But politicization entails much more than the parties dividing on policies. Politicization has now gone beyond shaping many Americans’ stances on issues or even their cultural tastes, to shaping who they are — whom they date (and
marry and
befriend), what communities they join, what religious faiths they profess, what life-and-death choices they make.
In the last several decades or so, more Americans have
sorted or
changed their views on
many disparate policies — for instance, on
immigration,
abortion,
war,
climate,
gender, and
crime — to better fit with their identities as Democrats or Republicans. Views on abortion, so deeply tied to one’s moral intuitions, provide a
dramatic example. In the early 1970s, Republicans were about as likely as Democrats to agree in the NORC/University of Chicago General Social Survey that it should be possible for “a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if she is married and does not want any more children.” Fifty years later, overall American opinion had not changed, but Republican support for such abortions had dropped by about 20 percentage points and Democratic support had increased by about 15 points; abortion had become a defining party issue. Similarly, in 1997 members of the two parties had, as recorded by a Gallup poll, the same level of concern about whether the effects of global warming had begun; by 2021, there was a
53-point gap between increasingly worried Democrats and increasingly sanguine Republicans.
One way this polarization could happen is that people switched parties to fit their evolving views on subjects such as abortion or the climate. Some of that surely happened. But much research shows that people as or more often switched their views to fit their political identity. This shows up in studies that follow people over several years and find that people often change their positions on a substantive topic after they first change their political affiliation, having adopted the new affiliation perhaps because of political events unrelated to that topic or because of new personal circumstances such as a marriage, a new job, or a new neighborhood. In other words, to follow the abortion example, many became Republicans (perhaps because of racial beliefs or new friends) and then became pro-life.
Increasingly, even survey respondents’ reports of what is real, such as whether the economy is
getting better or
worse or whether
inequality is growing, vary by party. Party has become so important that opinions on how much racial discrimination exists now
differ more between Democrats and Republicans than between Black people and white people; views
of income inequality differ more by party than by individuals’ incomes.
Political position has come, for more Americans, to
connect with all
sorts of tastes far beyond government policy— e.g., listening to Kid Rock or Beyoncé, going to museums or playing golf, watching
Curb Your Enthusiasm or
Antiques Roadshow. Consumption as political signaling — for example,
coffee branded by
political affiliation — has been vividly demonstrated in (my own) Berkeley, California: First, high rates of
Tesla ownership displaying climate liberalism (as well as displaying a healthy bank account), and then high rates of
protests against Tesla, displaying DOGE-fighting liberalism.
Some of this politicization might be dismissed as simply posturing, owning the libs, or what pollsters call “
expressive responding.” But the politicization goes deeper than that.
Party affiliation seems to increasingly determine, and not just reflect, Americans’ important personal decisions. Much of the discussion about “
affective polarization” — that more Democrats and Republicans nowadays
actually hate the other side — started with a
study reporting that more Americans were displeased in 2010 than were in 1960 with the prospect of gaining a son- or daughter-in-law of a different party. Years later, many single Americans
rule out dating someone with differing political views.
A
2020 survey found that about half of both Democrats and Republicans have intimate social networks made up exclusively of people who share their politics. Survey respondents often see
more agreement with the people in their lives than
actually exists, but nonetheless, this homogeneity is substantial and
has increased. (Social homogeneity, in turn,
encourages partisanship and hostility.)
Such political homogeneity results in part from who
individuals choose to spend time with and who they choose to avoid. Strong partisans
prefer to be with the like-minded and to
avoid conversations with the unlike-minded. And they tend to
drop friends (not so much family)
who disagree with them politically. By
one estimate, 15 percent of Americans “have ended a friendship over politics.” Political homogeneity also results in part
from the influence of family, friends, and
neighbors to
conform to their views.
Political identity affects people in less explicit ways, too. Americans have
increasingly segregated themselves
geographically — not primarily because they are seeking neighbors who are fellow party members, although some of
that is going on, but because the reasons people move — or decide
not to move — increasingly
connect with party. Those, for example, who like large houses and big yards tend to end up in red neighborhoods, while those who like to walk to local amenities tend to end up in blue neighborhoods. Both ways, party and neighborhood have become more linked. A 2021
study concluded that many “voters live with virtually no [local] exposure to voters from the other party.”
Yet more striking, Americans have increasingly lined up what they profess religiously to fit what they profess politically. Religion and politics have long been entangled in the United States — in 19th-century fights over alcohol prohibition, Sunday postal service, and which version of the Bible should be read in public schools, for instance; this was Americans’ faith driving their politics. For about 30 years now, politics have been joining
with religion and, importantly,
political identity is driving expressions of faith.
It first became clear in the 2000s that those identifying as Democrats, liberals, and moderates were
leaving organized religion and describing themselves as
having no religion (as “nones”) in great part as a reaction against what they saw as the conservative politicization of the church, especially on lifestyle issues.
Then, evidence in the last decade or so accumulated that more conservatives were starting to
profess faith, especially evangelical faith, probably for mirror-image reasons: to reject the secularism associated with liberal positions such as supporting gender transition. Ryan Burge, the dynamo researcher of
Graphs about Religion, suggested to me that the recent leveling off of the growth of “nones” might be explained by conservatives’ view that non-affiliation had “become so linked to left-wing politics.” These conservatives “are functionally non-religious… but they still can’t bear to not ID as Christian on a survey.” That political affiliation has
come to alter a significant number of Americans’ religious identities is profound testimony to the politicization of many Americans’ lives.
And then there is politics’ connection to life-and-death decisions. As might be expected, left and right differ on many health-related matters —
childhood vaccines,
cancer preventatives, and the dangers of
tackle football, for example. But left and right also differ in health behavior, from
diet, such as
how much meat people eat, to
exercise. One result is that residents of red counties more often tend to be
obese than residents of blue counties, even taking into account race, poverty, and education.
The most tragic example was the
Covid-19 pandemic. People in red states, where the vaccines were most resisted, died
at higher rates than those in blue states;
individual Republicans died at higher rates than individual Democrats. Hundreds of thousands of deaths can likely be attributed to political identity.
So what happened?Seventy years ago, gender, race, and region determined Americans’ lifestyles, fortunes, and identities more than they do now; educational attainment and, increasingly, politics have become the key answer for many people to who they are.
by Claude S. Fischer, Vox |