Showing posts with label Security. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Security. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 29, 2026

Drone Strikes on Data Centers Spook Big Tech, Halting Middle East Projects

A data center developer has paused all Middle East project investments after one of its facilities was damaged by an Iranian missile or drone attack. The decision comes as the Iran war is forcing Silicon Valley investors and tech companies to rethink a trillion-dollar plan to build more AI and cloud data centers in Gulf countries.

The damaged data center is owned by Pure Data Centre Group, a London-based company that is operating or developing more than 1 gigawatt of data center capacity across Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. “No one’s going to run into a burning building, so to speak,” Pure DC CEO Gary Wojtaszek told CNBC. “No one’s going to put in new additional capital at scale to do anything until everything settles down.”

Data center developers are already eating the costs of uninsurable war damage from the conflict, which began with a US-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28. Iran primarily responded by attacking shipping to shut down the Strait of Hormuz trade corridor along with striking US military bases and energy infrastructure across the Gulf region.

Iran also directly struck two Amazon Web Services (AWS) data centers in the United Arab Emirates, while a near-miss from an Iranian one-way attack drone damaged a third AWS data center in Bahrain. The Iranian attacks caused structural damage, disrupted power delivery, and also triggered fire suppression systems that caused water damage, AWS reported through its service dashboard on March 1.

That led to widespread disruptions in cloud services for AWS customers like banks, payment platforms, the Dubai-based ride-hailing app Careem, and the data cloud provider Snowflake.

Crucially for Amazon’s bottom line, the company chose to waive customer charges in its Middle East cloud region for the entire month of March 2026, as reported by The Register. That decision cost Amazon an estimated $150 million—not including the damaged data centers—because existing civil law frameworks put the financial burden on data center operators to absorb costs and refund clients in the event of military conflicts, according to Tech Policy Press. [...]

Big Tech in the crosshairs

It has been clear for a while that tech companies cannot pretend to be mere bystanders in the ongoing conflict. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps directly threatened retaliation against US companies that it identified as having Israeli links and supporting military tech applications after an Iranian bank’s data center was hit by a US or Israeli strike on March 11. The Iranian military organization released a list of “Iran’s new targets” that included offices and data centers operated by Google, Microsoft, Palantir, IBM, Nvidia, and Oracle, and it reiterated a similar threat against tech companies on March 31 in retaliation for Israeli and US military strikes that resulted in the assassination of Iranian leaders.

The Revolutionary Guard attempted to make good on that threat by attacking an Oracle data center in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on April 2, according to Data Center Dynamics. Although the Dubai Media Office initially dismissed the claim, it later confirmed that shrapnel had fallen on the facade of the Oracle facility after a “successful aerial interception” by local air defense systems. [...]

Silicon Valley investors and Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates may also need to rethink plans for making the Middle East into a hub for AI data centers alongside the United States and China, Rest of World reported. US tech companies have each announced plans for data center developments worth billions of dollars, while certain Gulf countries have each pledged hundreds of billions of dollars for investment in AI chips and data centers.

by Jeremy Hsu, Ars Technica |  Read more:
Image: Giuseppe CACACE/AFP via Getty Images
[ed. It should be obvious that ALL data centers everywhere are sitting ducks for terrorist attacks. Unless owners are ready to pay for military-grade defense systems, this will be an ongoing threat.]

Monday, April 27, 2026

A Technofascist Manifesto For the Future

Palantir CEO Alex Karp is a man in charge of one of the most important and frightening companies in the world. Karp’s new book, cowritten with Nicholas Zamiska, is called The Technological Republic. After claiming “because we get asked a lot,” Palantir posted a 22-point summary of the book that reads like a corporate manifesto. It evokes both weird reactionary shit and also trilby-wearing Reddit comments from the early 2010s.

Palantir’s summary of the book is ominous. But even the company’s name is unironically ominous. The palantíri are crystal balls in The Lord of the Rings that let Middle-earth’s worst tyrants spy on the heroes of the story. It’s a fun reference if you have no shame about your company’s mission.

We’ve attempted to translate these 22 points from Alex Karp’s alien words into something more reasonable, like human words from someone who might play him in the biopic. (Hello, Taika Waititi.) In so doing, we’ve become much more sympathetic to why Jürgen Habermas refused to supervise Karp’s research.

1. Silicon Valley owes a moral debt to the country that made its rise possible. The engineering elite of Silicon Valley has an affirmative obligation to participate in the defense of the nation.

Translation: Silicon Valley has an enormous opportunity to extract as much money from federal government defense contracts as possible. To do this, we will bring back a draft for engineers. We’re really into bringing back the draft. Deepfaked teenagers, low-paid gig workers, and victims of the Rohingya genocide need not apply.

2. We must rebel against the tyranny of the apps. Is the iPhone our greatest creative if not crowning achievement as a civilization? The object has changed our lives, but it may also now be limiting and constraining our sense of the possible.

Translation: We can’t say “we wanted flying cars, instead we got 140 characters” anymore because Elon Musk lets you write essays on Twitter now. Though if you thought the apps were tyrannical, wait until you get a load of us.

3. Free email is not enough. The decadence of a culture or civilization, and indeed its ruling class, will be forgiven only if that culture is capable of delivering economic growth and security for the public.

Translation: People are mad at tech billionaires for their obscene wealth and arrogance. Instead of winning them over by providing free access to a useful everyday service, we’re gonna sell a lot of software that will let the government spy on them while demanding tax cuts.

4. The limits of soft power, of soaring rhetoric alone, have been exposed. The ability of free and democratic societies to prevail requires something more than moral appeal. It requires hard power, and hard power in this century will be built on software.

Translation: Words and feelings are free, which is why we want to sell weapons. Nobody got rich suing for peace. [...]

5. The question is not whether A.I. weapons will be built; it is who will build them and for what purpose. Our adversaries will not pause to indulge in theatrical debates about the merits of developing technologies with critical military and national security applications. They will proceed.

Translation: “Soft power” and “ethics” are beta shit for Broadway shows and Dario Amodei. Hear that, Pete Hegseth? We’re warriors — pay up.

But seriously. If our enemies have no oversight then why should we? The future is an AI battlefield and we need rules of engagement that let us cook. Which is to say: Forget the rules of engagement. The government is not coming to save you — we are. The world is too dangerous for us to be governed by the law of armed conflict.

Welcome to the 21st century: safety not guaranteed.

6. National service should be a universal duty. We should, as a society, seriously consider moving away from an all-volunteer force and only fight the next war if everyone shares in the risk and the cost.

Translation: We’re going to bring back the draft. Our vision of permanent war only works if we courageously volunteer people 40 years younger than us to die for oil.

7. If a U.S. Marine asks for a better rifle, we should build it; and the same goes for software. We should as a country be capable of continuing a debate about the appropriateness of military action abroad while remaining unflinching in our commitment to those we have asked to step into harm’s way.

Translation: Sure, those wimps at Anthropic are selling an AI system they claim has spotted cybersecurity vulnerabilities in “every major operating system and web browser.” But Pete, seriously: We will kill anybody you want with our software guns.

8. Public servants need not be our priests. Any business that compensated its employees in the way that the federal government compensates public servants would struggle to survive.

Translation: We care about wages – which is why we think Washington’s revolving door of lobbying and office-holding should be way more lucrative for everyone. There are mountains of cash for people who will look the other way.

And if you’re not on board? Well, all those pesky bureaucrats who do things like “investigate fraud” and “enforce safety standards” and “administer the social safety net” are holier-than-thou myrmidons who should be fed into the DOGE wood chipper.

9. We should show far more grace towards those who have subjected themselves to public life. The eradication of any space for forgiveness—a jettisoning of any tolerance for the complexities and contradictions of the human psyche—may leave us with a cast of characters at the helm we will grow to regret.

Translation: If you made fun of that video where our CEO looks like he’s on cocaine, you’re responsible for the rise of fascism. Also, we’re going to be conveniently vague about what “those who have subjected themselves to public life” means, because “be nicer to multimillionaires who go on podcasts” doesn’t have the same ring. Oh, and if you complain about the IT Renfields of DOGE, you’re anti-American.

10. The psychologization of modern politics is leading us astray. Those who look to the political arena to nourish their soul and sense of self, who rely too heavily on their internal life finding expression in people they may never meet, will be left disappointed.

Translation: Society must stop centering sensitive crybabies who want to feel personally validated by elected officials and filter their politics through emotional reactions. Also, I feel strongly that Zohran Mamdani is a pagan who is going to Wicker Man me. [...]

14. American power has made possible an extraordinarily long peace. Too many have forgotten or perhaps take for granted that nearly a century of some version of peace has prevailed in the world without a great power military conflict. At least three generations — billions of people and their children and now grandchildren — have never known a world war.

Translation: Si vis pacem, para bellum, baby! We’ll conveniently leave out all of the regional and secret wars the US has engaged in over the years or the fact that Trump recently derailed the world economy by launching a war of aggression after campaigning on a promise of no new wars. We will not elaborate on what “next war” Point Six was talking about.

15. The postwar neutering of Germany and Japan must be undone. The defanging of Germany was an overcorrection for which Europe is now paying a heavy price. A similar and highly theatrical commitment to Japanese pacifism will, if maintained, also threaten to shift the balance of power in Asia.

Translation: We can definitely sell software to a militarized Germany and Japan too! [...]

22. We must resist the shallow temptation of a vacant and hollow pluralism. We, in America and more broadly the West, have for the past half century resisted defining national cultures in the name of inclusivity. But inclusion into what?

Translation: Are you still with us after 21 points? Great. Welcome to the great mystery. It cost you way less to get here than joining Scientology. Here’s the final thesis: Immigration? Bad. Canceling billionaires? Bad. Giving us money to fight (((globalism)))? Good. Just hit us up on cashapp.

by T.C. Sottek and Adi Robertson, The Verge |  Read more:
Image: Scott Olson / Getty Images
[ed. Someone must be feeling the heat from AI. After all, Palantir is fundamentally a software surveillance company (that would like to solidify and embed their position in government forever, before it's too late). Sometimes it's better to shut up, keep hauling in the billions, and stay under the radar (while continuing to work the back rooms). See also: Palantir’s technofascist manifesto calls for universal draft (Oligarch Watch) - yes, there's really a site called that.]
***
In the 2025 book The Technological Republic, Karp and Zamiska argue that American technological dominance requires deeper integration of Silicon Valley and defense interests. Karp contends that China operates with fewer ethical constraints than U.S. defense companies, making technological leadership essential for national security. The authors stress that deterrence through technological dominance could prevent many wars. Bloomberg noted that the atomic bomb the Manhattan Project produced was ultimately used. The New Republic called Karp's formation of Palantir an embrace of techno-militarism to advance American global supremacy through hard power and targeted violence. [...]

In 2017, BuzzFeed News reported that despite the reputation that connected Palantir to U.S. intelligence agencies (which Palantir deliberately crafted to help it win business), including the CIA, NSA, and FBI, the actual relationship was rocky for various reasons, with episodes of friction and recalcitrance. The NSA in particular had been resistant because it had plenty of its own talent and focused more on SIGINT while Palantir's software worked better for HUMINT. Meanwhile, the CIA had been so frustrated by the publicity associating Palantir with it that it tried to cancel the Palantir contract. But according to Karp, Palantir had a firm hold at the FBI because "They'll have no choice".  ~ Wikipedia

National Science Board Eviscerated

'Bozo the clown move'

All 22 members of the National Science Board were terminated by the Trump administration via a terse email on Friday.

The administration has provided no explanation for purging the board, which helps steer the National Science Foundation and acts as an independent advisory body for the president and Congress on scientific and engineering issues, providing reports throughout the year. The ousters represent another severe blow to the NSF and the overall scientific enterprise in America.

Members received a two-sentence email saying that, “On behalf of President Donald J. Trump,” their positions were “terminated, effective immediately.”

Keivan Stassun, a professor of physics and astronomy at Vanderbilt University and director of the Vanderbilt Initiative in Data-intensive Astrophysics, was among those terminated. After reaching out to fellow board members and finding that they, too, had been terminated, he described the move to The Los Angeles Times as “a wholesale evisceration of American leadership in science and technology globally.”

NSB members are appointed by the president and serve six-year terms, which overlap to provide continuity. Other members who spoke to reporters at Nature News told the outlet that the board was set to meet on May 5 and planned to release a report on how the US is ceding ground to China on scientific endeavors.

Assault on science

The NSF and the board were established by President Harry Truman in 1950. “We have come to know that our ability to survive and grow as a Nation depends to a very large degree upon our scientific progress,” Truman said after creating them. “Moreover, it is not enough simply to keep abreast of the rest of the world in scientific matters. We must maintain our leadership.”

The loss of all board members is just the latest attack on the NSF. Last year, the Trump administration proposed cutting its $9 billion budget by 55 percent, terminated hundreds of its active research grants, significantly slowed the pace of new grant awards, and laid off or forced out a massive chunk of its staff. Its director, a Trump appointee, resigned under the assault. Trump has nominated biotech investor Jim O’Neill, who lacks scientific expertise, to be the next NSF director.

by Beth Mole, Ars Technica |  Read more:
Image: Bloomberg
[ed. Forget shooting ourselves in the foot, now we're aimed at shooting ourselves in the head. See also: Trump fires the entire National Science Board (The Verge):]
***
The NSF has been fundamental in helping develop technology used in MRIs, cellphones, and it even helped get Duolingo get off the ground.

In a statement, Zoe Lofgren, the ranking Democrat on the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee, said:
“This is the latest stupid move made by a president who continues to harm science and American innovation. The NSB is apolitical. It advises the president on the future of NSF. It unfortunately is no surprise a president who has attacked NSF from day one would seek to destroy the board that helps guide the Foundation. Will the president fill the NSB with MAGA loyalists who won’t stand up to him as he hands over our leadership in science to our adversaries? A real bozo the clown move.”

Saturday, April 25, 2026

Dump the Jones Act. Permanently.

The Jones Act: A Burden America Can No Longer Bear (Cato Institute)
Image: uncredited
[ed. Expect to hear a lot more about this as a 90-day waiver has now been enacted to counteract rising oil prices. Alaska and Hawaii in particular have been held hostage to the Jones Act for decades, resulting in higher transport/shipping costs. See also: Jones Act Watch (Zvi).]

Friday, April 24, 2026

Iran War Updates: April 24, 2026

Iran War: Trump Says Time Is on His Side, Iranian Leadership Is Divided, Iran Begs to Differ (Naked Capitalism)
Image: USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) sails in the Indian Ocean, April 23. CENTCOM/X
[ed. Updates from a variety of sources. Draw your own conclusions. See also: Iran War: Team Trump as Narrative War Captives? (NC).]

Wednesday, April 22, 2026

You'll Regret It

Human beings have manic episodes; when it happens to an entire nation we call it empire. The affliction is the same. You prance around town with your tits practically pouring out your top, demanding drinks from strangers, snatching cigarettes out their hands. Isn’t it funny how I can do absolutely anything I want? And everybody loves me? You know you have a special destiny in the world. It’s obvious; flowers turn their faces towards you whenever you walk past. You’re going to save the world by sniffing coke off a stranger’s frenulum. And other people don’t understand, they’re all such bummers, they take things so personally, when really it was just a joke. In fact the whole world is a joke, none of it’s really serious, this great primary-coloured playground built for your delight. Sometimes in the brief moments you’re alone you can hear laughter, not coming from anyone in particular, not laughing at anything you can name, just the manic chattering laughter of the entire universe, flooding the silence. Lately you’ve been getting in fights. You’ve been winning them all. You’ve been stumbling into casinos and putting it all on red, emptying out your bank account, taking unsecured loans, putting it all on red and winning every time. God loves you more than he loves other people, he loves you in a different way. Maybe in an erotic way. Maybe you’re interested. You’ve been buying precious stones, rubies and sapphires; you keep them in your pockets. Sometimes people tell you that one day you’re going to wake up in hospital again, or jail, again, or in a pool of your own blood and vomit, or maybe not at all. They’re wrong. That happens to other people. It will never, ever happen to you. 

One good thing about Europe is we’ve all already been through it all. Here, every miserable dirt-poor republic had its century in the sun. Today, Splugovina is a dreary landlocked country of eight million people that produces sunflower seeds, insulated cables, and zinc-bearing ores, but for a brief period in the fifteenth century the glorious Splug Empire stretched clear across the continent. The crowned heads of Europe came to kneel and give tribute. After that, it’s true, there was the War of the Quintuple Alliance, and all the cities were razed, and maybe forty percent of the population starved in the fields, but there are still some very impressive ruins in the hills. That time is never coming back, though. All you can do now is put up a bunch of gaudy statues to the conquering heroes, make genocidal chants at football games. Remember, with a kind of lazy black bitterness, the days when the world was made of sugar and you were mad. [...]

I like American optimism. Not everyone does. A lot of people from long-vanished empires claim to find it unbearable; it reminds them of what they no longer have. But I like it. There’s something ridiculous about an American who tries to hate their own country, like a dog trying to walk on two legs. They don’t know what it means to wake up and curse the grey skies and poisoned soil of Splugovina, this place that closes around you like a tomb. They can rage against the slavery and genocide, but it’s still with that bright, feverish, all-American gleam in the eye. The only way an American can really encounter pessimism is by hiring a British person to perform it for them. That’s what I do, basically. It’s a living.

The problem, though, is the corollary to all this charming American exuberance, which is the repeated bouts of mass murder. It comes in cycles. A few years of screaming bloodlust until it all blows up in your face, and then you spend the next few years at home drinking wine out the bottle and wailing over the unfairness of the world, before finally straightening your back, giving one last sniff, and bravely stepping outside to once again club someone’s children to death. I used to think some kind of progress was possible here. I used to have something called the Iraq War Theory of Divorce in Hollywood Films. The theory says that if a film features a male lead character who gets divorced or separated from his main romantic interest, and it came out before 2005 or so, by the end he will have cajoled his ex back into bed and they’ll live happily ever after. Liar Liar, The Parent Trap, Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind. If it came out after 2005, by the end he will have learned to accept the situation, moved on, and found someone new. A total bloodbath in the Middle East, maybe a million people shot or blown up or tortured to death with power tools, so you can learn that hey, sometimes things don’t work out there way you want them to, and hey, sometimes that’s ok. But all these things are temporary. Don Quixote got a decade of sanity between volumes before the rabbit poison started glittering in his eyes and he was babbling about knight errantry again. America got less than half. Four years after the last American troops left Afghanistan under Taliban guard, war critic JD Vance was on the TV, saying that while he understood why people were put off by the last round of wars in the Middle East, ‘the difference is that back then we had dumb presidents, and now we have a president who actually knows how to accomplish America’s national security objectives.’ The dumb presidents, the ones who blundered around getting America into quagmires, still always held back from directly attacking Iran. The smart president is Donald Trump. [...]

So far, the war is going very well. It’s called Operation Epic Fury. Operation Epic Badass Ninja Pirate. Organs of state keep issuing public statements that say things like ‘Kill without hesitation, avenge without mercy’ and ‘You say death to America, we say America will be your death.’ They’re having no problems killing anyone they want to kill. Iran might be a proud and ancient civilisation with a historical memory stretching back six thousand years, but right now it’s an easily broken toy in the hands of an empire that can barely remember the day before yesterday. But somehow, the power to kill anyone at will isn’t enough. Things are not going according to plan. As far as I can tell, the plan was this. As soon as Israel and America eliminated the Supreme Leader, the entire Islamic Republic would disintegrate like an alien invasion fleet once the mothership’s been hit. At this point the Iranian people would fill the streets, overthrow the mullahs, and immediately start signing up for an OnlyFans account. Obviously these are early days, but it doesn’t look like things are going to plan. Something very different is happening. Decapitating the Islamic Republic has not shut it down. Instead, individual IRGC units are all operating autonomously, using their own mobile and highly fluid command structures. Instead of a single enemy, there’s now a swarm. No central authority to negotiate with even if you wanted to. A headless zombie Iran, the wreckage of a six-thousand-year-old state spewing ballistic missiles in every direction. Missiles falling on Saudi oil refineries, Bahraini radar installations, on the matcha labubu sexual slavery camps of Dubai. You thought all those CGI skyscrapers meant you were abstracted from geography, but this is still the Middle East. Meanwhile the revolutionaries have not yet shown up in the streets of Tehran. Possibly because the people most likely to overthrow the regime already tried that in January, and the regime killed or imprisoned them all. It might not happen. The Islamic Republic is a bad government, possibly the worst government anywhere on the face of the earth, but it’s being attacked by children making plane noises. 

by Sam Kriss, Numb at the Lodge |  Read more:
Image: uncredited

Tuesday, April 21, 2026

Elon vs. Altman: What Their Infrastructure Stacks Reveal About Power

Everyone’s obsessed with the Elon Musk vs. Sam Altman lawsuit. Ronan Farrow’s 18-month investigation. Molotov cocktails. Sister allegations. A $134 billion legal battle over OpenAI’s soul.

But they’re all asking the wrong question.

It’s not “who’s the good guy?” It’s not “who should we trust with AI?” It’s not even “who’s going to win the lawsuit?

The right question is: What does their infrastructure stack reveal about their actual theory of power?

Because here’s the thing about tech founders: They lie constantly. To investors, to users, to regulators, to themselves. But their products don’t lie. The infrastructure they choose to build. What they spend billions of dollars actually constructing reveals their real theory of survival.

Don’t listen to what they say. Look at what they build.

Elon Musk and Sam Altman are building for completely different endgames. And understanding the difference tells you everything you need to know about the actual stakes of their conflict.


Elon’s Stack: Collapse-Proof Sovereignty

Let’s start with Elon, because his infrastructure stack is massive and most people don’t understand how comprehensive it actually is. Every single piece is designed to function when legacy systems fail. This isn’t paranoia; it’s strategic architecture.

Tesla: Energy Independence

Solar panels. Powerwall battery systems. Electric vehicles. Supercharger network.

Translation: You don’t need the electrical grid. You don’t need oil. You don’t need gas stations. You don’t need the energy sector’s supply chains. If the grid goes down natural disaster, cyberattack, economic collapse, political breakdown. Tesla owners keep running. Solar generates power. Batteries store it. Vehicles consume it. The entire energy loop is self-contained. That’s not about environmentalism. That’s about Energy Sovereignty.

Starlink: Communications Independence

Over 5,000 satellites in low Earth orbit. Global internet coverage. Bypasses all terrestrial infrastructure.

Translation: You don’t need undersea fiber optic cables. You don’t need cell towers. You don’t need ISPs. You don’t need government-controlled telecommunications infrastructure. If a government shuts down the internet like Iran during protests, like Russia during Ukraine invasion. Starlink still works. You have communications capability independent of state control. That’s not about rural broadband. That’s about Information Sovereignty.

SpaceX: Logistics Independence

Reusable rockets (Falcon 9, Falcon Heavy, Starship). Cheapest launch cost per kilogram in human history. Point-to-point Earth transport capability. Orbital manufacturing potential.

Translation: You control access to space. You can move cargo anywhere on Earth in under an hour. You can put satellites into orbit cheaper than any nation-state. You can potentially manufacture things in zero-gravity that are impossible to make on Earth. If traditional supply chains break. Shipping disrupted, airspace restricted, borders closed. SpaceX can still move things. Anywhere. Fast. That’s not about exploration. That’s about Logistics Sovereignty.

The Deeper Play: Rockets Are Mythos

The Mars colonization narrative isn’t just a business plan. It’s a founding myth.

Think about how legitimacy works:

Ancient kings claimed “Divine Right” they were chosen by the gods to rule.

Democratic leaders claim “Popular Mandate” they were chosen by the people through voting.

Elon is building something different: “Cosmic Mandate”. He’s the one saving humanity by making us multi-planetary. “I’m building the infrastructure to preserve human consciousness across multiple worlds.

If you’re the person who saved the species from extinction by establishing a backup civilization on Mars, you’re not just a CEO. You’re not even just a political leader. You’re a Civilizational Founder. Like the people who established Rome, or the American republic, or any nation-state that becomes the foundation for centuries of subsequent history. Mars isn’t the goal. It’s the mythology that justifies rule. The founding story that makes everything else legitimate. 

[more]...

This is “Post-State Capability”. The ability to function and to maintain power when traditional state infrastructure is unavailable, hostile, or collapsed.

Elon’s not hoping for collapse. But he’s not betting against it either.

His thesis is simple: “The system will fragment. Build infrastructure that makes you powerful in the aftermath.” If collapse happens, He owns:- Energy systems- Communications networks- Logistics capability- Information channels- Labor (automated)- The founding myth (savior of humanity) That’s not a business portfolio. That’s a blueprint for post-state power.


Altman’s Stack: Acceleration-Dependent Fragility

Now let’s look at Sam Altman’s infrastructure.

OpenAI/ChatGPT: Centralized, Grid-Dependent, Fragile

OpenAI is building toward Artificial General Intelligence through massive-scale computing infrastructure. Current commitments: $1.4 trillion in data center buildout over 8 years.

This requires:
  • Stable energy grid (data centers consume gigawatts → entire power plants worth of electricity)
  • Chip manufacturing (NVIDIA GPUs, TSMC fabrication→ Taiwan and South Korea must remain stable and accessible)
  • Cooling infrastructure (water, HVAC systems, constant temperature regulation)
  • Fiber optic networks (global connectivity, low-latency communication)
  • Capital markets (functioning financial system to fund trillion-dollar buildouts)
  • Regulatory stability (permitting, zoning, environmental compliance, AI development allowed)
Notice the dependency structure?

Elon’s stack works when systems fail. Altman’s stack requires every system to keep working simultaneously.

The Vulnerability Comparison

Elon without electrical grid:
  • Still has Tesla solar panels generating power
  • Still has Powerwall batteries storing energy
  • Still has Starlink satellites providing internet
  • Still has rockets for logistics
  • Still has underground tunnels for transit
  • Still has robots for labor
  • Still powerful
Altman without electrical grid:
  • Data centers go dark immediately
  • ChatGPT stops responding
  • Training runs halt
  • No product, no revenue, no value
  • Completely powerless
The contrast is stark. Elon’s infrastructure is “distributed and resilient”. Altman’s infrastructure is centralized and fragile.

What Does Altman Actually Want?

So if Altman’s building such a vulnerable stack, what’s the theory?

Look at what he’s actually building with AI. Not what he says but what he builds.

He’s NOT focusing on:
  • AI companionship (even though Character.ai and Replica prove this is hugely profitable)
  • Entertainment AI (even though this is the biggest consumer market)
  • Social AI (even though emotional dependency creates the strongest lock-in)
He’s focusing on:
  • AI for scientific research (drug discovery, materials science, physics)
  • AI for productivity (coding assistants, automation, reasoning)
  • AI for problem-solving (complex systems, coordination challenges)
This is the tell. He’s explicitly said he was surprised people want emotional bonds with ChatGPT, and he’s not leaning into it.

Why?

by MythcoreOps |  Read more:
Images: uncredited

Monday, April 20, 2026

Ship of Fools

Behind Trump’s Public Bravado on the War, He Grapples With His Own Fears

Trump campaigned on ending foreign wars but wagered that he could solve, with American air and naval power, a national security problem that had bedeviled seven previous presidents. Now, a cease-fire is in doubt, a critical trade route has been closed for weeks and Iran’s regime has been replaced with radical new leaders, all threatening to lengthen an operation that Trump has repeatedly said would only last six weeks—a deadline already missed since the war began Feb. 28.

White House officials said they believe a breakthrough in negotiations with Iran could be reached in coming days, and they are eyeing more talks in Pakistan.

The president’s impulsive style has never before been tested during a sustained military conflict. Unlike the successful operation in Venezuela, which buoyed his confidence, Trump is confronting a more intractable foe in Iran, which is so far unwilling to bend to his demands.
 
“We are witnessing astonishing military successes that do not add up to victory and that is squarely on the president and how he’s chosen to do his job—lack of attention to detail and lack of planning,” said Kori Schake, a senior fellow at the right-leaning think tank American Enterprise Institute who served on former President George W. Bush’s National Security Council.

Soon after Trump’s holiday post, aides fielded calls from Republican senators and Christian leaders. They asked, why would he say “Praise be to Allah” on Easter morning? Why would he use the F-word? Trump swears profusely in private but usually calibrates it in public and on social media.
 

When one adviser later asked him about it, he said he came up with the Allah idea himself. He said he wanted to seem as unstable and insulting as possible, believing it could bring the Iranians to the table, senior administration officials said. It was a language, he said, the Iranians would understand. But he was also concerned about the fallout. “How’s it playing?” he asked advisers. (Iran’s parliamentary speaker called the threat reckless.)
 
On the Tuesday after Easter, he issued the most dramatic ultimatum of his presidency, saying that unless Iran struck a deal in 12 hours, a whole civilization would die.
 
Again, the post was improvisational, and not part of a national security plan, the administration officials said.


People around the U.S. and the world were gripped with fear and confusion about what the president intended to do. Behind the scenes, top aides saw the move as a way to spur negotiations in a war the president was desperately ready to end. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told others privately it was language that might actually bring the Iranians to negotiate.
 
What Trump really wanted, advisers said, was to scare the Iranians, and to end the conflict. Less than ninety minutes before his deadline, Trump announced a precarious two-week cease-fire.
 
“President Trump campaigned proudly on his promise to deny the Iranian regime the ability to develop a nuclear weapon, which is what this noble operation accomplishes,” said Karoline Leavitt, the White House press secretary. She said the president had “remained a steady leader our country needs.”
 
Trump is keeping close score on the war, measuring how many Iranian targets have been destroyed as a key metric of success, officials said.

‘Blood and sand’

Trump’s decision to venture into the war surprised many who knew him best. “Blood and sand,” he told advisers in his first term to describe the region, explaining why he wasn’t interested in getting drawn into any Middle East conflict.

After a persuasive February briefing from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in the Situation Room, and repeated conversations with a group of outside allies that included Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.), he said he trusted the military to pull it off. Look, he said to advisers, at how quickly they had “won” in Venezuela, where the U.S. had, in a matter of hours, captured its president and ended with his more compliant deputy in his place.
 
In Iran, the war started with the execution of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other top Iranian officials. Trump was shown clips every morning of stunning explosions across the Iranian terrain. Advisers said Trump remarked to them how impressive the military was, seeming in awe of the scale of bombs.
 
But Trump had done little to sell the American public on the war, and soon grew frustrated that his administration wasn’t getting the same kind of external praise. Leavitt attributed his frustration to what she deemed unfair news coverage of the administration. His team showed him poll results for the November midterm elections that showed him the war was dragging down Republican candidates.
 
Still, Trump himself wasn’t up for re-election—and he thought a win over Iran would give him a chance to reshape the global order in a way he couldn’t in his first term, two top officials said. Trump said early in the military operation that if we get this right, we are saving the world, according to a person who heard his comments.
 
With the strait’s closure choking off some 20% of the global oil supply, energy CEOs soon grew nervous. In mid-March, Energy Secretary Chris Wright appeared at a board meeting of the American Petroleum Institute, the oil industry’s primary lobbying group, and said the war would be over in weeks, according to people at the meeting. The energy leaders have at times worried that war would drive up prices far more than the White House seemed to appreciate if Trump continued an escalation that matched his rhetoric, people familiar with the matter said.

Trump vacillated, people close to him said, between considering economic worries in calls with advisers including Wright and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, and insisting that he was going to keep the war going. He told advisers that they needed to watch the markets, and his words often moved them.
 
But Trump quickly began ruminating on how the military action could turn into a catastrophe. [...]

The strait has been a particular source of frustration. Before the U.S. went to war, Trump told his team that Iran’s government would likely capitulate before closing the strait, and that even if Tehran tried, the U.S. military could handle it, The Wall Street Journal has reported. Some of the president’s advisers were caught off guard that tanker traffic would grind to a halt so quickly after the bombing began, according to a person in contact with the White House.

Trump has since marveled at the ease with which the strait was closed. A guy with a drone can shut it down, Trump has said to people, expressing belated irritation that the key waterway was so vulnerable. He has publicly oscillated between demanding support from allies to help open it and insisting that the U.S. doesn’t need or want military assistance.

In late March—about a week before the Iranians shot down the plane—Trump had ordered his negotiating team to find a way to start talks, according to a person familiar with the discussions.

By early April, the price of gas was up by more than $1 a gallon, and industry leaders worried that the market still hadn’t properly priced the risk that the war was posing to the oil supply. The president, through his force of personality, was doing a good job talking down the price of oil, but reality would soon set in, said one person familiar with the industry.
 
But they’ve been told Trump is willing to take the political hit for higher prices for a short period of time, the person said.

The president’s competing impulses, playing out in early-morning missives, concerned his aides who were growing worried the war was becoming a political albatross. [...]
  
Trump’s top aides have taken turns telling the president that he should limit the impromptu interviews because they were only convincing the public he had contradictory messages. At times, Trump would joke with Leavitt that he had talked to a reporter and made big news, but she would have to wait and see what it was, White House officials said. For a bit, he agreed to curb them—then soon returned.

Some advisers encouraged him to do a speech to the nation. White House chief of staff Susie Wiles thought it would reassure the country that Trump had a plan. Trump wasn’t initially interested. What would he say? He couldn’t declare victory. He didn’t know where it was going. He was eventually persuaded to make the address on April 1, and aides along with outside advisers filled the room hoping to encourage him.
 
The U.S. had succeeded on the battlefield and the U.S. military objectives would be completed “very shortly,” he told skeptical Americans. The speech, which didn’t clarify how the U.S. would exit the war, didn’t increase public support.
 
Minute-by-minute rescue

The repeated crises prompted by the war have led to scrambles inside the administration.
For 24 hours over Easter weekend, Trump’s team dialed into the Situation Room: Vice President JD Vance from Camp David, Wiles from her home in Florida. They received almost minute-by-minute progress reports, of the military entering Iran, the rescue planes getting stuck in the sand, the efforts to distract the Iranians. They called the last airman by a code name.
 
Trump wasn’t included in the meeting but received updates by phone.

After Trump’s subsequent threat to destroy Iranian civilization, White House officials talked to Pakistani counterparts about mediating a cease-fire. Trump was too mad at the Europeans for any of them to serve the role, administration officials said.
 
As the world waited on the president’s 8 p.m. deadline, Trump flitted between topics, aides said. He talked to officials about endorsements in an Indiana state race. His team prepped for the midterms. He listened to officials talk about cryptocurrency and artificial intelligence policy.
 
He also asked Wiles and Steve Witkoff, the U.S.’s chief negotiator with Iran, where things stood. Push them to a deal, he told Witkoff repeatedly.
 
White House concerns about security threats have been heightened, aides said.

In recent weeks, for example, Trump and his team have noticed an increase in security. On a cloudless night in April at Mar-a-Lago, every umbrella was up on the patio in an unusual arrangement, guests said. Club members were told that there was an effort to limit drone visibility, a Mar-a-Lago member said.
 
Rubio told others about standing outside his home at the military compound where he lives and watching a suspicious drone, administration officials said. Secret Service protection teams have expanded to carry weapons White House officials had never seen before.
 
Despite the high pressure moments, Trump has also told advisers he wants to talk about other topics and see the media focus on other issues. When guests showed up for a meeting of Kennedy Center officials in March, the president pulled some of them aside to talk about the ballroom he is constructing on White House grounds. Out came drawings showing a large hole in the ground—he was amazed at all that could be built underneath. Advisers said he has multiple meetings a week on the topic and views himself as the general contractor.

Also on his mind: raising money for the midterms. Hours after the war began on the last Saturday in February, he was at a fundraiser at Mar-a-Lago. When some staff questioned if they should cancel it, Trump said he would have to eat dinner regardless.
 
At another gathering, one night after threatening to end Iranian civilization, Trump stood in the White House with donors and top staff for a reception ahead of America’s 250th celebration this summer. He mused about giving himself the nation’s highest military honor, the Medal of Honor, designed to honor bravery, courage and sacrifice, according to people who were at the reception.
 
He then told a story about why he said he deserved it: In his first term as he flew into Iraq for a surprise holiday visit to the troops, his jet descended in the dark toward an unlit runway. In dramatic fashion, he counted down the feet to the plane landing, and recalled how scary it was. The pilots kept reassuring him, he said, and they landed safely.
He couldn’t get the medal, he said, because White House counsel David Warrington, who was standing nearby at the event, wouldn’t allow it.
 
Leavitt, the White House spokeswoman, said he was joking.

by Josh Dawsey and Annie Linskey, Wall Street Journal |  Read more:
Images: Matt Rourke/AP; Abedin Taherkenareh/EPA/Shutterstock
[ed. When you've lost the Wall Street Journal... If they (staffers) are keeping him at arms length and somewhat removed from any form of pragmatic decision-making, then that would partly explain why so many of his posts are uninformed and contradictory.]

Sunday, April 19, 2026

Behind the Curtain: China Wins by Watching


Chinese President Xi Jinping has spent the Iran war doing what he does best — patiently exploiting America's distraction and discord.

Why it matters: The conflict allowed China to bolster its diplomatic leverage, clean-energy muscle and intelligence on the U.S. military — all without firing a shot or spending a dollar.
  • The implications touch supply chains, energy procurement, geopolitical risk, and the race for superior AI and weaponry.
The military impact is the part that should scare the hell out of Pentagon planners.
  • The U.S. committed roughly 80% of its JASSM-ER stealth cruise missile inventory to the Iran fight, pulling stockpiles from the Pacific to feed it. The conflict significantly depleted U.S. supplies of Tomahawk and Patriot missiles, THAAD interceptors and drones.
  • Beijing got a free masterclass in modern American warfighting: how we use AI to target, how we rotate carrier groups, how cheap Iranian drones drain our most expensive interceptors. For Chinese war planners gaming out a Taiwan invasion, it was better than any simulation.
On energy, China emerged as a huge winner of the ongoing Hormuz shockwaves.
  • When oil and gas supplies get weaponized, import-dependent countries accelerate renewables. China owns over 70% of global solar, wind, battery and electric vehicle supply chains. The longer Hormuz stays disrupted, the deeper the world's dependency gets.
  • The war was the stress test that Beijing's energy strategy was designed for. Yes, roughly half its oil imports transit Hormuz. But the country is 85% energy self-sufficient. Renewables plus nuclear now exceed 20% of China's total energy consumed, passing oil as the No. 2 source last year. Its strategic petroleum reserves are full.
The diplomatic optics couldn't have been better for the Chinese.
  • While Trump was threatening to bomb Iran "back to the Stone Ages," Beijing was quietly helping Pakistan bring both sides to the table in Islamabad — while capitals from Riyadh to Jakarta are weighing which superpower to align with.
China's AI push got a clear boost from the war's second-order financial consequences.
  • The Gulf's massive AI buildout — billions from Microsoft, Oracle, Nvidia and others — faces indefinite geopolitical risk after Iranian strikes on AI-related targets across the region.
  • China already has the world's second-largest AI compute capacity. It doesn't need Gulf cooperation to scale. Every dollar of Western investment that stalls in the Gulf is a dollar that doesn't build an alternative to Chinese infrastructure.
The rare earths piece, out of sight for most Americans, might be Beijing's biggest asset right now.
  • There's currently no heavy rare-earth separation capacity in the U.S. at meaningful scale. China controls roughly 70% of rare-earth mining and 90% of separation and magnet manufacturing. New Pentagon procurement rules banning Chinese-sourced rare earths take effect in 2027 — but domestic alternatives won't be ready for years.
  • The weapons the U.S. fired in Iran — Tomahawks, JDAMs, Predator drones — all require rare earths for their precision guidance systems. Every smart weapon expended made America more dependent on Chinese supply chains that it's racing, but failing, to replace.
by Jim VandeHei, Axios | Read more:
Image: Aïda Amer/Axios. Photo: Contributor/Getty Images
[ed. See also: 4 ways the war in Iran has weakened the United States in the great power game (The Conversation); and, Scoop: NSA using Anthropic's Mythos despite blacklist (Axios).]
***
  • The National Security Agency is using Anthropic's most powerful model yet, Mythos Preview, despite top officials at the Department of Defense — which oversees the NSA — insisting the company is a "supply chain risk," two sources tell Axios.
  • The military is now broadening its use of Anthropic's tools while simultaneously arguing in court that using those tools threatens U.S. national security.

Saturday, April 18, 2026

Kamikaze Warfare

One‑way attack drones: Low‑cost, high‑tech weapons ‘democratize’ precision warfare

Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have propelled drones into the headlines. The word “drone” now stretches to cover everything from hobbyist camera rigs available on Amazon to the Predator and Reaper systems the United States has relied on to fight terrorist organizations over the past 20 years.

A common ancestor in the animal kingdom can give rise, under sufficient environmental pressure, to distinct species that demand their own classification. Drones have undergone their own rapid speciation: the one-way attack drone, the medium-altitude, long-endurance and high-altitude, long-endurance drones, the collaborative combat aircraft drone – these share a lineage and a label, but in terms of cost, range and use, increasingly little else.

Nowhere is this variation more consequential than in the category of one-way attack drones: systems designed not to return home like an airplane, but to fly directly into a target and destroy it, like a bullet or a missile. Russia and Ukraine have fired millions of these at each other since 2022, and Iran has launched thousands at United States military bases and embassies, Israel and other countries in the Middle East in 2026.

The world is now in an era we call “precise mass.” In the past, military power was often determined by size – the number of knights, soldiers, guns or tanks, depending on the era, that an army had. Since the Cold War, advanced militaries have emphasized precise munitions, such as cruise missiles, gaining advantage with fewer but more accurately targeted weapons. Inexpensive but technologically sophisticated drones bring mass and precision together.

Commercial manufacturing, precision guidance and advances in artificial intelligence and autonomy have democratized the ability of militaries and militant groups to accurately strike their adversaries. This includes first-person-view, or FPV, drones – a type of one-way attack drone with interfaces like video games – that groups aligned with Iran are already using to target American forces in the Middle East.

One-way attack drones

One-way attack drones have featured most prominently in the war between Russia and Ukraine, and in the Middle East today. The first category of one-way attack drones is longer range and can travel hundreds or even thousands of miles to strike targets deep in an adversary’s territory. They are like extremely cheap cruise missiles – Iran’s Shahed-136 one-way attack drone, for instance, has a reported range of up to 1,250 miles (2,000 km) and costs between US$20,000 and $50,000 each. In comparison, America’s Tomahawk cruise missile costs $2 million each.

by Michael C. Horowitz and Lauren Kahn, The Conversation |  Read more:
Image: uncredited via
[ed. See also: How Iran’s Cheap, Low-Tech Drones Have Cost the U.S. (NYT); and, Ukraine Has Finally Given Up on Trump (Atlantic):]
***
The change in Ukraine’s public posture comes as the country’s military situation has improved, at least relative to its struggles last year. Relying overwhelmingly on their homegrown drone industry and military structure, Ukrainian forces have regained the initiative in many areas. In recent months, they have reportedly caused more casualties than Russia can replace—and have taken back more territory than Russia has seized. Along the front lines, Ukraine has strengthened and extended its so-called drone wall, which restricts the movement of flesh-and-blood Russian forces. Earlier this week, Kyiv claimed to have seized a Russian position and captured a number of Russian soldiers while exposing no Ukrainians at all, only unmanned aerial and ground vehicles.

Meanwhile, Ukrainians have gained greater confidence in launching drone strikes on mid- and long-range targets far behind the front lines, as the attack near St. Petersburg showed. Finally, Ukraine continues to bottle up Russian naval power in the Black Sea. Vessels even in the most protected Russian naval bases are no longer safe from Ukrainian attack.

For the past 15 months, U.S. officials and many Western analysts have been fixated on Ukrainian weakness. Trump infamously insisted last year that Ukrainians had “no cards” to play. But their ability to adapt even without U.S. aid has been startling. Now a global leader in drone development and manufacturing, Ukraine is reportedly planning to produce up to 7 million military unmanned aerial vehicles in 2026.

Thursday, April 16, 2026

We May Be Living Through the Most Consequential Hundred Days in Cyber History, and Almost Nobody Has Noticed

[ed. Well, good luck with this one.]

The first four months of 2026 have produced a sequence of cyber incidents that, if any one of them had landed in 2014 or 2017, would have dominated a news cycle for a week.

A Chinese state supercomputer reportedly bled ten petabytes. Stryker was wiped across 79 countries. Lockheed Martin was hit for a reported 375 terabytes. The FBI Director’s personal inbox was dumped on the open web. The FBI’s wiretap management network was breached in a separate “major incident.” Rockstar Games was breached through a SaaS analytics vendor most people have never heard of. Cisco’s private GitHub was cloned. Oracle’s legacy cloud cracked open. The Axios npm package, downloaded a hundred million times a week, was hijacked by North Korea. Mercor, the $10 billion AI training-data vendor that sits inside the data pipelines of OpenAI, Anthropic, and Meta simultaneously, was breached through the LiteLLM open source library and had 4 terabytes extracted by Lapsus$. Honda was hit twice. The new ShinyHunters/Scattered Spider/LAPSUS$ alliance breached approximately 400 organizations and exfiltrated roughly 1.5 billion Salesforce records.

Stacked on top of each other across roughly a hundred days, these events are something a historian of computing security writing in 2050 will probably file as a turning point, regardless of what else happens between now and then.

And yet, the public conversation around them has been quiet to the point of being strange. This is a curious observation more than a complaint. And the goal of what follows is to gather the events into one place, cite the publications that reported each one, and then ask, gently, why the period feels so undocumented in real time.

Every named incident below is followed by inline parenthetical citations to the publications that broke or covered it, in the same way an academic paper would.

I am not arguing that the cybersecurity community is failing. I am noting that something unusual is happening.

by Patrick Quirk, Substack |  Read more:
Image: uncredited
[ed. Hmm... sounds suspicious.]

Wednesday, April 15, 2026

Mythos and "New Sages Unrivalled"

For the last six weeks or so, at least one American company has possessed a tool that could damage the operations of critical infrastructure and government services in every country on Earth, including the United States. Within another six weeks or so, if not already, 2-3 American companies will possess this capability. Some time after that, perhaps not much time at all, adversaries of the United States—principally China—will possess tools of this magnitude.

The company I am referring to is Anthropic, and the tool they posses is called Claude Mythos. Researchers at the company have said that the new model stands to fundamentally upend cybersecurity. At least, for the time being. They postulate that after a transitional period, the world will end up in a steady state where advanced AI benefits defenders rather than cyberattackers. Yet the transitional period could be a long and brutal storm, and we do not know what will break as it hits.

“The threat is not hypothetical,” they conclude. “Advanced language models are here.”

What we do next, both collectively and as individuals, will determine if we can weather the storm.

***
What do the capabilities of Mythos mean, prosaically speaking? It’s hard to say, because I do not have access to it, and in all likelihood, neither do you. The model is not currently public, and may never be in its current form. But broadly speaking, if one takes Anthropic at their word, the model can conduct automated software vulnerability discovery with nearly superhuman performance in some domains.

The model can find security vulnerabilities in software, including software systems upon which modern civilization rests, that have eluded security researchers for years, and sometimes decades. The model has found thousands of vulnerabilities so far, most of which have not yet been fixed (for this reason, Anthropic has not publicized the exploits, but they have reported them to the developers of the software in question). An enormous range of consumer and commercial services--from banking to healthcare to education to AI itself—are plausibly implicated.

My model of modern software is that, if you look hard enough, you will find critical vulnerabilities. Looking hard, however, used to be expensive—only the best hackers in the world could do it, and their time was limited. With Mythos, the price of “looking hard” at software has plummeted, and it will get cheaper each month.

This is not wholly bad news; after all, “looking hard” at software is also how software gets improved. Mythos and similarly capable models from other companies that will soon follow, in that sense, are one of the greatest gifts to cybersecurity ever given.

Yet as things stand today, the world is deeply vulnerable. Every day, you rely on untold millions of lines of code maintained by a global population of millions of developers. It will not all be fixed tomorrow, or next month, or next year. The reality is that models of this capability level—and more capable—will almost certainly diffuse widely before all “critical” software is patched. How much damage will be done is anyone’s guess.

If you doubted whether AI systems might have object-level national security implications, now we have clear evidence. Some of the most capable and prized teams in the United States intelligence community do precisely the kind of work that Claude Mythos automates. The same is true of China. You can be inclined to believe this will all work out fine in the end, but it is simply no longer credible to contend that there are no implications for national security from large language models, and therefore for government as a whole.

***
This has been a frustrating issue to discuss candidly for the past two years. The reason is that, in the adolescent period of AI policy and discourse that is now—I hope—coming to a close, taking AI risks seriously was considered uncouth. Speaking about how near-future models might have straightforwardly dangerous capabilities was enough to provoke suspicion: were you a secret “doomer” or Effective Altruist? Were you part of a grand conspiracy to achieve “regulatory capture” for the frontier AI companies? Were you trying to “ban open source”? These sorts of questions constrained debate and put blinders on a large number of otherwise-sane policymakers and other influential people. And these constraints, in turn, meant that one had to tiptoe around reality.

But I am done with tiptoeing now, and so should everyone else be. It is a great relief, albeit also a bit uncomfortable, to feel the biting winds against one’s face.

In that spirit, here are some things I believe to be true:
1. Actors who are hostile to the U.S. will possess the capabilities of Mythos, if not better, within a year or two. We will not stop this through “nonproliferation” or some other clever regulatory scheme. We can only blunt the impact of this reality by strengthening our cyberdefenses rapidly.

2. Strengthening cyberdefense will require coordination among state and local government entities, private sector critical infrastructure operators, frontier labs, and the broader private sector, as well as the federal government. But even more importantly, it will require compute: data centers. In recent testimony to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, I wrote about the urgency of speeding transmission siting to facilitate the buildout of supercomputing infrastructure for national security. Running massive fleets of automated software vulnerability researchers was precisely one of the use cases I cite in that testimony. In addition to speeding up the FERC process through administrative actions, we need permitting reform urgently.

3. Speaking of national security: The U.S. Department of War, and the federal government more broadly, are engaged in a lawfare campaign against Anthropic whose underlying motivations are deeply unclear and which attacks core American values. Now, the strategic wisdom looks worse and worse by the week. We are fighting a war against Iran, a highly capable cyberoffensive actor. It is inconceivable that the government can have a healthy relationship with the frontier AI industry while attempting to destroy what is arguably the field’s leading company. Anthropic and the Department of War must come to a truce, if not a resolution, as soon as possible, for the good of America’s national defense.

4. In the context of national-security-relevant cybersecurity capabilities, the key and salient difference between the United States and China is not our “innovation ecosystem,” but instead the simple reality that our firms possess the computing power to train and operate models like Mythos today, and theirs do not. It is that simple. China is prioritizing its efforts to develop its own compute manufacturing capacity, and this development is likely to motivate them even further. The best way to disrupt this is a serious increase in targeted export controls on semiconductor manufacturing equipment, too much of which flows freely today from the U.S. and its allies to China. It is long past time for major effort here from Congress and the Trump Administration.

5. The utility of SB 53, which requires frontier AI companies to disclose their assessments of their own models’ cybersecurity risks, is hopefully more apparent now. Some criticisms of that legislative framework have asserted that it attempts to control frontier AI or micromanage companies. But in truth, the framework rests on the notion that AI will not be controllable--that stopping the diffusion of potentially dangerous capabilities is impossible--and that therefore today’s “frontier” capabilities will be broadly dispersed within a short while. This is exactly we need transparency about what developers see at the frontier: so that a large range of societal actors can prepare their defenses appropriately against the developments we see forming at the frontier.

6. Today, Mythos is accessible only within Anthropic and to Anthropic’s chosen partners. Limited releases of this kind will likely be a growing trend because of both compute constraints and safety concerns. Mythos appears to be about five times more expensive to run than Opus, which was already not cheap, but for Anthropic the issue is not so much cost as it is allocating sufficient compute to serve Mythos to the public. This means that the best AI models of the future may be disproportionately, if not exclusively, used within frontier labs for their own purposes, which at least at first will be automated AI R&D. These so-called “internal deployments” have motivated my own pursuit of transparency and private governance frameworks, the latter being private organizations that would audit the safety and security posture of frontier AI companies, including their internal deployments.

*** 

I wrote on X that Mythos means the training wheels are coming off on AI policy. Perhaps the Department of War’s effort to strangle Anthropic is, to use another metaphor, a sign that the gloves are off too. If the last month has made anything clear, it is that we are in a nastier, sharper, harsher, meaner era of AI discourse, policy, and—ultimately—of AI development and use.

I will be honest: I do not see how it is possible for Mythos-level capabilities to diffuse through the world without causing at least some significant security crises and economic disruption. And of course, this cycle of compute infrastructure buildout has only just begun; within a year or so, gigawatts of additional AI compute capacity will be online.

The pimply and ill-shapen adolescence of AI and AI policy have come to an end. The first maturity has now begun.

by Dean W. Ball, Hyperdimensional |  Read more:
Image: via

***
Indeed, Anthropic itself has ‘slowed down AI’ in this situation, and done the closest thing we have had to a pause, by not releasing Mythos widely, and pretty much everyone agrees this was the right thing to do. Consider that we might need more similar capabilities, including more broadly.
But how long will it be before an open source version, even if somewhat inferior, is available? Will OpenAI and Google soon be showing similar capabilities? (And how will that shift the equilibrium?) Should we upgrade our estimates of the returns to investing in compute?
That depends on what counts as similar, especially with the ‘even if somewhat inferior.’ For reasonable values my guess is 1-2 years for open models in terms of absolute capabilities (by then bugs will be a lot harder to find), and on the order of months for OpenAI, and probably a few more months for Google.
How will the willingness of attackers to pay for tokens evolve, relative to the willingness of defenders to pay for tokens? Which are our softest targets?

As a side effect, will this also lead to higher economic concentration, as perhaps only the larger institutions can invest in quality patches rapidly enough?
I think this absolutely will lead to higher economic concentration, as it favors economies of scale across the board. [...]

Solve For The Equilibrium

Tyler Cowen shares a model from Jacob Gloudemans of what might happen, where vulnerabilities become much easier to find quickly, but the big problems actually go away due to the increased velocity of defenses and patching.

Rather than being able to hoard exploits everyone has to use their exploits right away or lose them, and most of the time most important actors don’t especially want to mess with any particular target, so they won’t even look for the exploits.

This model assumes good defense is being played where it counts, and that the supply of exploits is limited, and that when you catch an exploit you can defend against those who have already found it and tried to use it. I don’t think those are safe assumptions.

One also should consider the opposite scenario. Right now, an intelligence agency might find an exploit and sit on it for years, perhaps forever, because even if it normally goes unused its value at the right time is very high. But, if that exploit will not last, then they may try to use it.

Ultimately the equilibrium will still involve cyberattacks, because the correct number of cyberattacks is not zero. It might be correct to price out attacks to the point where everyone involved should have better things to do with their time, but if we collectively actually cause everyone to fully give up and go home then everyone is selfishly overinvesting in defenses, unless there is a modest cost to being fully safe. [...]

Conclusion: How To Think About Mythos

[ed. Ten points...]

Things are only going to get faster and weirder and scarier from here.