Showing posts with label Cities. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cities. Show all posts

Sunday, November 15, 2026

A Residence of 21 Years in the Sandwich Islands

A Residence Of 21 Years In The Sandwich Islands 

In October 1819, my grandmother’s grandfather’s grandfather, Hiram Bingham I, stood with his wife, Sybil, and his friends outside Park Street Church in Boston and bade farewell to family before venturing into the unknown. They would spend the next five months on a cramped ship sailing to a foreign land of strange people, full of “destitution, degradation, and barbarism.” They did not know if they would ever return to America.

Unlike others who voyaged out to sea, they were not whalers, nor merchants trying to make a quick profit. Instead, their goal was far more ambitious: to uplift an entire nation out of heathenry to civilization. Or as Hiram wrote, to “most effectually and most extensively promote the Redeemer’s cause with the means that are put into our hands”.

I first came across Hiram’s memoir, A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands, on my honeymoon to the Hawaiian Islands last summer. I had vague knowledge of a family connection to the area, and decided to do some research into it. As I started reading, I had a growing sense of deja vu as I recognized my own patterns of thinking in Hiram’s words. [...]

The Twenty-One Year Honeymoon

In many ways, the islands of Hawaii are a paradise on Earth, but to the missionaries who knew them as the Sandwich Islands, they were a savage place. These islanders, after all, had killed Captain Cook just 40 years ago. From 1782 to 1810, the nation was ravaged by war. King Kamehameha I, adopting Western military technology such as gunpowder, forcefully unified the islands into a single kingdom and suppressed potential rivals.

A young boy, Opukaha’ia, was left an orphan by Kamehameha’s warriors, who killed his father, mother, and infant brother. With nothing left for him in Hawaii, he joined the crew of a passing ship, and eventually made his way to New England, where he converted to Christianity and befriended theology students at Yale and Andover. Opukaha’ia described his native Hawaii as a land in need of salvation, and the local ministers decided to send a mission to spread the Gospel and the light of civilization. Opukaha’ia would return to Hawaii with the missionaries and serve as a translator. [...]

Hiram Bingham, a student at Andover Seminary, heard Opukaha’ia’s call to aid the Hawaiians. Born October 30, 1789, Hiram was one of the thirteen children of a Congregational deacon, Calvin Bingham. Although his parents had wanted Hiram to take over the family farm and care for them in old age, Hiram felt his duty to God was greater, and convinced his parents to allow him to study for the ministry. In Hiram’s own words, “Christ undoubtedly requires all his followers to bear their cross, and to forego or forsake whatever comes in competition with rendering him the highest service”. But service to God was not a gloomy undertaking; instead, it was accomplished “with joyful hearts and grateful praise.”

Hiram truly felt the commandment to “love thy neighbor”, and for him, the 130,000 native Hawaiians on the other side of the globe were neighbors just as much as the inhabitants of his hometown in Vermont. Thus, Hiram was eager to become a missionary as soon as he had finished his studies.

Unfortunately, during preparations for the mission, Opukaha’ia fell ill and died. Still, the plan went ahead. As Hiram writes, a good Christian must “extend the influence of the Gospel, because Christ requires it, rather than because of his own engagement. To know, to be qualified, to have opportunity, constitute the special call to do good.” Parents and relatives urged the missionaries not to go, but Hiram saw things differently: somebody had to and no one else would.

There was just one problem: Hiram needed a wife. Sending a young single man to a land of licentious heathens was asking for trouble, and therefore only married couples were allowed to be missionaries. Thus, after being ordained as a Congregational minister, Hiram proposed marriage to Sybil Moseley, a woman he had met at the ordination ceremony just twelve days earlier. Fortunately, she accepted, and later that month, the couple was on a ship bound for Hawaii — not as a two-week honeymoon, but as a mission that would last twenty-one years.

A Fortuitous Arrival

After a sea voyage of 18,000 miles, during which Hiram and Sybil’s first child was conceived, the missionaries spotted the peak of Mauna Kea on the morning of March 30, 1820. Five months after departure, the sight was exhilarating: the work of spreading Christianity, literacy, and civilization was finally at hand.

There was just one important restriction, put in place by the American missionary board: absolutely no meddling in the politics of the natives.

by Anonymous, Astral Codex Ten |  Read more:
Image: An old family portrait of Hiram and his six brothers taken sometime 1854-1860. Bottom row: Asa, Amos, Calvin, Luther. Top row: Hiram, Stephen, David. Not pictured were his six sisters.
***
[ed. What a crew. I used to drive Bingham St. in Honolulu often, to visit my girlfriend.]

Friday, November 13, 2026

Robert Caro: Lessons in Power

What Robert Caro learned about power after studying it for 50 years

[ed. Video interview with Dwarkesh Patel. In preparation for this interview Mr. Patel provides a short overview of two of Mr. Caro's subjects: Robert Moses (The Power Broker), and Lyndon Johnson (Master of the Senate): What I learned about power from LBJ and Robert Moses:]
*****
I recently interviewed Robert Caro. He’s spent the last 50 years writing a four volume biography of Lyndon Johnson, and he spent another 7 years before that writing the biography of Robert Moses, the master builder of New York. His books are widely regarded as the best explorations of political power that have ever been written. [...] 

I’ve spent so much time trying to make this interview happen: chasing his agent, calling his publisher, contacting the museums that have his archives, and even sending him handwritten letters.

I finally got to sit down with him, and I’m very happy with how it turned out. It’ll be out this Friday.

In the meantime, as I was preparing for the interview, and rereading these biographies, I wrote down the lessons they laid out about how to accumulate and use power.

Robert Moses

Robert Moses was the master builder of New York. He built more of the physical city than anyone before or since: the Triborough and Verrazano bridges, the Cross Bronx Expressway, Jones Beach, Lincoln Center, Shea Stadium, two giant power dams upstate, in addition to hundreds of parks and dozens of pools. Of the 899 miles of highways completed in New York State by 1964, Moses had built 672 of them. His projects collectively cost hundreds of billions of dollars in today’s money.

For more than 30 years, Robert Moses was the most powerful person in New York (more powerful than any elected mayor or governor, despite not being elected to anything). How did he get and keep that much power?

Exploits in law

Part of the answer is that Moses wrote the laws that governed him. He was called ‘the best bill drafter in Albany,’ and he used that skill to write himself powers that the legislators voting on his bills didn’t know they were granting. [...]  [ed. Example: Triborough Bridge Authority Act of 1933. Moses snuck a few small clauses and seemingly insignificant words into the Act that no one noticed.]

So, with just a few minor tweaks, Moses turned an act meant to allow the construction of two bridges into the basis of an institution that could build basically anything it wanted anywhere in New York (and whose authority to do so was protected by the U.S. Constitution).

The indispensable man

These bond covenants had turned Triborough Authorities’ power into granite, but nothing in them guaranteed that Robert Moses would remain as chairman. So how did Moses retain his position for 30 years?

Part of the answer is, again, the law. Moses drafted the Triborough act so that its commissioners could be removed mid-term only “on stated charges after a formal hearing.” But any differences he had with a mayor or governor were more about what he decided to build and whom he displaced to build it, rather than personal conduct.

As Caro says, “Robert Moses was not himself corrupt. He was, in fact, as uninterested in obtaining payoffs for himself as any public servant who ever lived. In the politicians’ phrase, he was ‘money honest.’”

So, there were never any formal charges to bring. But this only explains why he wasn’t fired in the middle of his term. Why was he reappointed every six years? Well, at his peak, Moses was a hydra with a dozen heads. He held 12 different government posts at the same time: city construction coordinator, chairman of the State Council of Parks, chairman of the State Power Authority, and so on. Some of these positions were appointed by the mayor, some by the governor, so no single person could cut off all his heads simultaneously. And removing him from any one position meant making an enemy of the man who would still be the most powerful person in New York.

The coalition for yes

And the power that Moses derived from his popularity with the masses was nothing compared to the power he derived from his connections with New York’s powerful private interests.

We are very used today to NIMBY, where powerful but concentrated interest groups manage to stymie projects despite their broad popularity. Moses built a concentrated faction for YIMBY. He built a graft machine that greased the wheels for new construction, because it ensured the most influential people in the state would all benefit whenever a project got underway.

The banks got to buy his bonds at a steep discount without competitive bidding, the unions got more jobs, politically connected lawyers got legal fees, and party bosses got paid to broker insurance policies on bridges that had no plausible risk of falling down. Moses could then rely on these beneficiaries to call up anyone who stood in the way of one of his projects, whether that was a borough president or the governor himself. [...]

Lyndon Johnson’s story, on the other hand, is kind of the opposite. For most of his career, there was little evidence he had a coherent political ideology - he was a ruthless power-seeker who embraced whatever happened to be most expedient at the time. When Johnson first entered the U.S. Senate, he realized that the most powerful men there were conservative Southern Dixiecrats. And the Johnson that they encountered was one who had molded himself to their form.

While writing Master of the Senate, Caro interviewed former Georgia Senator Herman Talmadge. He asked Talmadge what impression he got from freshman Senator Lyndon Johnson about the proper relationship between white people and black people.
“Master and servant.” So I [Caro] asked, Well didn’t Johnson have any sympathy for blacks, any desire to improve their lot? My notes say “long pause.” And then I wrote [Talmadge’s] two-word reply: “None indicated.” Another pause, and then: “He was with us in his heart. I believed him. I believed him.”
Of course, we know that once he became president, Johnson spearheaded the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the most important civil rights laws since Reconstruction.

So Moses began as a naive idealist but, in Caro’s telling, became someone seeking power for its own sake. Johnson was an ambitious opportunist from the very start, and it was only once he had real power that he used it for ideals few knew he had.

Lyndon Johnson

Lyndon Johnson was the most powerful Senate majority leader - perhaps the most powerful legislator period - in the history of this country. Here’s Caro in Master of the Senate:
He was master of the Senate—master of an institution that had never before had a master, and that at the time, almost half a century later, when this book is being written, has not had one since.

No leader before Johnson had wielded this kind of power, because the Senate had been deliberately set up by the founders to not be “led”. When Johnson asked the Library of Congress for a list of the Majority Leader’s formal powers, he found that there was only one: the right to be recognized first on the floor. Before Johnson, the Majority Leader was less a leader and more a lightning rod. He’d be blamed in the national press and in his home state for everything the Senate failed to do, yet he had no actual power to do anything about those failures. Being in this predicament was so politically toxic that Johnson’s two predecessors as majority leaders had both lost their own Senate seats.

A big part of the reason that Johnson became his party’s leader at just 44, in a Senate whose average age was around 60, was that hardly anyone else wanted such a thankless and useless job. And in their hands, this job would have remained useless. But they were not Lyndon Johnson.

Johnson turned himself into the second most powerful man in America (right behind the president) in three different ways.

Things to promise, things to threaten with

Johnson transformed the Senate’s rules, institutions and norms so that he alone had the power to grant important favors to his colleagues. If a senator needed a bill passed, Johnson was the one who could get it scheduled on the floor and persuade the committee chairman to report it out. If the bill needed help in the House, Johnson was the one with a direct line to Speaker Sam Rayburn. And if the senator needed money for his next campaign (to ensure that he would remain a senator), Johnson was the one who could put in a good word with oilmen from his native Texas.

Johnson also put himself in a position to control committee assignments, which are the single biggest factor that shapes how a senator’s whole career plays out. For about a century, they had been handed out by seniority. Practically overnight, Johnson changed the system so that many seats were no longer being settled by seniority but rather negotiated by the party’s Steering committee, which Johnson controlled. If you wanted a good seat, you had to do what Johnson wanted. In 1957, Estes Kefauver voted against Johnson on an important motion. That very same week, the highly coveted open seat on the Foreign Relations Committee, which Kefauver was expecting to get, was instead handed over to a far more junior senator named John F. Kennedy.

The real political genius of Lyndon Johnson was identifying and then gaining control over every possible source of leverage over his colleagues. Whatever a senator needed to survive, whether that was money, committee seats, or the passage of bills that matter to his home state, Johnson could give, and Johnson could withhold.

Setting the agenda

What the final bill that passes says depends on which one version actually comes to a vote, and with what final modifications. Whoever gets to set the agenda controls the outcome. So you won’t be surprised by who put himself in this position. Johnson’s main tool for setting the agenda was the unanimous consent agreement. By default, Senate debate is unlimited. A senator can talk about a bill for as long as he likes, and as he does so, he can also offer amendments that have nothing to do with that bill, each of which can stall the bill even further. A unanimous consent agreement sets those freedoms aside for a single bill: it fixes the allotted time for debate and constrains the opportunity to amend it. Earlier leaders rarely used such agreements, and even then, only after weeks of debate on a bill had already exhausted all the senators. Johnson made their use the norm in the Senate. He wouldn’t even allow a bill to reach the floor until such an agreement was in place.

Johnson wanted to control which bill reached the floor, and to keep the floor from changing anyone’s mind, because he wanted every vote settled in private beforehand, through the wheeling-and-dealing where his leverage worked best. The last thing he wanted was for a long, public debate on the merits of the bill to change a senator’s mind at the last minute, or for a surprise amendment to unravel a deal he had spent weeks painstakingly brokering. As Paul Douglas put it, under Johnson “all the action takes place offstage, before the play begins.”

The view from the center

Johnson made sure that as much of the Senate’s information as possible ran through him. He had every committee assign a staffer to tell him what was being drafted. His aides tracked what every senator was up to. And he spent his own days in the cloakroom and the hallways cajoling and listening to his colleagues. So he knew what each senator really wanted, what he would and wouldn’t give up to get it.

In any session, the Senate faces hundreds of possible bills and amendments. A senator’s vote on one bill can be traded for another senator’s vote on a different one, and any single bill can be amended a dozen ways to win someone over. So there’s an almost endless combination of possible deals to be made. Johnson made sure that he was the one instigating and brokering most of these deals. As a result, he could make sure that any deal left Johnson coming out ahead.

by Dwarkesh Patel, Podcast |  Read more:
Images: Abebooks

Thursday, November 12, 2026

Localpedia

Wikipedia pages of landmarks close to you. Very Cool.
Url here: (https://edjefferson.com/localpedia/)

Monday, November 9, 2026

Juneau, Alaska: How Much is Too Much?

Juneau set a fourth straight cruise record, and still hasn’t decided how many ships are too many.

Juneau has room for only so many cruise ships, and this past season brought more than the city had settled on. The last of them have sailed for the winter, and the Alaska capital has still not drawn the line.

For a few months each year, the town fills and empties with the ships, more people than the small downtown was built for. Most come for the scenery and the wildlife, and many want the same thing: a whale-watch run out of Auke Bay, where the humpbacks feed all summer.

Juneau counted 1,733,016 large-ship cruise passengers in 2026, up from 1,688,738 the year before and about 1.64 million in 2023. Across Alaska, cruise traffic has held closer to flat, near 1.8 million passengers in each of the last two summers.

For a capital of about 32,000 people, that is heavy company, roughly 54 visitors for every year-round resident. The city and the cruise lines limit traffic by agreement, a voluntary ceiling of five large ships a day and, new in 2026, a cap of about 16,000 passengers a day on most days. A city task force is reviewing the pressures of a big season, among them downtown congestion, helicopter flightseeing, whale-watching traffic and a planned data-collection effort. 

by Mandy Applegate, Seattle Times |  Read more:
Image: Andrew Chin/Shutterstock
[ed. They asked for it. Being the seat of government, Juneau is largely composed of current and former state bureaucrats (which maybe explains why they can't come to a consensus). Tip to travelers: if you want to "visit Alaska" don't ever take a cruise ship up the Inside Passage to Juneau or anywhere else along that route. You'll miss some beautiful scenery traveling at night, and the next day be deposited in another small "fishing town" just to buy some local trinkets or pay for expensive side excursions, along with thousands of other tourists. Yuk. See also: (Skagway): This small Alaska town is swamped by cruise ship visitors every summer. But what happens when they all go home? (Guardian).]

Wednesday, November 4, 2026

Why Does Culture Feel So Samey? A Walking Tour Reveals the Math.

On a recent afternoon, Lauren Leek stood on a typical London shopping street, in front of a Victorian-era pub and a predictable array of corporate-owned food, drink and retail outlets: Pret a Manger, Starbucks, Joe & the Juice, Subway.

“What we see in front of us used to be culturally diverse. Now it is culturally generic,” said Leek, a Dutch Australian data scientist who is an assistant professor at Leiden University in the Netherlands. “Most of what we see is the big chains we see everywhere,” she said. “It creates a sense of placelessness. We could be anywhere.”

Leek recently posted a Substack article, with the headline “Temperature Zero for Culture: Why Everything Is Starting to Look the Same,” that analyzed the “flattening” effect that predictive algorithms have had on music, movies, hospitality and almost every aspect of today’s consumer culture. The post was shared and discussed by widely read technology commentators such as Cory Doctorow and John Naughton.

Taking 640 shopping streets in London as a test case, Leek used advanced data-analysis tools to examine how predictive algorithms have helped create what she calls a homogeneous “monoculture” in which, she writes in her Substack post, “we lose the ability to tell the difference between what people wanted and what the system made easy to want.”

Leek’s insight into everyday consumer behavior is, in some ways, reminiscent of Roland Barthes’s classic 1957 collection of essays, “Mythologies.” Back then, Barthes used the recently developed discipline of semiotics, the study of signs and their meanings, to turn things as disparate and as seemingly banal as soap powder, wrestling, margarine and automobiles into subjects of serious cultural consideration.

But unlike Barthes, who was steeped in the French philosophical tradition, Leek is a London School of Economics-educated data cruncher. She uses her own algorithms, digital mapping and text analysis to show how large language models are making consumer culture, wherever it happens to be, feel the same.

A recent excursion with Leek in southwest London to experience her analysis in action began in the Prince of Wales pub. The bar is owned by one of Britain’s biggest brewers and hospitality retailers, which runs 2,600 sites across the country. This British company is in turn owned by a Hong Kong-listed property development and investment conglomerate.
It was just after noon, and the old-fashioned wall décor and wooden furniture lent the pub a traditional feel. Multiple TV screens were showing the buildup to a Premiere League soccer match. Generic mood music played in the background.

“Often these pub chains have playlists that artificial intelligence automatically adjusts according to the sound level,” Leek said. “If the pub isn’t very full, it will play chilled background music,” she explained. “When it gets louder, the music gets louder.”

Pop music is an area where Leek’s research has revealed how sharply culture has “flattened” in recent years. Her Substack post includes a graph that tracks the verbal richness of lyrics from over 4,000 songs in Billboard magazine’s Hot 100 hits from 1950 to 2015. Since the early 1960s, Leek found, the range of distinct words has contracted more than a quarter, while the number of repeated lines has increased nearly a third.

“Streaming has created very concrete incentives — pay starts after 30 seconds,” Leek said. “A repeated hook in a song is the rational response.”

Leek studied the pub’s menu. It included staples such as chicken wings, burgers, and fish and chips, all of which could be ordered via a QR code. “Pub chains get the data from people who have previously ordered. They typically aggregate ordering data across their sites to optimize their menus. Everything has been analyzed,” Leek said. “Local differences have been taken away. Quirkiness is taken out.”

Leek’s tour moved on to an upmarket cafe and bakery nearby. It is one of a chain of more than 150 in London majority owned by an American private equity company that manages more than $200 billion of assets. A cappuccino costs 4.40 pounds, about $5.90.

As a steady stream of customers ordered coffees and pastries, Leek explained that chain stores use specialized site-section algorithms to choose the optimum locations for their branches.

“They use public, open socio-economic data, like small-area census statistics. They have their own data, which neighborhood restaurants don’t have access to. And they have their own data analysis teams,” Leek said.

For Leek, the key to the flattening of consumer culture lies in the mathematics of algorithms and their methodology of next-token prediction. Language models like ChatGPT write one small chunk of text, called a “token,” at a time and predict and select the most likely next token at each step. The models have a “temperature” setting, a set of parameters that control how adventurous that pick is. At “temperature zero,” the model always chooses the most likely next token and gives the same answer every time.

“It’s predictable and safe,” Leek said. “When the model is uncertain, it still has to make a prediction, so it always falls back on the most expected answer.” That means there is no randomness, no surprises. Leek argues that algorithms are pushing culture toward a blandly predictable, mathematically determined temperature zero.

“The algorithm is making predictions for the average person, but the average person doesn’t exist,” she said. “Each person has some niche preferences, and the niches differ. A system that optimizes for the average of everyone’s tastes produces something that nobody particularly dislikes but nobody particularly loves,” she added. “It’s built for a person who doesn’t exist.”

by Scott Reyburn, NY Times | Read more:
Image: Joanna Yee
[ed. I can't blame it all on algorithms. This process has been going on for decades. Every street (save for whatever underlying unique architecture used to exist), mall, airport, hotel, restaurant, clothing store, bar, etc. all looks the same. Why go to Paris or London, Japan, Dublin, or even China, if you're just going to see the same chains everywhere? In fact, it's probably harder than ever to find a city that still retains its unique character unpolluted by the likes of Starbucks, KFC, McDonalds, Taco Bell, 7-11, Louis Vitton and the rest of their ilk these days. Corporations have the deep pockets to buy the best trafficked locations. See also: We already live in 'clone towns' - AI is making it worse (Observer).]

*****
In this terminology, a “home town” is a place that retains its individual character and is instantly recognisable and distinctive to the people who live there, as well as those who visit. A “clone town”, in contrast, is a place that has had the individuality of its high street shops replaced by a “monochrome strip of global and national chains”. Which meant that its retail heart could easily be mistaken for dozens of other bland town centres across the country. Of the towns surveyed, the NEF concluded: 41% were clone towns, 33% were home towns and 26% were “border towns”, meaning somewhere in between.

This lack of diversity is not just confined to towns. It’s everywhere. You see it in property ads for new flats, or houses that have been modernised for resale. Kitchens like operating theatres (and upmarket ones with the obligatory island); sitting rooms featuring white settees with overstuffed cushions, polished wood flooring and oversized TVs. Or cafes with exposed brickwork, and an expectation that oat milk with flat whites and smashed avocado are what you want. Or the legion of young influencers on Instagram who seem increasingly undistinguishable.

Tuesday, November 3, 2026

An Easy Fix to Expand Housing Inventory

Cheaper manufactured homes could be having a moment, if only states can catch up. A new law could make manufactured homes cheaper, but old zoning barriers could slow their expansion.

For decades, manufactured home builders have been working to shed the old image of boxy trailer homes reserved for the outskirts of cities and suburbia. Now, a small change in federal regulations could open the door for architecture welcomed in more neighborhoods.

This summer’s sweeping housing bill, the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act, removed a 1974 mandate that required every manufactured home to be built on a nonremovable steel frame, known as a chassis. Experts and home producers think the change could help unlock thousands more affordable housing options around the country.

But first, experts say, states have to examine outdated regulations that are blocking the manufactured home industry’s potential. The Pew Charitable Trusts’ housing initiative estimates that 30 states might need to change their regulations to align with the new federal law.

Unlocking manufactured homes from chassis will allow manufactured homes to become multi-family developments, said Stephanie Hawke, associate research director of land use and supply at the Terner Center for Housing Innovation at the University of California, Berkeley.

They’ll be cheaper for builders, she noted, and they’ll be easier to stack into two-story and multi-family homes.

“First of all, you were putting a very heavy, expensive thing on the bottom of these homes that is not needed and it is not used, and it’s made out of steel,” Hawke said. “If you’ve got this heavy piece of steel on the bottom of a home, stacking it becomes more difficult.”

Manufactured homes are built entirely in a factory, regulated by U.S. Housing and Urban Development codes, and then trucked to a home site.

They cost 50% less per square foot than homes built on a site, according to the Manufactured Housing Institute, an industry group. And experts say dropping the chassis could drive down costs by $5,000 to $10,000 per home.

“There’s really the opportunity to stack these manufactured homes to make multi-family developments,” Hawke said. “So it’s unlocking this thing which was primarily used for single-family and it’s making it much more accessible for a multi-family developer, which is great because manufactured housing is far and away the least expensive non-subsidized housing supply in the United States.”

In a 2026 earnings call, UMH Properties, a publicly traded real estate company that owns and develops manufactured-home communities, said the chassis rule change will allow it to put two-story manufactured homes on existing lots. The company also is considering designs that could combine two stories with duplex units, allowing for smaller, more affordable apartment rentals.

“You build 2,000 square feet of homes instead of 1,000 square feet on the same piece of land. It’s a very, very important development,” said Eugene Landy, founder and chairman of UMH Properties, on the earnings call. “This is a change that’s gonna help every manufactured home community out in the country.”

Another benefit to removing the chassis, according to Mark Brunner, president of the Manufactured & Modular Home Association of Minnesota, is that manufactured homes can blend more seamlessly into subdivisions because they won’t look too different from other homes. [...]

Following World War II, a shift in how mobile homes were being used began forming. No longer reserved as temporary housing, mobile homes were designed to be increasingly more permanent. Mobile home communities sprang up, though many were zoned into rural or suburban areas on a city’s edge.

For decades, manufactured homes — called mobile homes until the early 1970s — have been built in factories and trucked to their new locale. Many were unloaded into mobile home communities, specialized zoning districts where residents own their house but rent the land underneath. [...]

In the past, a home attached to a trailer or visibly hoisted a few feet off the ground were tells of manufactured housing when they first popped up in neighborhoods. But many modern ones are virtually unrecognizable from site-built homes.

“They have the same walls, ceiling, sheetrock, windows and shingles,” said Dustin Brakemeier, who owns and operates manufactured home communities in Minnesota, South Dakota and Wisconsin. “One’s built in a factory, one’s built outside. They’re the same.’”
 
Changing zoning, mortgage rules

Pennsylvania Republican state Rep. Dan Moul, who owns a manufactured home park in Oxford Township in Adams County, recalled in an interview that zoning restrictions kept him from expanding the community into an adjoining parcel a few years ago. The township said the land was zoned exclusively for detached single-family residential housing.

“The bottom line is they look at mobile home communities as that’s where the poor riffraff lives, and we don’t want any more riffraff,” Moul said.

One of the big domino effects from the removal of the chassis requirement could be state banning or overriding restrictive local zoning policies that targeted manufactured homes. [...]

Alex Rodino, a real estate agent in Savannah, Georgia, who sells manufactured homes, said the stigma isn’t just among local governments and stodgy neighborhood groups. Some buyers, he said, are confusing modern manufactured housing with the image of older mobile homes.

“I think (that perception) is slowly changing as construction quality improves and traditional housing becomes less affordable,” said Rodino.

by Robbie Sequeira, Stateline | Read more:
Image: Jon King/Michigan Advance
[ed. See also: A New ROAD for Factory-Built Homes: States Must Act in Coming Year (Pew).]

Tuesday, October 27, 2026

The Smartphone Trap We Built for Ourselves

Here’s a non-exhaustive list of things that, as recently as seven years ago, we could reliably do without a smartphone:
  • Read a restaurant menu while seated inside, and pay your check.
  • Enter a concert or sporting event.
  • Use a parking garage or park your car on the street.
  • Receive packages or retrieve purchases.
  • Complete the sign-in process for work, banking, or government services.
  • Attend school events or communicate with your kid’s school.
  • Access health care and other kinds of appointments.
  • Take public transit.
  • Get a taxi.
  • Get into a gym or fitness class.
I’ve been thinking about this drift toward mandatory apps and QR codes a lot lately, as a new millennial parent unhappy with my addictive tendency to mindlessly scroll near my baby. [...]

You should not have to have an addictive device in your pocket at all times in order to do ordinary things. We should be pushing for a world where adults can meaningfully reduce their smartphone use, or quit it altogether if they want.

And it’s not just about personal self-improvement. The status quo has already been long untenable for many people, especially the elderly, the disabled, the unhoused, and anyone who just can’t afford a data plan.

Pushing for a non-smartphone option is about accessibility, affordability, and agency. It’s about demanding the kind of freedom in a society we deserve to have. There should never be any essential service that requires phones as the only way in.

We can fix this, and some people are already showing how.

How we got here

Even if it takes us another decade to unwind, it’s important to remember these changes are less than ten years old.

Smartphone ownership exploded over the 2010s, rising from 35 percent of US adults in 2011 to 81 percent in 2019, according to Pew. It has since climbed to roughly 9 in 10.


In other words, smartphones stopped being a device many people had and started becoming a device every institution could assume you had. What happened next was part real improvements in convenience, part cost-cutting that pandemic-era policy made easier to justify, and part what sociologists call “isomorphism” — organizations converging on a practice not because it works best, but because everyone else has adopted it.

Isomorphism is one of my favorite concepts I learned in college, and you know it when you see it. For example, you’re planning a conference, and somewhere along the way it became true that a “good” conference has its own app, even though nobody wants to download an app to learn when lunch is on the schedule. Or it’s the way every mission statement sounds like every other mission statement.

I’d say the charitable reason we drifted toward handling so much by smartphone is that a lot of it genuinely is better, faster, and harder to lose. Tapping a turnstile with my phone, and never wondering whether I left my DC metro card at home, has made my life easier.

The less benign reasons are that digital systems let companies and governments cut labor and operating costs. Apps and QR codes replace cashiers, waitstaff, printed materials, and customer service reps, and shift new work onto us, the customer. The smartphone systems also generate a lot of personalized data which companies love to collect, and sometimes sell.

Then there’s control, which companies certainly like. Not all of it is sinister. (Think blocking tickets from being resold, or prices and menus being updated instantly.) But when sellers control the interface and know a lot about us, two people can open the same app at the same moment and see different prices. Economists call this price discrimination, and it’s much easier to pull off when there’s no posted price we can compare against.

But just because inertia is leading us toward a universal smartphone society, that doesn’t mean it’s where we’ll end up. We have options to push back.

by Rachel Cohen Booth, Vox | Read more:
Image:Matteo Della Torre/NurPhoto via Getty Images
[ed. I've experienced this just trying to pay for a parking spot in Seattle. First, had to get the app. Then register. Then follow all the instructions for punching in a special code for my space, license plate number, and finally estimated time period of parking. Took me nearly 25 minutes. Not to mention trying to read the small type on the sign and memorizing the special app url. Suppress scream.]

Sunday, October 11, 2026

Thursday, October 8, 2026

Mamdani Is Showing the World How It’s Done

A few days before the leaders of the world streamed into the cavernous, marble-lined General Assembly Hall to deliver their speeches on the grave crises convulsing our combustible world, Mayor Zohran Mamdani offered his own, somewhat surprising solution to the problem of rising authoritarianism: filling potholes.

“If politics cannot deliver on the block where you live, why would you trust it to deliver anywhere?” Mamdani asked a gathering of mayors from big cities across the world, explaining his obsession with potholes, more than 200,000 of which have been filled across the city since he took office. “If you are making a New Yorker’s life a little smoother, so too you are making their journey to believe in government’s ability to deliver for them.”

It is commonplace to lament the ineffectual talking shop that the United Nations General Assembly has become, with its blustering speeches and endless unread communiqués. Wars of aggression are raging in Ukraine and Iran; Israel has carried out a genocide in Gaza; climate catastrophes impoverish and kill. In the face of these calamities, the organization appears powerless.

Today, the body’s soaring aims — to create a more peaceful, humane world that respects the sovereignty of each nation and the dignity of each human being — seem like a fantasy from another dimension. Citizens the world over are dissatisfied with their governments and in many places are souring on democracy itself. Can it be any surprise that this supranational body comes in for such contempt?

And yet Mamdani sensed an opportunity to reclaim some of its founding spirit. Racing across the city last week, he seemed to be offering an antidote to globe-spanning distemper. To restore faith in institutions, you must begin from the bottom up, starting with things as simple as potholes. Politics, as he put it, “has to translate to the pavement.”

New York City has long held a singular spot on the international stage, and its mayors have become global figures. But Mamdani, by dint of his youth, his improbable rise and his unusual background, brings a vivid symbolism to the role. African by birth, South Asian by heritage, American by choice, Mamdani in many ways embodies the cosmopolitan ideal at the heart of the United Nations’ founding.

World leaders lined up to spend time with him. He went to Queens with Ireland’s prime minister for a bingo game at an Irish American community center. He met with Brazil’s octogenarian leftist president and breakfasted with Spain’s dashing left-wing prime minister. Norway’s prime minister tagged along with him to visit a New York City classroom and talk about artificial intelligence in education.

Even President Trump couldn’t resist some time with the mayor. Last Monday he dropped by Gracie Mansion, spending about an hour behind closed doors with Mamdani — an eternity in presidential scheduling. Trump seemed in no rush to leave as the two took questions from reporters, beaming as he declared, “I want him to be a great mayor, and he’s certainly got potential, got great potential.”

Mamdani’s agenda, as befits a mayor, was mostly municipal. He visited a wastewater treatment facility with his counterparts from Helsinki, Rome and Barcelona; welcomed families moving into public housing with the mayors of Paris, Amsterdam and Greater Manchester; and handed out fliers to delivery workers explaining their rights with Mexico City’s mayor.

When he wasn’t hanging out with his fellow mayors, he celebrated the city’s victory in court against the delivery service DoorDash, wresting over $131 million from the company in a settlement for underpaying or not paying its workers. He also announced a new initiative to give out 70,000 free tickets to the Metropolitan Opera House, part of his push to make the city’s most exclusive cultural offerings accessible to everyday New Yorkers.

Mamdani’s many critics have tried to portray him as fixated on distant hobbyhorses, like arresting Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, for war crimes in Gaza. But if anything, it was Netanyahu who seemed obsessed with the mayor. In his thundering speech at the United Nations last week, he called Mamdani an antisemite with “Hamas buddies.” He darkly name-checked the leftist streamer Hasan Piker and even castigated Mamdani’s wife for her likes on social media.

When I caught up with Mamdani by phone late last week, I asked him what he had hoped to get out of his first General Assembly. “We are a city that is home to hundreds of nationalities and even more languages,” Mamdani told me. “If any city is an illustration of what the United Nations principles hope to achieve, it is ours.”

But no matter how admirable those principles, the weakness of institutions like the United Nations in the face of the world’s spiraling chaos is an invitation to ask deeper questions, Mamdani said: “In a moment of a rising far right and the questioning of institutions that have otherwise been durable over many decades, it is also an opportunity to rethink what has been at the heart of those institutions, and the question of who they can serve and who they seek to serve.”

by Lydia Polgreen, NY Times |  Read more:
Image: David Dee Delgado/Reuters
[ed. ... aka, Socialist Commie.]

Monday, September 28, 2026

America’s Shifting Blue-Collar Landscape

Even as manufacturing jobs decline, Alaska offers lucrative work for men without college degrees.

Ten years ago, the changing geography of blue-collar jobs reshaped American politics. As the effects of the 2008 financial crisis, automation, and expanding global trade swept across the former industrial heartland, voters—male voters especially—spurned establishment figures for candidates they saw as more attuned to their concerns.

Donald Trump steamrolled to the Republican nomination in 2016 and dismantled the Democrats’ “blue wall” across states where manufacturing had suffered most. Democrats responded by nominating Joe Biden in 2020, hoping his working-class image would help reclaim voters without college degrees. Since then, both parties have made reviving manufacturing central to their economic agendas. Yet in Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, fewer manufacturing jobs exist today than when Trump rode down the escalator in June 2015.

The geography of blue-collar work, meanwhile, has continued to evolve. A few thousand miles northwest of the industrial heartland, Alaska offers a frontier version of that emerging economy. In a 2025 paper, economists Gordon Hanson and Enrico Moretti show that as manufacturing employment has declined, other industries have emerged as sources of good jobs for noncollege workers, particularly construction and sectors complementing tradeable, high-skill industries.

Having traveled extensively across Alaska this year to examine its industrial ecosystems, I came to see the state as a revealing case study of what blue-collar opportunity looks like when manufacturing is no longer the nation’s primary source of such jobs.

Manufacturing accounts for less than 5 percent of Alaska employment, yet the state offers unusually lucrative work for men without college degrees. My analysis of Census data finds that more than 40 percent of civilian, prime-age, noncollege Alaska men employed in blue-collar occupations earn at least $75,000. More strikingly, 9.4 percent of Alaska’s civilian, prime-age, noncollege men work a blue-collar job and earn at least $100,000, compared with 3.6 percent nationally, ranking Alaska first in the country. Among those in such occupations more than one in four earns six figures.

What explains those returns? Alaska’s abundant natural resources play a major role. Median earned income for oil-and-gas drilling workers is an astonishing $191,500, while mining operators earn $134,000, compared with the national median for blue-collar workers of $48,400. Resource extraction, like manufacturing, belongs to the tradeable sector: production occurs locally, but the output gets sold into global markets.

Those workers represent only a small blue-collar elite, however. Far more Alaskans work in transportation, construction, and equipment maintenance, and many of these occupations also command substantial premiums, particularly when tied to the resource economy. Construction-equipment operators earn a median $87,500, 50 percent more than the national median for that occupation; truck mechanics and diesel specialists, $92,000, 54 percent more. Truck drivers and carpenters each earn $58,000—11 percent and 29 percent more, respectively.

A carpenter I met on the North Slope, along Alaska’s Arctic coast, works for the region’s largest oil-and-gas operator and reported earning about $120,000 annually—a reminder that attachment to the tradeable sector, not occupation alone, often determines earnings.

But Alaska’s remarkable wages do present a puzzle. The state has the nation’s highest median earned income for civilian, prime-age, noncollege men in blue-collar jobs, at more than $63,500. Yet only 36.6 percent of such Alaska men work in blue-collar occupations—below the national average.

Part of the explanation is Alaska’s distinctive demographics. Employment among civilian, prime-age, noncollege men is relatively low, particularly for Alaska Natives living in remote communities with subsistence economies. But another factor is more revealing. My sample is restricted to Alaska residents, yet a large proportion of workers earning Alaska’s high wages don’t actually live there.

Among the men I met on the North Slope in June, many described a fly-in, fly-out lifestyle, commuting to Alaska for weeks at a time before returning home. Kevin Daems, a drilling operator with Hilcorp, lives in Montana; Alex Mosier, a maintenance worker for Schlumberger, lives in Louisiana.

According to the Alaska Department of Labor, nonresidents fill 45.2 percent of private-sector jobs on the North Slope. Statewide, nonresidents account for 22.9 percent of workers, including 23.4 percent in construction, 30.9 percent in transportation and warehousing, and more than 40 percent in resource extraction.

To understand why so many jobs go to outsiders, I spoke with Ray Weber, dean of technical and vocational education at the University of Alaska Anchorage. Weber oversees more than 40 certificate and associate-degree programs preparing Alaskans for the state’s blue-collar industries, from short programs in construction skills and marine service technology to two-year degrees in process technology and aviation maintenance. The sweet spot, he says, is six- to nine-month programs. Graduates of UAA’s six-month millwright program start at about $70,000 and typically earn six figures within five years.

What about placement? “Since Covid, we’ve just had active recruiting,” Weber says. “I don’t have any students that walk out without jobs. Many of them have it ahead of time. Holland America [a cruise line operator] sponsors eight of the diesel students to come here and finish the program. So, they’re already hired. We haven’t had an issue getting the students the employment.”

Many students already work in Alaska’s core industries and return for specialized credentials. “A lot of the people that we end up getting are coming back after they’ve been laborers or have worked on the Slope for a significant amount of time doing odd jobs and want something specific,” Weber notes.

What Weber says next, though, highlights Alaska’s blue-collar puzzle: the struggle of attracting workers in the first place. “We have more of an issue, depending on the program,” he tells me, “getting people to want to do it.”

For all the promise of Alaska’s blue-collar wages, the state struggles even to retain its own residents. Every year since 2011, more people have left Alaska for other states than have moved there from the rest of the country.

That’s no surprise to Weber. “Can [wages in Alaska] be higher [than in the rest of the country]? Yes, especially Slope jobs or jobs that suck. Like, we have electrical linemen that go across the state. They’re going to Unalakleet, the only way to get there is by airplane. And there’s one pizza joint. One. No other restaurant. You generally end up sleeping either in a bunkhouse, if you’re lucky. Or you’re sleeping in the school auditorium. . . . I like Alaska, but we’re asking the wrong questions if you’re saying, ‘high-paying, lucrative jobs.’ What do the younger generation consider important? The answer is: Things that are not in Alaska.”

Economists call this a compensating wage differential: the premium required to induce workers to accept jobs with undesirable nonpecuniary characteristics. Work in Alaska is colder, darker, lonelier, and often more dangerous. The roughly $120,000 premium earned by North Slope oil-and-gas workers over their counterparts elsewhere, and the roughly $40,000 premium earned by electricians deploying to isolated communities such as Unalakleet, are partly the price employers must pay to fill jobs few want.

by Jordan McGillis, City Journal | Read more:
Image: Bonnie Jo Mount/The Washington Post via Getty Images
[ed. Alaska has always attracted get rich quick opportunists. With Prudhoe Bay and Trans-Alaska pipeline construction, the influx of transient treasure seekers went into overdrive. Before then, there was a deeply rooted sense of community and shared experience. That solidarity doesn't exist anymore (for various reasons). By the way, Unalakleet is a wonderful and highly educated Alaskan village, one of the best.]

Sunday, September 27, 2026

On “Simple Solutions” to the Western Water Problem

Spoiler: There is no such thing.

It seems like every time the Colorado River and other Western water woes make national headlines, some pundit — usually from the East Coast — weighs in with their “simple” or “obvious” solution. And I get mad and start throwing things around the room, then type out some blistering rant riddled with epithets and insults.

Well, the Colorado River is in the news again, and with it have come the usual swarm of oversimplified hot-takes. The one that really got my goat this time is from Matthew Yglesias, who wrote a piece headlined: The Western water crisis has a simple solution: Stop giving the majority of the water away to farmers for almost nothing!


These things piss me off so much not because they’re wrong, but because there is no “simple” solution to the Western water crisis. That’s because the crisis itself isn’t simple, and saying that it has simple fixes implies that the folks who have spent a lot of time trying to solve the problem are a bunch of idiots, since they hadn’t come up with this solution already. It seems as if Yglesias and his ilk assume that the West is not only monolithic, but that we Westerners are a bunch of backwoods bumpkins who don’t understand the region’s own problems.

Who cares what these bozos believe, right? Right. But judging by the comments on Yglesias’ social media posts, a lot of other people are similarly deluded. So I figured his piece provides a nice opportunity to clear some things up.

In fact, there is no single “Western water crisis.” The West is huge and is geographically, hydrographically, and ecologically diverse. While most, but not all, of the Western U.S. is in some stage of drought currently, not all of those places are experiencing a water crisis, per se. There is a Colorado River water crisis and a Rio Grande water crisis and a San Joaquin Valley water crisis, but those crises are not all the same.

The Colorado River crisis is multifaceted and manifests in different ways in different places and on different levels. The river itself is in crisis, in that stretches of the mainstem and its tributaries virtually dry up during summers like this one. Its users are facing a potential crisis, i.e. looming shortages, as in some of them are getting less water from the river than they did in the past. And the vast and complex plumbing system and legal framework that has been built up to harness and govern the river is perhaps facing the most immediate crisis: It is collapsing under its own weight and in many ways has become obsolete. Each of these is a distinct calamity, with its own twists, turns, causes, and bevy of potential solutions.

From his perch in the Northeast, however, Yglesias sees just one dimension, writing in the “nut graf” of his piece:
Even worse, the whole Western water conflict has an incredibly simple solution: End federal law’s current stipulation that a huge share of the available water must be sold at very low prices exclusively for the purpose of agriculture.

The issue here is well known, well understood, and not particularly controversial. It’s just that nobody seems to want to actually fix it.
Uh, not quite.

Yes, irrigated agriculture is by far the dominant consumer of Colorado River water, accounting for 52% of overall consumption and 74% of direct human consumption. And yes, agricultural users typically and notoriously pay less for the water than municipal users. No, this is not dictated by federal law.

Agricultural users were among the first entities in the colonial-settler era to put large quantities of water to beneficial use, giving them the most senior rights to the largest quantities of water. The Imperial Irrigation District, for example, has senior rights to about 3 million acre-feet of Colorado River water, most of which is used for agriculture.

These water rights holders have a legal right to use a set amount of water each year. They are not leasing or purchasing the water from the federal government or anyone else. It’s essentially theirs, for free, as long as they are able to divert it from the river and put it to beneficial use.

Usually the water rights are held by irrigation districts, ditch companies, municipalities, corporations, or, in some cases, very large individual landholders. In the late 1800s, these entities built their own diversions, canals, and delivery systems. Construction was often financed by private investors and the individual irrigators, who held stocks, or shares, in the ditch company. Each share would entitle its holder to a set amount of water from the canal. The shareholder would pay an annual fee for each share to cover construction, maintenance, and operating costs.

The Bureau of Reclamation was established in 1902 to build larger scale dams, diversions, and canals to deliver water to users and to spur agricultural development in the arid West. [...] 

One of the Bureau’s big projects was the 80-mile-long All-American Canal, built in the 1930s to ferry Colorado River water to the Imperial Irrigation District and other users. The IID entered into a 50-year payback contract, which ended in 1994. The Bureau still owns the canal, but the IID operates and maintains it and other infrastructure that delivers Colorado River water to nine cities and some 500,000 acres of farmland. [...]

Similar setups exist across the Colorado River Basin. But each system is distinct, and each has its own mix of federal and private funding and operational scenarios and rates.

And here’s one of the main flaws of Yglesias’s argument: He assumes that there’s some all powerful actor out there that sets rates and standards for water from the Colorado River, although he himself clearly doesn’t know who or what that actor is (he always uses the passive voice, or the all-encompassing “you” in these cases). That’s because that entity doesn’t exist. While the feds could stop subsidizing agriculture, and should not build any more water projects, they don’t have the authority to step in and adjust water rates. States probably could set rates for groundwater, but they can’t charge the IID for exercising their water rights on the Colorado River.

Next, Yglesias pivots to pillorying alfalfa, because that’s in vogue these days. I’m not going to get into that too much, because I’ve written about it so many times here before, but this little bit is pretty funny:
“The whole crisis is because of alfalfa” sounds ridiculous, in part because alfalfa is a funny word. But also because it’s so random. Wheat? That’s in bread and pasta. Everyone loves wheat. Cotton? That’s my shirt, I get why we need cotton.

But alfalfa?

Alfalfa is grown as animal feed.
Now, I’m no alfalfa apologist (nor am I an alfalfaphobe), but I feel like I should point out that most of the alfalfa grown with Colorado River water is used to feed dairy cows, which in turn produce milk and cheese and ice cream. Unless Yglesias is a vegan, he might want to consider that. He then argues that since alfalfa is relatively low-value (money wise) compared to Las Vegas casinos, Phoenix microchip factories, or housing, the water should be going to casinos, factories, and housing, not farms, which would presumably happen if farmers had to pay more for water (i.e. they’d go broke and be forced to sell).

In recent weeks I’ve written a piece or two about alfalfa. My thesis: As the biggest single water user in the Colorado River Basin, the crop must play an equally large role in contributing to the cuts necessary to keep the river from drying out. I know, it doesn’t seem like a hot-button topic. I mean, it’s just hay, after all.
Read full story

He continues:
The real point here, though, isn’t that the farmers are living high on the hog and need to be taken down a peg. You could easily let them keep their windfall water rights but turn those rights into property that they’re able to sell. Then existing cities or industrial users or real estate developers looking to build new housing or whoever else could just buy out the alfalfa farmers. The land currently under cultivation could shift to less water-intensive uses. Even a golf course uses significantly less water per acre than an alfalfa farm. Much of the land would, of course, turn into housing, but some could become non-irrigated parks with native vegetation.
First off, there is nothing novel or groundbreaking about this idea. Sprawl has been gobbling up farmland, and water rights, for decades in the West. Phoenix didn’t just grow into the desert, it also grew into citrus orchards and alfalfa fields, and will probably continue to build housing and data centers on what ag land remains. A different version of this concept, where a city or developer purchases a farmer’s water rights, but uses them somewhere else — a practice known as buy and dry — is also not uncommon.

This does not solve the water crisis. Instead of cutting consumption, which is what’s needed, it merely shifts the consumption from one use — agriculture — to other ones, such as housing and golf courses and chip manufacturing and data centers. This may wring more cash out of each acre-foot of water, but it doesn’t lower consumption. An acre-foot is an acre-foot, whether it’s going to alfalfa, a golf course, a neighborhood’s lawns, a data center or a swimming pool.

Besides, transitioning land out of agriculture comes with its own problems. We can argue forever about whether farming alfalfa or any other crop in the desert is appropriate, or of adequately high value, or whatever. We can argue that the Bureau of Reclamation should never have existed, and that irrigating the arid West should have been left to private entities operating in a free market. But the fact is, there is farming in the desert, those projects did end up subsidizing the agriculture industry, and communities, economies, cultures, and even new landscapes have emerged from and formed around those farms.

Taking vast swaths of land out of farming, whether to build houses or solar panels or to buy the water rights and use them somewhere else, has myriad consequences, many of them negative. Fields can become noxious-weed-clogged dust pits, the wildlife and ecosystems that have come to rely on irrigation runoff dry up, farm workers and families and the businesses that rely on them are displaced, communities’ economies are upended. As Madeline Wilson, an agricultural systems specialist for Colorado State University’s extension office pointed out at a 2024 panel on dust-on-snow, every field fallowed in the San Luis Valley for conservation purposes also represents a family. “We’re not just talking about drying up lands,” she said, “but the drying up of our economy.”

In no way does this mean that farms should be immune from curtailment. Indeed, because agriculture is the biggest user of Colorado River water, it will have to take the largest cuts in consumption. There is simply nowhere else from which the 4 million acre-feet or more of reductions per year needed to bring demand into line with dwindling supplies can come. But forcing farmers into bankruptcy by jacking up water rates (if there was a mechanism to do so), or prescribing “incredibly simple” policy solutions that don’t consider the complexities of the situation and its myriad moving parts or the on-the-ground impacts, isn’t the way to do it.

The “root cause” of the Colorado River crises is not alfalfa or pecans or cotton or cattle, it’s not the prior appropriation doctrine or the low price of water, it’s not overpopulation, it’s not data centers or golf courses or lawns or bad forest management or lack of or too many reservoirs. The root cause is twofold. First, there’s scarcity. The Southwest is an arid place, and climate change-exacerbated warming is drying it out more: there is less precipitation; the precipitation we do get is falling as rain, not snow; the snow we get is melting faster; and evapotranspiration is happening at a higher rate. This all leads to less water in the streams, reservoirs, rivers, and even aquifers. Secondly, there’s the chronic and long-term failure to acknowledge the scarcity, and the stubborn refusal to adapt to it and adjust consumption accordingly. [...]

There is one simple solution to the Colorado River crises: Everyone on the river has to use less water. Period. 

by Jonathan P. Thompson, The Land Desk | Read more:
Image: the author

Monday, September 14, 2026

How To Avoid Becoming A Doomsday Prepper

I knew I had gone too far when the question of whether we should buy a gun crossed my mind. This came at the apex of a weeklong anxiety spiral triggered by a New York Times feature about the possibility of an 18-month nationwide blackout. I was uneasy seeing the phrase “art form” used to describe the archaic manufacturing process of the transformers that underpin our electrical grid; the process involves painstakingly bespoke techniques of winding copper coils, wrapping paper insulation, and binding wiring, all by hand. The intensity and intricacy of that process means that there is a backlog of transformer manufacturing and repair, sometimes stretching as long as five years. There are more than 55,000 substations in the United States, but according to a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission official cited in the article, only nine of the most powerful substations would need to be taken out to trigger a nationwide blackout, which could go on to last as long as 18 months.
 
At the same time I read this article, an actual blackout was taking place in Gary, Indiana, a state where more than 370,000 people—the population is disproportionately black—were left in the dark for two weeks before power was restored. ... I replayed the videos and then thought about them for days, imagining how I would respond in that type of situation and knowing that I was completely unprepared to defend myself if I needed to do so. [...]

The Covid pandemic was a lesson in catastrophe, a confirmation for many of us that the worst can actually happen. And the likelihood of disaster, which has always loomed in the background, continues to escalate in unprecedented ways. The air is dense and orange because wildfires are ravaging the north. Flash flooding caused horrific mudslides in Nepal. A super El Niño is brewing in the Pacific. How does a person, in good conscience, bring a baby into a world like this?

It was in this miasma of paranoia, anticipation, and horror that a self-preservation instinct began to take over, one grounded deeply in my ability to purchase comfort and safety. This is how I ended up on the Preppers subreddit, reading about the relative merits of pre-made emergency kits (pre-made is better than nothing, but you’re generally better off compiling your own) and the most important things to do in the first 12 hours of a blackout (stockpile as much water as you can, but also consider stocking cigarettes and alcohol for bartering). I let myself drift into a prepper spiral and bookmarked generators and hand-crank radios, and then considered how much space in my basement could be dedicated to storing food and water.

The websites that sold emergency prep kits depicted a post-blackout world as a ravaged apocalypse and the would-be owners of their kits as savvy, self-sufficient survivors. “When the grid dies,” one site says, “you don’t.”

The Reddit preppers recommended thousands of dollars worth of products, but they also extolled the virtues of practical knowledge. You should know basic construction, they said, and also collect seeds, and also know self-defense. There were always ways you could go deeper and become more self-sufficient. This is how people end up with massive compounds filled with weapons and enough food to last years. I could see the logical jumps my mind could make to land me there.

My personality is particularly susceptible to this kind of anxiety, and so is my partner’s. After a few days of sending links back and forth to each other, we sat down to talk about how far we actually wanted to take this. We landed on a 30-day supply of freeze-dried food from Costco and an emergency first aid kit—a modest financial investment toward alleviating our shared anxiety. We kept generators and solar panels off the table, but when the thought of buying weapons fleetingly crossed my mind, I knew I needed to call a timeout and figure out what I was actually worrying about.

I was afraid of losing control, of life not going according to plan, of another major disruption changing the course of history. I was afraid that my neighbors would turn on each other, that the world would turn into every post-apocalyptic movie I’ve ever seen, and that I would regret not doing everything I could to protect my family. I was afraid of the horror my child would inevitably experience when confronted with the cruelty and neglect that humans are capable of, and I was afraid that as their parent, I wouldn’t be able to do anything to protect them from it.

Once I articulated these fears, I realized I could not control them even if I spent my entire life in a defensive crouch of paranoid preparation. If the U.S. is plunged into an 18-month national blackout, it will be a cataclysmic event that will touch every part of our society and economy such that continuing any kind of normal life will be impossible. The amount of preparation I would have to do to maintain a semblance of normalcy in that instance would require such absurd investments of time and money that it would force me to adopt “emergency preparedness” as a main personality trait and hobby. And doing that would require a change of my fundamental values and worldview, too, because it would make me live in a way that assumes people are more likely to hurt than help each other.

Coincidentally, my partner, who is a college professor, taught a lesson recently contrasting Hobbesian and Lockean states of nature for his Intro To Government class. Thomas Hobbes believed that people were driven by competition, distrust, and scarcity. In projecting a disaster scenario, Hobbes would expect neighbors to steal from each other and would place a priority on self-defense and independence. John Locke, on the other hand, believed that people’s actions are generally governed by natural law to not hurt “Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions,” that peace is the natural condition of society, and that any conflict that arises is an exception, rather than its fundamental nature. This doesn’t mean that Locke imagines a utopian response to disaster, but even if conflict arose, he would expect a greater amount of cooperation between people.

You can see why Hobbes and Locke are taught at the beginning of a government class: The way you view the world determines how you live in it. These two theories also underpin the central policy differences between the left and the right. What is responsible for the problems in our world, and how do we go about solving them? If you believe that people are mostly selfish and hungry for power and resources, for example, you will be less likely to advocate for social safety nets. I realized that my anxiety was leading me into an imaginary Hobbesian hellscape, and I was using my impending parenthood to justify it.

Later that day, we walked over to a block party in our neighborhood hosted by a coffee shop/bar/event space that some neighbors founded in an old church. The shop, West Art, serves as a third space and community hub for our neighborhood. Free clubs meet up there nearly every night of the week, from songwriting circles to watercolor painting; the actual church space is booked up multiple times a day for events like children’s art classes, political organizing, square dancing, and concerts. West Art’s founders, Josh Gibbel and Rufus Deakin, are two of my neighbors who just acted on the very common intrusive thought of “What if this was something?” They bought the church in 2023, and since then they’ve transformed it into what they call “the living room of Lancaster.”

The block party was an all-day event where vendors set up shop along the residential street that West Art occupies, along with two stages for bands to perform, food trucks, a bounce house, and lots of community organizing. As I sat on the ground and watched kids throw balls at the fundraising dunk tank, my anxieties about the apocalypse began to feel small and silly. If disaster does come, I’m lucky to live in a community of people who already have lots of practice in looking out for each other. There’s privilege in that; it’s easier to live up to your values, whatever they are, when you have a fridge full of groceries and a roof over your head. Even still, the block party was a reminder to me of the state of nature I believe in, where people are more likely to help than hurt each other and one’s survival isn’t just a matter of individual responsibility. 

by Alex Sujong Laughlin, Defector | Read more:
Image: Getty
[ed. I was in a community once that suffered a week long electrical blackout. First off, you don't open the refrigerator much, except for quick grabs. Then the backyard cookouts, everyone trying to use up whatever frozen items like meat, fish and other perishables that would spoil. It was a tight community so people were used to sharing, and that helped a lot. After a few days neighbors came up and would ask if you had enough to eat (with canned chili and ramen being especially welcome). The two supermarkets were closed (no credit/debit card readers, cash registers or lights), so too the gas station (electric gas pumps, cash registers), banks (computers, security), and everything else that ran on electricity (including ATMs - cash is king). And of course, all electrical outlets were dead (no phone charging). One woman (a stranger) even offered to lend me money because the ATMs and bank weren't working and she saw my frustration. Also, when the sun goes down so does everything else. No lights, tv, reading, music or anything unless you have laterns or candles. Some folks brought out guitars and other instruments and little song circles formed here and there. Even better, kids were everywhere outside doing kid things again. You never really think about how electricity powers everything until it's gone. Since then I've always kept a good supply of canned goods and other necessities stored, and have a go-bag with all the important stuff I need (papers, id, passport, medication, money, some clothes, first aid, enough food and water for a few days, and an added solar phone charger. Depending on your community you might want to consider a gun and some ammo. Mostly, I was just impressed at how everyone pulled together, sharing goods and news, and trying to stay positive together.]

Saturday, September 5, 2026

Bosco Verticale: Vertical Forest in Milan ~ Milan (Year Unknown) by Macenzo — Residential skyscrapers integrated with abundant plant life

Wednesday, September 2, 2026

A Cop’s Case For Flock

A car is a difficult thing to steal. It is large, cherished by its owner, difficult to hide and required by law to have identifying metal plates that everyone can see. A good thief changes the plates, and an excellent thief steals a common car in a boring color and hopes to blend in among the crowd. But eventually, no matter what techniques they use, they must drive that car on the road, and roads are public places.

But until recently, finding a stolen car and catching its thief depended on a diligent police officer looking at the right road at the right moment and managing to copy down a license plate number going past at speed, and then remembering he had seen it on the morning briefing’s stolen car hot sheet. America has four million miles of public roads, and almost 50 percent of the country’s police departments employ fewer than ten full-time officers. The odds were in the thief’s favor.

With not much to go on, police officers were forced to operate on vague descriptions and partial plates. While I pulled over a car that happened to be the same color as the suspect’s vehicle, and spent time checking names and licenses; the criminal was usually somewhere else. Imprecision allowed thieves to escape while intruding on the lives of millions of innocent motorists. That is, until the arrival of systems like Flock.

Bare ALPR

Flock Safety, a startup based in Atlanta, Georgia, was founded in 2017 to give police departments better eyes. Its product is a small solar-powered automatic license plate recognition (ALPR) camera attached to a pole on the roadside. As a car passes, the device takes a photograph of the vehicle, notes identifying features like color and make, and reads its license plate. The license plate is instantly checked against the FBI’s national database of stolen cars or wanted persons. If there’s a match, it sends an alert to police officers in the area, who may be eating their lunch instead of watching the road. As a police officer in the southeastern United States, I have often used Flock to catch wanted criminals. [...]

For much of the technology’s history, however, it has needed expensive installations or cameras attached to police vehicles, affordable to only the largest departments. Alerts were often neither instant nor accurate. Flock’s idea was to sell a more accurate ALPR camera for an annual subscription of just $3,000, an affordable price given that the typical US police department has an annual budget of $1 million. It worked, and today almost 30 percent of police agencies in the United States subscribe to the service.

It is easiest to imagine the Flock camera, or any ALPR device, as a roadside barcode scanner. I can use a ‘lookup’ tool for either a plate or vehicle description that could be connected to a specific investigation. For instance if a victim of a sexual assault told me the suspect was driving a white Toyota Tacoma with a roof rack, I could while still on scene conduct a lookup in the area filtered for similar vehicles with roof racks and see results from within a particular timeframe. For each search, I am required to record a case number and a reason that is then published in a monthly audit sent to and validated by department administrators.

I have used Flock myself, for instance, to locate a vehicle involved in a hit and run when all there was to go on was a model and color. Using that and an approximate time window, I was able to find an image from when a car entered my jurisdiction, and when it left, with the visible addition of a significant dent from the collision.

What Flock cannot do is search for individuals or show who is driving a particular vehicle that it scans. An ALPR camera does not care about the person driving a car, or its passengers, and even if an officer gets an alert that a vehicle is known to be driven by a wanted felon they must themselves establish who is behind the wheel before having probable cause to stop it.

Stolen cars provide the clearest evidence such a scanner works. American police solve only 8.2 percent of reported vehicle thefts with an arrest. A recent working paper suggests that agencies that adopted the devices saw a 15.9 percent relative increase in car thefts caught, which would raise the national rate to 9.5 percent. But that is just stolen cars.

Vehicle crime takes many forms. It is often the means by which a robber or a murderer arrives at and departs from their crimes. Criminals’ vehicles carry drugs and guns, and smuggle cash. In Atlantic City, New Jersey, vehicles were involved in 53 percent of shootings during the two years before the city expanded its ALPR network. After the expansion, Atlantic City saw monthly averages of motor vehicle thefts drop by 20 percent, property crimes by 34 percent and fatal shootings by almost 40 percent. Seventy-two alert-caused traffic stops located forty stolen vehicles and nine stolen plates.

Flock itself conducted a study claiming that 10 percent of all reported crime in the United States is solved using evidence obtained from their cameras. Not bad for a few thousand dollars a year. [...]

Good Flock, Bad Flock

And yet, the past month has seen this simple piece of crime-fighting technology become the most reviled piece of street furniture in America. Flock cameras have been sawn from their poles, hammered into shards by teenagers, and rammed by vehicles. Cities have canceled contracts even where their own audits found no evidence that their officers had misused the system. Opposition stretches from Bernie Sanders all the way to the former WWE wrestler Kane, who now serves as the Republican mayor of Knox County, Tennessee, and who describes Flock as ‘unconstitutional’.

More than 150 cities and towns have now deactivated their Flock cameras or canceled contracts with the company. Over the space of a few weeks a startup previously known to just police officers and neighborhood associations has joined data centers, Covid vaccines, 5G towers, pasteurized milk and fracking in the pantheon of American moral panics.

Opponents of Flock tend to believe that it is abused by policemen with impunity, that it can track individuals as well as cars, and that it violates American constitutional protections. None of those things are true.

Obviously a camera capable of finding a stolen car is also capable of finding a car driven by somebody’s ex-wife and so like any software, Flock has been abused. There are stories of police officers who have used it to stalk girlfriends, and there are also innocent motorists who have been stopped by police after Flock cameras misread plates or received old information from national databases. A common issue from my experience is stolen front license plates being entered into a database and the innocent owners of the rear license plate being held on suspicion of car theft.

But Flock comes with protections. As mentioned earlier, each search in Flock must be accompanied by a recorded reason. Similarly entering a plate into a hotlist must have a case number assigned. Results were originally retained for thirty days, but recent changes by Flock mean that recorded plates are now kept for only seven days. Suspicious searches are picked up by algorithms or found in department audits, with the service blocking users until senior officers evaluate and resolve flags. The Institute for Justice, a think tank that is critical of ALPR, studied misuse of Flock in April of this year and found 51 incidents across the United States since 2024, noting that ‘Nearly all of these officers were criminally charged and lost their jobs, either by resigning or getting fired’. Another incorrect belief is that Flock does more than scan vehicles, with some suggesting it scans and tracks passing phones or devices – but it does no such thing.

While Flock is a tool that can be audited, there is nothing to stop a corrupt officer simply following a car when they don’t like the look of its driver, or writing down plates of vehicles spotted outside an ex-girlfriend’s house – they would just be harder to catch. And Flock does not proactively alert officers to cars that do not trigger flags on national or local hotlists. There is no reason state legislatures or Congress could not create harsh punishment or penalties for abuse of ALPR, without getting rid of it entirely.

Another argument against Flock, as espoused by Kane, is that it violates liberties granted by the Fourth Amendment, protecting citizens from unreasonable privacy breaches from law enforcement. But it has been repeatedly established over the last century by courts across the country that cops observing license plates, either with the naked eye or by machine, is not an unreasonable search. After all, your license plate belongs to the government and a highway is a public place. [...]

Flock did not invent its capabilities and certainly does not have a monopoly on them. There are at least five other companies that offer almost identical products and services to public and private enterprise, some arguably even more invasive. Even some of the cities that have canceled contracts with Flock Safety in recent weeks have signed up to buy similar products from the company’s rivals.

It seems unlikely that America will ever ban ALPR at a state level, let alone a national one. Instead, a patchwork already familiar to American policing will result, where policies and practices diverge across local and political boundaries.

Nor would the cameras actually disappear, even in towns where governments restrict their use and cancel contracts. The already-mentioned Fourth Amendment only applies to the government, not to private enterprise. Police departments may dismantle their networks but homeowners associations concerned about vehicle theft can buy their own network of Flock cameras, as many already do. 

by Ned Donovan, Works in Progress |  Read more:
Image: Flock Safety