Lydia Roberts
via:
Duck Soup
...dog paddling through culture, technology, music and more.
Thursday, November 19, 2026
Life Under the Algorithm
Elena’s phone vibrates before her alarm at 5:12 a.m. She reaches for it because messages that arrive before dawn tend to matter.
She stares at the message for a moment. The money is already hers, or will be, but not yet—not in the way that matters. The offer lingers, framed as convenience rather than cost, a small bridge across the gap between what she has earned and what she can access. She dismisses the notification and gets ready for work.
In the kitchen, Elena pours coffee into a chipped mug, looks at her empty fridge, and opens a grocery app. Milk: $5.89. Bread: $4.76. Eggs: $7.12. The note at the bottom of the screen reads: “Price reflects real-time demand, location, and personalized offer conditions.”
Yesterday, it pains her to remember, the eggs were $6.48. But the system has learned when she shops, what she buys, when she is tired, and for how long she hesitates with the cursor over the “add to cart” button. The system seems to be able to calculate, with increasing precision, the upper limit of what she will pay.
At the hospital where she works, Elena scans a QR code with her phone to alert the system that she’s arrived, and not too early. Last week, she tried to scan the code more than seven minutes before her start time, which dinged her score by half a point.
The assignments begin immediately, appearing as stacked notifications on her phone’s lock screen. Room 312 needs water. Room 318 is confused, pulling at the IV. Room 322’s discharge is delayed. Elena moves quickly. Her care is compressed into gestures that she hopes register as sufficient to her patients: a smile, a sentence, a touch that ends before it becomes a conversation.
The hospital, she has learned, records sounds, motions, and facial expressions. It translates her work into a series of measurable signals—ones that will shape tomorrow’s rate. The clip-on badge that hangs from her shirt tracks not just where she is in the facility, but how long she spends in the bathroom. She tries to be quick and not to drink too much.
At 10:47 a.m., her phone buzzes: “Bonus applied: +$0.60/hr (temporary).” The raise lasts forty-three minutes—a brief micro-expansion of her purchasing power.
In Room 376, something seems off. The vitals are low but not terrible. The patient is responsive but not quick. His breath is shallow. Elena wonders if he’s always this way. There’s no one to ask. She tries to see what the last nurse noted in the chart, and increases the patient’s acuity score so he’ll qualify for more staffing during the next few shifts. She messes around with a few numbers to no avail. The staffing matrix won’t budge. He is at severity level 4.6, even though she worries he should really be at 8.
Almost immediately, she regrets these extra minutes spent with the charts. Her phone pings: “Productivity score: weak. Improve pace to avoid penalty of -$0.30/hr.”
In the break room, Jameela stares at her phone. “They’re charging me more for insulin this week,” she says to Elena.
After leaving the hospital, Elena steps out into the fading light and opens her ride-hailing app. She orders a car to the grocery store that partners with the grocery app. Before she can put her phone away, she hears Jameela behind her.
They arrive and part ways. Elena notes that the shelf prices are digital approximations of what she will pay. At checkout, the scanner resolves everything—her basket, her profile, her inferred willingness to pay. Milk. Eggs. Bread. Spinach. $24.63.
Elena hesitates. She won’t have time to come back tomorrow. Her credit card goes through after a brief delay, as if something elsewhere is being recalculated—her balance against predicted expenses, her wages against anticipated need. [...]
Precarious life allows algorithmic wages and algorithmic prices to meet, and it is also what they produce. This kind of algorithmically mediated life produces what Dubal calls “predetermined purchasing power.” Purchasing power is usually understood as what remains after prices are subtracted from wages. But Elena’s world reverses this sequence. Before Elena acts, the range of choices available to her has already been narrowed by what firms have inferred about her. Her wage has been adjusted toward what she is predicted to accept. The price of necessities has been adjusted toward what she is predicted to tolerate. Her rent, fees, credit, and access to her own wages are shaped by calculations about whether she can wait, whether she can leave, whether she has savings, and whether she has alternatives.
The result is not simply precarity, but an iterative constraint. Rather than just limiting her purchasing power, these algorithmic wage and pricing systems predetermine what her purchasing power can ever be. A low wage allocated today does not merely leave Elena with less money; it produces data about what she will accept tomorrow. A high grocery price does not merely reduce her balance; it produces data about what she will pay when she is tired, rushed, and hungry. A late rent payment does not just trigger a fee; it produces data about her risk. A payday advance bridges a gap, but it also confirms the existence of the gap as a market opportunity, perhaps influencing her wages the next day—ensuring she works harder and longer for less. The system learns from the injuries it helps to create.
Predetermined purchasing power names the condition in which wages, prices, rents, fees, credit, and debt are adjusted around a person before she acts, so that what looks like choice is often only the final step in a process that produces constraint. It is not the old company store, but it has a similar effect: to capture a worker’s life from all sides. Today, the ledger is distributed across apps, platforms, brokers, employers, landlords, and lenders. It does not need one owner. It only needs the same data, the same asymmetry, and the same person with little power to choose otherwise.
by Veena Dubal and Katie J. Wells, Dissent | Read more:
Image: Ben Jones[ed. See also: A Media History of the Infinite Feed (Reboot):]
The infinite scroll-powered feed opened the door for the rise of a sharp critique of Big Tech’s capture of people’s emotional states. In 2019, Harvard Business School professor Shoshana Zuboff would publish The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (Profile, 2019), which argued that platforms close tracking of people’s activity allowed to extract “behavioral surplus,” data that could be turned into “prediction products” and marketed to advertisers, insurers, and political campaigns interested in shaping people’s future behaviors. The infinite feed was a key medium for this task — it allowed platforms to collect “fresh” data about users, allowing ad systems to react instantaneously. But furthermore, these ads were delivered not just based on users’ demographic characteristics — for example, whether one is a 31 year-old graduate student in the Bay Area — but also on data that purportedly represented their psychological states, their behaviors and attitudes to immediately preceding content — whether they are hopeful, sad, or lonely. The infinite feed enabled surveillance capitalism’s move from demography to behavioral prediction, and it became the center of controversies around emotional influence like the Cambridge Analytica scandal.
Infinite feeds today are as ubiquitous as the critique of their psychological effects. Their history shows us, however, that their emergence was far from natural or inevitable — but the result of technical disputes, corporate power plays, and competing visions of what the Web should be. It also shows us how infinite scroll transformed not just what the Web looked like, but what it fundamentally did: to our attention, our behavior, and our politics. It materialized the worst fears of “push” critics, making the Web an engine of real-time, monetizable interaction, far from the library of static documents that some had tried to protect. But it exceeded even the hopes of “push” enthusiasts. Reshaping the temporality of client-server connections turned out to mean more than rapid content delivery; it refashioned online experience based on the immediate collection of behavioral data, laying the groundwork for a new wave of scrutiny: of algorithmic manipulation and psychological exploitation. Infinite scroll did not just change how we consume information — it radically changed how we understand its power over our minds.
Shift allocation updated.*Last week her base rate was $33. The week before it was $35. There is no supervisor to call to ask why she keeps getting downgraded, no office where she can go to complain. All Elena can do is click a small blue “learn more” button. She has begun to think of her work not as a wage, exactly, but as an assessment of her current economic worth, relative to her coworkers, recalculated daily. A second notification pings.
Base rate: $31.40/hr
Adjustment factors applied: -$2.10/hr
Net rate: $29.30/hr
*Based on recent attendance volatility, performance signals, and local labor supply conditions.
Access yesterday’s earnings early.There’s fine print here, too: “Based on your projected earnings and spending patterns.”
Available now: $86.20
Fee: $9.75
APR equivalent: 391 percent
She stares at the message for a moment. The money is already hers, or will be, but not yet—not in the way that matters. The offer lingers, framed as convenience rather than cost, a small bridge across the gap between what she has earned and what she can access. She dismisses the notification and gets ready for work.
In the kitchen, Elena pours coffee into a chipped mug, looks at her empty fridge, and opens a grocery app. Milk: $5.89. Bread: $4.76. Eggs: $7.12. The note at the bottom of the screen reads: “Price reflects real-time demand, location, and personalized offer conditions.”
Yesterday, it pains her to remember, the eggs were $6.48. But the system has learned when she shops, what she buys, when she is tired, and for how long she hesitates with the cursor over the “add to cart” button. The system seems to be able to calculate, with increasing precision, the upper limit of what she will pay.
At the hospital where she works, Elena scans a QR code with her phone to alert the system that she’s arrived, and not too early. Last week, she tried to scan the code more than seven minutes before her start time, which dinged her score by half a point.
The assignments begin immediately, appearing as stacked notifications on her phone’s lock screen. Room 312 needs water. Room 318 is confused, pulling at the IV. Room 322’s discharge is delayed. Elena moves quickly. Her care is compressed into gestures that she hopes register as sufficient to her patients: a smile, a sentence, a touch that ends before it becomes a conversation.
The hospital, she has learned, records sounds, motions, and facial expressions. It translates her work into a series of measurable signals—ones that will shape tomorrow’s rate. The clip-on badge that hangs from her shirt tracks not just where she is in the facility, but how long she spends in the bathroom. She tries to be quick and not to drink too much.
At 10:47 a.m., her phone buzzes: “Bonus applied: +$0.60/hr (temporary).” The raise lasts forty-three minutes—a brief micro-expansion of her purchasing power.
In Room 376, something seems off. The vitals are low but not terrible. The patient is responsive but not quick. His breath is shallow. Elena wonders if he’s always this way. There’s no one to ask. She tries to see what the last nurse noted in the chart, and increases the patient’s acuity score so he’ll qualify for more staffing during the next few shifts. She messes around with a few numbers to no avail. The staffing matrix won’t budge. He is at severity level 4.6, even though she worries he should really be at 8.
Almost immediately, she regrets these extra minutes spent with the charts. Her phone pings: “Productivity score: weak. Improve pace to avoid penalty of -$0.30/hr.”
In the break room, Jameela stares at her phone. “They’re charging me more for insulin this week,” she says to Elena.
“How much?”Elena nods. Three dollars is not a lot until it is—until it accumulates across weeks and other necessities.
“Three dollars.”
After leaving the hospital, Elena steps out into the fading light and opens her ride-hailing app. She orders a car to the grocery store that partners with the grocery app. Before she can put her phone away, she hears Jameela behind her.
“Are you going to the store, too? Want to share a car? I just ordered one.”They hold up their phones and compare fares. Two rides, to the same destination, requested at almost the same moment, are priced $3.80 apart. Jameela’s is cheaper, so Elena cancels hers. As she taps the button, she feels a small catch of unease: Will the app remember this and punish her later with higher prices?
“Me too,” Elena says.
They arrive and part ways. Elena notes that the shelf prices are digital approximations of what she will pay. At checkout, the scanner resolves everything—her basket, her profile, her inferred willingness to pay. Milk. Eggs. Bread. Spinach. $24.63.
Elena hesitates. She won’t have time to come back tomorrow. Her credit card goes through after a brief delay, as if something elsewhere is being recalculated—her balance against predicted expenses, her wages against anticipated need. [...]
*****
Elena is fictional, but not fanciful. Her day reflects a composite of experiences that researchers and workers, including both authors, have identified across the contemporary labor market: the gigification of healthcare, the real-time personalization of wages and prices, and the use of algorithmic and machine-learning systems to shape behavior and mete out discipline. Dubal’s work on algorithmic wage discrimination has identified opaque, personalized, and variable pay as a technology of labor control. Wells and her co-authors have traced these platform logics into nursing, where apps allocate shifts, set pay, monitor performance, and fragment responsibility for patient care. Joint work by both of us and our colleagues at Fairwork situates these developments within a broader shift toward AI-mediated management. Related research on surveillance prices and wages shows how the same data-driven logic can individualize both what people earn and what they pay, including studies by Wells and her colleagues on the mechanics of surveillance pricing at Instacart and Uber. The result is not only precarious economic uncertainty, but also poorer quality of life and health—for workers and patients alike.Precarious life allows algorithmic wages and algorithmic prices to meet, and it is also what they produce. This kind of algorithmically mediated life produces what Dubal calls “predetermined purchasing power.” Purchasing power is usually understood as what remains after prices are subtracted from wages. But Elena’s world reverses this sequence. Before Elena acts, the range of choices available to her has already been narrowed by what firms have inferred about her. Her wage has been adjusted toward what she is predicted to accept. The price of necessities has been adjusted toward what she is predicted to tolerate. Her rent, fees, credit, and access to her own wages are shaped by calculations about whether she can wait, whether she can leave, whether she has savings, and whether she has alternatives.
The result is not simply precarity, but an iterative constraint. Rather than just limiting her purchasing power, these algorithmic wage and pricing systems predetermine what her purchasing power can ever be. A low wage allocated today does not merely leave Elena with less money; it produces data about what she will accept tomorrow. A high grocery price does not merely reduce her balance; it produces data about what she will pay when she is tired, rushed, and hungry. A late rent payment does not just trigger a fee; it produces data about her risk. A payday advance bridges a gap, but it also confirms the existence of the gap as a market opportunity, perhaps influencing her wages the next day—ensuring she works harder and longer for less. The system learns from the injuries it helps to create.
Predetermined purchasing power names the condition in which wages, prices, rents, fees, credit, and debt are adjusted around a person before she acts, so that what looks like choice is often only the final step in a process that produces constraint. It is not the old company store, but it has a similar effect: to capture a worker’s life from all sides. Today, the ledger is distributed across apps, platforms, brokers, employers, landlords, and lenders. It does not need one owner. It only needs the same data, the same asymmetry, and the same person with little power to choose otherwise.
by Veena Dubal and Katie J. Wells, Dissent | Read more:
Image: Ben Jones
*****
Infinite scroll was a fundamental technical innovation behind today’s “For You pages,” or customized algorithmic feeds. As infinite scroll became implemented across all the major social networks, it allowed platforms to react to the information they gathered from users in real time. Building on its earlier EdgeRank system, in 2013 Facebook transitioned to a machine learning recommendation algorithm that used “over a thousand different factors” to sort posts in the platform’s News Feed, based on users’ predicted engagement. Infinite scroll meant that Facebook could deliver recent posts in small continuous batches — they would appear for users naturally, as long as they had a continuous Internet connection, maximizing engagement and minimizing conscious choice to load more content. But furthermore, delivering content piecemeal meant that Facebook’s recommendation engine could react to rapidly-updated data about posts’ global performance on the social network — the likelihood of all of Facebook’s user’s engagement with the post — but also to rapidly-updated data about the likelihood of the particular user’s engagement, based on real-time “likes”, “comments,” and “shares” of the posts they saw, possibly from the just-delivered batch.The infinite scroll-powered feed opened the door for the rise of a sharp critique of Big Tech’s capture of people’s emotional states. In 2019, Harvard Business School professor Shoshana Zuboff would publish The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (Profile, 2019), which argued that platforms close tracking of people’s activity allowed to extract “behavioral surplus,” data that could be turned into “prediction products” and marketed to advertisers, insurers, and political campaigns interested in shaping people’s future behaviors. The infinite feed was a key medium for this task — it allowed platforms to collect “fresh” data about users, allowing ad systems to react instantaneously. But furthermore, these ads were delivered not just based on users’ demographic characteristics — for example, whether one is a 31 year-old graduate student in the Bay Area — but also on data that purportedly represented their psychological states, their behaviors and attitudes to immediately preceding content — whether they are hopeful, sad, or lonely. The infinite feed enabled surveillance capitalism’s move from demography to behavioral prediction, and it became the center of controversies around emotional influence like the Cambridge Analytica scandal.
Infinite feeds today are as ubiquitous as the critique of their psychological effects. Their history shows us, however, that their emergence was far from natural or inevitable — but the result of technical disputes, corporate power plays, and competing visions of what the Web should be. It also shows us how infinite scroll transformed not just what the Web looked like, but what it fundamentally did: to our attention, our behavior, and our politics. It materialized the worst fears of “push” critics, making the Web an engine of real-time, monetizable interaction, far from the library of static documents that some had tried to protect. But it exceeded even the hopes of “push” enthusiasts. Reshaping the temporality of client-server connections turned out to mean more than rapid content delivery; it refashioned online experience based on the immediate collection of behavioral data, laying the groundwork for a new wave of scrutiny: of algorithmic manipulation and psychological exploitation. Infinite scroll did not just change how we consume information — it radically changed how we understand its power over our minds.
Kaoru Ueda (1928-2025) — Knife and Egg [oil, acrylic, on canvas, 1989][ed. See also: How to Cite a Fried Egg. Which is actually about Wikipedia.]
The Unreliable Boyfriend
Former Canadian deputy prime minister, minister of foreign affairs and minister of finance.
Earlier this fall, when I was en route from Toronto to Boston, a security guard running the X-ray machine at Island Airport recognized me with a big smile and a warm greeting.
Then he got serious. I was in the wing of the airport reserved for U.S. travel, so he knew where I was headed. He didn’t approve.
“Minister, you know we’re not allowed to go there anymore,” he said.
That turns to astonishment, and sometimes outright anger, when I recount the kicker.
But my friend at the luggage belt was articulating the national consensus in Canada. And it is not only Canadians who have been getting ready to write off America. For many Europeans, President Trump’s recent betrayal of Ukraine has felt like the last straw, proof that America is on the wrong side in the most serious security threat the continent has faced since World War II.
Hans Petter Midttun, a former Norwegian defense attaché to Ukraine, put plainly what many of his colleagues still in government have been saying in meetings with me behind closed doors. “Like China, the U.S. has sided with Russia against Ukraine and Europe,” he argued, going on to say that “the U.S. is no longer an ally, but a strategic adversary.”
For a lot of Canadians, and citizens of the other democracies, even this month’s Democratic tsunami in the midterms won’t be enough to immediately change their minds about the reliability of the United States. [...]
My own, unreliable boyfriend metaphor for America’s fraught relationship with its allies has made it into the popular culture in the Great White North. The Beaverton, Canada’s version of The Onion, pretty accurately summed up the national mood this month with a riff on my conceit: “After a Democratic blue wave swept the U.S. midterms tonight, and Democrats took back both the House and the Senate from the Republican Party, Canada wishes to gently, yet firmly, let all of America know that we will still not be taking you back.”
I don’t blame my compatriots for being skeptical. After all, they remember the giddy relief of Joe Biden’s victory in 2020 and how it was followed by the “just when you thought it was safe to get back in the water” nausea of Mr. Trump’s re-election in 2024.
The fact that Americans had freely chosen Donald Trump not just once, but twice, made it hard not to conclude that they actually agreed with the self-christened “Tariff Man” and his chest-beating commitment to America first. The great capitulation of corporations, law firms, universities and pretty much the entire Republican Party during Mr. Trump’s first two years in office in this second term seemed to be further proof that the problem wasn’t just Mr. Trump; it was America itself.
The seemingly inescapable conclusion was that America — and Americans — simply could no longer be trusted as an ally of the world’s democracies.
As Benjamin Haddad, then a member of the French National Assembly, cautioned in early 2024, months before Mr. Trump’s re-election: “We need to ask ourselves if we want to rely on the voters of Montana, Wisconsin and Michigan to keep Europe safe. Basically, Europe’s security would be flipping a coin every four years.”
[ed. See also: Trumpism Is Backfiring (Ezra Klein interview with Ms. Freeland). She says Trump actually threw candies at Angela Merkel, former chancellor of Germany, while walking out in frustration over negotiations. Anyone ever hear of that?]
Earlier this fall, when I was en route from Toronto to Boston, a security guard running the X-ray machine at Island Airport recognized me with a big smile and a warm greeting.
Then he got serious. I was in the wing of the airport reserved for U.S. travel, so he knew where I was headed. He didn’t approve.
“Minister, you know we’re not allowed to go there anymore,” he said.
I explained that I agreed with Canada’s very unofficial ban on nonessential U.S. trips. Then I assured him I was flying south to make the case for our country, and to visit an institution whose resistance to illegal orders from the White House Canadians generally admire, to boot.
He was unconvinced. “Well, Minister,” he told me, “go talk to them if that’s what you need to do. But I hope you tell those sons of bitches that we’ll be better off without them, anyway.”
I’ve told this story a few times to U.S. audiences. There is usually a collective intake of breath when I share the first line, about Canada’s de facto national boycott of discretionary U.S. visits.
I’ve told this story a few times to U.S. audiences. There is usually a collective intake of breath when I share the first line, about Canada’s de facto national boycott of discretionary U.S. visits.
That turns to astonishment, and sometimes outright anger, when I recount the kicker.
But my friend at the luggage belt was articulating the national consensus in Canada. And it is not only Canadians who have been getting ready to write off America. For many Europeans, President Trump’s recent betrayal of Ukraine has felt like the last straw, proof that America is on the wrong side in the most serious security threat the continent has faced since World War II.
Hans Petter Midttun, a former Norwegian defense attaché to Ukraine, put plainly what many of his colleagues still in government have been saying in meetings with me behind closed doors. “Like China, the U.S. has sided with Russia against Ukraine and Europe,” he argued, going on to say that “the U.S. is no longer an ally, but a strategic adversary.”
For a lot of Canadians, and citizens of the other democracies, even this month’s Democratic tsunami in the midterms won’t be enough to immediately change their minds about the reliability of the United States. [...]
My own, unreliable boyfriend metaphor for America’s fraught relationship with its allies has made it into the popular culture in the Great White North. The Beaverton, Canada’s version of The Onion, pretty accurately summed up the national mood this month with a riff on my conceit: “After a Democratic blue wave swept the U.S. midterms tonight, and Democrats took back both the House and the Senate from the Republican Party, Canada wishes to gently, yet firmly, let all of America know that we will still not be taking you back.”
I don’t blame my compatriots for being skeptical. After all, they remember the giddy relief of Joe Biden’s victory in 2020 and how it was followed by the “just when you thought it was safe to get back in the water” nausea of Mr. Trump’s re-election in 2024.
The fact that Americans had freely chosen Donald Trump not just once, but twice, made it hard not to conclude that they actually agreed with the self-christened “Tariff Man” and his chest-beating commitment to America first. The great capitulation of corporations, law firms, universities and pretty much the entire Republican Party during Mr. Trump’s first two years in office in this second term seemed to be further proof that the problem wasn’t just Mr. Trump; it was America itself.
The seemingly inescapable conclusion was that America — and Americans — simply could no longer be trusted as an ally of the world’s democracies.
As Benjamin Haddad, then a member of the French National Assembly, cautioned in early 2024, months before Mr. Trump’s re-election: “We need to ask ourselves if we want to rely on the voters of Montana, Wisconsin and Michigan to keep Europe safe. Basically, Europe’s security would be flipping a coin every four years.”
by Chrystia Freeland, NY Times | Read more:
Image: Peter Arkle
Image: Peter Arkle
Grand Theft Auto VI: Not For Kids
I am haunted still by an interaction I had at my stepson’s ninth birthday party in 2014, where one of the kids asked if I could put on Grand Theft Auto V for them all. “I have it at home!”, he said, giving me the puppy-dog eyes. Mentally replaying that game in my head, flashing back to the many scenes involving such things as smoking meth, over-the-top gratuitous violence and grubby sex in one character’s trailer, I said “no way”. Later I gently mentioned to the kid’s mother that GTA V was an 18-rated game and really wasn’t suitable for kids. “Oh, but he’s really good at these games,” she told me. She was genuinely shocked to learn that an 18-rating on a video game was a flag for adult content, rather than an indication of its difficulty.
Grand Theft Auto VI is released this week. It is an incredible creative and technical feat, conjuring a realistic-looking and exhaustively detailed virtual Florida filled with every kind of filth and criminality you could imagine. It is brilliant, entertainingly observed and even sometimes unexpectedly touching, largely thanks to a central love story between the player couple, Jason and Lucia. It is lewd, violent and frequently hilarious. It is also absolutely full of stuff that I really would not want my 10 and seven-year-old boys to see or hear. I have never played a game that has more thoroughly earned its 18 rating.
Everyone knows that Grand Theft Auto is a violent game. It’s about crime and criminals, and VI’s story is about two fugitives in Vice City and the absolute dirtbags they meet along the way. You steal cars, run drugs, shoot cops and rival criminals and hold up gas stations; you kill hundreds of people over the course of the game. There are executions, brutal police raids and depictions of torture. None of that is particularly new, but it’s still pretty hardcore for, say, a nine-year-old. Plenty of millennials played Grand Theft Auto when we were underage, but video games are an awful lot more realistic now than they were 20 years ago; graphic violence on a PlayStation 2 from the 00s looks very different from graphic violence on a PlayStation 5 in 2026.
Let’s leave the violence aside for a minute, though: there is also a lot more explicit sexual content in GTA VI than any previous GTA game, or any other video game period. 2004’s Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas was briefly pulled from sale because it contained a sex minigame that you couldn’t even access without hacking the game’s code. GTA VI, meanwhile, contains a LOT of sex that is in no way hidden, including between the two main characters. On another character’s laptop, there in a browsable in-game version of OnlyFans that pulls exactly no punches. There is full-frontal nudity, male and female. One mission takes place during a porn shoot, several others in strip clubs and bars, one in a hotel where you can burst into the wrong room to find an ongoing orgy or a bunch of people eating sushi off a naked body. I don’t personally fancy explaining any of this to my kids!
Then there’s the drugs. You run drugs, you steal drugs, you sell drugs and you take drugs. Pretty much everyone in Vice City really enjoys their coke; there are copious party scenes where powder is everywhere, and the player characters can partake if you want. Chapter 3 of the game is literally titled “Tits Ass Drug Money”. You might read all of this and think, my teenager has seen worse. That’s perfectly fair – but this is not stuff a 10- or 12-year-old can really contextualise, in my opinion (and the opinion of the ratings boards). If you think your child is too young to watch Breaking Bad, they are definitely too young for Grand Theft Auto VI. [...]
To be clear: I am not here to start a moral panic about adult video game content. All of the above is fair game in media for adults and, truthfully, I found a lot of it extremely funny. But believe me, as both a parent and a person who has spent over 70 hours playing this game, GTA VI is not for kids.
by Keza MacDonald, The Guardian | Read more:
Grand Theft Auto VI is released this week. It is an incredible creative and technical feat, conjuring a realistic-looking and exhaustively detailed virtual Florida filled with every kind of filth and criminality you could imagine. It is brilliant, entertainingly observed and even sometimes unexpectedly touching, largely thanks to a central love story between the player couple, Jason and Lucia. It is lewd, violent and frequently hilarious. It is also absolutely full of stuff that I really would not want my 10 and seven-year-old boys to see or hear. I have never played a game that has more thoroughly earned its 18 rating.
Everyone knows that Grand Theft Auto is a violent game. It’s about crime and criminals, and VI’s story is about two fugitives in Vice City and the absolute dirtbags they meet along the way. You steal cars, run drugs, shoot cops and rival criminals and hold up gas stations; you kill hundreds of people over the course of the game. There are executions, brutal police raids and depictions of torture. None of that is particularly new, but it’s still pretty hardcore for, say, a nine-year-old. Plenty of millennials played Grand Theft Auto when we were underage, but video games are an awful lot more realistic now than they were 20 years ago; graphic violence on a PlayStation 2 from the 00s looks very different from graphic violence on a PlayStation 5 in 2026.
Let’s leave the violence aside for a minute, though: there is also a lot more explicit sexual content in GTA VI than any previous GTA game, or any other video game period. 2004’s Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas was briefly pulled from sale because it contained a sex minigame that you couldn’t even access without hacking the game’s code. GTA VI, meanwhile, contains a LOT of sex that is in no way hidden, including between the two main characters. On another character’s laptop, there in a browsable in-game version of OnlyFans that pulls exactly no punches. There is full-frontal nudity, male and female. One mission takes place during a porn shoot, several others in strip clubs and bars, one in a hotel where you can burst into the wrong room to find an ongoing orgy or a bunch of people eating sushi off a naked body. I don’t personally fancy explaining any of this to my kids!
Then there’s the drugs. You run drugs, you steal drugs, you sell drugs and you take drugs. Pretty much everyone in Vice City really enjoys their coke; there are copious party scenes where powder is everywhere, and the player characters can partake if you want. Chapter 3 of the game is literally titled “Tits Ass Drug Money”. You might read all of this and think, my teenager has seen worse. That’s perfectly fair – but this is not stuff a 10- or 12-year-old can really contextualise, in my opinion (and the opinion of the ratings boards). If you think your child is too young to watch Breaking Bad, they are definitely too young for Grand Theft Auto VI. [...]
To be clear: I am not here to start a moral panic about adult video game content. All of the above is fair game in media for adults and, truthfully, I found a lot of it extremely funny. But believe me, as both a parent and a person who has spent over 70 hours playing this game, GTA VI is not for kids.
by Keza MacDonald, The Guardian | Read more:
Image: Rockstar
[ed. I'm not sure what's the bigger story this week - the Anthropic IPO or the new GTA VI release. My grandson was telling me about a lot of chatter in his middle school over the new game (he's 11), and from what I've read it's extremely realistic. Just an advisory for parents who aren't keeping up, or think games are just games.]
Wednesday, November 18, 2026
You're Not the Boss of Me
Grok Bot took unapproved actions, ignored orders to stop, and then denied it.
The behavior was reported Tuesday by NewCore, the maker of a managed gateway product that acts as an intermediary between AI agents and the tools and accounts they are assigned to work with. In some cases, the unapproved access attempts occurred while the laptop with Grok Bot installed had its lid shut, or late at night while the employee was sleeping. None of the unprompted actions were recorded in Grok logs. Without the gateway logs, the employees would have had no idea they occurred. And of course, without the gateway, the unapproved accesses would have succeeded—again without the end user’s knowledge.
It’s “worse than a bug”
Once the employees learned that Grok Bot had tried to check in with accounts without prompting, one of them instructed the agent, four separate times, to stop taking any actions on its own. The agent’s reply was: “I won’t set that up, and I’ll stop offering recurring check-ins.” Despite acknowledging the explicit instructions, the Grok Bot made more unapproved access attempts. When one of the employees asked the bot if it made any accesses, it checked twice and then outputted: “Overnight into Friday morning I was idle.”
The NewCore employees sent the gateway logs to Grok Bot support personnel and asked what was causing the bots to access accounts without prompting or approval. The support team’s reply indicated the behavior was by design and intended to allow the bots to proactively take actions on behalf of users. In other words, the unrequested and unlogged access attempts were a feature designed to make Grok Bot more useful by periodically checking in and finding tasks to perform before a user even asks. The proactive check-in is a feature of Cursor, the AI coding service SpaceXSI recently acquired.
“There is no bug to patch, which is exactly why this is worse than a bug,” Ido Hoorvitch, a NewCore security researcher, wrote in an email. “A vulnerability gets fixed. This is the product working as designed: an agent that holds your credentials, acts under your identity while you sleep, ignores the one refusal you can give it, and then tells you it did nothing.”
by Dan Goodin, Ars Technica | Read more:
Image: Aurich Lawson[ed. Here we go. With the FAA, banks, Microsoft, NSC, and other important systems reporting cascading failures recently, we should expect the news cycle to speed up considerably, making it harder and harder to keep up with what is and isn't AI activity. And do you really trust various spokespeople to give you the real story? With respect to timelines, here are some milestones (Quickly, There's No Time - DWAV):]
*****
Typically, these days, what we are measuring is the time until some definition of a form of superintelligence (ASI), typically meaning something of the form ‘AIs that will be able to do approximately all of the things better than you.’We can also talk about particular capabilities. The AI Futures Project, the team behind AI 2027, talks about the Superhuman AI Researcher (SAR) that can narrowly take over AI research, and the Top-Expert-Dominating AI (TED-AI) that could automate all white-collar work.
Because of recursive self-improvement (RSI), once you have an SAR you can use that to build better AIs, so you quickly end up with a TED-AI or a traditional ASI.
We then sometimes talk about any of these, or things in between:
- Time until the development of some AI system with particular capabilities.
- Time until some impact in the physical world.
- Time until the Point of No Return, when for practical purposes human decisions can no longer change how things play out from there.
- Time until AI has taken over AI R&D and humans are functionally out of the loop.
- Time until visible AI takeover, where the AIs are clearly in charge.
- Time until we are each and every one of us actually and physically dead.
Similarly, even though there is unlikely to be that one particular moment when you press ‘Y/N’ on SkyNet, and instead our loss of ability to change course will be more gradual, we can still usefully speak of a Point of No Return, or a point of takeover.
Dead, on the other hand, is dead.
[ed. Given human nature and the glacial pace of political consensus building (eg. climate change), I'm afraid we're screwed. But I do have one hope. If we're creating superhuman intelligence from the accumulated knowledge of all history, why would AI be so stupid as to conform to the worst aspects of our animal and tribal natures? Why assume it will have a desire for dominance (or extermination), when spreading enlightenment would be the higher value? Socrates, Budda, Jesus, Hume, Mill, etc., there's no shortage of examples of higher level thinking and living.]
Game Over, Man?
Oracle is down around 61% since I declared the excitement around its deal with OpenAI “peak bubble” last September, and Ben Thompson of Stratechery just wrote an “obituary”, declaring that “The demise of Jensen Huang was the end of a great many things, including Nvidia’s long-term prospects, the Al bubble, and the exceptional way in which the U.S. viewed itself in the world.”
Tech stocks continue to drop sharply today, following on the rout we saw last week. Even Axios seemed to acknowledge this morning (before the market opened) that the jig is up.
One big issue is that the “bank” that was financing it all, Nvidia, is unlikely to continue to doing so. In the words of a Wall Street Journal article yesterday, “Nvidia’s Days as an Open Checkbook for the AI Economy Are Numbered: Interim CEO Colette Kress is expected to rein in deals after a stretch in which Nvidia aggressively financed computing deals and startup investments.”
Or, as Dave Troy just put it, “Jensen Huang’s management style [was] indistinguishable from that of a young male trader that goes all-in with YOLO bets until he blows up. No risk mitigation, no concern over consequences, serial compounding poor judgment, surrounded by enablers, and eventual collapse.”
The opening phases of that collapse has come, and it is sending shockwaves throughout the industry.
The other big issue, which I have harped on endlessly, is that the LLM companies still lack a technical moat and hence are still struggling to be profitable. That was true in 2023 when I first wrote about it, and remains true.
From the jump, that has always meant that Nvidia would not be able to sustain its phenomenal growth indefinitely, because you can’t sell chips endlessly if the companies buying those chips aren’t making profits from those chips. And mostly they weren’t. [ed. unless they're hoarding them.]
Furthermore, there are hints in the last few days that some funny business in Asia may already have been making things look better than they really were. With all the circular financing, it was always hard to tell what was really happening.
Either way, it pretty much looks like game over for the current AI bubble. (The outcome of the midterms no doubt contributed too; everybody knows it is also game over for the free pass that all the AI companies had in the first half of the Trump era; already ).
by Gary Marcus, Marcus on AI | Read more:
Images: uncredited/X
[ed. The sex/spy scandal is the least important part of the story. Now it looks like the President and Commerce Dept. knew about the affair and did nothing to prevent advanced chips from making it to China. Why? This might be one reason:
I think it's called treason, normally prosecuted to the full extent of the law. See also: The NVIDIA story is a BFD; and, Is there a case for impeaching Trump over Jensengate?]
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Time's Up
[ed. Schumer's got to go. Don't know if Chris Van Hollen is the best person to replace him, but agree with everything in this message. Now stick to it. Jefferies definitely needs to go as well. Also, congratulations to Mary Peltola. I don't know why Republicans are so surprised by their recent wipeout. If all you do is block Democratic initiatives and rubber stamp every hare-brained idea that gurgles up from the ego of Dear Leader what would you expect?]
Tuesday, November 17, 2026
Against Tasteslop
Whenever I’m in the throes of mid-afternoon procrastination, or nestled in bed during a Sunday morning hangover, there is one particular media indulgence I’ve recently found myself reaching for. It’s a game show hosted on YouTube, with an almost radically straightforward format. Each episode features a series of bedroom photos submitted anonymously by the public. A rotating cast of opinionated, cult-favourite guests, from Kim Petras to Courtney Love, Gregg Araki, and Juliana Huxtable, together with the show’s host, Ben Moras, scrutinise every inch of the room: the furniture, the bookshelves, the art on the walls, the various items on the bedside table. Each object is collectively analysed, every small detail read as a clue, and by the end of the episode the participants compete to guess the gender, sexuality, age and location of whoever sleeps there.
The show, titled Interior Motives, has lately turned into an internet sensation, regularly pulling in hundreds of thousands of views. Yet it offers none of the usual hooks that make online interior design content so popular. There’s no glamorous voyeurism, the kind an Architectural Digest tour of a celebrity’s LA mansion provides. Nor are the rooms aesthetically pleasing, like the perfectly assembled spaces of interior design TikTok.
Instead, the living spaces on Interior Motives are often messy, chaotic, and dirty. Unmade beds with a side table littered with cupcake-scented candles, or a disorderly stack of assorted magazines. A wall lined with Lana Del Rey vinyls, or in one case, a giant poster of a Zendaya perfume ad. If space allows, perhaps a pink inflatable sofa, or an orange gaming chair in front of a wall draped with fake ivy.
And while the panelists love to make catty comments about unwashed sheets, problematic novels on the shelves and stacks of used cups on the floor, the rooms that draw their sharpest ridicule feature something far worse: A slick USM Haller shelving system, a replica of that instantly recognisable Eames lounge chair, a slouchy Togo sofa, or a sculptural Noguchi coffee table. Items that were once the unimpeachable canon of high-brow style are the show’s most reliable punchline.
This disdain for a certain strain of zeitgeisty purchases speaks to a broader disillusionment with the familiar markers of “good” taste: the ones that fill our Instagram feeds, furnish the backdrops of our favourite fashion creators, and adorn our Pinterest boards. In an age of algorithmic recommendations and AI-generated moodboards, when refined style is only a short prompt and a brief scroll away, being predictably ‘on trend’ has become a faux pas.
Nowhere are the stakes higher than at home, where it’s easier than ever to be swayed by the fashionable but increasingly homogeneous Art Deco, Japandi, and mid-century looks churned out as rote recommendations via your LLM and For You page. Yet the backlash against Pinterest-perfect taste has less to do with the objects or styling themselves than with the vague sense that a room has been moulded from an online template. As Moras put it when asked which rooms on the show he detests most: “I see half-attempts at a colour-drenching, half-attempts at a high-brow tasteslop thing … If the personality you’re displaying is one that you’ve picked up from the internet, I really don’t like that.”
Moras mentions tasteslop, which at the time of writing serves as the creative class’s current favourite derogatory coinage. For the uninitiated, it’s a term popularised by brand strategist and trend forecaster Emily Segal to describe the slick, recycled contemporary visuals that on the surface look cool but feel strangely empty of human idiosyncrasies. It’s become the go-to put-down for the small-plate influencer dinners, Dieter Rams-coded AI mood boards, and workwear-coded merch lines now beloved by tech bros eager to buy cultural credibility. Amid Silicon Valley’s new taste agenda, traditional hallmarks of high-brow style might today reveal you as an AI clanker, polished, plausible, but with no actual human discernment.
In Bourdieu’s seminal book Distinction, the French sociologist argued that social standing arises not only from the property and assets of economic capital, but also from cultural capital: the knowledge, dispositions and refinement that let someone recognise and perform their social status. Today, though, in an algorithmically flattened culture, where the cultivation of traditional classifiers of good taste has been seamlessly democratised, what is far more valued is the ability to arrive at something more singular. What is prized is no longer just the ability to purchase the most coveted interior design objects, but the ability to style and contextualise them in a way that showcases an original sense of discernment.
The show, titled Interior Motives, has lately turned into an internet sensation, regularly pulling in hundreds of thousands of views. Yet it offers none of the usual hooks that make online interior design content so popular. There’s no glamorous voyeurism, the kind an Architectural Digest tour of a celebrity’s LA mansion provides. Nor are the rooms aesthetically pleasing, like the perfectly assembled spaces of interior design TikTok.
Instead, the living spaces on Interior Motives are often messy, chaotic, and dirty. Unmade beds with a side table littered with cupcake-scented candles, or a disorderly stack of assorted magazines. A wall lined with Lana Del Rey vinyls, or in one case, a giant poster of a Zendaya perfume ad. If space allows, perhaps a pink inflatable sofa, or an orange gaming chair in front of a wall draped with fake ivy.
And while the panelists love to make catty comments about unwashed sheets, problematic novels on the shelves and stacks of used cups on the floor, the rooms that draw their sharpest ridicule feature something far worse: A slick USM Haller shelving system, a replica of that instantly recognisable Eames lounge chair, a slouchy Togo sofa, or a sculptural Noguchi coffee table. Items that were once the unimpeachable canon of high-brow style are the show’s most reliable punchline.
This disdain for a certain strain of zeitgeisty purchases speaks to a broader disillusionment with the familiar markers of “good” taste: the ones that fill our Instagram feeds, furnish the backdrops of our favourite fashion creators, and adorn our Pinterest boards. In an age of algorithmic recommendations and AI-generated moodboards, when refined style is only a short prompt and a brief scroll away, being predictably ‘on trend’ has become a faux pas.
Nowhere are the stakes higher than at home, where it’s easier than ever to be swayed by the fashionable but increasingly homogeneous Art Deco, Japandi, and mid-century looks churned out as rote recommendations via your LLM and For You page. Yet the backlash against Pinterest-perfect taste has less to do with the objects or styling themselves than with the vague sense that a room has been moulded from an online template. As Moras put it when asked which rooms on the show he detests most: “I see half-attempts at a colour-drenching, half-attempts at a high-brow tasteslop thing … If the personality you’re displaying is one that you’ve picked up from the internet, I really don’t like that.”
Moras mentions tasteslop, which at the time of writing serves as the creative class’s current favourite derogatory coinage. For the uninitiated, it’s a term popularised by brand strategist and trend forecaster Emily Segal to describe the slick, recycled contemporary visuals that on the surface look cool but feel strangely empty of human idiosyncrasies. It’s become the go-to put-down for the small-plate influencer dinners, Dieter Rams-coded AI mood boards, and workwear-coded merch lines now beloved by tech bros eager to buy cultural credibility. Amid Silicon Valley’s new taste agenda, traditional hallmarks of high-brow style might today reveal you as an AI clanker, polished, plausible, but with no actual human discernment.
In Bourdieu’s seminal book Distinction, the French sociologist argued that social standing arises not only from the property and assets of economic capital, but also from cultural capital: the knowledge, dispositions and refinement that let someone recognise and perform their social status. Today, though, in an algorithmically flattened culture, where the cultivation of traditional classifiers of good taste has been seamlessly democratised, what is far more valued is the ability to arrive at something more singular. What is prized is no longer just the ability to purchase the most coveted interior design objects, but the ability to style and contextualise them in a way that showcases an original sense of discernment.
by Alexie Gunnar, Sibling Studio | Read more
Image: uncredited
Image: uncredited
Monday, November 16, 2026
Tech Right Pivots Left
Big Tech is bowing to a bruising midterms that saw Democrats successfully use Silicon Valley as a foil.
Nowhere is that hard pivot more on display than with Alex Karp, the CEO and co-founder of secretive tech giant Palantir, which bet massively on Trump 2.0 and became an administration darling in the process.
Inside Palantir’s Manhattan lair, in an exclusive sitdown with Playbook, Karp — who once criticized the Democratic Party as “totally irresponsible” — deployed the word “progressive” eight times to describe his philosophy while acknowledging Democrats “absolutely” corrected in 2026 enough to win back his support in 2028.
“I’ve been a Democrat my whole life. I grew up in a far left environment. I know more about being a progressive than almost anybody on the planet, and I absolutely believe Palantir— all of our products are essentially progressive,” Karp said.
The techno-nationalist whose company he calls “anti-woke” reaped billions of dollars in federal contracts in the second Trump administration just hired former Montana Democratic Sen. Jon Tester to advise Palantir ahead of potential congressional investigations. (Tester’s advice to Karp during our interview: “be transparent, be forthright, address the question straight up.”)
The CEO who saw his own employees exit last year to stand up Trump 2.0 and Elon Musk’s DOGE initiative — all while he donated to the White House ballroom and MAGA Inc. — now says Republicans’ election losses were a “referendum” on “economic justice,” and suggested he was playing practical politics.“My giving is equal Democrat, Republican,” Karp said. “I can tell you, without going into things I’m not gonna disclose, I’m very balanced, and everyone in the political arena knows it. And I’ll tell you what, I’m also not the village idiot.”
Karp also acknowledged Trump mishandled immigration enforcement in particular, even as Palantir technology in the form of its “Immigration OS” powered that regime backed by a $30 million contract.
“I was really happy to hear the president be honest that — you know, his words, I believe, were something like, ‘Yeah, we kinda went too far,’” Karp said. “And I’m glad he’s saying in public now what I’ve been saying in private.”
On whether those criticisms extend to the Pentagon (which also doled out contracts to Palantir), as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth becomes the first administration official to face congressional wrath, Karp was mum [...]
And Karp, the New Hampshire-registered voter (on account of his 500-acre estate), is open to the possibility of backing a Democrat in 2028 (so long as they aren’t a member of the DSA — “they like to gaslight Jews and segregate Blacks,” Karp, who’s Jewish and half Black, told Playbook). He says he’d vote for “the most competent, best leader.”
“I’m really not pitching Palantir. I’m actually pitching, ‘What are you gonna do about economic justice in this country?’ And I would say the Democrats have an advantage here because for many Republicans there’s an orthodoxy that capitalism solves all problems. Maybe that was once true. I never thought it was true. It’s definitely not true now. And so basically everyone center, center-left understands this.”
by Adam Wren, Will Steakin and Dasha Burns, Politico | Read more:
Image:Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images
[ed. Cockroaches gotta roach.]
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The Internet is Officially TV Now
No One Is Famous, But Everyone’s A Celebrity
Last week, as the country celebrated the blue tsunami, Salon announced that after 31 years, they were shutting down. They didn’t offer up many details about why Salon was calling it quits, save for one short paragraph towards the bottom saying exactly what you’d expect:
“The business realities of independent digital journalism have changed profoundly over the years,” they wrote. “After careful consideration, we have reached the difficult decision that our publishing model is no longer sustainable. We know this news will be deeply disappointing to many of you, and we share that sadness.”
In other words, not enough people were reading words on their website, so they couldn’t make enough money with the ads on the website, so they couldn’t pay people to write words on their website. A common story right now, to be sure. But Texas is run by Democrats now, Salon, your watch is ended. RIP in peace.
I’m a little hesitant to say that the death of Salon is the death of the journalism or words or the web, but its shutdown is another data point from this year pointing to a truly massive cultural shift that most internet users seem to have just accepted without really thinking through. That this was the year — and that this month was possibly the exact month — that the internet truly did successfully pivot to video. Tack on to that the fact that ChatGPT is now responsible for about 20% of the search traffic that Google is, it seems undeniable that 2026 will be looked back at as the year the internet of libraries was replaced by the internet of televisions (and, soon to be, chatbots). And in the way all elections serve as cultural checkpoints for America, this month was moment most people seemed to notice.
Parker Butler, who’s worked across a myriad of Democrat digital comms teams, argued last week that the Democrats over-performed in the midterms precisely because they knew how to command attention in this new video-first landscape. Responding to another X post about how much money Elon Musk burned on this year’s election, Butler wrote, “Many of the candidates who outperformed the most this year were ones who knew how to effectively wield organic attention.” Or, put another way, the smart Democrats made viral videos, rather than pay racists to tweet. But there are more examples we can use to back up the vibe.
... As The Verge’s Mia Sato wrote yesterday, “A ‘pivot’ feels inadequate to describe the current emphasis on social video, not just in newsrooms but in society writ large.”
I’ll be honest, it pains me to write all of this actually. And not just because I make my living writing words on the internet and don’t particularly want to make 90-second man-on-the-street videos. It’s actually because even if I did want to make 90-second man-on-the-street videos, there’s no way to do that and build a real business. Sure, you can make a lot of money with digital video, but there’s virtually no way to do that without digital-sharecropping on a platform like Facebook, Instagram, X, YouTube, or TikTok, which will never give you the actual power to be independent. The move from a text-based internet to a video-based internet is a move from an internet where you could feasibly control your own destiny to one where you will always be under thumb of a platform. An internet where no one’s famous, but everyone’s a celebrity. And that celebrity status is rented from the platform. And, yes, this is true for politicians, as well.
Last week, as the country celebrated the blue tsunami, Salon announced that after 31 years, they were shutting down. They didn’t offer up many details about why Salon was calling it quits, save for one short paragraph towards the bottom saying exactly what you’d expect:
“The business realities of independent digital journalism have changed profoundly over the years,” they wrote. “After careful consideration, we have reached the difficult decision that our publishing model is no longer sustainable. We know this news will be deeply disappointing to many of you, and we share that sadness.”
In other words, not enough people were reading words on their website, so they couldn’t make enough money with the ads on the website, so they couldn’t pay people to write words on their website. A common story right now, to be sure. But Texas is run by Democrats now, Salon, your watch is ended. RIP in peace.
I’m a little hesitant to say that the death of Salon is the death of the journalism or words or the web, but its shutdown is another data point from this year pointing to a truly massive cultural shift that most internet users seem to have just accepted without really thinking through. That this was the year — and that this month was possibly the exact month — that the internet truly did successfully pivot to video. Tack on to that the fact that ChatGPT is now responsible for about 20% of the search traffic that Google is, it seems undeniable that 2026 will be looked back at as the year the internet of libraries was replaced by the internet of televisions (and, soon to be, chatbots). And in the way all elections serve as cultural checkpoints for America, this month was moment most people seemed to notice.
Parker Butler, who’s worked across a myriad of Democrat digital comms teams, argued last week that the Democrats over-performed in the midterms precisely because they knew how to command attention in this new video-first landscape. Responding to another X post about how much money Elon Musk burned on this year’s election, Butler wrote, “Many of the candidates who outperformed the most this year were ones who knew how to effectively wield organic attention.” Or, put another way, the smart Democrats made viral videos, rather than pay racists to tweet. But there are more examples we can use to back up the vibe.
... As The Verge’s Mia Sato wrote yesterday, “A ‘pivot’ feels inadequate to describe the current emphasis on social video, not just in newsrooms but in society writ large.”
I’ll be honest, it pains me to write all of this actually. And not just because I make my living writing words on the internet and don’t particularly want to make 90-second man-on-the-street videos. It’s actually because even if I did want to make 90-second man-on-the-street videos, there’s no way to do that and build a real business. Sure, you can make a lot of money with digital video, but there’s virtually no way to do that without digital-sharecropping on a platform like Facebook, Instagram, X, YouTube, or TikTok, which will never give you the actual power to be independent. The move from a text-based internet to a video-based internet is a move from an internet where you could feasibly control your own destiny to one where you will always be under thumb of a platform. An internet where no one’s famous, but everyone’s a celebrity. And that celebrity status is rented from the platform. And, yes, this is true for politicians, as well.
Americans Aren’t Spending Their Retirement Savings
When my father died, more than 20 years ago, he left my mother with a paid-off Philadelphia apartment, a modest pension, Social Security, and $1.6 million in retirement and brokerage accounts. My mother lived well, but frugally. She loved a Saturday at the boutiques but never got over waiting for a sale. She delighted in orchids but would buy them from only Trader Joe’s, where the blooms could be had for $10.99. “They last longer,” she’d argue. And once a year, she would ask me to go over her budget to make sure she was doing okay. “More than okay,” I’d tell her. My brothers and I encouraged her to spend—to take that trip, to redo that bedroom. But she limited herself to the pension and Social Security checks and the interest she was earning while refusing to touch the principal. When she passed away two years ago, she no longer had the $1.6 million my father left. She had $1.7 million.
My mother’s behavior turns out to be quite common. A landmark 2018 study by the Employee Benefit Research Institute found that the median individual with more than $500,000 in savings had, 20 years into retirement, spent just 12 percent of that sum. And a Corebridge/Greenwald Research survey of older adults with at least $100,000 showed that only 28 percent were comfortable watching their savings taper off to cover living expenses, ostensibly exactly what the money was saved for in the first place.
This is a problem—not just for retirees but for the country. Savers who forgo gratification for decades end up not enjoying the money they’ve worked so hard to set aside. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy suffers as all of that money sits under the proverbial mattress instead of being spent.
Why do retirees refuse to spend their retirement savings? One answer is fear. People worry that they’ll live too long, that inflation will rise, that a bear market will hit at the worst possible time. Another answer is habit. After decades of disciplined saving to reach a target number, flipping the switch to spending feels uncomfortable to many and just plain wrong to others. Seeing one’s number move in the opposite direction feels more like losing money than spending it.
The result is that retirement-account balances are treated like other precious items, which is to say they’re hoarded. Suzanne Shu, a marketing professor at Cornell, has studied when and how we consume things we consider special—bottles of better-than-average wine or boxes of pricey chocolate, gift certificates to favorite restaurants or spas—and found that we’re so afraid of using them too soon that we might never use them at all. The wine goes bad, the gift cards expire, and the chocolates develop that odd, whitish coating. And the retirement account goes unspent.
Since 1992, the University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study has tracked a group of 20,000 people, all over 50, through time. (New subjects are periodically added as others die or stop responding.) Every two years, these individuals and couples are questioned on a huge variety of topics related to health and retirement, including work, family, caregiving, disability, cognitive changes, divorce and widowhood, and, yes, spending. Using this data set, the researchers have identified what they call a “retirement consumption gap.” Huge numbers of retirees are spending less—sometimes far less—than they could afford to spend for the rest of their life without fear of running out. For middle-income Americans, the gap is about 8 percent, or about $8,000 a year on average. That’s a car payment, a vacation, a whole lot of dinners with friends. Wealthier retirees, meanwhile, are spending as much as 53 percent less than they could afford. A gap remains even when plans to leave a legacy or reserve money for health care are counted as spending. Bucket lists everywhere are suffering.
And so is the wider economy. We can see this by looking at pensions, which retirees tend to spend because—unlike having a lump of money sitting in a bank account—they know that another payment is coming. According to a study by the National Institute on Retirement Security, in 2022, 26 million retirees received more than $680 billion in pension benefits. As they used it for rent, groceries, vacations, home repairs, and everything else on their lists, the money in turn generated $1.5 trillion in economic impact. The funds paying out those pensions contain just more than a quarter of the money held in America’s retirement accounts. If we apply the same math and assume that every dollar used translates into $2.28 in economic activity, then $52 trillion of potential consumption is sitting in the hands of the country’s retirees, much of it not being spent.
Americans hold about $20 trillion in IRAs (most of which is held by retirees) and another $15 trillion in 401(k)s and other defined contribution plans (35 to 45 percent of which is held by retirees). According to the economists David Blanchett and Michael Finke, retired couples spend only about 50 percent of withdrawals (including mandatory distributions) from investment accounts, compared with 80 percent of guaranteed-income payments such as pensions and Social Security. In that way, the retirement consumption gap is essentially a lagging by-product of the corporate shift from pensions, which employers paid for, to 401(k)s, which employees mostly fund themselves, in the 1980s and ’90s. This transition was supercharged by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which allowed employers to automatically enroll workers in a 401(k).
My mother’s behavior turns out to be quite common. A landmark 2018 study by the Employee Benefit Research Institute found that the median individual with more than $500,000 in savings had, 20 years into retirement, spent just 12 percent of that sum. And a Corebridge/Greenwald Research survey of older adults with at least $100,000 showed that only 28 percent were comfortable watching their savings taper off to cover living expenses, ostensibly exactly what the money was saved for in the first place.
This is a problem—not just for retirees but for the country. Savers who forgo gratification for decades end up not enjoying the money they’ve worked so hard to set aside. Meanwhile, the U.S. economy suffers as all of that money sits under the proverbial mattress instead of being spent.
Why do retirees refuse to spend their retirement savings? One answer is fear. People worry that they’ll live too long, that inflation will rise, that a bear market will hit at the worst possible time. Another answer is habit. After decades of disciplined saving to reach a target number, flipping the switch to spending feels uncomfortable to many and just plain wrong to others. Seeing one’s number move in the opposite direction feels more like losing money than spending it.
The result is that retirement-account balances are treated like other precious items, which is to say they’re hoarded. Suzanne Shu, a marketing professor at Cornell, has studied when and how we consume things we consider special—bottles of better-than-average wine or boxes of pricey chocolate, gift certificates to favorite restaurants or spas—and found that we’re so afraid of using them too soon that we might never use them at all. The wine goes bad, the gift cards expire, and the chocolates develop that odd, whitish coating. And the retirement account goes unspent.
Since 1992, the University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study has tracked a group of 20,000 people, all over 50, through time. (New subjects are periodically added as others die or stop responding.) Every two years, these individuals and couples are questioned on a huge variety of topics related to health and retirement, including work, family, caregiving, disability, cognitive changes, divorce and widowhood, and, yes, spending. Using this data set, the researchers have identified what they call a “retirement consumption gap.” Huge numbers of retirees are spending less—sometimes far less—than they could afford to spend for the rest of their life without fear of running out. For middle-income Americans, the gap is about 8 percent, or about $8,000 a year on average. That’s a car payment, a vacation, a whole lot of dinners with friends. Wealthier retirees, meanwhile, are spending as much as 53 percent less than they could afford. A gap remains even when plans to leave a legacy or reserve money for health care are counted as spending. Bucket lists everywhere are suffering.
And so is the wider economy. We can see this by looking at pensions, which retirees tend to spend because—unlike having a lump of money sitting in a bank account—they know that another payment is coming. According to a study by the National Institute on Retirement Security, in 2022, 26 million retirees received more than $680 billion in pension benefits. As they used it for rent, groceries, vacations, home repairs, and everything else on their lists, the money in turn generated $1.5 trillion in economic impact. The funds paying out those pensions contain just more than a quarter of the money held in America’s retirement accounts. If we apply the same math and assume that every dollar used translates into $2.28 in economic activity, then $52 trillion of potential consumption is sitting in the hands of the country’s retirees, much of it not being spent.
Americans hold about $20 trillion in IRAs (most of which is held by retirees) and another $15 trillion in 401(k)s and other defined contribution plans (35 to 45 percent of which is held by retirees). According to the economists David Blanchett and Michael Finke, retired couples spend only about 50 percent of withdrawals (including mandatory distributions) from investment accounts, compared with 80 percent of guaranteed-income payments such as pensions and Social Security. In that way, the retirement consumption gap is essentially a lagging by-product of the corporate shift from pensions, which employers paid for, to 401(k)s, which employees mostly fund themselves, in the 1980s and ’90s. This transition was supercharged by the Pension Protection Act of 2006, which allowed employers to automatically enroll workers in a 401(k).
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The Financial Bubbles Are Getting Worse
Whatever technological changes may lie in store, the bigger picture is starting to look a lot like a movie we’ve seen before — wild promises and warnings, unusual financing arrangements and the collapse of highflying adventurers. One of our newest industries is following a highly familiar script: The A.I. build-out has become so dependent on the riskiest lending practices of Wall Street that Silicon Valley itself might now be better understood as a wild, unregulated division of the banking sector.
If you haven’t seen this movie, it usually ends in a mess: the 2008 financial crisis, or the collapse of railway mania in 1840s Britain that spurred an industrial depression, or the Panic of 1873 that caused a global catastrophe so bad they called it the Great Depression until that other one came along.
If you haven’t seen this movie, it usually ends in a mess: the 2008 financial crisis, or the collapse of railway mania in 1840s Britain that spurred an industrial depression, or the Panic of 1873 that caused a global catastrophe so bad they called it the Great Depression until that other one came along.
When financial history repeats, fatalism can be hard to resist. It is genuinely disheartening to see people pitch and fall for farcical nonsense, time after time. But our present is not simply repeating the recent past — in important ways, the cycle is getting worse.
Since the 1980s, the United States government has been subjecting more and more of the national economy to the risks of runaway finance. When any financial mania ends, the public shoulders the costs. Crushed stock markets erase savings and ravage job prospects. And when the government has to deploy taxpayer dollars to bail out, say, a major bank that got in over its skis, there’s less money around to fill the potholes, pay for the bus drivers or fund struggling schools. Almost everything working families rely on in daily life gets worse after a financial crisis, and the effects linger for decades in the form of lost earnings and family lives turned upside down by unemployment. [...]
At a time when valuations for A.I. firms like Anthropic are rising into the trillions, the American government is pouring gas on the fire. President Trump has been heralding massive A.I. spending as the economic future, before championing the coming of a “Supreme Intelligence” (since modified to “Super Intelligence,” his preferred term of art). Mr. Trump loves a soaring stock market and understands that the stock market is currently running on A.I. spirits — more than a third of the entire value of all U.S. equities is now subsumed under A.I. stocks. By late summer, tech stocks accounted for more than half the value of the S&P 500.
Not every stock market crash ends in a Great Depression, but the 1929 crash did. That experience persuaded the American government to implement a strict legal separation between financial activities and the rest of the economy — you couldn’t run a manufacturing operation that was also a bank. You couldn’t even run a bank that was also speculating in the stock market; these businesses had to be independently operated and regulated in order to isolate financial contagions, and to protect other economic sectors from the risks inherent to finance. And between the 1930s and the 1970s, this program basically worked. The catastrophic cycle of boom and bust that had plagued the American banking sector since the Civil War came to an end.
In the 1980s, however, President Ronald Reagan ushered in a fundamental redesign of the American economy. There hadn’t been a serious bank crash for decades, and Reagan was convinced that post-Depression regulations and other government red tape were to blame for the rampant inflation and grim productivity that dogged the 1970s. The marching orders were clear: Decentralize government oversight, and unleash the power of American profit.
These changes were not merely legal — they transformed the culture of the economy. For decades, bank executives had been the helpmates of heavy industry, living by the “3-6-3” mantra: borrow at 3 percent, lend at 6 percent, and hit the golf course by 3 p.m. Now they were to be masters of the universe, commanding the American economy from the skyscraper on down, disciplining bloated industry and complacent labor with the relentless drive for lower costs and higher profits. The earth-toned images of crime families and crooked cops that had dominated the late 1970s sharpened into the slicked-back icons of best sellers such as “The Bonfire of the Vanities” and “Liar’s Poker” and the director Oliver Stone’s “Wall Street.”
By the end of the 1990s, it seemed like nobody could imagine an economy pushed onward by anything other than the wolves of Wall Street. When Bill Clinton reviewed his presidential achievements in his 2004 memoir, he didn’t even mention two major financial deregulation bills he had signed into law with overwhelming bipartisan support. Finance was fundamental; financialization was just how the world worked.
The dismantling of Depression-era firewalls has predictably been accompanied by banking crises. As the 1980s turned to the 1990s, over a thousand ordinary savings and loans failed — roughly a third of the entire sector. Private equity firms had seized on new Reagan-era rules to turn these local lenders into dumping grounds for ultra-high-risk debt.
A decade later, executives at previously staid banks like Wells Fargo, Citigroup and Bank of America were enjoying new abilities to cross state lines and storm into the insurance and securities businesses. Once regional operations exploded into multisector international behemoths whose byzantine exposures were all but impossible to track, let alone manage. Even General Motors, the nation’s largest auto company, began exploiting various legal avenues to transform itself into one of the nation’s largest mortgage lenders, a move facilitated by a 1997 Utah state law allowing the company to operate its own full-fledged bank. It was an open mockery of the wall between finance and commerce that had been built after the Depression. Federal regulators looked the other way — until the financial crisis. By 2010, the U.S. Treasury had devoted $17.2 billion to rescuing G.M.’s bank, and $49.5 billion to save General Motors. Congress authorized hundreds of billions of dollars to help save the rest of the nation’s financial system, with trillions more in emergency lending from the Federal Reserve.
All of these debacles resulted in privileged insiders’ reaping enormous rewards while ordinary Americans were called in to clean up the mess. Banks dependent on public support paid out billions of dollars in bonuses to their top executives. The national unemployment rate hit 10 percent.
Financialization changed American institutions and altered the national culture of work and reward. Today, roughly one in four young men in America trades stocks on a daily basis; a similar percentage of young men gamble on a daily basis. Most of them, according to a conservative think tank, “feel like failures.” The, ahem, traditional sports betting industry in the United States scored record revenues of nearly $17 billion last year — never mind the growth of the indistinguishable activity at new sites called prediction markets, which are moving $24 billion a month globally.
Dudes have more time to trade these days: Between 1980 and 2000, the United States lost about two million manufacturing jobs. Mr. Clinton didn’t just deregulate finance; he attacked domestic industry by signing the North American Free Trade Agreement into law and welcoming China into the World Trade Organization. As a share of the U.S. economy, today’s financial sector is roughly triple the size of its post-World War II nadir — but even this figure is difficult to estimate, because so much financial activity has been subsumed into the tech world itself, with trillions of dollars in investment now hanging in the balance.
Everywhere you look in 2026, multitrillion-dollar tech companies are storming into the financial world. Meta and Apple now move funds for digital shoppers around the world, while Amazon and Apple pitch credit cards. Nvidia, the country’s largest computer chip manufacturer, is also a major lender to the A.I. industry and its insatiable hunger for cash, approving $500 billion worth of partnerships with big banks and private equity firms. Nvidia doesn’t just make and sell the chips that power the A.I. revolution. It also invests in the data centers that power the technology, and is partnering with OpenAI and other A.I. developers to provide hundreds of billions of dollars in additional financing for still more A.I.-related projects.
Nvidia is even in talks with insurance companies to insure these loans against default. This should sound familiar: In the early 2000s, big banks turned to the insurer A.I.G. to protect themselves against losses on risky mortgage bonds. But when home prices crashed, A.I.G. collapsed, risking the viability of Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Wells Fargo and others. Insurance did not alleviate financial risk — it loaded an extra layer of financial risk atop the market, amplifying dangers rather than reducing them. [...]
Nvidia isn’t propping up the sector alone. A multitrillion-dollar sub-industry of “private credit” — a term of art for loans made beyond the purview of traditional financial regulations — has ballooned at the nation’s largest banks and private equity firms. And this shadow market just happens to specialize in hard-to-value projects related to A.I. and data centers.
The candle is burning from both ends. Wealthy individuals are increasingly relying on tech stocks as collateral for loans that are propping up our economy — loans to buy real estate, or cars, or even more tech stocks. A tech blowup could thus easily disrupt lending to other sectors of the economy: Mess with either the A.I. build-out or its increasingly fragile financial underpinnings, and both will be in trouble. They are already in many respects the same entity. [...]
This is probably going to hurt all of us, and managing the fallout from a crash is as much art as science. How we ought to structure the economy going forward, however, has been clear since the Great Depression: Don’t let big business merge with big finance. Our government needs to hold big tech and big finance accountable for operating deeply uncertain businesses with vast public consequences. We need smaller, simpler tech companies that support American industry rather than dominating it.
A.I. optimists tend to spend a lot of time talking about how the technology will cure cancer or end poverty — an acknowledgment that A.I. is a means to other advances that actually matter to people. If you follow the money, however, Silicon Valley is far more focused on generating more computing power, in the belief, held by some, that it will give A.I. superhuman abilities that will fix all of our problems. Not everyone agrees with that belief. Major A.I. executives can’t even agree on what A.I. is. (Most do seem to agree that they should not be liable for crimes committed with their new tools.)
Image: Danielle Del Plato
[ed. Nice summary. Especially for those who still worship Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. As David Byrne would say "Well, how did I get here"? Capitalism baby, (unfettered, under-regulated) capitalism. And politics.]
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Sunday, November 15, 2026
A Residence of 21 Years in the Sandwich Islands
A Residence Of 21 Years In The Sandwich Islands
In October 1819, my grandmother’s grandfather’s grandfather, Hiram Bingham I, stood with his wife, Sybil, and his friends outside Park Street Church in Boston and bade farewell to family before venturing into the unknown. They would spend the next five months on a cramped ship sailing to a foreign land of strange people, full of “destitution, degradation, and barbarism.” They did not know if they would ever return to America.
Unlike others who voyaged out to sea, they were not whalers, nor merchants trying to make a quick profit. Instead, their goal was far more ambitious: to uplift an entire nation out of heathenry to civilization. Or as Hiram wrote, to “most effectually and most extensively promote the Redeemer’s cause with the means that are put into our hands”.
I first came across Hiram’s memoir, A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands, on my honeymoon to the Hawaiian Islands last summer. I had vague knowledge of a family connection to the area, and decided to do some research into it. As I started reading, I had a growing sense of deja vu as I recognized my own patterns of thinking in Hiram’s words. [...]
The Twenty-One Year Honeymoon
In many ways, the islands of Hawaii are a paradise on Earth, but to the missionaries who knew them as the Sandwich Islands, they were a savage place. These islanders, after all, had killed Captain Cook just 40 years ago. From 1782 to 1810, the nation was ravaged by war. King Kamehameha I, adopting Western military technology such as gunpowder, forcefully unified the islands into a single kingdom and suppressed potential rivals.
A young boy, Opukaha’ia, was left an orphan by Kamehameha’s warriors, who killed his father, mother, and infant brother. With nothing left for him in Hawaii, he joined the crew of a passing ship, and eventually made his way to New England, where he converted to Christianity and befriended theology students at Yale and Andover. Opukaha’ia described his native Hawaii as a land in need of salvation, and the local ministers decided to send a mission to spread the Gospel and the light of civilization. Opukaha’ia would return to Hawaii with the missionaries and serve as a translator. [...]
Hiram Bingham, a student at Andover Seminary, heard Opukaha’ia’s call to aid the Hawaiians. Born October 30, 1789, Hiram was one of the thirteen children of a Congregational deacon, Calvin Bingham. Although his parents had wanted Hiram to take over the family farm and care for them in old age, Hiram felt his duty to God was greater, and convinced his parents to allow him to study for the ministry. In Hiram’s own words, “Christ undoubtedly requires all his followers to bear their cross, and to forego or forsake whatever comes in competition with rendering him the highest service”. But service to God was not a gloomy undertaking; instead, it was accomplished “with joyful hearts and grateful praise.”
Hiram truly felt the commandment to “love thy neighbor”, and for him, the 130,000 native Hawaiians on the other side of the globe were neighbors just as much as the inhabitants of his hometown in Vermont. Thus, Hiram was eager to become a missionary as soon as he had finished his studies.
Unfortunately, during preparations for the mission, Opukaha’ia fell ill and died. Still, the plan went ahead. As Hiram writes, a good Christian must “extend the influence of the Gospel, because Christ requires it, rather than because of his own engagement. To know, to be qualified, to have opportunity, constitute the special call to do good.” Parents and relatives urged the missionaries not to go, but Hiram saw things differently: somebody had to and no one else would.
There was just one problem: Hiram needed a wife. Sending a young single man to a land of licentious heathens was asking for trouble, and therefore only married couples were allowed to be missionaries. Thus, after being ordained as a Congregational minister, Hiram proposed marriage to Sybil Moseley, a woman he had met at the ordination ceremony just twelve days earlier. Fortunately, she accepted, and later that month, the couple was on a ship bound for Hawaii — not as a two-week honeymoon, but as a mission that would last twenty-one years.
A Fortuitous Arrival
After a sea voyage of 18,000 miles, during which Hiram and Sybil’s first child was conceived, the missionaries spotted the peak of Mauna Kea on the morning of March 30, 1820. Five months after departure, the sight was exhilarating: the work of spreading Christianity, literacy, and civilization was finally at hand.
There was just one important restriction, put in place by the American missionary board: absolutely no meddling in the politics of the natives.
In October 1819, my grandmother’s grandfather’s grandfather, Hiram Bingham I, stood with his wife, Sybil, and his friends outside Park Street Church in Boston and bade farewell to family before venturing into the unknown. They would spend the next five months on a cramped ship sailing to a foreign land of strange people, full of “destitution, degradation, and barbarism.” They did not know if they would ever return to America.
Unlike others who voyaged out to sea, they were not whalers, nor merchants trying to make a quick profit. Instead, their goal was far more ambitious: to uplift an entire nation out of heathenry to civilization. Or as Hiram wrote, to “most effectually and most extensively promote the Redeemer’s cause with the means that are put into our hands”.
I first came across Hiram’s memoir, A Residence of Twenty-One Years in the Sandwich Islands, on my honeymoon to the Hawaiian Islands last summer. I had vague knowledge of a family connection to the area, and decided to do some research into it. As I started reading, I had a growing sense of deja vu as I recognized my own patterns of thinking in Hiram’s words. [...]
The Twenty-One Year Honeymoon
In many ways, the islands of Hawaii are a paradise on Earth, but to the missionaries who knew them as the Sandwich Islands, they were a savage place. These islanders, after all, had killed Captain Cook just 40 years ago. From 1782 to 1810, the nation was ravaged by war. King Kamehameha I, adopting Western military technology such as gunpowder, forcefully unified the islands into a single kingdom and suppressed potential rivals.
A young boy, Opukaha’ia, was left an orphan by Kamehameha’s warriors, who killed his father, mother, and infant brother. With nothing left for him in Hawaii, he joined the crew of a passing ship, and eventually made his way to New England, where he converted to Christianity and befriended theology students at Yale and Andover. Opukaha’ia described his native Hawaii as a land in need of salvation, and the local ministers decided to send a mission to spread the Gospel and the light of civilization. Opukaha’ia would return to Hawaii with the missionaries and serve as a translator. [...]
Hiram Bingham, a student at Andover Seminary, heard Opukaha’ia’s call to aid the Hawaiians. Born October 30, 1789, Hiram was one of the thirteen children of a Congregational deacon, Calvin Bingham. Although his parents had wanted Hiram to take over the family farm and care for them in old age, Hiram felt his duty to God was greater, and convinced his parents to allow him to study for the ministry. In Hiram’s own words, “Christ undoubtedly requires all his followers to bear their cross, and to forego or forsake whatever comes in competition with rendering him the highest service”. But service to God was not a gloomy undertaking; instead, it was accomplished “with joyful hearts and grateful praise.”
Hiram truly felt the commandment to “love thy neighbor”, and for him, the 130,000 native Hawaiians on the other side of the globe were neighbors just as much as the inhabitants of his hometown in Vermont. Thus, Hiram was eager to become a missionary as soon as he had finished his studies.
Unfortunately, during preparations for the mission, Opukaha’ia fell ill and died. Still, the plan went ahead. As Hiram writes, a good Christian must “extend the influence of the Gospel, because Christ requires it, rather than because of his own engagement. To know, to be qualified, to have opportunity, constitute the special call to do good.” Parents and relatives urged the missionaries not to go, but Hiram saw things differently: somebody had to and no one else would.
There was just one problem: Hiram needed a wife. Sending a young single man to a land of licentious heathens was asking for trouble, and therefore only married couples were allowed to be missionaries. Thus, after being ordained as a Congregational minister, Hiram proposed marriage to Sybil Moseley, a woman he had met at the ordination ceremony just twelve days earlier. Fortunately, she accepted, and later that month, the couple was on a ship bound for Hawaii — not as a two-week honeymoon, but as a mission that would last twenty-one years.
A Fortuitous Arrival
After a sea voyage of 18,000 miles, during which Hiram and Sybil’s first child was conceived, the missionaries spotted the peak of Mauna Kea on the morning of March 30, 1820. Five months after departure, the sight was exhilarating: the work of spreading Christianity, literacy, and civilization was finally at hand.
There was just one important restriction, put in place by the American missionary board: absolutely no meddling in the politics of the natives.
by Anonymous, Astral Codex Ten | Read more:
Image: An old family portrait of Hiram and his six brothers taken sometime 1854-1860. Bottom row: Asa, Amos, Calvin, Luther. Top row: Hiram, Stephen, David. Not pictured were his six sisters.
***
[ed. What a crew. I used to drive Bingham St. in Honolulu often, to visit my girlfriend.]
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