chinese scientists are under insane publish or perish pressures—they are far more likely to lie and cheat. Don’t you know Chinese scientists take part in citation cartels? Haven’t you read those bitter critiques of the new system written by China’s own disgruntled scientists?”

My main response to this: you guys have lost the thread. I am reminded of a similar style of argument we often see in AI development. Every time a new model is released people play around with it for a bit and then start to catalog the flaws of this model. But the real story, the story historians will tell a generation from now, is never about the model of the moment. What matters is movement between those moments. History is made by the trend-line. What capabilities did the models have four years ago? What capabilities do they have now? What might they reasonably be expected to have in a decade hence?

Something similar might be said for science and China.

Moreover, it is not hard so hard to find examples of dominance in the scientific literature leading to dominance in the world of applied technology. More than a decade ago Chinese researchers began to dominate academic work on batteries. Today China produces 80% of the world’s battery cells. Around that same time Chinese researchers took the lead on factory robots and factory automation. Today Chinese firms buy more robots than the rest of the world combined. They have a higher robot density than almost every other country in world, despite being the world’s second largest nation. Another example: China is the only place where the unit cost of building a new nuclear reactor has gone down over the last decade. Do you think this is unrelated to the number of nuclear engineers they train and the amount of basic research they publish on nuclear engineering? Again I beg you to look at the trend-line: In 2026 China has 102 nuclear reactors either in operation or under construction. How many did they have 15 years ago? Less than 30.

Why is China pouring so many resources into scientific and technological advance? Here is a 30-second thumbnail sketch: Xi Jinping and those around him have a specific view of history. Like most Chinese, they remember with fondness past eras when their nation was the centerpiece of human civilization. They mourn China’s fall from those grand heights. They remember with bitterness the “century of humiliation” in which their people were exploited by foreign powers and wasted by vicious warlords. The Communist Party of China was founded to save China from that fate. From its inception it has seen itself as the vehicle for the salvation of the Chinese nation and thence the restoration of this nation to its rightful place at the center of the human story.

But why was China displaced from its spot “at the center of the world stage” in the first place? Chinese intellectuals have been asking this question for more than a century. Here is their most common answer: science and technology. Today Party-affiliated thinkers often describe modern human history as punctuated by discrete revolutionary moments when a new technological regime comes into being. They call these moments “rounds of techno-scientific revolution and industrial transformation.” In such moments the material basis of human civilization changes. Those who master this transition master… well, just about everything.

by Tanner Greer, Scholar's Stage |  Read more:
Image: uncredited

Monday, September 21, 2026

Annie Dillard, Meditative Author of ‘Pilgrim at Tinker Creek,’ Dies at 81

Annie Dillard, who as a young American writer walked into the woods and came out with a Pulitzer Prize-winning book on the wonders and horrors of creation, the modern classic “Pilgrim at Tinker Creek,” died Tuesday at her home in South Wellfleet, Massachusetts. She was 81.

Her death was confirmed by her literary executor, Maggie Nelson. No further details were given.

With the publication of “Pilgrim at Tinker Creek” in 1974, Dillard, just 28, was recognized as a major new voice in American letters. It was only the beginning of her career: In the years to come, she would publish essays, meditations on religion, poems, a theory of literature, two novels, journalism, a bestselling autobiography and another bestseller, “The Writing Life,” about what it takes to put words into a world that has more than enough of them.

Reviewers of “Tinker Creek” were quick to understand it as a 20th-century analogue to Henry David Thoreau’s “Walden.” This was no coincidence: Dillard had chosen Thoreau as the subject of her master’s thesis at Hollins University, the women’s liberal arts college in Roanoke, Virginia.

Like Thoreau, she found an unremarkable body of water to be as good a place as any for deep thoughts — particularly about how to reconcile the idea of a benevolent God with nature’s cruelty.

Unlike Thoreau, Dillard didn’t build a cabin in the woods and live there through the seasons of a year. Though her writing could convey the sense of a solitary life in the wilderness, she was mostly a day-tripper. After her forays into the Roanoke Valley of the Blue Ridge Mountains — which was, after all, her neighborhood — she would return home to the suburban house she shared with Richard Dillard, a creative writing instructor she had married at the end of her sophomore year at Hollins.

That she was a photogenic young woman coming to grips with raw nature — a business that had been almost exclusively the province of men with beards — was undeniably part of the Dillard mystique. So was her insistence that, in spite of her patient, unflinching observations on flora and fauna, she wasn’t a nature writer, but rather a theologian looking high and low for God. [...]

“Tinker Creek” won the Pulitzer for general nonfiction in 1975, and Dillard was overwhelmed by requests for speeches, interviews and television appearances. Her looks were thought by many media outlets to be as newsworthy as her writing — so much so that she was ridiculed in some circles as “Cheesecake at Tinker Creek.”

Repelled by the consequences of her success, she moved to Washington state and began dividing her time between the city of Bellingham and the islands Waldron and Lummi. Her marriage to Richard Dillard had ended in amicable divorce, and in the Pacific Northwest, she found privacy enough to regain the concentration essential to her work.

“The Cascade Range, in these high latitudes, backs almost into the water,” she wrote. “There is only a narrow strip, an afterthought of foothills and farms sixty miles wide, between the snowy mountains and the sea.”
 
by Daniel Lewis, NY Times via Seattle Times |  Read more:
Image: Rollie McKenna
[ed. Just learned about Annie's death this morning. One of my all-time favorite books is The Living (a fictional depiction of the evolution of Whatcom county, the area around Bellingham, WA). See also: Annie Dillard brought poetry into prose, pioneering a mystical form of creative nonfiction (The Conversation):]
***
Not all writing is the same. Prose typically features continuous sentences arranged in paragraphs. Poetry tends to be differentiated from prose by a deliberate organization of language that’s not determined by the page itself.

Prose poetry, the lyric essay and other hybrid forms of literature play at the intersection of genre, which usually defines these separate categories of writing. Creative nonfiction likewise aims to accurately convey reality while emphasizing literary style. The literary features of creative nonfiction are often drawn from fiction, with devices such as dialogue, scene and flashback.

But one of the distinctions of Annie Dillard’s nonfiction is how much her prose owes to poetry.

Poetry can be defined in many ways, but it tends to be characterized by honed, heightened language. Poems are often noted for their memorable images, rich sounds and foregrounding of emotion. Dillard’s nonfiction is shot through with images that arrest readers with their beauty or confront readers with their terror – as in her Harper’s essay “The Death of a Moth,” where the insect is drawn to a candle flame, becomes stuck in the wax and is transformed into a burning wick. In Dillard’s words:
“She burned for two hours without changing, without swaying or kneeling – only glowing within, like a building fire glimpsed through silhouetted walls, like a hollow saint, like a flame-faced virgin gone to God, while I read by her light, kindled, while Rimbaud in Paris burnt out his brain in a thousand poems, while night pooled wetly at my feet.”
It’s no accident that Dillard describes herself as reading the work of French poet Arthur Rimbaud by the light of the moth. She previously wrote that she loved how language sounds in French symbolist poetry, and Rimbaud was known to combine prose with his poetry in a way Dillard herself does.

Tuesday, September 15, 2026

James Taylor

[ed. Great barn concert. Full playlist here. History of the Frozen Man here (do watch untill the end).]

Friday, September 11, 2026

After Work, We’ll Have Each Other

What will people do all day? I mean, of course, if the AIs surpass us at all economically necessary forms of labor.

There’s an emerging consensus on this point, assuming we’re all still alive and not subjects of a cyberpunk feudalist dystopia. When the machines can do everything else, our relationships will be what’s left.

Maybe we won’t have to work at all. Or maybe we’ll still have something that superficially resembles modern employment, just concentrated in what economist Alex Imas calls “the relational sector” in his essay “What Will Become Scarce.” We’ll always need humans to supply the human touch. And how will we get those relational jobs? Relationships, obviously. It’s not what you know, it’s who you know, since everyone knows everything anyway.

What is really being suggested here is less a continuation of modern work than a return to a much older cultural understanding of labor. Imas makes this point directly: “Before industrialization, it was difficult to separate a product from the person who made it … Economic transactions had a distinct social component that was innately linked to the consumption experience.”

Relatedly, before industrialization, there was very little sense that working, in itself, could be dignified or meaningful. We were not defined by our jobs but by our participation in a densely interconnected social world. And we might be again. That’s the natural consequence of all these relationalist predictions — a world where our connections to other humans are what give us structure, identity, and meaning.

I am afraid they’re right. 

Power and sex among apes

Making sweeping statements about the relationship between technology and cultural change is always a risk, and I’d rather avoid it until it’s absolutely necessary. At the same time, our degree of ignorance about the future is greatly exaggerated. If the future looks anything like the past — and there’s good reason to believe it will — then we can make progress with case studies.

Let’s start with 18th-century aristocrats. Aristocrats are (typically) rich, which we certainly will be if we have robots capable of all normal nonrelational labor. More importantly, when they did need to acquire material resources, they did it through leveraging their connections to obtain more land or a lucrative position at court — no drudgery necessary.

They did not work for pay; they certainly did not see work as a source of meaning. It’s certainly true that some of them had real obligations, like governing or killing each other, but court life in the age of absolutism is as close to a purely relational world as anything I can think of.

We also know a great deal about what mattered most to them and how they chose to occupy their time.[...]

You might be imagining glittering salons where the leading figures of the Enlightenment discussed poetry, drama, and the most pressing philosophical issues of the day. This is (mostly) a lie. Salons existed and philosophes attended them, but more for entertainment than for rational discourse. When we look at the enormous amount of written material the salonnieres and their guests produced — as French historian Antoine Lilti did — it is clear that their conversation consisted overwhelmingly of political gossip. They were almost all aristocrats, and they almost always talked about themselves. [...]

The working classes

That would be The Urban Villagers, a 1962 ethnography of working-class Italian Americans in the West End of Boston by sociologist and urban planner Herbert J. Gans. This seems like an odd comparison. Don’t the working classes, by definition, work? [...]

Gans’ use of the term “urban village” was deliberate: He believed that the West Enders had inherited the basic forms of social organization from their parents and grandparents, rural peasants from Sicily or Southern Italy. These were not people who had absorbed a typically Yankee relationship to work. Most male West Enders worked unskilled or semiskilled blue-collar jobs, and their employment was typically precarious. They did not see a fulfilling career, or indeed a career of any kind, as possible or even desirable.

It’s not that West Enders liked their dead-end jobs. They just didn’t think much about them. Work was not a central organizing activity of West End life. West Enders worked just enough to support their lifestyle, which revolved around what Gans calls the peer group. The West End, in his words, was a “peer group society.” An adult peer group might include a married couple’s same-age relatives — siblings, cousins, in-laws — and perhaps a few childhood friends, who would probably be “adopted” in as godparents to the couple’s children. These people would spend almost all of their time together, meeting in the apartment of one family or another after work and staying late into the night. The men might gamble at a local corner store — gambling is absolutely omnipresent in this world — but mostly, they talked, and talking mostly meant gossip.

This is where the parallels to old money Midwestern ladies and European aristocrats start to show. While there are any number of things these groups don’t have in common, all of them share certain features.

First, none of them see work as a source of status. West Enders do like to show off, but never about their jobs: Their talent as conversationalists in the peer group setting is much more important. Second, they are exclusive. A West Ender knows all the same people from early childhood. They’re very skeptical of outsiders, including members of other ethnic groups who’ve lived in the same neighborhood their whole lives.

Finally, they all spend an enormous amount of energy policing deviant behavior. In the West End, this usually means sexual promiscuity for women, effeminacy for men, and class aspirations for anyone. A boy might be mercilessly bullied for doing too well in school or for wanting a white-collar job. Even unusual success is frowned upon. A person’s primary source of dignity is not their own achievements, but their relationship to the group:

The major criteria for ranking, differentiating, and estimating compatibility are ingroup loyalty and conformity to established standards of personal behavior, as well as interpersonal relations. West Enders expect each other to maintain prevalent social practices and consumer styles, to marry within the ethnic — or at least the religious — group, and to reject middle-class forms of status and culture … The most significant criterion of interpersonal behavior is behavioral control — the ability to regulate one’s own needs and wishes and to defer to the needs of the group when necessary.
Gans, like all good ethnographers, likes his subjects, and their way of life has a lot to like — they really do enjoy a warm, rich, close-knit social world. But he also goes out of his way to emphasize that these people are extraordinarily conformist relative to middle-class American suburbanites in the 1950s. [...]

Friendship was invented in 18th-century Scotland

Relational living comes to us naturally. It’s the most common form of social organization in human history, and millions of people around the world are perfectly happy with it. But when our personal dignity comes from our membership in a group, everything the group does reflects on us — and everything we do reflects, unavoidably, on the group. It’s not a coincidence that Russian princes and Bostonian Italian day laborers spent most of their time gossiping (or, if we want to be technical, constructing and enforcing norms of behavior). They were defending their collective reputations: the thing that mattered most to them in the world.

This is why so much contemporary discussion of work and meaning is misguided. It’s very clear that humans don’t need work or anything like it to live meaningful lives. Nor do we need the things that people who talk about “meaning” mean — individual self-actualization, personal growth, serving a greater purpose. We can get by just fine without any of them, as historically most of us have. What we absolutely can’t live without is a social framework for understanding ourselves in relation to the rest of our society and gaining the respect of our peers. The most important thing work gives us — after money, of course — is an alternative way to meet those needs. Not all jobs are pleasant or rewarding, but all of us benefit from living in a system where we can earn respect and dignity as adults from what we do, not who we know, or who we are.

And this is exactly what we see when we look at what Americans actually get out of work.

To start, most of us like it. Surveys from Pew typically find that about 85% of us are “somewhat” or “completely” satisfied with our jobs. Other long-running polls from Gallup and The Conference Board find similar results. This is true even when the jobs themselves aren’t impactful or even particularly interesting.

As the anthropologist Claudia Strauss has documented, plenty of people with very ordinary jobs report that their work is fun. But that’s not why they do it. [...]

Like all other human beings in history, workers want to be respected. But unlike members of relational societies, the things we want respect for are impersonal: our skills, our accomplishments, our contributions to a shared goal. These contributions don’t have to be earth-shatteringly significant — a waitress in Chicago or an office assistant in Grand Rapids can still feel that work matters. (Tocqueville, again: “American servants do not believe themselves degraded because they work; for around them everyone works. They do not feel debased by the idea that they receive a salary; for the President of the United States also works for a salary.”)

Moral equality is something relational societies struggle with. They tend to be more restrictive and more exclusionary. It’s nice to imagine a world where everyone is satisfied to be simply a good spouse or parent or friend, but that’s not how these things work in practice. When our dignity depends on our membership in a group, we start to police who else can join and what happens when they do. When humans get relational, we get clannish.

This brings us back to what we already know: The modern labor market has dissolved the bonds of tradition, family, and clan. In the modern world, relationships matter less. And because they matter less, we can do much more inside them. They are freer. They have room to breathe.

by Clara Collier, Asterisk | Read more:
Image:David Teniers the Younger (–1690), Smoking and drinking monkeys, c. 1660
[ed. See also: Strangers Next Door: The Decline of Neighborhood Socializing and the Class Divide in Belonging; and, A Digital Divide in American Adolescence: Gender, Class, and the New Teenage Experience (SCAL).]