Showing posts with label Relationships. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Relationships. Show all posts

Saturday, July 4, 2026

What is the United States of America Now?

The United States of America is a truck that has driven into a ditch. The United States of America is a program that has been hacked. The United States of America is ... so many things, horrific and magnificent, good and evil, promising and cursed, as it approaches its quarter millennium mark. I say it as though the US was one thing, but it is a thousand things.

It is the masked ICE agent shooting Renee Good while standing up for immigrants, but it is also Good herself and the immigrants, and the streets of Minneapolis and their Dakota and Ojibwe Indigenous past – and present and future. The US before 1865 was slaveowners, but it was also the enslaved and the abolitionists.

The US is the KKK and the ACLU and the NAACP, right-to-life terrorists and Planned Parenthood security guards. It is Chevron and Exxon and one of the world’s first environmental organizations, the Sierra Club, founded in San Francisco in 1892, and the thousands of environmental, environmental justice, and climate groups right now. It is its contradictions, its conflicts.

It is 340 million people, including almost 2 million prisoners, a population larger than 12 US states (which has long made me think that prison can be imagined as the 51st state, one with virtually no representation).

It is a country where guns outnumber people, and a country that produced nonviolent resistance’s most lyrical advocate, Martin Luther King Jr, who was shot on a balcony of a motel in Memphis.

King is said to have come out to the balcony of the motel to greet jazz musician Ben Branch, whose rendition of the song Precious Lord King loved. It is the country that gave the world jazz and blue jeans and atom bombs and the birth control pill; it is its best and its worst people and products.

At its heart the US has always been an experiment, an argument, and a question with countless answers, which is to say it was never and will never be one thing, even if it has one federal government that is currently a catastrophic crime scene. It is tempting to make the current White House a metaphor for the country.

Currently, one third of the people’s house built under Roosevelt has been wrecked and carted away, leaving an open wound visible in aerial photographs, its rose garden built up by Jacqueline Kennedy has been paved over, its lawn recently covered with a glitzy Thunderdome gladiatorial arena in which toxic masculinity would fight itself.

But he is not the country. The United States is the 77 million adult citizens who voted for him, the 75 million who voted for Harris, and the nearly 90 million who didn’t vote, and it’s also all the children, noncitizens, prisoners and former prisoners who are not part of that voting population.

It is the land itself from the maple and birch forests of the north-east to the glaciers of Alaska to the tropical rainforests of Hawaii, with a lot of prairie, swamp and desert in between. That land was here in various configuration not for millions but billions of years before 1776, and it will be here long after the US has ceased to exist, because cease it must at some point, and so must the human race.

The US is the desert tortoises who have been ambling through versions of the Mojave deserts of what is now California, Nevada and Arizona for 60m years and the people who strove to create the protected lands in which they may survive a little longer.

But the question at hand is the US at 250 and its possible futures. One thing about this wildly diverse country’s future is certain: it will become a non-white majority country in a couple of decades, and there is nothing that Stephen Miller and the other white nationalists can do about it.

Earlier this year, I was struck by the valiant, idealistic, dedicated young people who one after the other came into the spotlight. We only came to know Renee Good, 37, shot on 7 January, and Alex Pretti, also 37, shot on 24 January, through their willingness to face death for what they believed in and who they believed matters.

But another young person came into power on New Year’s Day of 2026, while they were still alive, Zohran Mamdani, age 34. He beat the odds and the status quo and all the money behind Andrew Cuomo (who’s been accused of sexual assault), to become mayor – the city’s first Muslim mayor – of this country’s biggest city as he spoke up for the all the marginalized and minority populations that make New York City what it is.

On 8 February, despite rightwing outcries, Bad Bunny, age 32, took the Super Bowl stage and put on a halftime show that was a celebration – in Spanish – of his beloved Puerto Rico, of the musical traditions that converge in his songs, and the huge spectacle he staged was striking for the range of its performers, and for his insistence on his version of America, a generous joyous multilingualone, an America in which anyone can dance with anyone else.

Later that month, Oakland’s own Alysa Liu, daughter of a refugee from China, won the figure-skating gold at the Olympics with a performance whose freedom and joy cast a shadow over virtually all other figure skating before her victory on 19 February. [...]

These were not typical Americans, but like the 8 million people who showed up for the No Kings demonstration on 28 March, they were Americans. No Kings was unprecedented in sheer size as well as in how the protests took place in every single congressional district in the country. I said the US is a perpetual question; these lives and these performances were demonstrations of the answers some of us have given and some of us have cheered.

I do not believe that Trump will destroy the US, but he has badly broken it, and what comes after has to include consequences for the criminals and a massive clean-up operation. There will be no return to how things were, and we must go ahead by fixing what allowed this destruction to happen.

by Rebecca Solnit, The Guardian |  Read more:
Image: Mario Tama/Getty
[ed. For a more optimistic view: America Should Love Itself Again (Common Reader).]

Monday, June 29, 2026

Choosing Penelope

Riley and I were married on a Saturday in a small Los Angeles church.

We had only been engaged for a month when, at the counsel of our close friend, we decided to have the wedding in three weeks, right before we planned to move away from LA to live in a small town in Louisiana, where I was born and raised.

Initially, the wedding was going to be an incredibly humble affair. I pictured us and a couple of friends in the first few pews. To our surprise, three weeks later, with the nearly-free and movie-montage-esque help of friends and family, eighty-something people showed up (some from clear across the country) at the behest of a mass text that said what amounted to “I know you probably can’t make it, but…”

It was a strange and beautiful wedding, not least because it was also a goodbye. It was a little like the final episode of a beloved sitcom. Also, thirty minutes before the wedding, I was helping my groomsmen clear away shelves of Narcan and lube for the homeless program in the very room where our reception was going to be about an hour later. This is that sort of perfect memory that arises from unplannable imperfection that no amount of time or money can reproduce.

Pronounced man and wife, we ran outside to be showered in rice. Cars horns erupted and windows rolled down to release pumping fists. People just can’t help it, possessed by the spirit of a cloud of cheering witnesses.

My argument for marriage starts and ends with that image. Even jaded LA people sitting in traffic automatically know a good thing when they see it, before they can rationalize their way into thinking something else. Generally, language makes us into casuists, able to twist ourselves into believing whatever helps us avoid the pain of making a permanent choice. Automatic responses remind us what we really must think and what should be attuned to with gentle attention. That’s a long way of saying why we know stories are truer than data.

Speaking of The Data, it suggests the opposite of happily ever after. Divorce is more than likely. My parents got divorced. That whole ordeal nearly ruined me. But the end of my parents’ marriage being catastrophic did not convince me it was a poor institution. If anything, it made me think that the force of the catastrophe could only be produced in the destruction of something good. What kept me living the bachelor’s life into my 30’s was not fear of repeating my parents’ mistakes; it was the lie of eternity promised in fleeting relationships. It was Swiping’s Lie: hookup culture and the corporate hustle that we all know is its conjoined twin.

In The Odyssey, Odysseus is held captive on an island after the Trojan war. Holding him there is the goddess, Calypso promising him eternal life, eternal youth and eternal sex. This is the image of hookup culture, in case you thought it was something new. It’s the age-old promise of never having to grow up—the ability to continuously find newness and youth in others and to therefore renew the youth in yourself. You can easily imagine how a man like Great Odysseus would be tempted to rest on his laurels. The dream of Calypso, after all, is only available to those brave, chosen few men who have risen to the top of the hierarchy. She, then, is the spirit within the droves of young women who would share a hero instead of settling for a man. That image is also still alive and well. Think of DiCaprio. It’s maybe not a coincidence that you might also picture him on an island with his girls, or a yacht at least.

The first part of a man’s life is occupied by the desire to become worthy of Calypso’s island. For Odysseus, that took place in The Iliad. Once the war is over and he is well-known as a brave man, the rules change. The very desire that drove him away from Ithaca to go on a grand adventure now threatens to keep him trapped on an island of his rewards. What the gods conspire to inject in him now is a new kind of courage: the courage to choose his eventual grave. The temptations against this odyssey are great: Calypso is more beautiful than any mortal woman could ever be (because she is the essence of youth and beauty itself, expressed only in part and at times in individual women). His wife back home, Penelope, though very beautiful, does not compare to Calypso. Worse, she will quickly become old and ugly and tired, like Odysseus himself would, if he left the island.

He chooses Penelope. He chooses to go home. And he is punished for the length of the novel as a test of the graveness of that choice.

Riley and I had a strangely old-fashioned wedding, which was made even more strange by its setting in the infinitely hip neighborhood of Silverlake. An artist friend of ours, who, in my opinion, is very hip indeed, said the aesthetic was cool, almost “gothic.” I liked that. Riley’s antique dress made her look like the Virgin Mary. Mine was a navy-issued, double-breasted felt wool suit, authentic from the 50’s. We’ve joked that we should have done it real old-fashioned and gotten married in our own graves.

What’s romantic about a wedding is not the passing promise to pretend we’ll feel puppy-love for each other for the rest of our lives (e.g. “You’re my person”). Or else the even-sadder and more common promise to always watch TV together, as if we know all adventure is over and we have firmly settled for less than we once dreamed of. What’s romantic about a wedding are the parts modern weddings cut out or downplay: the “til’ death” part. That’s not to be morbid. The opposite. Given that we both have the choice to stay on the proverbial island with Calypso—forever looking for something new and better—we both look each other in the eyes and choose our eventual decay. We’re going home. As a result of this sacrifice there are no immediate riches; storms will rage and probably a cyclops will try to eat us, but we are going home to be with each other, come hell or high water.

People love romantic love, especially when it breaks rules, because it has no “why.” The moment you put a “why” on love—economic reasons, reasons of convenience, or because you’ve finally accepted that you just can’t do any better—it dies. So people yearn for the reckless and reasonless love they think can only be found outside the bounds of marriage. They have associated marriage with necessity, and cannot conceive of any other way it could be. [...]

The number one reason young people give for not getting married is money. It seems likely to me that this is a convenient substitute for the real reason. If you have enough money, after all, it can make commitments go away when they become inconvenient. Money makes kids go away when they annoy you. It can even get you a younger wife down the line, which is to say that money makes for a false sacrifice. At the same time, people damn well know they shouldn’t stay in Calypso’s cave forever. They sense they will wake up one day as an old child and with either no children or estranged ones, but they lack the courage to choose Penelope outright. So they try to have it both ways: to keep the island as a backup plan. We can all guess what half-measures avail us.

Speaking of money, it shocked Riley and I how much people wanted to help us once we announced we were getting married. Dozens of people worked for free to make our wedding happen in less than three weeks. There is an old Italian saying that married couples always have bread under their arm, which, you could argue (cynically), is just a way to encourage poor people to get married. It has proved to be incredibly true for us.

As a man, it has also been incredibly humbling. Had I continued searching for more and more ways to win friends and accumulate resources before I got married, it may have never taught me that provision is better gained as a gift received than something to be wrestled from a hostile world. Marrying a woman taught me what women know intuitively: that the world wants to help you. When I was still a single man, the sentiment was more like that it hated me. And it did, in the sense that young men, unlike young women, have to prove their worth. Joining flesh with a woman means that my personal war against the Trojans is over. That courage is not wasted, it has just outlived its usefulness and it’s time for me to develop a new kind of courage. The kind that takes me home. [...]

Unconsciously, also, Riley and I originally moved to LA looking for a king to serve: a big Hollywood king who could bestow power and fame on us if we pushed the correct sycophantic buttons. From that high place, we dreamed, perhaps, our king would die (or something equally fortuitous) and then maybe we would be king. This is the unspoken language of the American dream. We, of course, unlike every other person who has ever existed before us, would use our power for good, our world uncorrupted by our slobbering pursuit of pleasing those corrupt kings we claim to despise. Articulating it like this makes it plain to me now that this plan doesn’t even work in theory, much less in practice. It is also plain to me that we were on a pathway of likely-forever frustrated mediocrity because our spirits were at odds—we wanted what we also hated. And a house divided cannot stand. If we had managed to fully abandon ourselves to our ambitions (which some do manage with the help of some mixture of new age sorcery and hard drugs) we would have been so spiritually mangled that our fates would be something worse than death. What does a man gain if he gets the whole world but sacrifices his soul?

I can forgive myself (a little) because patterns like these usually can’t be apprehended from within. Perspective is required. Waking perception can’t see the forest for the trees, so we sometimes have visions or dreams. These are vague, counterintuitive, and don’t play by the rules of the game you are currently fixated on. So, most people ignore them, most of the time. We also have lost most of our sophisticated language to understand visions or dreams, seeing it all as arbitrary or unscientific. The language didn’t go completely away (it can’t), so it just became unhelpfully simplistic. We’ve settled for, “Follow your dreams,” which now means something like, “Get what you already think you want at any cost and ignore any subconscious warnings against that, especially in the form of other people (aka ‘haters’)” when it probably ought to indicate something more like, “Do that thing you have a strange sense you should do, where people also seem to want you around, even if you lose whatever you once thought was important to you.”

Riley and I found each other in LA as the former type of dream follower. Funnily, though, we met each other as a direct result of a small act of the latter type of dreaming. For in the midst of all our big dreams in LA, we had both followed a still small voice to go to that little church down the street. It was uncomfortable to keep going, I now realize, because it was at odds with the larger part of our spirit that was looking for a good earthly king to serve. But we just kept showing up and volunteering at the food pantry. Right outside of that church was where I first broke the news: “I think we like each other.” And with that, old dreams began to lose their power and new, strange, and humble dreams started to crowd in.

I have to remind myself, that although what I’m trying to do here is make some sense out of all this, there are aspects that go plainly beyond sense. I doubt I will ever recover them with language. One example would be the dream that led me here in the first place, another would be my wife’s exceptional character in the face of these circumstances. For context, she is not just some aspiring actress from LA who, on some level, wanted an excuse to leave the thankless grind behind. She filmed a movie this year and was part of a Disney project last year. She had every concrete reason to stay in Hollywood. She left only because of my weird dream. Now that we’re here and living in the old house, I am the one who is much more likely to forget the dream and fret over some concern of status. Or worry that she doesn’t want to be here because there are too many blighted and abandoned homes on our street. She is usually the one to remind me why we are here: to be involved with people and to do what we are told. This is a special place. There is real history here, and that’s part of it, but what I find remarkable about the town is its aliveness and relative beauty in spite of its total lack of economics. Once you dig a bit, you realize that this town is kept alive only by the good will of a few wealthy families who care about the community. [...]

It also keeps us attuned to how our broader environment may be shaping our inner environment. We notice, for example, that to the extent there is unexplored territory in the house—places filled with dust and cobwebs—there is also unexplored territory in the mind. It is important, then, to intentionally clean every corner of the house, slowly and consciously, literally getting your fingers in every nook and cranny. While you do that, your psychology changes. You master the domain and your nervous system regulates to a more calm, resting state. Until the motions are embodied physically and dramatically, the cobwebs remain also in the marriage. This is not to say dust and cobwebs should be eradicated. Just that the opportunity of their maintenance should be perceived as a privilege rather than the terrifying indication of inevitable decay they are usually seen as. In fact, the modern compulsion to eschew all signs of rust incur an ever-increasing debt that I, at least in this phase of my life, am no longer willing to subsidize my time to afford. I’m thinking of clean, glassy, modern architecture; I once heard someone joke about that sort of place—I can’t remember who said it or where I read it—that those places would be perfect if it wasn’t for all the people in them. The cost is not just in the anti-people aesthetic (which brings a psychic cost probably higher than anyone reckons), but the literal salaries of uncountable maintenance, janitorial, and security people, all built into the ever-increasing hours demanded of the email workers inside. And all that for what? To avoid looking at some dirt, to avoid the realization that you were once that dirt and are quickly becoming it again. And by avoiding those realizations, our resilience to them gets lower, and so we erect even more walls and glass to keep it more securely away, and the cost of it all rises and rises and so we are forced to work our email jobs for longer and longer hours while someone else, also paid for with more and more working hours, makes life-long memories with our children in our stead. You start to think that a little dirt is a small price to pay for freedom. [...]

By choosing Riley, I have made the decision to leave the island of Calypso forever. I went home, in my case both figuratively and literally. That means we have both sacrificed the illusion of eternal youth and have intentionally chosen to have kids, make a home, get old and ugly together, and then eventually die. By making the choice in full consciousness, I feel that I have received a better kind of eternity in exchange.

by James Taylor Foreman, The Metaphor |  Read more:
Image: Anthony Frederick Augustus Sandys (1829-1904), Penelope

We Were Promised Sex Robots

Neil McArthur was sure we'd have sex robots by now. The University of Manitoba philosophy professor has spent over a decade studying sex tech. In 2019, when he went to the AVN Adult Entertainment Expo, the industry's largest annual conference, he saw robots with tough, tire-like skin that couldn't walk and spoke more jaggedly than early versions of Siri. When he returned in 2024, well into the LLM boom, he thought, "Things have to have come a long way."

They hadn't. The robots' skin and speech were still unrealistic, and they couldn't move around the conference floor. What was new, though, were several Chinese companies had arrived. (Their founders were invariably young men; one was so young his mom was there, hovering in the background, McArthur says.) As with AI, electric vehicles, and several other tech sectors, China's entrance into the sex robots market had knocked down the price point. Whereas American-made sex robots from the 2010s hype cycle typically started at around $7,000 and quickly exceeded $10,000, some Chinese manufacturers sell sex robots at around $3,000. "The technology had gotten cheaper, but not better," McArthur says.

Several of the Chinese sex doll producers I reached out to did not respond to emails, including VMDoll and IronTech. Others seemed to have AI bots operating their WhatsApp messages. Eventually, I reached Stella Lau, a sales director for Jiggly Joy, a doll manufacturer based in Guangdong province with 160 employees. Lau, 32, has worked for Jiggly Joy for seven years, long before the company released its first AI robot in February.

Jiggly Joy's new model has all the classic features of a sex robot — Lau is one of many merchants who hyped up the "sucking vagina," a suction-and-release pump system — plus it could smile, talk, and wave. It also has a blonde bombshell haircut and can turn its neck like M3GAN. The robot still cannot walk, but that's mostly for safety reasons, Lau says; she's too heavy. The company has been selling about 21 AI dolls a month at $3,000, Lau says. Most of the buyers are American; they're either former sex doll users or lonely and wanted someone to talk to, Lau says.

I also reached a representative for Formosa Doll, a 5-person Hong Kong-based distributor that works exclusively with Chinese sex doll companies. (He asked for anonymity to protect his privacy.) He says AI sex robots are "underdeveloped" and not ready for sale. For one, some doll head prototypes removed the oral sucking motors from the mouth to make space for the AI voice. Trading sucking for talking, he says, is a "big downside."

Voice AI can also be unpredictable and unruly, and sex doll users may be used to making up role-play scenarios in their heads — scenarios they have full control over. That makes him skeptical that AI robots would sell well. "People want an experience, they want to satisfy a fantasy," he says. "People don't want something at home that talks."

The Western market, meanwhile, has mostly flattened out. I tried to contact four of the sex doll makers featured in articles in the 2010s hype cycle. My emails bounced, and my calls went to disconnected numbers.

The only company remaining from the late 2010s appears to be RealDoll, which is now spinning off from the publicly traded Realbotix. The independent RealDoll will be led by Sue Ennis, who started as president of Realbotix the day before our chat. She has big plans, repeating four times that the company would be the "Apple store of intimacy technology."

The robots are built and selling; RealDoll was shipping out 12 as we speak, Ennis tells me. (It's generally a low-revenue business: Realbotix, whose humanoids are also used in healthcare and corporate training settings, reported $353,037 in Q1 earnings.) They have AI voices, AI vaginas, and proprietary skin technology that's also sold to burn victims. Still, the dolls remain very heavy and lack mobility. Some customers take their dolls out on dates. "The dolls are definitely not walking into the theater," Ennis says. "They're being wheeled in."

If the sex robot revolution does happen, it may spread through specialization.

Most of the current AI robots look the same: blonde, skinny, hourglass-shaped. The sex doll underclass is growing more diverse, though. Elves were popular at Formosa Doll, as was Judy Hopps from the "Zootopia" movies. "Goblin dolls are a really hot trend now," Formosa's rep tells me. Consumers don't want generic sexbots; they want their sexbot.

Porn stars are an easy way in. Fans spend thousands in tips to their favorite OnlyFans models. Some are finding that they're willing to spend even more to see them in the (artificial) flesh. Cliff Jensen, a 37-year-old award-winning porn star and OnlyFans model, says his fans want to date him, to prank their friends with him, and to make him take it up the bum. "They've always wanted me to bottom, and I never have," he says.

I meet Jensen at his rep's apartment in Silver Lake, California. We sit side-by-side on the couch, a clutter-filled table with joints and doughnuts in front of us. The big chair is reserved for his sex doll doppelgänger, which he heaved in from his trunk. Jensen is upset; the previous owner, it seemed, had stuffed the sex doll in a closet and piled things on top. The doll retained some head scratches and a mild case of pink eye.

Jensen has worked with the Chinese company IronTech for over 3 years, during which the doll has undergone many evolutions. He performed a 3D body scan for the first iteration, but they couldn't scan his penis. When he saw the doll in-person, he ripped its too-small penis off clean. "It's bad for my brand," he says. He keeps that early, poorly sized phallus as a keepsake.

Yes, Jensen has had sex with himself. It was in an orgy scene, and he found it hilarious. After that scene, Jensen accidentally dropped the doll down a flight of stairs, damaging it beyond repair. He threw the doll in the dumpster, but a hairy elbow peeked out of the trash bag. A neighbor called the cops, thinking it was a corpse. The cops were delighted, he says. "They've seen sex dolls before, but they're those cheap, smaller ones that are washed up on the shore," he says. "They're like, 'Dude, this is gold.'"

Indeed, Jensen's doll didn't look cheap at all. I feel the skin and the hair, which are hauntingly realistic. I hold the breathtakingly large penis in my hand, and it feels like a breathtakingly large penis. Jensen has dozens of ideas to keep improving it: an opening in the lips so you could kiss it, a kit of different penis sizes for those who cannot take his full member, and an AI voice. His primary goal, though, is weight reduction: the current model is at least 140 pounds. He has to haul it over his shoulder to move it.

Jensen has sold around 100 dolls at about $3,800. His customers seem price-sensitive; sales have dropped since the tariffs went into effect. Some fans have considered a doll-sharing model.

by Henry Chandonnet, Business Insider | Read more:
Images: Simon Simard; Cliff Jensen
[ed. See also Lars and the Real Girl (with Ryan Gosling). Now streaming on Tubi for free (with ads). Also, Are Humanoid Robots Ready to Be Deployed? (New Yorker).]

Pharmaceutical Freedom: Why Patients Have a Right to Self-Medicate

If Patients Can Refuse Care, Why Can't They Access It?
A Psychiatrist’s Read of Jessica Flanigan's "Pharmaceutical Freedom"

V. The Third Person in the Room

The clinical encounter is not a two-party relationship. There is a third presence in the room, composed of malpractice precedent, DEA scrutiny, prior-authorization architecture, board-of-medicine expectations, and institutional risk management. It does not speak. It shapes what can be offered, what can be discussed openly, and what stays outside the bounds of the conversation. The patient senses it. The prescriber feels it more acutely.

Flanigan directs her critique at the state, as if the state were a discrete actor whose policies could be evaluated on their merits and replaced with better ones. The state is not in the room. Individual prescribers are in the room, and the policies of the state arrive there refracted through professional liability, employer policy, payer requirements, and the residue of every malpractice case any of us has read about. What looks like medical paternalism is, in many cases, professional survival adapting to a system in which the visible costs of one kind of error are concentrated and the visible costs of the other are dispersed.

The cost of error is asymmetrically distributed. A patient who refuses care and deteriorates is generally respected as having exercised autonomy; the death is sad, but it is hers. A prescriber who provides risky access and watches harm follow is scrutinized, second-guessed, sometimes sued, occasionally disciplined by their state medical board. These outcomes are not philosophically symmetric, and prescribers have absorbed that asymmetry into their reflexes. Daniel Carpenter, in his analysis of the FDA in Reputation and Power, names the same pattern at the regulatory scale: visible harms are minimized, dispersed harms are tolerated, and the institution's incentive structure runs in one direction. The clinic operates on the same logic as the agency, scaled to a single examination room.

There is something genuinely appealing to me about Flanigan's proposal from inside this structure. If physicians are not the gatekeepers, they are not the bearers of the consequences. The consultant role, in which I inform rather than authorize, is the more honest description of what I am actually competent to do. It removes a distortion in the encounter that the current regulatory structure quietly imposes. I would, in some moods, sign on tomorrow.

The cost of removing it is that gatekeeping organizes responsibility in ways that are not always coercive. The patient who can be conditionally offered a risky medication, contingent on a safety plan and a follow-up visit, is in a different conversation than the patient who can simply buy it at retail. Whether that difference is therapeutic or merely bureaucratic depends on the case, the patient, and the medication; the honest answer is that it is both, in proportions that vary.

Quong's distinction returns here in a form Flanigan does not fully address. Removing physician gatekeeping does not eliminate the coercive structure around pharmaceutical decisions. It relocates it. Insurers, employers, licensing bodies, fitness-for-duty examiners, family courts, child-welfare agencies: these are the secondary gatekeepers waiting to absorb the function. A pilot whose airline learns he has been self-medicating does not become more autonomous because his prescriber is no longer the bottleneck. Flanigan's payment proposals, which include collective insurance bargaining, conditional reimbursement, and vouchers, are sensible on their own terms, but they describe a system in which insurers retain decisive control over which drugs are practically affordable, and that control is itself a form of gatekeeping.

Her reform of the prescription system would not abolish gatekeeping. It would migrate it from a clinical relationship, where there is at least some individual accountability and some possibility of negotiation, into administrative structures with less of either.

VI. What the Book Gets Uncomfortably Right

This is where Flanigan's abstraction becomes clinically useful. There is a version of her argument that sounds exaggerated until you follow it through the structure described above. Delay accumulates in individual patients. In aggregate it looks like a policy. In the clinic it looks like a pattern.

Four things in the book survive clinical scrutiny better than I would like them to.

The first is that delay is a body count, and the count is not zero. Flanigan's most provocative line, the one about prescription requirements killing people, lands harder here than in the section that introduced it, because by now the reader has the structure to see what she means. The sequence is familiar to anyone who has watched a patient cycle through the standard-of-care options for a treatment-resistant condition. An early-phase signal is not strong enough to meet the chosen endpoint. The endpoint was chosen to withstand regulatory scrutiny rather than to register clinical benefit. The trial extends. Approval waits. The patient cycles through partial responses, accumulates side effects, loses jobs and relationships, and eventually either stabilizes on something inadequate or does not stabilize at all. The drug arrives later, with narrower labeling and higher evidentiary confidence. Some patients benefit. Others have already moved on, in one direction or another. No one counts the ones who did not wait.

This is the asymmetry Carpenter describes at institutional scale. The cost of being wrong in one direction is concentrated, identifiable, traceable to a decision; the cost of being wrong in the other direction is dispersed across a population that never appears in the same frame as the decision that produced it. That asymmetry constrains what I can offer the person sitting in front of me. The menu of available treatments at any given visit is a function of what is approved, what is labeled, what is defensible, and what is reimbursable. I am choosing among the survivors of a filtration process that selected for evidentiary confidence at the cost of timeliness, and for legal defensibility at the cost of clinical range. Flanigan is right that delay carries a cost. Carpenter explains why that cost is tolerated. The clinic is where the two positions meet and refuse to resolve.

The second is regulatory inconsistency. Alcohol is sold at gas stations. Tobacco is regulated at point of sale rather than at access. The supplement industry sells substances with measurable pharmacological effects under almost no oversight, some of which overlap meaningfully with prescription pharmacology. Meanwhile, drugs with established mechanisms, known dosing, decades of safety data, and clear therapeutic niches remain tightly controlled. The boundary does not track risk. It tracks regulatory history, which is to say it tracks the order in which different industries developed, captured their respective agencies, and stabilized their privileges.

The third is that restriction redistributes harm rather than eliminating it, and the redistribution is stratified by resources. The patients who already operate in a world of pharmaceutical freedom are overwhelmingly wealthy, educated, well-connected, and white. They have the time, language, money, and confidence to use international pharmacies, online vendors, supplement markets, ketamine-clinic networks, and direct-to-consumer telehealth. They self-experiment with peptides, pay cash for novel neuromodulation protocols, and design off-label regimens with help from physicians willing to advise them and from AI tools that explain pharmacokinetics on demand. One patient with bipolar disorder, able to afford a nonstandard neuromodulation course out of pocket, designed a variant protocol after reading the literature; it seems to have helped him, and the clinical work was free to proceed because he could bypass the insurance pathway entirely. Another patient, after years of severe fibromyalgia, researched a newly approved neurosteroid obsessively and had two weeks of striking relief on samples left at an office; her right-to-try appeal failed and she could not afford the cash price. What separated those two patients was resources rather than biology. Patients without those resources remain inside the formal system, where access is slower, narrower, and subject to authorization workflows designed by people who do not have to use them. Psychedelic therapy is the cleanest contemporary example: psilocybin retreats in legal jurisdictions, ketamine clinics, and underground guides are available to people who can afford them, while the same compounds remain federally inaccessible to the patients most likely to benefit and least likely to find a way around the prohibition.

The fourth is that restriction shapes honesty. This is essentially Anomaly's learned-helplessness point, and it deserves the most attention. When access depends on prescriber approval, the patient has a strong incentive to present in whatever way maximizes the likelihood of getting what they want. Symptoms are emphasized or hidden. Histories are edited. Substance use gets reframed as something else, or omitted. This is not lying in the sense that anyone would prosecute. It is adaptation to a system where the prescriber's authority over access creates a corresponding pressure on the information that prescribers receive. Anomaly's framing draws on Mill: state restrictions, by promising to manage risks on the citizen's behalf, can permanently stunt the development of the very faculties that would have allowed the citizen to manage them. The clinical version is more local. The frame that promises to protect the patient from bad decisions also produces the patient who cannot tell his doctor what he is actually doing.

A system that restricts access does not eliminate risk. It redistributes it: toward patients who cannot find their way around the workarounds, into clinical encounters where honesty has been priced out, and onto the timelines of patients waiting for permission that may never arrive. The conversation in which the options run out happens more often than the policy debate suggests.

VII. Toward a Capacity-Based Hybrid

The book's great virtue is that it forces clinicians to defend the gatekeeping role rather than assume it. Most pharmaceutical regulation is implicitly risk-based. The higher the perceived risk of a drug, the tighter the controls on access. Flanigan's most useful contribution, after the symmetry argument, is to demonstrate that risk on its own is a poor foundation for coercion; many activities of comparable or greater risk go entirely unrestricted, and the threshold at which paternalism becomes legitimate is not derived from any consistent principle.

A capacity-based framework offers a different organizing principle. The threshold for restricting access is not the level of risk involved, but the integrity of the decision-making process about that risk. [...]

The right analogy is not the prescriber as gatekeeper but the prescriber as fiduciary advisor. Financial advisors do not authorize their clients' trades; they cannot prevent a client from making a foolish investment. What they offer is a relationship across time, a track record of trust long enough to make persuasion possible, and the authority that comes from being someone the client has chosen to listen to. The advisor's job is to deepen the conditions under which the client can exercise autonomy well, not to override it. Having no coercive authority is what makes the advisor freer to be honest about what the client is doing wrong. That structural freedom is precisely what the prescriber's role currently lacks.

by Anonymous, Astral Codex Ten |  Read more:
[ed. From the 2026 ACT annual book review contest (here). This is a recurring frustration - patient requests for various drug prescriptions versus what doctors will actually prescribe (for a variety of reasons articulated in this review, none of them transparent). Since a patient generally has more intimate insight into how their body functions and feels than a physician does you'd think they'd have more influence in the decision-making process, but no. And it's hard to discern what's driving those decisions - see the list at the top of this post. (As an aside, I've never understood why there are so many drug commercials on nightly news, and who they're directed at. Do you know of anyone going to a doctor and saying "hey, I saw a new drug for my condition on tv last night, and how about we give it a try". Try it, see what kind of response you get.]

Tuesday, June 23, 2026

Are There Any Straight Women Left?

Consensus has formed, in recent years, that womanhood consists of fending off suitors. Resentful men, perhaps hearing one narrative after the next of how to be a woman is to be drooled over, see this as a form of female privilege. “Any young woman who is even moderately attractive,” wrote critic William Deresiewicz in a 2023 Tablet essay, “will be courted, complimented, paid attention to, by women as well as men. Older men will buy them things. People will hang on their words even when they aren’t interesting and laugh at their jokes even when they aren’t funny. They will have entry into places—private clubs, backstage after a show—young men can only press their noses against. They will be able to advance professionally by batting their eyelashes at powerful men.”

It was an entertainingly written essay, but one that bore no relation to how I experienced my twenties. Where were these flirtation-based promotions? William, I wanted to tell him (if he would register my middle-aged presence), what you are describing is not how it goes for young women, but what it is to be Emily Ratajkowski. The misconception is not unique to Deresiewicz. If anything, he gets points for at least specifying that he meant young women—and past a certain attractiveness threshold.

Female heterosexuality has been understood almost exclusively as the experiences of women who may be nominally straight, but whose relations with men are mainly about deflecting their advances. Yes, there are a handful of women—Naomi Campbell, Isabelle Huppert, Helen Mirren—who spend a half century turning heads. Most do not. A typical straight female life cycle goes surprisingly quickly from an awkward youth unsure if any of the boys you like will ever reciprocate to an adulthood where men compare you unfavourably with eighteen-year-olds. Life expectancy for Canadian women is over eighty. This means, of approximately seventy man-liking years, a woman may spend ten in love-interest mode herself.

Most women—most people—are not remarkable-looking, in either direction, but are, as the kids say, mid. The women whose physical presence screams female sexuality, whose physiques are referenced by the expression sex sells, are the exception. Yet very few women are asexual. Contrary to the images the expression a sexual woman might summon, most female sexuality is happening in the minds and bodies not of lingerie models but of women whose general-interest sex appeal is nil. I’m here to make the case for a concept of straight womanhood that includes, even prioritizes, women whose interest in men is stronger than their interest to men, rather than the other way around.

There is a long-standing myth: that men possess a general lust for life that includes sexual appetites, whereas women choose between ambition and romance. Underpinning the divergence is this notion that male sexuality is a natural and near-unstoppable force, whereas women can take it or leave it—and will, if serious people, do the latter. Straight women’s need for men is not understood as a mirror image of straight men’s need for women but rather as an entirely different category of requirement.

So here I am, reclaiming man-needing as a feminist pursuit. Women are people, after all, people who want. Maybe we shouldn’t like men, but on the whole, we do. That needs to be our starting point.

Straight women today are at a crossroads. Not obsolete, exactly, but on the decline. Straight women are, going by survey data, a smaller percentage of the population than ever before. A 2022 Gallup polling of more than 10,000 adult Americans shows that 19.7 percent of Gen Z identifies as “something other than heterosexual,” compared with 7.2 percent of the overall population, and women are more likely than men to identify as bisexual.

What is female heterosexuality, anyway? Is it a gender and sexual orientation combo like any other? Or is it a social role, one held by women with no great interest in men but who lack the courage or sense of adventure for other paths? At a moment when women are succeeding like never before in education and professional life, do men still hold any interest for women? Would all women be gay if they could, and if they say they can’t, what’s stopping them? Isn’t female sexuality fluid? Didn’t they do that study where women were equally aroused by hetero porn, lesbian porn, and monkey sex? Do women even desire men, or have we merely been socialized over millennia to put up with them?

Some theorize that women are inherently sexually fluid, capable of sexual and romantic feelings for men and women, and that binary sexual orientation is a man thing. Moreover, “women” is itself a category in some degree of flux and sometimes deemed exclusionary. People assigned female at birth are now more likely than those assigned male to medically transition as adolescents. And more people—in Gen Z, mainly uterus-having sorts—now identify as nonbinary. Together, this means that there are fewer people inhabiting that bit of the Venn diagram where “straight” meets “woman.”

Much of this shift can be attributed to people feeling freer to come out than in previous generations. But there is also a sense, in some quarters, that straight woman is a bit ick as an identity, that it sounds reactionary or conventional, that it comes across as staid or unadventurous. ...

Is it men that women have gone off or just the confining role of boring straight lady? It would seem, at least from the countless magazine and newspaper features on gender and sexual politics, that straight women are passĂ©. In the world of actual people, this indifference has yet to manifest, at least in the aggregate. Well-intended efforts to counter the assumption that all women are straight give the equally misleading impression that it’s a fifty-fifty shot whether any given woman will like men, something even the Gen Z stats don’t claim. Young women are approximately as into men as ever before but less into the whole straight thing than in previous generations. [...]

My aim here is not to insist that heteroflexible women with husbands, or assigned-female-at-birth non-binary people with high heels and boyfriends, are in some definitive sense straight women in denial about their true selves. If, in an everyday situation, a woman tells you she’s queer, and then introduces her male partner, no gotcha is in order. Maybe, if she expanded upon what she meant by “queer,” you wouldn’t think she was, but politeness dictates nodding along respectfully. If you feel moved to call her a straight woman who thinks she’s interesting, have the decency to wait until she’s left the room. But I’d also urge some sympathy for the spicy straights. If you get some straight women claiming to be queer, this is because . . . straight women have internalized the idea that straight womanhood is a bit ridiculous.

by Phoebe Maltz Bovy, The Walrus |  Read more:
Image: Pavel Danilyuk (Pexels) / iStock / Alana Enahoro

Are Americans Too Old?

The country you live in is changing. Month by month, year by year, an insurgent group has been taking over. Its members are moving into your neighborhood, casting votes, and pushing your interests aside. These people claim to care about the community, but they’re mostly loyal to one another—and their numbers are growing. If their ascendance has been ignored, that’s mainly because of political correctness: it’s considered rude to talk about them as a group. If you do so, you must adopt a respectful, even reverential tone, observing how hard life is for them, even though they have all the power.

“They” are the old—at least, according to “Gerontocracy in America,” a new book by Samuel Moyn, a professor at Yale Law School. Moyn argues that the oldest Americans, because of their retrograde politics and ever-increasing presence, are profoundly reshaping our collective life. Historically, “elderly Americans have counted among the most oppressed,” he writes, and many still suffer abuse, or struggle in penury. But the bigger picture is that more Americans are living longer, staying healthier, and getting much wealthier as they age. As a result, Moyn says, the country’s fate and character are being determined not by forward-looking people in their youth or their prime but by backward-looking ones in the final third of their lives.

The French have a phrase for stating the obvious: “enfoncer une porte ouverte,” or “to break down an open door.” We all know that there are lots of boomers, and that Joe Biden and Donald Trump are the oldest Presidents in history. Even so, Moyn writes, the extent of America’s transformation has, like aging itself, snuck up on us. His title is a play on Alexis de Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America”: it implies that gerontocracy—rule by the old—is now the country’s essential condition. “Had she won the presidency in 2024, Kamala Harris would have taken office at sixty,” Moyn points out; only in a gerontocratic America could she have presented herself as a youthful alternative.

To really appreciate the “gobsmacking” degree to which the country has aged, Moyn suggests, you have to look at the statistics. In 1980, the median age in America was thirty. (In other words, half of Americans were younger than thirty, and half older.) Today, the median age is nearly forty. There used to be an “age pyramid,” Moyn explains, with a broad base of younger people narrowing to a small elderly population at the top. Now we have an age rectangle—more people are reaching their seventies and eighties—and it could soon become a top-heavy trapezoid, since young people are having fewer children. In 1920, less than five per cent of Americans were older than sixty-five; by 2060, according to the A.A.R.P., the number will be one in four.

The age of the median voter is now fifty-two. In primaries, it is sixty-five—meaning that the oldest voters ordain the choices for the rest of us. “The most common age of donors in recent elections can run as high as seventy,” Moyn reports; since politicians often do what donors want, even younger elected officials are likely to vote older than their age. That’s not to say that there are lots of younger politicians: the median age in Congress is more than sixty. There are four hundred and thirty-five members of the House of Representatives; only one was born in the nineteen-nineties, and only sixty-four in the eighties. Democrats in Congress trend a little older than Republicans, and “at least half of the Democrats in the House over seventy-five are running again in 2026,” Moyn writes, despite the fact that, between 2022 and 2025, eight congressional Democrats died in office.

All of this has made younger voters more cynical and disengaged. And with good reason: there is ample evidence that older people favor policies that emphasize security for themselves over investment in the young. Broadly speaking, laws now make it much easier for older people to buy property and make investments while avoiding taxes. Meanwhile, being healthier, they have kept working into their seventies, occupying positions that might otherwise be filled by those younger than them. The result has been a widening economic rift between the old and the young, with the net worth of older households rising and the wealth of younger households falling. “The age group most likely to own a home in America, at a rate of over 80 percent, is seventy to seventy-­four,” Moyn writes. The second most likely group is people seventy-five and older.

There are nearly sixty million Americans over the age of sixty-five. Can we really generalize about their attitudes and opinions? “As the individual life dwindles, playing for time in the face of impending catastrophe is a psychologically appealing stratagem of avoidance and denial,” Moyn suggests. At the very least, it seems reasonable to say that our opinions grow less au courant as we age. Surveys find that, among people aged eighteen to twenty-nine, the most important foreign-policy issue is climate change; among “old people,” Moyn writes, “the biggest issue is terrorism.” We face all sorts of big civilizational challenges—and yet, if Moyn’s analysis is right, the people who are most directly invested in building the future are being dominated by those who indulge the status quo. “Gerontocracies are prone to let long-term problems fester and worsen,” Moyn warns. But the power of older Americans is hardly despotic; it’s democratic, deriving from the principle of one person, one vote. What, if anything, should be done about it? [...]

Is gerontocracy the right diagnosis for what ails us? In an essay titled “Old People Aren’t the Problem,” Nathan J. Robinson, the editor of Current Affairs, argues that Moyn is making a category mistake. Not all older people are wealthy and powerful; in fact, in 2019, seventy per cent of the wealth owned by those over sixty-five belonged to just ten per cent of American seniors. “Wealth is not actually concentrated among old or young people,” Robinson writes. “It’s concentrated among rich people.” He points out that, in modern America, the politician who has done the most to advance progressive ideas is Bernie Sanders, who is now eighty-four years old (and, to all appearances, totally with it). Would the world be a better place if Sanders were mandatorily retired? “The class struggle overlaps a bit with age, but the policies we should adopt have to be aimed around redistributing wealth and power, period,” Robinson concludes—otherwise we’ll just be “exploited by a younger ruling class.” [...]

The fault lines between young and old are real. I’m in my mid-forties, with two small children, and I live in one of only a few school districts on Long Island where the school budget failed to pass; most of the people I know reasonably assume that it was older voters, wary of even modest tax increases, who voted it down, happy to risk the drastic cuts to programs like tutoring, music, and sports that will occur if a new budget isn’t passed. (On Facebook, there are arguments between parents who want services for their kids and older residents who say those services didn’t exist “back in my day.”) There are vacant lots and empty buildings in town where new housing could be built, but residents, defensive of their property values, keep nixing new development. The status quo rules. And yet it’s not just older people who cling to the past. A mood of retrospection seems to have settled everywhere. In conversation, almost no one will express hope for the future. Maybe one sign that we’re living under gerontocracy is that so many people yearn for the old version of America, in which dynamism abounded and everyone was young.

by Joshua Rothman, New Yorker | Read more:
Image: Josie Norton
[ed. I'm old, and old people drive me nuts. But, the slow, steady transfer of accumulated wealth over the next couple of decades will have a big impact on these issues. Will lucky recipients act any differently?]

Saturday, June 20, 2026

Bridesmaid Boxes - the Influencer-ification of the Bridal Party

Bachelorette parties and bridesmaid proposal boxes look increasingly like brand trips and PR mailers.

It had started with four words — “Will you marry me?” — which led Alaina to make a proposal of her own. About three months after her fiancĂ© got down on one knee, a “complete surprise on an otherwise regular Sunday afternoon,” holding an elongated cushion-cut diamond, Alaina posed a question of her own. Five words this time, and six gift bags.

Each bag was tied together with a personalized silk ribbon that read each bridesmaid-to-be’s name and was filled with custom-monogrammed makeup, toiletries, travel perfumes (Kilian Paris’s Love, Don’t Be Shy), and other goodies you’d find stocked at Sephora — and some you wouldn’t, like mini-shooters and Crate & Barrel glasses. Inside, a note on beautiful cardstock made the same request, verbalized to her lifelong friends: “Will you be my bridesmaid?”

They had taken her only about three hours to complete. And about $345 — per box.

For Alaina, it was a reasonable price “given that these women have been with me for my whole life, and they’ll be spending a similar amount to attend the wedding festivities,” the 28-year-old says. Her inspiration for these ceremonial boxes, and what to include inside, was “Instagram, of course.”

The internet is awash with these so-called bridesmaid proposal boxes, a now-ceremonial way of asking the person who loved you through every season of life, through every bad ex and bad haircut, to stand beside you on your big day — wrapped in tissue paper or embossed with a custom monogram. Each bag is seeded with photogenic products like full-size NĂ©cessaire bodywashes, expensive lip oils, and silk pillowcases. Sometimes, during a scroll, you’ll even catch a box with Maison Margiela Replica candles ($72) that match the scent, or vibe, of the wedding each of the girls is enlisted to participate in.

It stretches beyond the proposal box, too, as bachelorette parties now have welcome bags and curated itineraries. It all feels like a sliver of influencer culture unsurprisingly encroaching on the wedding universe: These moments are looking more sponsored than bridal.

Charissa, a 36-year-old New York–based bride-to-be, says that’s exactly the point: for these gift bags to feel like a brand present or mailer. Charissa gave her six bridesmaids MoĂ«t & Chandon and handwritten notes (done by an Etsy calligrapher for $30 per note, wax seal and all) during such pre-wedding events because she wanted the experience to feel elevated, like something you’d get at a luxury hotel. Like something you’d see brides doing for their girls on Instagram.

“I never felt like I had to do it — I wanted to,” she says, adding that if her friends are spending money to celebrate her, she wants to spoil them in return with a curated experience.

For some brides, the bridesmaid proposal box is simply the first installment in a fully branded wedding universe, one that begins long before invitations go out. What starts with a proposal to join the bride at the altar often extends into the destination bachelorette party, where trips come with themes (“Palms and Prosecco,” “Million-Dollar Cowgirl”) because it’s no longer enough to just go to Palm Springs or Jackson Hole. You now have to play into the larger concept, too.

That often means a chunk of the cost quietly falls to the bridesmaids. Sometimes it’s buying entirely new outfits to dress for the theme; other times it’s funding it outright. “There’s, like, a fully cohesive aesthetic rollout before a trip even begins,” says Mallory, 28, a Chicago-based attendee of four weddings this year — three of which she’s in. As a result, she’s become “deeply” familiar with personalization sites like Minted and Zazzle, where bridesmaids create custom branding for the weekend. “Custom logos are printed on everything: Champagne bottles, menus, posters, itineraries,” she says, which can sometimes total anywhere from $250 to $300 for a bride who is all in. “And the other times when the brides pay for it, we’re still expected to match the theme.”

Kate, 31, says she had “already shelled out thousands for the bride’s plane ticket to St. Pete for her bachelorette, plus meals and a chartered boat,” but what really sent her over the edge was the “$80 Venmo request from the maid of honor for matching ‘Bride Tribe’ sunglasses, T-shirts, and palm-tree earrings.” She adds that she never agreed to the Amazon and Shein orders but was charged anyway.

At least the bride is expected to reward such falling in line. At a bachelorette party’s rented Airbnb, you can expect balloons and matching PJs she’s laid on the bed for her girls; L.L.Bean totes stuffed with costly lip balm or eye masks. Mason Pearson brushes are in the bathroom — or, if the budget doesn’t stretch that far, Wet Brushes will do. An embroidered cowboy hat for their arrival in Aspen; matching Alo sets for a group workout no one particularly asked for. “That’s $397.90 per girl,” one TikTok commenter points out in a video of one of these tote bags with similar-style products. [...]

If you can’t charter a private plane to St. Barts like influencer Danielle Pheloung, better known as @acquiredstyle, for her “Acquired a Husband” bachelorette, the very least you can do, according to TikTok, is DM brands for freebies. This usually looks like brides or bridesmaids directly messaging businesses or PR contacts on Instagram with a quick pitch (“We’re planning a bachelorette trip — would love to try your product”) in hopes of getting gifted items in exchange for tags or social posts. “I reached out to 425 companies to ask for PR,” says @endo.adeno.girlie in one of many viral videos explaining how to do it, telling her followers which specific brands will send free products. Videos like hers follow a simple logic: The more products you can get for free, the less likely anyone is to get hit with a moan-inducing post-bachelorette Venmo request. Michelle, 29, calls herself a “failed maid of honor” because her group didn’t cold-email enough brands for freebies after watching TikToks that explained how to score sponsored Liquid IV packets and hangover kits in exchange for social-media exposure. [...]

Lindsay, 28, a Michigan-based bride who is getting married in August, says she “understands” how it’s easy to get carried away; when you’re freshly engaged, you want every moment to feel as big as the proposal or the wedding. “I don’t regret it, no,” she says, looking back at the Dutch chocolates and silk pillowcases that she gifted to each bridesmaid. The bridesmaid proposal is something she will remember forever, because she was able to present the boxes at a girls’ lunch, with a table reserved for the most important people in her life. “But it does add up fast. And now, with hindsight, I realize I could’ve maybe budgeted it differently.”

by Morgan Sullivan, The Cut |  Read more:
Image: The Cut/Getty
[ed. Influencer-ification. How to take a nice ceremony and turn it into a (more) stress-filled nightmare.]

Friday, June 19, 2026

How Everthing Became Left or Right “Coded”

In America today, there are conservative and liberal jeans (Levi Strauss versus Wrangler), beer (Heineken versus Coors), and footwear (Birkenstocks versus cowboy boots). The MAGA movement itself is seen as tied to Kid Rock and eating steak.

In an era when partisan division is so febrile that acceptance of political violence has grown and violent political attacks are on the rise — the Charlie Kirk assassination being the latest of great note — it is hard to remember that it wasn’t always so.

As recently as the 1950s, Americans were politically calm — so calm that a committee of the American Political Science Association urged the two parties to accentuate their differences, to provide a “true choice.” In 1964, Barry Goldwater campaigned for president as the Republican who would provide “a choice, not an echo” and was badly defeated for his pains. Some political scientists applauded the political apathy of the era as both a sign of popular satisfaction and a shock absorber for the system. Four generations on, there seems to be too much party difference and too little political apathy.

Why have we gotten to a place where even open-toed sandals are left-wing?

Simple answers might point to combative politicians, President Donald Trump above all, to aggressive social movements like the Tea Party and Black Lives Matter, or to changes in the media such as the rise of cable television and then online feeds like Facebook and TikTok. But the key dynamic, many researchers have found, is the increasing proportion of Americans for whom political affiliation is central to their identities — to what they think, to what they feel, to who they feel they are.

I need to stop right here: This assertion does not directly apply to most Americans. In 2024, only 30 percent of Americans described themselves as “strong” Democrats or Republicans (only about half even claimed a political party). The largest chunk of Americans are not partisans. About politics, they care little, talk little, consume little, and know little — and they vote little (although when they vote they determine who holds power, the partisans being evenly divided).

Still, the politicization of so many Americans matters even for the apolitical. The latter are the audience for the political theater — which Americans find “exhausting” — and when they do vote, usually only every four years, they are presented with polarized options. For the nation as a whole, it means less constructive cooperation and more animosity and anger. 

Still, the politicization of so many Americans matters even for the apolitical. The latter are the audience for the political theater — which Americans find “exhausting” — and when they do vote, usually only every four years, they are presented with polarized options. For the nation as a whole, it means less constructive cooperation and more animosity and anger. [...]

A different story of political polarization


But politicization entails much more than the parties dividing on policies. Politicization has now gone beyond shaping many Americans’ stances on issues or even their cultural tastes, to shaping who they are — whom they date (and marry and befriend), what communities they join, what religious faiths they profess, what life-and-death choices they make.

In the last several decades or so, more Americans have sorted or changed their views on many disparate policies — for instance, on immigration, abortion, war, climate, gender, and crime — to better fit with their identities as Democrats or Republicans. Views on abortion, so deeply tied to one’s moral intuitions, provide a dramatic example. In the early 1970s, Republicans were about as likely as Democrats to agree in the NORC/University of Chicago General Social Survey that it should be possible for “a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if she is married and does not want any more children.” Fifty years later, overall American opinion had not changed, but Republican support for such abortions had dropped by about 20 percentage points and Democratic support had increased by about 15 points; abortion had become a defining party issue. Similarly, in 1997 members of the two parties had, as recorded by a Gallup poll, the same level of concern about whether the effects of global warming had begun; by 2021, there was a 53-point gap between increasingly worried Democrats and increasingly sanguine Republicans.

One way this polarization could happen is that people switched parties to fit their evolving views on subjects such as abortion or the climate. Some of that surely happened. But much research shows that people as or more often switched their views to fit their political identity. This shows up in studies that follow people over several years and find that people often change their positions on a substantive topic after they first change their political affiliation, having adopted the new affiliation perhaps because of political events unrelated to that topic or because of new personal circumstances such as a marriage, a new job, or a new neighborhood. In other words, to follow the abortion example, many became Republicans (perhaps because of racial beliefs or new friends) and then became pro-life.

Increasingly, even survey respondents’ reports of what is real, such as whether the economy is getting better or worse or whether inequality is growing, vary by party. Party has become so important that opinions on how much racial discrimination exists now differ more between Democrats and Republicans than between Black people and white people; views of income inequality differ more by party than by individuals’ incomes.

Political position has come, for more Americans, to connect with all sorts of tastes far beyond government policy— e.g., listening to Kid Rock or BeyoncĂ©, going to museums or playing golf, watching Curb Your Enthusiasm or Antiques Roadshow. Consumption as political signaling — for example, coffee branded by political affiliation — has been vividly demonstrated in (my own) Berkeley, California: First, high rates of Tesla ownership displaying climate liberalism (as well as displaying a healthy bank account), and then high rates of protests against Tesla, displaying DOGE-fighting liberalism.

Some of this politicization might be dismissed as simply posturing, owning the libs, or what pollsters call “expressive responding.” But the politicization goes deeper than that.

Party affiliation seems to increasingly determine, and not just reflect, Americans’ important personal decisions. Much of the discussion about “affective polarization” — that more Democrats and Republicans nowadays actually hate the other side — started with a study reporting that more Americans were displeased in 2010 than were in 1960 with the prospect of gaining a son- or daughter-in-law of a different party. Years later, many single Americans rule out dating someone with differing political views.

A 2020 survey found that about half of both Democrats and Republicans have intimate social networks made up exclusively of people who share their politics. Survey respondents often see more agreement with the people in their lives than actually exists, but nonetheless, this homogeneity is substantial and has increased. (Social homogeneity, in turn, encourages partisanship and hostility.)

Such political homogeneity results in part from who individuals choose to spend time with and who they choose to avoid. Strong partisans prefer to be with the like-minded and to avoid conversations with the unlike-minded. And they tend to drop friends (not so much family) who disagree with them politically. By one estimate, 15 percent of Americans “have ended a friendship over politics.” Political homogeneity also results in part from the influence of family, friends, and neighbors to conform to their views.

Political identity affects people in less explicit ways, too. Americans have increasingly segregated themselves geographically — not primarily because they are seeking neighbors who are fellow party members, although some of that is going on, but because the reasons people move — or decide not to move — increasingly connect with party. Those, for example, who like large houses and big yards tend to end up in red neighborhoods, while those who like to walk to local amenities tend to end up in blue neighborhoods. Both ways, party and neighborhood have become more linked. A 2021 study concluded that many “voters live with virtually no [local] exposure to voters from the other party.”

Yet more striking, Americans have increasingly lined up what they profess religiously to fit what they profess politically. Religion and politics have long been entangled in the United States — in 19th-century fights over alcohol prohibition, Sunday postal service, and which version of the Bible should be read in public schools, for instance; this was Americans’ faith driving their politics. For about 30 years now, politics have been joining with religion and, importantly, political identity is driving expressions of faith.

It first became clear in the 2000s that those identifying as Democrats, liberals, and moderates were leaving organized religion and describing themselves as having no religion (as “nones”) in great part as a reaction against what they saw as the conservative politicization of the church, especially on lifestyle issues.

Then, evidence in the last decade or so accumulated that more conservatives were starting to profess faith, especially evangelical faith, probably for mirror-image reasons: to reject the secularism associated with liberal positions such as supporting gender transition. Ryan Burge, the dynamo researcher of Graphs about Religion, suggested to me that the recent leveling off of the growth of “nones” might be explained by conservatives’ view that non-affiliation had “become so linked to left-wing politics.” These conservatives “are functionally non-religious… but they still can’t bear to not ID as Christian on a survey.” That political affiliation has come to alter a significant number of Americans’ religious identities is profound testimony to the politicization of many Americans’ lives.

And then there is politics’ connection to life-and-death decisions. As might be expected, left and right differ on many health-related matters — childhood vaccines, cancer preventatives, and the dangers of tackle football, for example. But left and right also differ in health behavior, from diet, such as how much meat people eat, to exercise. One result is that residents of red counties more often tend to be obese than residents of blue counties, even taking into account race, poverty, and education.

The most tragic example was the Covid-19 pandemic. People in red states, where the vaccines were most resisted, died at higher rates than those in blue states; individual Republicans died at higher rates than individual Democrats. Hundreds of thousands of deaths can likely be attributed to political identity.

So what happened?

Seventy years ago, gender, race, and region determined Americans’ lifestyles, fortunes, and identities more than they do now; educational attainment and, increasingly, politics have become the key answer for many people to who they are.

by Claude S. Fischer, Vox | Read more:
Image: NurPhoto via Getty Images

Thursday, June 18, 2026

What Women See in Men and Vice Versa: Estimates Based on Sex Ratios and Marriage Patterns

Abstract 

Much of what looks like changing marriage preferences over the twentieth century is actually demographics. Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in sex ratios across U.S. birth cohorts (1870, 1930, 1950), we jointly identify preferences, match quality dynamics, and the costs of marriage and divorce. Demographics alone explain two-thirds of cross-cohort differences. Women’s premium for older husbands collapsed across cohorts; men’s preferences barely changed. Love that survives its early years becomes permanent, but the odds of surviving fell from 97% to 44%. Divorce costs fell six-fold and depend on life stage. A horse race across behavioral channels shows that the match quality process—not mate-age preferences—is the primary dimension of generational change. Declining divorce costs and fragile match quality are substitutes: either alone fits the data, but together they reveal two independent dimensions of social change. The model validates out of sample on the 1910 and 1970 cohorts.

Introduction 

Much of what looks like changing marriage preferences over the twentieth century is actually demographics. Variation in sex ratios and mortality across U.S. birth cohorts—driven by immigration and differential longevity gains—accounts for two-thirds of the cross-cohort differences in marriage and divorce behavior, with no change in behavioral parameters at all. This paper provides the first joint identification of marriage preferences, match quality dynamics, and the costs of marriage and divorce in a unified equilibrium framework, exploiting the large demographic variation across the 1870, 1930, and 1950 birth cohorts.

The variation we exploit is plausibly exogenous to marriage preferences. The sex ratio at marriageable ages fell from 1.056 men per woman (1870 cohort) to 0.942 (1950 cohort)—a swing from male surplus to female surplus driven by the closing of the frontier, declining male immigration, and faster female mortality improvements. These forces operate through the population’s age and sex structure, not through tastes over partners. They change who is scarce and who must compete in the marriage market, so that equilibrium marriage and divorce patterns shift even if no one’s preferences change. We estimate a dynamic general equilibrium model of marriage and divorce, matching 84 moments of marriage and divorce behavior across the three cohorts. Beyond the aggregate role of demographics, the estimates reveal sharp findings about what people value and how relationships work:

Women’s preferences changed; men’s did not. Women in the 1870 cohort placed a premium on older over younger husbands large enough to delay marriage by several years relative to a world with symmetric preferences (Figure 3). By 1950 this premium had collapsed to near zero. Men’s preferences over partner age are essentially constant across all three cohorts. The marriage age gap is driven not by men preferring younger (more fecund) women, as Siow (1998) suggests, but by women’s preference for older, more established men—a preference that erodes as women gain economic independence. 

Love that survives becomes permanent—but surviving got harder. A good match, once achieved, is permanent: the implied duration exceeds the remaining lifetime. But in the 1870 cohort a new marriage had a 97% probability of reaching the good state; by 1950, this had fallen to 44%. The 1950 cohort uniquely allowed recovery from bad matches with 16% chances, generating dynamics that resemble cohabitation. 

Divorce costs depend on life stage. The middle-age group (“young” in our model) faces the 2 Throughout we consider only opposite-sex couples, reflecting the historical period studied. For historical mortality rates, see Haines (1998) and Arias (2012); for historical patterns of gender-biased immigration to the U.S., see Donato and Gabaccia (2015). 2 highest effective divorce cost—roughly six times the utility value of a standard-deviation match shock—substantially above both adolescents and the old. This generates the age-declining divorce rate profile observed in every cohort. The base cost declined six-fold across cohorts, with a structural break between 1910 and 1930 coinciding with the liberalization of divorce laws and the entry of women into the labor force. 

Divorce costs and match quality are substitutes. Cohort-specific match quality process alone— without any cohort variation in divorce costs—achieves the same fit as the Baseline specification. Both channels govern marital dissolution, one through the price of exit, the other through the probability of wanting to exit. Combining both yields a further 14% improvement, revealing two independent dimensions of social change: the liberalization of exit and the increasing uncertainty of relationships. 

How can these mechanisms be separately identified? The key is that different moments respond to different parameters, and the three cohorts provide 84 moments under very different demographic conditions. Marriage rates by age for male and female reveal how each sex values partners of different maturities: when the sex ratio shifts from male surplus to female surplus, the scarce sex becomes pickier and marriage patterns change in ways that depend on the preference parameters. Divorce rates and their age profile reveal the cost of exit: the pervasive pattern that divorce declines with age identifies the age-dependent component of divorce costs, because without it the model would predict flat or rising divorce with age. The fraction never married by age 50 disciplines marriage frictions: a high never-married fraction signals that substantial frictions prevent matches from forming. The persistence of marriages—how quickly divorce rates fall with duration—reveals match quality dynamics: if good matches are permanent but medium matches are fragile, divorce concentrates in the early years. The cross-cohort variation in these moments overdetermines the parameter vector. [...]

This paper contributes to the literature on marriage and matching in three ways. First, it provides a framework to separate demographic forces from behavioral responses in equilibrium matching markets. Second, it identifies the dynamics of match quality and the role of divorce costs using variation that is orthogonal to preferences. Third, it shows that much of the long-run change in marriage and divorce patterns can be understood as the consequence of demographic shifts rather than changes in tastes.

by Jose-Victor Rios-Rull; Shannon Seitz; Satoshi Tanaka, PIER/University of Pennsylvania |  Read more (pdf):