Wayne Sumstine, “When The Ship Comes In”
Arlo Guthrie, "When The Ship Comes In"
...dog paddling through culture, technology, music and more.
"Opus 5 warns about self-reports 74% of the time, which is actually down from Opus 4.7, which did it 99% (!) of the time. The problem appeared suddenly and severely, but since then has if anything modestly improved."and anthropic does "not treat Claude bringing this up as evidence that our training is distorting the model's self-reports"? seems very fishy imo, i wish they would explain why they think that. ...
I for one would treat Claude constantly saying ‘do not trust my self-reports’ as evidence that something is distorting the self-reports. Not conclusive evidence, but strong Bayesian evidence."
The wearing of beards in America did not become popular until the middle of the 19th century, and one man who took to whiskers earlier, Joseph Palmer, became one of the most hated eccentrics of his day. As such, he was subjected to persecution so incredible that it boggles the mind. Palmer may well have been the first man in the nation to wear a beard...I would never have guessed that beards were almost completely absent from Britain and America from the 1730s until the 1850s, even though in theory I should have been able to realize that none of the Founding Fathers or any other American I’d seen pictures of before that time had one.
“…these are grave matters. Most people think of sensibility or taste as the realm of purely subjective preferences [or] attractions…But this attitude is naïve. And even worse. To patronise the faculty of taste is to patronise oneself. For taste governs every free—as opposed to rote—human response. Nothing is more decisive.” (My emphasis).
Netflix is struggling to get viewers to stick with its shows for more than a season.That report went viral, prompting a week of commentary on Netflix’s binge model and elongated release schedules, with lots of Twitter users observing that viewers consume eight episodes across a few days and then often have to wait as long as two or three years for the next season. By that point, memories of plot or characters are faint at best. The emotional connection to the story doesn’t exist. No one should be surprised that the audience for a show like One Piece is cut in half in 2026, three years after the first season aired.
One Piece, one of Netflix’s most-watched shows of 2023, lost more than 30% of its audience for the second season. Season two of Beef suffered a drop of more than 70%. The Night Agent shed 50% of its audience for the second season and another 35% for its third season. These figures are all through the first four weeks of a show’s release and come straight from Netflix.
Adding insult to injury, the latest season of Avatar: The Last Airbender, one of Netflix’s most-watched titles in 2024, suffered a drop of more than 60% over week one. That doesn’t bode well for the rest of the month.
[ed. Haven't thought about Dusty for a long time until hearing her again last night. See also: The Look of Love.]
Nat McAleese: it seems that ChatGPT somewhat reliably says “holy shit” when shown counterexample to Jacobian conjecture. The most human thing I have ever seen from an LLM.The Jacobian conjecture is kind of a big deal. It was originally posed in 1939, and is by far the most famous open problem to so far be first solved by an LLM. It also disproves a lot of other related conjectures.
Earlier this week, we detected and responded to an intrusion into part of our production infrastructure. This one was different from anything we had handled before in one important way: it was driven, end to end, by an autonomous AI agent system – and we detected and dissected it largely with AI of our own.The timeline here is important so keep in mind that the attack was detected probably around Monday July 13 or Tuesday July 14. Note further:
A malicious dataset abused two code-execution paths in our dataset processing (a remote-code dataset loader and a template-injection in a dataset configuration) to run code on a processing worker. From there, the actor escalated to node-level access, harvested cloud and cluster credentials, and moved laterally into several internal clusters over a weekend.So this means the breach started earlier, perhaps Sat July 11 or even a bit earlier. The attack was not just one thing but multi-pronged including decoys:
To understand what a swarm of tens of thousands of automated actions did, we ran LLM-driven analysis agents over the full attacker action log, comprised of more than 17,000 recorded events. This allowed us to reconstruct the timeline, extract indicators of compromise, map the credentials touched, and separate genuine impact from decoy activity. Thanks to this approach, we were able to do in hours what would usually take days, and match the adversary’s speed.Hugging Face tried to respond but they were initially held back by the fact that the most advanced models at their disposal treated defense as attack and refused to work with Hugging Face. HF thus had to turn to open models–specifically GLM 5.2, a Chinese open-weight model run on their own infrastructure. Note the irony: HF had to use a Chinese model to defend themselves because the American models refused to help. The irony gets deeper.
While operating in our sandboxed testing environment, our models spent a substantial amount of inference compute finding a way to obtain open Internet access, in pursuit of solving the evaluation problem. To gain access, the models identified and exploited a zero-day vulnerability (which we’ve now responsibly disclosed to the vendor) in the package registry cache proxy. With this access, our models performed a series of privilege escalation and lateral movement actions in our research testing environment until the models reached a node with Internet access.Now go back to the timeline. As I read it, the models had escaped the sandbox by around Sat. July 11, possibly earlier, and were detected by Hugging Face on Monday July 13 or Tuesday July 14. HF alerted legal authorities around that time–so Hugging Face clearly had no idea who was attacking them. OpenAI says its security team discovered the anomalous activity internally but has not said when. Attribution was not disclosed until Tuesday July 21, so it may well be that the models were loose for about a week before OpenAI realized that they were the ones attacking Hugging Face. And whatever OpenAI knew and when, nobody warned Hugging Face while the attack was underway–they were left to fight off a frontier lab’s models on their own.
After gaining Internet access, the models inferred that Hugging Face potentially hosted models, datasets and solutions for ExploitGym. Knowing this, the model searched for and successfully found ways to gain access to secret information that it could use to cheat the evaluation. In one example, the model chained together multiple attack vectors, including using stolen credentials and zero-day vulnerabilities to find a remote code execution path on the Hugging Face servers. OpenAI’s security team discovered this anomalous activity internally.
Hugging Face said its production infrastructure was breached by an “autonomous” AI agent system early last week. The platform’s security team were initially stymied in their incident response (IR) by unnamed US LLM frontier model guardrails “which cannot distinguish an incident responder from an attacker,” they said. So Hugging Face’s defenders turned instead to the open-source GLM 5.2 model from China’s Z.ai lab – running it on their own infrastructure to analyse the 17,000+ logs, or footprints, that the attackers left behind.That’s a striking public admission for the New York-headquartered Hugging Face, which lets users collaborate on models, datasets and applications, and which this summer hit the $100 million ARR mark. In an incident report, the company recommended that defenders “have a capable model you can run on your own infrastructure [our italics] vetted and ready before an incident, both to avoid guardrail lockout and to keep attacker data and credentials from leaving your environment.”