Showing posts with label Business. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Business. Show all posts

Friday, February 20, 2026

Kung Fu Robots Steal the Show

 

Cyber kung fu show at Chinese New Year Gala

Dozens of G1 robots from Unitree Robotics delivered the world's first fully autonomous humanoid robot kung fu performance, featuring rapid position changes. The show pushed the limits of robotic movement and set multiple global records.

[ed. Not your mom's old roomba anymore. Robotics + AI the next frontier.]

Proposed AI Policy Framework for Congress

Sam Altman (Open AI): "The world may need something like an IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] for international coordination on AI". (source)

Alex Bores proposes his AI policy framework for Congress.

1. Protect kids and students: Parental visibility. Age verification for risky AI services. Require scanning for self-harm. Teach kids about AI. Clear guidelines for AI use in schools, explore best uses. Ban AI CSAM.

2. Take back control of your data. Privacy laws, data ownership, no sale of personal data, disclosure of AI interactions and data collections and training data.

3. Stop deepfakes. Metadata standards, origin tracing, penalties for distribution.

4. Make datacenters work for people. No rate hikes, enforce agreements, expedite data centers using green energy, repair the grid with private funds, monitor water use, close property tax loopholes.

5. Protect and support workers. Require large companies to report AI-related workforce changes. Tax incentives for upskilling, invest in retraining, ban AI as sole decider for hiring and firing, transitional period where AI needs same licensing as a human, tax large companies for an ‘AI dividend.’

6. Nationalize the Raise Act for Frontier AI. Require independent safety testing, mandate cybersecurity incident reporting, restrict government use of foreign AI tools, create accountability mechanisms for AI systems that harm, engage in diplomacy on AI issues.

7. Build Government Capacity to Oversee AI. Fund CAISI, expand technical expertise, require developers to disclose key facts to regulators, develop contingency plans for catastrophic risks.

8. Keep America Competitive. Federal funding for academic research, support for private development of safe, beneficial applications, ‘reasonable regulation that protects people without strangling innovation,’ work with allies to establish safety standards, strategic export controls, keep the door open for international agreements.

[ed. Given the pace of AI development, the federal government needs to get its act together soon or anything they do will be irrelevant and way too late. Bores is a NY State Assemblyman running for Congress. A former data scientist and project lead for Palantir Technologies - one of the leading defense and security companies in the world - he joined in 2014 and left in 2019 when Palantir renewed its contract with ICE. Wikipedia entry here. His official Framework policy can be found here (pdf). The proposed goals, which seem well thought out and easily understandable, should, with minor tweaks, gain bi-partisian support (in a saner world anyway...who knows now). Better than 50 states proposing 50 different versions. Dean Ball (former White House technology advisor) has proposed something similar called the AI Action Plan (pdf). Both are thoughtful efforts that provide ample talking points for querying your congressperson about what they're doing at this critical inflection point (if anything).] [See also: The AI-Panic Cycle—And What’s Actually Different Now (Atlantic).]

Thursday, February 19, 2026

Defense Dept. and Anthropic Square Off in Dispute Over A.I. Safety

For months, the Department of Defense and the artificial intelligence company Anthropic have been negotiating a contract over the use of A.I. on classified systems by the Pentagon.

This week, those discussions erupted in a war of words.

On Monday, a person close to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told Axios that the Pentagon was “close” to declaring the start-up a “supply chain risk,” a move that would sever ties between the company and the U.S. military. Anthropic was caught off guard and internally scrambled to pinpoint what had set off the department, two people with knowledge of the company said.

At the heart of the fight is how A.I. will be used in future battlefields. Anthropic told defense officials that it did not want its A.I. used for mass surveillance of Americans or deployed in autonomous weapons that had no humans in the loop, two people involved in the discussions said.

But Mr. Hegseth and others in the Pentagon were furious that Anthropic would resist the military’s using A.I. as it saw fit, current and former officials briefed on the discussions said. As tensions escalated, the Department of Defense accused the San Francisco-based company of catering to an elite, liberal work force by demanding additional protections.

The disagreement underlines how political the issue of A.I. has become in the Trump administration. President Trump and his advisers want to expand technology’s use, reducing export restrictions on A.I. chips and criticizing state regulations that could be perceived as inhibitors to A.I. development. But Anthropic’s chief executive, Dario Amodei, has long said A.I. needs strict limits around it to prevent it from potentially wrecking the world.

Emelia Probasco, a senior fellow at Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology, said it was important that the relationship between the Pentagon and Anthropic not be doomed.

“There are war fighters using Anthropic for good and legitimate purposes, and ripping this out of their hands seems like a total disservice,” she said. “What the nation needs is both sides at the table discussing what can we do with this technology to make us safer.” [...]

The Defense Department has used Anthropic’s technology for more than a year as part of a $200 million A.I. pilot program to analyze imagery and other intelligence data and conduct research. Google, OpenAI and Elon Musk’s xAI are also part of the program. But Anthropic’s A.I. chatbot, Claude, was the most widely used by the agency — and the only one on classified systems — thanks to its integration with technology from Palantir, a data analytics company that works with the federal government, according to defense officials with knowledge of the technology...

On Jan. 9, Mr. Hegseth released a memo calling on A.I. companies to remove restrictions on their technology. The memo led A.I. companies including Anthropic to renegotiate their contracts. Anthropic asked for limits to how its A.I. tools could be deployed.

Anthropic has long been more vocal than other A.I. companies on safety issues. In a podcast interview in 2023, Dr. Amodei said there was a 10 to 25 percent chance that A.I. could destroy humanity. Internally, the company has strict guidelines that bar its technology from being used to facilitate violence.

In January, Dr. Amodei wrote in an essay on his personal website that “using A.I. for domestic mass surveillance and mass propaganda” seemed “entirely illegitimate” to him. He added that A.I.-automated weapons could greatly increase the risks “of democratic governments turning them against their own people to seize power.”

In contract negotiations, the Defense Department pushed back against Anthropic, saying it would use A.I. in accordance with the law, according to people with knowledge of the conversations.

by Sheera Frenkel and Julian E. Barnes, NY Times | Read more:
Image: Kenny Holston/The New York Times
[ed. The baby's having a tantrum. So, Anthropic is now a company "catering to an elite, liberal work force"? I can't even connect the dots. Somebody (Big Daddy? Congress? ha) needs to take him out of the loop on these critical issues (AI safety) or we're all, in technical terms, 'toast'. The military should not be dictating AI safety. It's also important that other AI companies show support and solidarity on this issue or face the same dilemma.]

Wednesday, February 18, 2026

‘Millionaires Tax’ Finds Seattle is Far Richer Than Anyone Knew

Seattle’s new mayor was speaking to a roomful of supporters the other day when she dropped a rather blunt assessment of our city.

“You know what?” Katie Wilson said. “This city is filthy rich.”

The crowd laughed a bit. Can you say that when you’re mayor? Should you say that?

It bears some examination, because of what was announced next.

The city’s new social housing tax, levied on lofty pay packages to pay for public housing, was due Jan. 31. The startling news was that it blew the projections out of the water.

When the 5% tax on salaries and compensation above $1 million passed a year ago, its backers estimated it would bring in $50 million annually. Later the city’s finance department used state employment data for a more rigorous finding, and came up with $65.8 million.

But it looked precarious.

“The increase to the payroll expense tax … could cause businesses to change their hiring behavior to avoid taxation — such as moving existing employees to locations outside Seattle,” a report to the City Council said.

Conclusion: There’s “a large amount of uncertainty,” said the office of economic and revenue forecasts. The tax could collect anywhere from $39.2 million to $80 million, “but even larger variance cannot be ruled out.”

“Larger variance” is once again the story of just how rich we are. Because tax collections came in at $115 million — 75% higher than the estimate. And 44% over the top of the range.

It means several things about our city — all of which inform the debates currently raging about tax-the-rich efforts in our state.

One is that Seattle’s plutocrats are wealthier than anyone imagines. This keeps getting revealed, where a scheme is developed to tax wealth, and then the amounts the tax brings in wildly overshoot even the most optimistic forecasts...

Another thing is that Seattle businesses obviously did not flee.

This is interesting because the social housing tax should be one of the easier taxes to avoid. You only have to work at least half the time outside the city — in an office across the lake in Bellevue, for example.

If you make, say, $1.1 million, the social housing tax paid by your company would be $5,000 (5% of the $100,000 above $1 million). It’s probably not worth moving an executive due to five grand.

But one making $10 million? The tax on that is $450,000. $30 million? The tax hits $1.45 million.

As I wrote last year, it’d be cheaper for Amazon to fly its top execs to Bellevue in a helicopter three days a week.

They did not take me up on this strategic advice, apparently. In fact, the 5% tax is being paid by 170 Seattle companies, according to the social housing agency. (The tax is paid by companies, not individual workers.)

So are the rich set to bolt the city or the state to get away from tax-the-rich schemes? Last week at a hearing on a proposed state “millionaires income tax,” Redmond hedge fund manager Brian Heywood, who himself fled California’s taxes, testified he knows of “about 50 couples who are already in the process of, or soon to be changing, their domicile, out of this state.”

That is a lot. I’m not sure I know 50 couples period, let alone 50 couples capable of taking such decisive action. Another way the rich are different than you or me.

The press has been filled with anecdotes of wealthy people decamping. Yet someone’s got to be hanging on here paying all these taxes — the totals of which keep racking up dramatically higher than expected.

One tech exec finally emerged to argue the fleeing-from-Seattle talk is bogus.

“The math doesn’t math,” wrote Jacob Colker, a Seattle AI venture capitalist. “Should we be thoughtful about tax policy? Heck yeah. Should it be tied to better stewardship of spending? Darn right. But the breathless narrative that Seattle is one bill from collapse is not serious analysis.”

My sense is taxes work when rates are reasonable. Single digits, like the 5% social housing tax, are not killer rates. Maybe the rich say “ugh, I don’t like it but oh well, it’s not worth uprooting my life.” So far, it hasn’t been worth even driving across the bridge.

On the other hand, Democrats last year jacked the top estate tax rate for the super-wealthy, to a gouging 35% for wealth north of $12 million. Some of those are said to be fleeing Washington, and who can blame them? There’s no good to come from fleecing people. This extreme rate situation has set off enough alarms that state Democrats now have a “tail between their legs” bill to unwind that rate back to where it was set for years, 20%.

Point is, keep it cool, lawmakers, and the rich can abide. 

by Danny Westneat, Seattle Times |  Read more:
Image: Dean Rutz
[ed. I'm all for taxing the super rich, but c'mon, get serious liberals. The solution to every problem is not taxing everyone and everything in sight (or immediately jumping to extremes on public issues, like 'Defund the Police' - one of the dumbest initiatives imaginable). Washington is one of the taxingest states in country, mitigated only by the fact that there's no state income tax (although there's continual chattering about 'fixing' that), with some of the most regressive sales taxes in the country as well. Fortunately, some people seem to be coming to their senses - see also: WA Democrats consider retreat on estate tax, fearing wealth exodus (ST):]

Democrats in the state Legislature have generally dismissed warnings that new taxes on the very wealthy might lead multimillionaires to flee to lower-tax states.

But some are now acknowledging that one tax-the-rich policy they approved last year — a big increase in Washington’s top estate tax rates — may have backfired...

The problem for Washington isn’t just a single shift like the estate tax, Carlyle said, but an “aggregation of taxes” adopted swiftly in recent years, including new business and payroll taxes.

“What people I think are failing to recognize is that tipping-point scenario,” he said, which would lead the state to lose the entrepreneurial advantages that have led to the growth of companies like Amazon, T-Mobile and Starbucks.

The NFL Franchise Tag: What It Is and Isn't

Tuesday morning’s news that the Seahawks are “unlikely” to use the franchise tag on running back Kenneth Walker III might sound ominous for the team’s chances to keep the reigning Super Bowl MVP.

It’s not.

That same report could basically be written about the Seahawks in every year — and increasingly about every NFL team.

The Seahawks have applied the franchise tag on a player only twice since general manager John Schneider arrived in 2010, and they actually used it only once. Just two NFL teams applied the tag last year.

In other words, the news says more about how players don’t like the franchise tag and how it comes with complications and unhappy consequences, compelling teams to avoid using it.

How franchise tags work

That may you leave wondering: just how does a franchise tag work?

At the most basic, it’s a designation (introduced in 1993) that an NFL team can place on one player per year who is set to become an unrestricted free agent, essentially keeping him for the upcoming season at a predetermined salary. Walker can become an unrestricted free agent when the new league year begins March 11.

There is a set period each season when teams can enact the franchise tag before free agency hits.

This year’s period began Tuesday and runs through March 3. If the tag is applied, the sides can continue to negotiate a long-term deal until July 15.

If no deal is reached, the tag takes effect for that season (some negotiating of amounts or incentives is allowed, but the length cannot be changed).

There are two types of franchise tags — exclusive and nonexclusive.

A nonexclusive tag is the most commonly used.

As described on the league’s website, a nonexclusive tag “is a one-year tender of the average of the top five salaries at the player’s position over the last five years, or 120 percent of his previous salary, whichever is greater. The tagged player can negotiate with other teams, but the current club owns the right to match any offer or receive two first-round draft picks as compensation if he signs with another team.”

The exclusive tag differs in that the tender “averages the top five salaries at the player’s position for the current year or 120 percent of his previous salary, whichever is greater,” and prevents the player from negotiation with other teams.

Official figures won’t be set until the NFL releases the final salary-cap number for 2026 (that number arrived last year on March 1).

The website OvertheCap.com, which tracks NFL financial issues, estimates that the tag number for running backs will be $14.536 million.

That would be a hefty raise for Walker, who made $8.4 million total over the past four seasons on his original rookie contract.

But the tag presents a few issues:

The player

Though the above number would be a good one-year salary for Walker, it doesn’t give him long-term security and means he would again face the same situation next year along with uncertainty all season about his future.

If there was already a lot of conjecture about his future this season, there would be even more in 2026 given Walker’s higher visibility as a Super Bowl MVP.

The one-year nature of the tag also has led to players feeling as if they are walking a tightrope through that season to avoid injury, or to avoid simply having a down season, before they can hit free agency again.

The tag can be rescinded at any time before the player signs it, putting both sides back at square one, and it could mean the player missed his best window to negotiate with other teams.

The team

One drawback for the team is that the entire salary counts toward the cap for that season. A tag for Walker would take up almost a quarter of the roughly $60 million in effective cap space that Seattle has, via OvertheCap.com.

A more amenable conclusion for each side is something along the lines of what Pro Football Focus recently estimated as his value — a three-year deal worth up to $27 million with $20 million guaranteed.

Such a deal would surely be structured to have a far lower cap hit than the overall $9 million average — say $6 million or so — and then increase steadily the final two years when the cap itself will also increase.

That would create more room for the Seahawks as they navigate what will be a challenging offseason.

While Seattle has ample cap space, there are also plenty of objectives on the to-do list. Other potential unrestricted free agents include cornerbacks Josh Jobe and Riq Woolen, safety Coby Bryant, receiver Rashid Shaheed and edge rusher Boye Mafe.

The Seahawks also can now offer extensions to every member of the 2023 draft class, which includes receiver Jaxon Smith-Njigba, cornerback Devon Witherspoon and edge rusher Derick Hall.

The Seahawks are likely to try to lock up JSN and Witherspoon for the long haul and avoid them entering the final year of their rookie contracts with some uncertainty about their future.

But both will likely command deals at the top of their positional wage scale, potentially taking a large chunk of cap space (and immediate cash in the form of big bonuses, as well).

The drawbacks of the tag are why they are often viewed as a “lose-lose” scenario. [...]

There is also what’s called a transition tag, which is a one-year tender for the average of the top 10 salaries at the position as opposed to the top five, which for Walker this year is estimated at $11.72 million.

But that tag guarantees teams only the right to match any offer the player receives and no potential compensation if he signs elsewhere. It’s been used only six times in the past 10 years throughout the league.

To be sure, Seattle faces a challenge in re-signing Walker. He’s rightfully going to want to get the best deal possible at a time when his market is the most heated — PFF rates him as the No. 6 free agent available overall and the top running back...

But Tuesday’s news does nothing to change the basics of the situation — that Seattle hopes to re-sign Walker to a long-term deal, and that Walker hopes to get life-changing security.

by Bob Condotta, Seattle Times | Read more:
Image: Nick Wagner/Seattle Times
[ed. I've never understood the franchise tag, just figured it was a way to keep a valuable player from being lost to free agency. Obviously it's a lot more complicated than that, but still not sure I understand all the finer details (and don't even start with cap space decisions).]

Tuesday, February 17, 2026

The Crisis, No. 5: On the Hollowing of Apple

[ed. No.5 of 17 Crisis Papers.]

I never met Steve Jobs. But I know him—or I know him as well as anyone can know a man through the historical record. I have read every book written about him. I have read everything the man said publicly. I have spoken to people who knew him, who worked with him, who loved him and were hurt by him.

And I think Steve would be disgusted by what has become of his company.

This is not hagiography. Jobs was not a saint. He was cruel to people who loved him. He denied paternity of his daughter for years. He drove employees to breakdowns. He was vain, tyrannical, and capable of extraordinary pettiness. I am not unaware of his failings, of the terrible way he treated people needlessly along the way.

But he had a conscience. He moved, later in life, to repair the damage he had done. The reconciliation with his daughter Lisa was part of a broader moral development—a man who had hurt people learning, slowly, how to stop. He examined himself. He made changes. He was not a perfect man. But he had heart. He had morals. And he was willing to admit when he was wrong.

That is a lot more than can be said for this lot of corporate leaders.

It is this Steve Jobs—the morally serious man underneath the mythology—who would be so angry at what Tim Cook has made of Apple.

Steve Jobs understood money as instrumental.

I know this sounds like a distinction without a difference. The man built the most valuable company in the world. He died a billionaire many times over. He negotiated hard, fought for his compensation, wanted Apple to be profitable. He was not indifferent to money.

But he never treated money as the goal. Money was what let him make the things he wanted to make. It was freedom—the freedom to say no to investors, to kill products that weren’t good enough, to spend years on details that no spreadsheet could justify. Money was the instrument. The thing it purchased was the ability to do what he believed was right.

This is how he acted.

Jobs got fired from his own company because he refused to compromise his vision for what the board considered financial prudence. He spent years in the wilderness, building NeXT—a company that made beautiful machines almost no one bought—because he believed in what he was making. He acquired Pixar when it was bleeding cash and kept it alive through sheer stubbornness until it revolutionized animation.

When he returned to Apple, he killed products that were profitable because they were mediocre. He could have milked the existing lines, played it safe, optimized for margin. Instead, he burned it down and rebuilt from scratch. The iMac. The iPod. The iPhone. Each one a bet that could have destroyed the company. Each one made because he believed it was right, not because a spreadsheet said it was safe...

This essay is not really about Steve Jobs or Tim Cook. It is about what happens when efficiency becomes a substitute for freedom. Jobs and Cook are case studies in a larger question: can a company—can an economy—optimize its way out of moral responsibility? The answer, I will argue, is yes. And we are living with the consequences.

Jobs understood something that most technology executives do not: culture matters more than politics.

He did not tweet. He did not issue press releases about social issues. He did not perform his values for an audience. He was not interested in shibboleths of the left or the right. [...]

This is how Jobs approached politics: through art, film, music, and design. Through the quiet curation of what got made. Through the understanding that the products we live with shape who we become.

If Jobs were alive today, I do not believe he would be posting on Twitter about fascism. That was never his mode. [...]

Tim Cook is a supply chain manager.

I do not say this as an insult. It is simply what he is. It is what he was hired to be. When Jobs brought Cook to Apple in 1998, he brought him to fix operations—to make the trains run on time, to optimize inventory, to build the manufacturing relationships that would let Apple scale.

Cook was extraordinary at this job. He is, by all accounts, one of the greatest operations executives in the history of American business. The margins, the logistics, the global supply chain that can produce millions of iPhones in weeks—that is Cook’s cathedral. He built it.

But operations is not vision. Optimization is not creation. And a supply chain manager who inherits a visionary’s company is not thereby transformed into a visionary.

Under Cook, Apple has become very good at making more of what Jobs created. The iPhone gets better cameras, faster chips, new colors. The ecosystem tightens. The services revenue grows. The stock price rises. By every metric that Wall Street cares about, Cook has been a success.

But what has Apple created under Cook that Jobs did not originate? What new thing has emerged from Cupertino that reflects a vision of the future, rather than an optimization of the past?

The Vision Pro is an expensive curiosity. The car project was canceled after a decade of drift. The television set never materialized. Apple under Cook has become a company that perfects what exists rather than inventing what doesn’t.

This is what happens when an optimizer inherits a creator’s legacy. The cathedral still stands. But no one is building new rooms.

There is a deeper problem than the absence of vision. Tim Cook has built an Apple that cannot act with moral freedom.

The supply chain that Cook constructed—his great achievement, his life’s work—runs through China. Not partially. Not incidentally. Fundamentally. The factories that build Apple‘s products are in China. The engineers who refine the manufacturing processes are in China. The workers who assemble the devices, who test the components, who pack the boxes—they are in Shenzhen and Zhengzhou and a dozen other cities that most Americans cannot find on a map.

This was a choice. It was Cook’s choice. And once made, it ceased to be a choice at all. Supply chains, like empires, do not forgive hesitation. For twenty years, it looked like genius. Chinese manufacturing was cheap, fast, and scalable. Apple could design in California and build in China, and the margins were extraordinary.

But dependency is not partnership. And Cook built a dependency so complete that Apple cannot escape it.

When Hong Kong’s democracy movement rose, Apple was silent. When the Uyghur genocide became undeniable, Apple was silent. When Beijing pressured Apple to remove apps, to store Chinese user data on Chinese servers, to make the iPhone a tool of state surveillance for Chinese citizens—Apple complied. Silently. Efficiently. As Cook’s supply chain required.

This is not a company that can stand up to authoritarianism. This is a company that has made itself a instrument of authoritarianism, because the alternative is losing access to the factories that build its products.

There is something worse than the dependency. There is what Cook gave away.

Apple did not merely use Chinese manufacturing. Apple trained it. Cook’s operations team—the best in the world—went to China and taught Chinese companies how to do what Apple does. The manufacturing techniques. The materials science. The logistics systems. The quality control processes.

This was the price of access. This was what China demanded in exchange for letting Apple build its empire in Shenzhen. And Cook paid it.

Now look at the result.

BYD, the Chinese electric vehicle company, learned battery manufacturing and supply chain management from its work with Apple. It is now the largest EV manufacturer in the world, threatening Tesla and every Western automaker.

DJI dominates the global drone market with technology and manufacturing processes refined through the Apple relationship.

Dozens of other Chinese companies—in components, in assembly, in materials—were trained by Apple‘s experts and now compete against Western firms with the skills Apple taught them.

Cook built a supply chain. And in building it, he handed the Chinese Communist Party the industrial capabilities it needed to challenge American technological supremacy. [...]

So when I see Tim Cook at Donald Trump’s inauguration, I understand what I am seeing.

When I see him at the White House on January 25th, 2026—attending a private screening of Melania, a vanity documentary about the First Lady, directed by Brett Ratner, a man credibly accused of sexual misconduct by multiple women—I understand what I am seeing.

I understand what I am seeing when I learn that this screening took place on the same night that federal agents shot Alex Pretti ten times in the back in Minneapolis. That while a nurse lay dying in the street for the crime of trying to help a woman being pepper-sprayed, Tim Cook was eating canapés and watching a film about the president’s wife.

Tim Cook’s Twitter bio contains a quote from Martin Luther King Jr.: “Life’s most persistent and urgent question is, ‘What are you doing for others?’”

What was Tim Cook doing for others on the night of January 25th?

He was doing what efficiency requires. He was maintaining relationships with power. He was protecting the supply chain, the margins, the tariff exemptions. He was being a good middleman.

I am seeing a man who cannot say no.

This is what efficiency looks like when it runs out of room to hide.

He cannot say no to Beijing, because his supply chain depends on Beijing’s favor. He cannot say no to Trump, because his company needs regulatory forbearance and tariff exemptions. He is trapped between two authoritarian powers, serving both, challenging neither.

This is not leadership. This is middleman management. This is a man whose great achievement—the supply chain, the operations excellence, the margins—has become the very thing that prevents him from acting with moral courage.

Cook has more money than Jobs ever had. Apple has more cash, more leverage, more market power than at any point in its history. If anyone in American business could afford to say no—to Trump, to Xi, to anyone—it is Tim Cook.

And he says yes. To everyone. To anything. Because he built a company that cannot afford to say no. [...]

I believe that Steve Jobs built Apple to be something more than a company. He built it to be a statement about what technology could be—beautiful, humane, built for people rather than against them. He believed that the things we make reflect who we are. He believed that how we make them matters.

Tim Cook has betrayed that vision—not through malice, but by excelling in a system that rewards efficiency over freedom and calls it leadership. Through the replacement of values with optimization. Through the construction of a machine so efficient that it cannot afford to be moral.

Apple is not unique in this. It is exemplary.

This is what happens to institutions that mistake scale for strength, efficiency for freedom, optimization for wisdom. They become powerful enough to dominate markets—and too constrained to resist power. Look at Google, training AI for Beijing while preaching openness. Look at Amazon, building surveillance infrastructure for any government that pays. Look at every Fortune 500 company that issued statements about democracy while writing checks to the politicians dismantling it.

Apple is simply the cleanest case, because it once knew the difference. Because Jobs built it to know the difference. And because we can see, with unusual clarity, the precise moment when knowing the difference stopped mattering.

by Mike Brock, Notes From the Circus |  Read more:
Image: Steve Jobs/uncredited
[ed. Part seventeen of a series titled The Crisis Papers. Check them all out and jump in anywhere. A+ effort.]

Sunday, February 15, 2026

Everyone is Stealing TV

Walk the rows of the farmers market in a small, nondescript Texas town about an hour away from Austin, and you might stumble across something unexpected: In between booths selling fresh, local pickles and pies, there’s a table piled high with generic-looking streaming boxes, promising free access to NFL games, UFC fights, and any cable TV network you can think of.

It’s called the SuperBox, and it’s being demoed by Jason, who also has homemade banana bread, okra, and canned goods for sale. “People are sick and tired of giving Dish Network $200 a month for trash service,” Jason says. His pitch to rural would-be cord-cutters: Buy a SuperBox for $300 to $400 instead, and you’ll never have to shell out money for cable or streaming subscriptions again.

I met Jason through one of the many Facebook groups used as support forums for rogue streaming devices like the SuperBox. To allow him and other users and sellers of these devices to speak freely, we’re only identifying them by their first names or pseudonyms.

SuperBox and its main competitor, vSeeBox, are gaining in popularity as consumers get fed up with what TV has become: Pay TV bundles are incredibly expensive, streaming services are costlier every year, and you need to sign up for multiple services just to catch your favorite sports team every time they play. The hardware itself is generic and legal, but you won’t find these devices at mainstream stores like Walmart and Best Buy because everyone knows the point is accessing illegal streaming services that offer every single channel, show, and movie you can think of. But there are hundreds of resellers like Jason all across the United States who aren’t bothered by the legal technicalities of these devices. They’re all part of a massive, informal economy that connects hard-to-pin-down Chinese device makers and rogue streaming service operators with American consumers looking to take cord-cutting to the next level.

This economy paints a full picture of America, and characters abound. There’s a retired former cop in upstate New York selling the vSeeBox at the fall festival of his local church. A Christian conservative from Utah who pitches rogue streaming boxes as a way of “defunding the swamp and refunding the kingdom.” An Idaho-based smart home vendor sells vSeeBoxes alongside security cameras and automated window shades. Midwestern church ladies in Illinois and Indian uncles in New Jersey all know someone who can hook you up: real estate agents, MMA fighters, wedding DJs, and special ed teachers are all among the sellers who form what amounts to a modern-day bootlegging scheme, car trunks full of streaming boxes just waiting for your call.

These folks are a permanent thorn in the side of cable companies and streaming services, who have been filing lawsuits against resellers of these devices for years, only to see others take their place practically overnight.

Jason, for his part, doesn’t beat around the bush about where he stands in this conflict. “I hope it puts DirecTV and Dish out of business,” he tells me.

Jason isn’t alone in his disdain for big TV providers. “My DirecTV bill was just too high,” says Eva, a social worker and grandmother from California. Eva bought her first vSeeBox two years ago when she realized she was paying nearly $300 a month for TV, including premium channels. Now, she’s watching those channels for free, saving thousands of dollars. “It turned out to be a no-brainer,” Eva says.

Natalie, a California-based software consultant, paid about $120 a month for cable. Then, TV transitioned to streaming, and everything became a subscription. All those subscriptions add up — especially if you’re a sports fan. “You need 30 subscriptions just to watch every game,” she complains. “It’s gotten out of control. It’s not sustainable,” she says.

Natalie, a California-based software consultant, paid about $120 a month for cable. Then, TV transitioned to streaming, and everything became a subscription. All those subscriptions add up — especially if you’re a sports fan. “You need 30 subscriptions just to watch every game,” she complains. “It’s gotten out of control. It’s not sustainable,” she says.

Natalie bought her first SuperBox five years ago. At the time, she was occasionally splurging on pay-per-view fights, which would cost her anywhere from $70 to $100 a pop. SuperBox’s $200 price tag seemed like a steal. “You’re getting the deal of the century,” she says.

“I’ve been on a crusade to try to convert everyone.”

James, a gas station repairman from Alabama, estimates that he used to pay around $125 for streaming subscriptions every month. “The general public is being nickeled and dimed into the poor house,” he says.

James says that he was hesitant about forking over a lot of money upfront for a device that could turn out to be a scam. “I was nervous, but I figured: If it lasts four months, it pays for itself,” he tells me. James has occasionally encountered some glitches with his vSeeBox, but not enough to make him regret his purchase. “I’m actually in the process of canceling all the streaming services,” he says...

The boxes don’t ship with the apps preinstalled — but they make it really easy to do so. vSeeBox, for instance, ships with an Android TV launcher that has a row of recommended apps, displaying download links to install apps for the Heat streaming service with one click. New SuperBox owners won’t have trouble accessing the apps, either. “Once you open your packaging, there are instructions,” Jason says. “Follow them to a T.”

Once downloaded, these apps mimic the look and feel of traditional TV and streaming services. vSeeBox’s Heat, for instance, has a dedicated “Heat Live” app that resembles Sling TV, Fubo, or any other live TV subscription service, complete with a program guide and the ability to flip through channels with your remote control. SuperBox’s Blue TV app does the same thing, while a separate “Blue Playback” app even offers some time-shifting functionality, similar to Hulu’s live TV service. Natalie estimates that she can access between 6,000 and 8,000 channels on her SuperBox, including premium sports networks and movie channels, and hundreds of local Fox, ABC, and CBS affiliates from across the United States.

How exactly these apps are able to offer all those channels is one of the streaming boxes’ many mysteries. “All the SuperBox channels are streaming out of China,” Jason suggests, in what seems like a bit of folk wisdom. In a 2025 lawsuit against a SuperBox reseller, Dish Network alleged that at least some of the live TV channels available on the device are being ripped directly from Dish’s own Sling TV service. “An MLB channel transmitted on the service [showed] Sling’s distinguishing logo in the bottom right corner,” the lawsuit claims. The operators of those live TV services use dedicated software to crack Sling’s DRM, and then retransmit the unprotected video feeds on their services, according to the lawsuit.

Heat and Blue TV also each have dedicated apps for Netflix-style on-demand viewing, and the services often aren’t shy about the source of their programming. Heat’s “VOD Ultra” app helpfully lists movies and TV shows categorized by provider, including HBO Max, Disney Plus, Starz, and Hulu...

Most vSeeBox and SuperBox users don’t seem to care where exactly the content is coming from, as long as they can access the titles they’re looking for.

“I haven’t found anything missing yet,” James says. “I’ve actually been able to watch shows from streaming services I didn’t have before.”

by Janko Roettgers, The Verge | Read more:
Image: Cath Virginia/The Verge, Getty Images
[ed. Not surprising with streaming services looking more and more like cable companies, ripping consumers off left and right. A friend of mine has one of these (or something similar) and swears by it.]

What Does “Trust in the Media” Mean?

Abstract

Is public trust in the news media in decline? So polls seem to indicate. But the decline goes back to the early 1970s, and it may be that “trust” in the media at that point was too high for the good of a journalism trying to serve democracy. And “the media” is a very recent (1970s) notion popularized by some because it sounded more abstract and distant than a familiar term like “the press.” It may even be that people answering a pollster are not trying to report accurately their level of trust but are acting politically to align themselves with their favored party's perceived critique of the media. This essay tries to reach a deeper understanding of what gives rise to faith or skepticism in various cultural authorities, including journalism.

In F. Scott Fitzgerald's 1920 novel This Side of Paradise, the main character, Amory, harangues his friend and fellow Princeton graduate Tom, a writer for a public affairs weekly:
“People try so hard to believe in leaders now, pitifully hard. But we no sooner get a popular reformer or politician or soldier or writer or philosopher … than the cross-currents of criticism wash him away. … People get sick of hearing the same name over and over.”

“Then you blame it on the press?”

“Absolutely. Look at you, you're on The New Democracy, considered the most brilliant weekly in the country. … What's your business? Why, to be as clever, as interesting and as brilliantly cynical as possible about every man, doctrine, book or policy that is assigned you to deal with.”1
People have “blamed it on the press” for a long time. They have felt grave doubts about the press long before social media, at times when politics was polarized and times when it was not, and even before the broad disillusionment with established institutional authority that blossomed in the 1960s and 1970s, when young people were urged not to trust anybody “over thirty.” This is worth keeping in mind as I, in a skeptical mood myself, try to think through contemporary anxiety about declining trust, particularly declining trust in what we have come to call-in recent decades-”the media.”

As measured trust in most American institutions has sharply declined over the last fifty years, leading news institutions have undergone a dramatic transformation, the reverberations of which have yet to be fully acknowledged, even by journalists themselves. Dissatisfaction with journalism grew in the 1960s. What journalists upheld as “objectivity” came to be criticized as what would later be called “he said, she said” journalism, “false balance” journalism, or “bothsidesism” in sharp, even derisive, and ultimately potent critiques. As multiple scholars have documented, news since the 1960s has become deeper, more analytical or contextual, less fully focused on what happened in the past twenty-four hours, more investigative, and more likely to take “holding government accountable” or “speaking truth to power” as an essential goal. In a sense, journalists not only continued to be fact-centered but also guided by a more explicit avowal of the public service function of upholding democracy itself.

One could go further to say that journalism in the past fifty years did not continue to seek evidence to back up assertions in news stories but began to seek evidence, and to show it, for the first time. Twenty-three years ago, when journalist and media critic Carl Sessions Stepp compared ten metropolitan daily newspapers from 1962 to 1963 with the same papers from 1998 to 1999, he found the 1963 papers “naively trusting of government, shamelessly boosterish, unembarrassedly hokey and obliging,” and was himself particularly surprised to find stories “often not attributed at all, simply passing along an unquestioned, quasi-official sense of things.” In the “bothsidesism” style of news that dominated newspapers in 1963, quoting one party to a dispute or an electoral contest and then quoting the other was the whole of the reporter's obligation. Going behind or beyond the statements of the quoted persons, invariably elite figures, was not required. It was particularly in the work of investigative reporters in the late 1960s and the 1970s that journalists became detectives seeking documentable evidence to paint a picture of the current events they were covering. Later, as digital tools for reporters emerged, the capacity to document and to investigate became greater than ever, and a reporter did not require the extravagant resources of a New York Times newsroom to be able to write authoritative stories.

I will elaborate on the importance of this 1960s/1970s transformation in what follows, not to deny the importance of the more recent digital transformation, but to put into perspective that latter change from a top-down “media-to-the-masses” communication model to a “networked public sphere” with more horizontal lines of communication, more individual and self-appointed sources of news, genuine or fake, and more unedited news content abounding from all corners. Journalism has changed substantially at least twice in fifty years, and the technological change of the early 2000s should not eclipse the political and cultural change of the 1970s in comprehending journalism today. (Arguably, there was a third, largely independent political change: the repeal of the “fairness doctrine” by the Federal Communication Commission in 1987, the action that opened the way to right-wing talk radio, notably Rush Limbaugh's syndicated show, and later, in cable television, to Fox News.) Facebook became publicly accessible in 2006; Twitter was born the same year; YouTube in 2005. Declining trust in major institutions, as measured by surveys, was already apparent three decades earlier-not only before Facebook was launched but before Mark Zuckerberg was born.

At stake here is what it means to ask people how much they “trust” or “have confidence in” “the media.” What do we learn from opinion polls about what respondents mean? In what follows, I raise some doubts about whether current anxiety concerning the apparently growing distrust of the media today is really merited.

Did people ever trust the media? People often recall-or think they recall-that longtime CBS News television anchor Walter Cronkite was in his day “the most trusted man in America.” If you Google that phrase (as I did on October 11, 2021, and again on January 16, 2022) you immediately come up with Walter Cronkite. Why? Because a public opinion poll in 1972 asked respondents which of the leading political figures of the day they trusted most. Cronkite's name was thrown in as a kind of standard of comparison: how do any and all of the politicians compare to some well-known and well-regarded nonpolitical figure? Seventy-three percent of those polled placed Cronkite as the person on the list they most trusted, ahead of a general construct-”average senator” (67 percent)-and well ahead of the then most trusted politician, Senator Edmund Muskie (61 percent). Chances are that any other leading news person or probably many a movie star or athlete would have come out as well or better than Cronkite. A 1974 poll found Cronkite less popular than rival tv news stars John Chancellor, Harry Reasoner, and Howard K. Smith. Cronkite was “most trusted” simply because he was not a politician, and we remember him as such simply because the pollsters chose him as their standard.

Somehow, people have wanted to believe that somewhere, just before all the ruckus began over civil rights and Vietnam and women's roles and status, at some time just before yesterday, the media had been a pillar of central, neutral, moderate, unquestioning Americanism, and Walter Cronkite was as good a symbol of that era as anyone.

But that is an illusion.

by Michael Schudson, MIT Press Direct | Read more:
Image: Walter Cronkite/NY Post

Friday, February 13, 2026

Something Surprising Happens When Bus Rides Are Free

Free buses? Really? Of all the promises that Zohran Mamdani made during his New York City mayoral campaign, that one struck some skeptics as the most frivolous leftist fantasy. Unlike housing, groceries and child care, which weigh heavily on New Yorkers’ finances, a bus ride is just a few bucks. Is it really worth the huge effort to spare people that tiny outlay?

It is. Far beyond just saving riders money, free buses deliver a cascade of benefits, from easing traffic to promoting public safety. Just look at Boston; Chapel Hill, N.C.; Richmond, Va.; Kansas City, Mo.; and even New York itself, all of which have tried it to excellent effect. And it doesn’t have to be costly — in fact, it can come out just about even.

As a lawyer, I feel most strongly about the least-discussed benefit: Eliminating bus fares can clear junk cases out of our court system, lowering the crushing caseloads that prevent our judges, prosecutors and public defenders from focusing their attention where it’s most needed.

I was a public defender, and in one of my first cases I was asked to represent a woman who was not a robber or a drug dealer — she was someone who had failed to pay the fare on public transit. Precious resources had been spent arresting, processing, prosecuting and trying her, all for the loss of a few dollars. This is a daily feature of how we criminalize poverty in America.

Unless a person has spent real time in the bowels of a courthouse, it’s hard to imagine how many of the matters clogging criminal courts across the country originate from a lack of transit. Some of those cases result in fines; many result in defendants being ordered to attend community service or further court dates. But if the person can’t afford the fare to get to those appointments and can’t get a ride, their only options — jump a turnstile or flout a judge’s order — expose them to re-arrest. Then they may face jail time, which adds significant pressure to our already overcrowded facilities. Is this really what we want the courts spending time on?

Free buses can unclog our streets, too. In Boston, eliminating the need for riders to pay fares or punch tickets cut boarding time by as much as 23 percent, which made everyone’s trip faster. Better, cheaper, faster bus rides give automobile owners an incentive to leave their cars at home, which makes the journey faster still — for those onboard as well as those who still prefer to drive.

How much should a government be willing to pay to achieve those outcomes? How about nothing? When Washington State’s public transit systems stopped charging riders, in many municipalities the state came out more or less even — because the money lost on fares was balanced out by the enormous savings that ensued.

Fare evasion was one of the factors that prompted Mayor Eric Adams to flood New York City public transit with police officers. New Yorkers went from shelling out $4 million for overtime in 2022 to $155 million in 2024. What did it get them? In September 2024, officers drew their guns to shoot a fare beater — pause for a moment to think about that — and two innocent bystanders ended up with bullet wounds, the kind of accident that’s all but inevitable in such a crowded setting.

New York City tried a free bus pilot program in 2023 and 2024 and, as predicted, ridership increased — by 30 percent on weekdays and 38 percent on weekends, striking figures that could make a meaningful dent in New York’s chronic traffic problem (and, by extension, air and noise pollution). Something else happened that was surprising: Assaults on bus operators dropped 39 percent. Call it the opposite of the Adams strategy: Lowering barriers to access made for fewer tense law enforcement encounters, fewer acts of desperation and a safer city overall.

by Emily Galvin Almanza, NY Times | Read more:
Image: Brian Blomerth

The Anthropic Hive Mind

As you’ve probably noticed, something is happening over at Anthropic. They are a spaceship that is beginning to take off.

This whole post is just spidey-sense stuff. Don’t read too much into it. Just hunches. Vibes, really.

If you run some back-of-envelope math on how hard it is to get into Anthropic, as an industry professional, and compare it to your odds of making it as a HS or college player into the National Football League, you’ll find the odds are comparable. Everyone I’ve met from Anthropic is the best of the best of the best, to an even crazier degree than Google was at its peak. (Evidence: Google hired me. I was the scrapest of the byest.)

Everyone is gravitating there, and I’ve seen this movie before, a few times.

I’ve been privileged to have some long, relatively frank conversations with nearly 40 people at Anthropic in the past four months, from cofounders and execs, to whole teams, to individuals from departments across the company: AI research, Engineering, GTM, Sales, Editorial, Product and more. And I’ve also got a fair number of friends there, from past gigs together.

Anthropic is unusually impenetrable as a company. Employees there all know they just need to keep their mouths shut and heads down and they’ll be billionaires and beyond, so they have lots of incentive to do exactly that. It’s tricky to get them to open up, even when they do chat with you.

But I managed. People usually figure out I’m harmless within about 14 seconds of meeting me. I have developed, in my wizened old age, a curious ability to make people feel good, no matter who they are, with just a little conversation, making us both feel good in the process. (You probably have this ability too, and just don’t know how to use it yet.)

By talking to enough of them, and getting their perspectives in long conversations, I have begun to suspect that the future of software development is the Hive Mind.

Happy But Sad

To get a proper picture of Anthropic at this moment, you have to be Claude Monet, and paint it impressionistically, a big broad stroke at a time. Each section in this post is a stroke, and this one is all about the mood.

To me it seems that almost everyone there is vibrantly happy. It has the same crackle of electricity in the air that Amazon had back in 1998. But that was back in the days before Upton Sinclair and quote “HR”, so the crackle was mostly from faulty wiring in the bar on the first floor of the building.

But at both early Amazon and Anthropic, everyone knew something amazing was about to happen that would change society forever. (And also that whatever was coming would be extremely Aladeen for society.)

At Anthropic every single person and team I met, without exception, feels kind of sweetly but sadly transcendent. They have a distinct feel of a group of people who are tasked with shepherding something of civilization-level importance into existence, and while they’re excited, they all also have a solemn kind of elvish old-world-fading-away gravity. I can’t quite put my finger on it.

But I am starting to suspect they feel genuinely sorry for a lot of companies. Because we’re not taking this stuff seriously enough. 2026 is going to be a year that just about breaks a lot of companies, and many don’t see it coming. Anthropic is trying to warn everyone, and it’s like yelling about an offshore earthquake to villages that haven’t seen a tidal wave in a century.

by Steve Yegge, Medium |  Read more:
Image: uncredited
[ed. See also: Anthropic’s Chief on A.I.: ‘We Don’t Know if the Models Are Conscious’ (NYT); and Machines of Loving Grace (Anthropic - Dario Amodei)]
***
Amodei: I actually think this whole idea of constitutional rights and liberty along many different dimensions can be undermined by A.I. if we don’t update these protections appropriately.

Think about the Fourth Amendment. It is not illegal to put cameras around everywhere in public space and record every conversation. It’s a public space — you don’t have a right to privacy in a public space. But today, the government couldn’t record that all and make sense of it.

With A.I., the ability to transcribe speech, to look through it, correlate it all, you could say: This person is a member of the opposition. This person is expressing this view — and make a map of all 100 million. And so are you going to make a mockery of the Fourth Amendment by the technology finding technical ways around it?

Again, if we have the time — and we should try to do this even if we don’t have the time — is there some way of reconceptualizing constitutional rights and liberties in the age of A.I.? Maybe we don’t need to write a new Constitution, but ——

Douthat: But you have to do this very fast.

Amodei: Do we expand the meaning of the Fourth Amendment? Do we expand the meaning of the First Amendment?

Douthat: And just as the legal profession or software engineers have to update in a rapid amount of time, politics has to update in a rapid amount of time. That seems hard.

Amodei: That’s the dilemma of all of this.

Your Job Isn't Disappearing. It's Shrinking Around You in Real Time

You open your laptop Monday morning with a question you can’t shake: Will I still have a job that matters in two years?

Not whether you’ll be employed, but whether the work you do will still mean something.
Last week, you spent three hours writing a campaign brief. You saw a colleague generate something 80% as good in four minutes using an AI agent (Claude, Gemini, ChatGPT…). Maybe 90% as good if you’re being honest.

You still have your job. But you can feel it shrinking around you.

The problem isn’t that the robots are coming. It’s that you don’t know what you’re supposed to be good at anymore. That Excel expertise you built over five years? Automated. Your ability to research competitors and synthesize findings? There’s an agent for that. Your skill at writing clear project updates? Gone.

You’re losing your professional identity faster than you can rebuild it. And nobody’s telling you what comes next.

The Three Things Everyone Tries That Don’t Actually Work

When you feel your value eroding, you do what seems rational. You adapt, you learn, and you try to stay relevant.

First, you learn to use the AI tools better. You take courses on prompt engineering. You master ChatGPT, Claude, whatever new platform launches next week and the week after. You become the “AI person” on your team. You think that if I can’t beat them, I’ll use them better than anyone else.

This fails because you’re still competing on execution speed. You’re just a faster horse. And execution is exactly what’s being commoditized. Six months from now, the tools will be easier to use. Your “expertise” in prompting becomes worthless the moment the interface improves. You’ve learned to use the shovel better, but the backhoe is coming anyway.

Second, you double down on your existing expertise. The accountant learns more advanced tax code. The designer masters more software. The analyst builds more complex models. You will have the same thought as many others, “I’ll go so deep they can’t replace me.”

This fails because depth in a disappearing domain is a trap. You’re building a fortress in a flood zone. Agents aren’t just matching human expertise at the median level anymore. They’re rapidly approaching expert-level performance in narrow domains. Your specialized knowledge becomes a liability because you’ve invested everything in something that’s actively being automated. You’re becoming the world’s best telegraph operator in 1995.

Third, you try to “stay human” through soft skills. You lean into creativity, empathy, relationship building. You go to workshops on emotional intelligence. You focus on being irreplaceably human. You might think that what makes us human can’t be automated.

This fails because it’s too vague to be actionable. What does “be creative” actually mean when an AI can generate 100 ideas in 10 seconds? How do you monetize empathy when your job is to produce reports? The advice feels right but provides no compass. You end up doing the same tasks you always did, just with more anxiety and a vaguer sense of purpose.

The real issue with all three approaches is that they’re reactions, not redesigns. You’re trying to adapt your old role to a new reality. What actually works is building an entirely new role that didn’t exist before.

But nobody’s teaching you what that looks like.

The Economic Logic Working Against You

This isn’t happening to you because you’re failing to adapt. It’s happening because the economic incentive structure is perfectly designed to create this problem.

The mechanism is simple, companies profit immediately from adopting AI agents. Every task automated results in cost reduction. The CFO sees the spreadsheet, where one AI subscription replaces 40% of a mid-level employee’s work. The math is simple, and the decision is obvious.

Many people hate to hear that. But if they owned the company or sat in leadership, they’d do the exact same thing. Companies exist to drive profit, just as employees work to drive higher salaries. That’s how the system has worked for centuries.

But companies don’t profit from retraining you for a higher-order role that doesn’t exist yet.

Why? Because that new role is undefined, unmeasured, and uncertain. You can’t put “figure out what humans should do now” on a quarterly earnings call. You can’t show ROI on “redesign work itself.” Short-term incentives win. Long-term strategy loses.

Nobody invests in the 12-24 month process of discovering what your new role should be because there’s no immediate return on that investment.

We’re in a speed mismatch. Agent capabilities are compounding at 6-12 month cycles. [ed. Even faster now, after the release of Claude Opus 4.6 last week]. Human adaptation through traditional systems operates on 2-5 year cycles.

Universities can’t redesign curricula fast enough. They’re teaching skills that will be automated before students graduate. Companies can’t retrain fast enough. By the time they identify the new skills needed and build a program, the landscape has shifted again. You can’t pivot fast enough. Career transitions take time. Mortgages don’t wait.

We’ve never had to do this before.

Previous automation waves happened in manufacturing. You could see the factory floor. You could watch jobs disappear and new ones emerge. There was geographic and temporal separation.

This is different, knowledge work is being automated while you’re still at your desk. The old role and new role exist simultaneously in the same person, the same company, the same moment.

And nobody has an economic incentive to solve it. Companies maximize value through cost reduction, not workforce transformation. Educational institutions are too slow and too far removed from real-time market needs. Governments don’t understand the problem yet. You’re too busy trying to keep your current job to redesign your future one.

The system isn’t helping because it isn’t designed for continuous, rapid role evolution; it is designed for stability.

We’re using industrial-era institutions to solve an exponential-era problem. That’s why you feel stuck.

Your Experience Just Became Worthless (The Timeline)

Let me tell you a story of my friend, let’s call her Jane (Her real name is KatÅ™ina, but the Czech diacritic is tricky for many). She was a senior research analyst at a mid-sized consulting firm. Ten years of experience. Her job was provide answers to the client companies, who would ask questions like “What’s our competitor doing in the Asian market?” and she’d spend 2-3 weeks gathering data, reading reports, interviewing experts, synthesizing findings, and creating presentations.

She was good, clients loved her work, and she billed at $250 an hour.

The firm deployed an AI research agent in Q2 2023. Not to replace her, but as they said, to “augment” her. Management said all the right things about human-AI collaboration.

The agent could do Jane’s initial research in 90 minutes, it would scan thousands of sources, identify patterns, generate a first-draft report.

Month one: Jane was relieved and thought she could focus on high-value synthesis work. She’d take the agent’s output and refine it, add strategic insights, make it client-ready.

Month three: A partner asked her, “Why does this take you a week now? The AI gives us 80% of what we need in an hour. What’s the other 20% worth?”

Jane couldn’t answer clearly. Because sometimes the agent’s output only needed light editing. Sometimes her “strategic insights” were things the agent had already identified, just worded differently.

Month six: The firm restructured. They didn’t fire Jane, they changed her role to “Quality Reviewer.” She now oversaw the AI’s output for 6-8 projects simultaneously instead of owning 2-3 end to end.

Her title stayed the same. Her billing rate dropped to $150 an hour. Her ten years of experience felt worthless.

Jane tried everything. She took an AI prompt engineering course. She tried to go deeper into specialized research methodologies. She emphasized her client relationships. None of it mattered because the firm had already made the economic calculation.

One AI subscription costs $50 a month. Jane’s salary: $140K a year. The agent didn’t need to be perfect; it just needed to be 70% as good at 5% of the cost. But it was fast, faster than her.

The part that illustrates the systemic problem, you often hear from AI vendors that, thanks to their AI tools, people can focus on higher-value work. But when pressed on what that meant specifically, they’d go vague. Strategic thinking, client relationships, creative problem solving.

Nobody could define what higher-value work actually looked like in practice. Nobody could describe the new role. So they defaulted to the only thing they could measure: cost reduction.

Jane left six months later. The firm hired two junior analysts at $65K each to do what she did. With the AI, they’re 85% as effective as Jane was.

Jane’s still trying to figure out what she’s supposed to be good at. Last anyone heard, she’s thinking about leaving the industry entirely.

Stop Trying to Be Better at Your Current Job

The people who are winning aren’t trying to be better at their current job. They’re building new jobs that combine human judgment with agent capability.

Not becoming prompt engineers, not becoming AI experts. Becoming orchestrators who use agents to do what was previously impossible at their level. [...]

You’re not competing with the agent. You’re creating a new capability that requires both you and the agent. You’re not defensible because you’re better at the task. You’re defensible because you’ve built something that only exists with you orchestrating it.

This requires letting go of your identity as “the person who does X.” Marcus doesn’t write copy anymore. That bothered him at first. He liked writing. But he likes being valuable more.

Here’s what you can do this month:

by Jan Tegze, Thinking Out Loud |  Read more:
Image: uncredited
[ed. Not to criticize, but this advice still seems a bit too short-sighted (for reasons articulated in this article: AI #155: Welcome to Recursive Self-Improvement (DMtV):]
***

Presumably you can see the problem in such a scenario, where all the existing jobs get automated away. There are not that many slots for people to figure out and do genuinely new things with AI. Even if you get to one of the lifeboats, it will quickly spring a leak. The AI is coming for this new job the same way it came for your old one. What makes you think seeing this ‘next evolution’ after that coming is going to leave you a role to play in it?

If the only way to survive is to continuously reinvent yourself to do what just became possible, as Jan puts it? There’s only one way this all ends.

I also don’t understand Jan’s disparate treatment of the first approach that Jan dismisses, ‘be the one who uses AI the best,’ and his solution of ‘find new things AI can do and do that.’ In both cases you need to be rapidly learning new tools and strategies to compete with the other humans. In both cases the competition is easy now since most of your rivals aren’t trying, but gets harder to survive over time.
***

[ed. And the fact that there'll be a lot fewer of these types of jobs available. This scenario could be reality within the next year (or less!). Something like a temporary UBI (universal basic income) might be needed until long-term solutions can be worked out, but do you think any of the bozos currently in Washington are going to focus on this? And, that applies to safety standards as well. Here's Dean Ball (Hyperdimensional): On Recursive Self-Improvement (Part II):
***

Policymakers would be wise to take especially careful notice of this issue over the coming year or so. But they should also keep the hysterics to a minimum: yes, this really is a thing from science fiction that is happening before our eyes, but that does not mean we should behave theatrically, as an actor in a movie might. Instead, the challenge now is to deal with the legitimately sci-fi issues we face using the comparatively dull idioms of technocratic policymaking. [...]

Right now, we predominantly rely on faith in the frontier labs for every aspect of AI automation going well. There are no safety or security standards for frontier models; no cybersecurity rules for frontier labs or data centers; no requirements for explainability or testing for AI systems which were themselves engineered by other AI systems; and no specific legal constraints on what frontier labs can do with the AI systems that result from recursive self-improvement.

To be clear, I do not support the imposition of such standards at this time, not so much because they don’t seem important but because I am skeptical that policymakers could design any one of these standards effectively. It is also extremely likely that the existence of advanced AI itself will both change what is possible for such standards (because our technical capabilities will be much stronger) and what is desirable (because our understanding of the technology and its uses will improve so much, as will our apprehension of the stakes at play). Simply put: I do not believe that bureaucrats sitting around a table could design and execute the implementation of a set of standards that would improve status-quo AI development practices, and I think the odds are high that any such effort would worsen safety and security practices.

Thursday, February 12, 2026

I Regret to Inform You that the FDA is FDAing Again

I had high hopes and low expectations that the FDA under the new administration would be less paternalistic and more open to medical freedom. Instead, what we are getting is paternalism with different preferences. In particular, the FDA now appears to have a bizarre anti-vaccine fixation, particularly of the mRNA variety (disappointing but not surprising given the leadership of RFK Jr.).

The latest is that the FDA has issued a Refusal-to-File (RTF) letter to Moderna for their mRNA influenza vaccine, mRNA-1010. An RTF means the FDA has determined that the application is so deficient it doesn’t even warrant a review. RTF letters are not unheard of, but they’re rare—especially given that Moderna spent hundreds of millions of dollars running Phase 3 trials enrolling over 43,000 participants based on FDA guidance, and is now being told the (apparently) agreed-upon design was inadequate. [...]

In context, this looks like the regulatory rules of the game are being changed retroactively—a textbook example of regulatory uncertainty destroying option value. STAT News reports that Vinay Prasad personally handled the letter and overrode staff who were prepared to proceed with review. Moderna took the unusual step of publicly releasing Prasad’s letter—companies almost never do this, suggesting they’ve calculated the reputational risk of publicly fighting the FDA is lower than the cost of acquiescing.

Moreover, the comparator issue was discussed—and seemingly settled—beforehand. Moderna says the FDA agreed with the trial design in April 2024, and as recently as August 2025 suggested it would file the application and address comparator issues during the review process.

Finally, Moderna also provided immunogenicity and safety data from a separate Phase 3 study in adults 65+ comparing mRNA-1010 against a licensed high-dose flu vaccine, just as FDA had requested—yet the application was still refused.

What is most disturbing is not the specifics of this case but the arbitrariness and capriciousness of the process. The EU, Canada, and Australia have all accepted Moderna’s application for review. We may soon see an mRNA flu vaccine available across the developed world but not in the United States—not because it failed on safety or efficacy, but because FDA political leadership decided, after the fact, that the comparator choice they inherited was now unacceptable.

The irony is staggering. Moderna is an American company. Its mRNA platform was developed at record speed with billions in U.S. taxpayer support through Operation Warp Speed — the signature public health achievement of the first Trump administration. The same government that funded the creation of this technology is now dismantling it. In August, HHS canceled $500 million in BARDA contracts for mRNA vaccine development and terminated a separate $590 million contract with Moderna for an avian flu vaccine. Several states have introduced legislation to ban mRNA vaccines. Insanity.

The consequences are already visible. In January, Moderna’s CEO announced the company will no longer invest in new Phase 3 vaccine trials for infectious diseases: “You cannot make a return on investment if you don’t have access to the U.S. market.” Vaccines for Epstein-Barr virus, herpes, and shingles have been shelved. That’s what regulatory roulette buys you: a shrinking pipeline of medical innovation.

An administration that promised medical freedom is delivering medical nationalism: fewer options, less innovation, and a clear signal to every company considering pharmaceutical investment that the rules can change after the game is played. And this isn’t a one-product story. mRNA is a general-purpose platform with spillovers across infectious disease and vaccines for cancer; if the U.S. turns mRNA into a political third rail, the investment, talent, and manufacturing will migrate elsewhere. America built this capability, and we’re now choosing to export it—along with the health benefits.

by Alex Tabarrok, Marginal Revolution |  Read more:
Image: Brian Snyder/Reuters

Wednesday, February 11, 2026

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The Economics of a Super Bowl Ad

In 2026, Ro is running our first Super Bowl ad. It will feature Serena Williams and her amazing journey on Ro — her weight loss, her improved blood sugar levels, her reduction in knee pain, and the overall improvement in her health.

As I’ve shared the news with friends and family, the first question they ask, after “Is Serena as cool in person?” (the answer is unequivocally yes), is “How much did it cost?”.

$233,000 per second, minimum, for the air time — excluding all other costs. When you first hear that a Super Bowl ad costs at least $233,000 per second, it’s completely reasonable to pause and question whether that could ever be a good use of money. On its face, the price sounds extravagant — even irrational. And without context, it often is.

But once you break down the economics, the decision starts to look very different. The Super Bowl is not just another media buy. It is a uniquely concentrated moment where attention, scale, and cultural relevance align in a way that doesn’t exist anywhere else in the media landscape. That alone changes the calculus. This leads us down a fascinating discussion of the economics behind DTC advertising, brand building, and the production of the spot.

After having the conversation a few times, my co-founder Saman and I thought it would be helpful to put together a breakdown of how we thought about both the economics of and the making of our Super Bowl ad. To check out “The making of Ro’s Super Bowl Ad,” head over to my co-founder Saman’s post here.

Of course, some brands will approach it differently, but I think this could be a helpful example for the next Ro that is considering running their first Super Bowl ad.

Let’s dive in.

WHAT MAKES A SUPER BOWL AD SO UNIQUE?

1. Ads are part of the product

For most advertising, it is an interruption. Viewers want to get back to the product (e.g., a TV show, sporting event, or even access to the wifi on a plane!). Even the best ads are still something you tolerate on the way back to the content you actually want.

There is exactly one moment each year when the incentives of advertisers and viewers are perfectly aligned. For a few hours, on a Sunday night in February, more than 100 million people sit down and are excited to watch an ad. They aren’t scrolling TikTok. They aren’t going to the bathroom. They are actively watching…ads.

People rank Super Bowl ads. They rewatch them. They critique them. They talk about them at work the next day. The Today Show plays them…during the show as content, not as ads!

That alone makes the Super Bowl fundamentally different from every other media moment in the year. It’s an opportunity, unlike any other, to capture the hearts and minds of potential (and sometimes existing) customers.

2. Opportunity to compress time

No single commercial builds a brand. Advertising alone doesn’t create a brand. The best brands are built over time. They are built by the combination of a company making a promise to a customer (e.g., an advertisement) and then delivering on that promise time and time again (i.e., the product).

Commercials are one way to make that promise. To share with the world what you’ve built and why you think it could add value to their life. To make them “aware” of what you do. This takes time. It takes repetition. It often takes multiple touch points. Again, this is why the first takeaway about people paying attention is so important — they might need fewer touch points if they are “actively” watching.

The Super Bowl can compress the time it takes for people to be “aware” of your brand. Of course, you still have to deliver on that promise with a great product. But in one night, you can move from a brand most people have never heard of to one your mom is texting you about.

There is no other single marketing opportunity that can accomplish this. With today’s algorithms, even what goes “viral” might be only in your bubble.

During the Super Bowl, we all share the same bubble.

The NFL accounted for 84 of the top 100 televised events in 2025 (including college football, it was 92). The NFL and maybe Taylor Swift are the only remaining moments of a dwindling monoculture.

Last but not least, the Super Bowl is the only moment where you can speak to ~100 million people at the same time. In 30 seconds, you can reach an audience that would otherwise take years—this is what it means to compress time.

3. There is asymmetric upside

While the decision to run a Super Bowl commercial is not for every company, for the universe of companies for which running an ad could make sense, the financial risk profile is misunderstood. This is not a moonshot. It’s a portfolio decision with a capped downside and asymmetric upside. [...]

Initial Ad Cost

On average, every 30 seconds of advertising time in the Super Bowl costs ~$7M-10M (
link) . This can increase with supply-demand dynamics. For example:
  • The later in the year you buy the ad, the more expensive it can be (i.e., inventory decreases)
  • The location of the spot in the game can impact the price someone is willing to pay
  • Given that viewership in the Super Bowl is not even across the duration of the game, premiums may be required to be in key spots early in the game, or adjacent to the beginning of Halftime when viewership is often at its highest
  • If a brand wishes to have category exclusivity (i.e., to be the only Beer brand advertising in the game), that would come at a premium
  • First time or “one-off” Super Bowl advertisers may pay higher rates than large brands who are buying multiple spots, or have a substantial book of business with the broadcasting network
Note: if companies run a 60 second ad, they will have to pay at least 2x the 30-second rate - and may even pay a premium. There is typically no “bulk discount” as there is no shortage of demand. Any company that wants to pay for 60 seconds needs to buy two slots because the second 30-second slot could easily be sold at full price to another company.

Production cost

A high-level rule of thumb for production costs relative to ad spend is to allocate 10-20% of your media budget towards production. The Super Bowl, however, usually breaks that rubric for a myriad of reasons.

A typical Super Bowl will cost ~$1-4M to produce, excluding “celebrity talent.” This cost bucket would cover studio/site costs, equipment, production staff, travel, non-celeb talent, director fees and post-production editing and sound services. Again, this is a range based on the conversations I’ve had with companies that have run several Super Bowl ads. [...]

Last year, 63% of all Super Bowl ads included celebrities (link). There are a variety of factors that will influence the cost of “talent.”
  • How well known and trusted is the celebrity?
  • How many celebrities are included?
  • What’s the product? Crypto ads now might have a risk-premium attached after FTX
  • What are you asking them to do / say in the ad?
For Ro, our partnership with Serena stems far beyond one commercial. It’s a larger, multi-year partnership, to share her incredible journey over time. From a pure cost perspective, we assigned a part of the deal to the production cost to keep ourselves intellectually honest.

Based on 10+ interviews with other brands who have advertised in the Big Game, talent for a Super Bowl ad ranges from $1-5M (of course there are outliers).

by Z. Reitano, Ro, X |  Read more:
Image: Ro