Kaiser Health News, now rebranded as KFF Health News, has a new article on PBMs, with the news hook that the Senate just held hearings on PBMs before a vote on PBM legislation….with the description of what PBMs do, exactly, and what the legislation entails peculiarly hazy.
Matt Stoller, in his post The Red Wedding for Rural Pharmacies, gave the 50,000 foot description of how PBMs work and how they abuse their monopoly position. A key section:
By Arthur Allen, a KFF Health News Senior Correspondent, previously worked for Politico, and before that was a freelance writer for publications such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, Smithsonian, Lingua Franca magazine, The New Republic, Slate, and Salon. Earlier in his career, he worked for The Associated Press. Originally published at KFF Health News
For two decades, patients and physicians eagerly awaited a lower-cost version of the world’s bestselling drug, Humira, while its maker, AbbVie, fought off potential competitors by building a wall of more than 250 patents around it.
When the first Humira biosimilar — essentially a generic version — finally hit the market in January, it came with an unpleasant surprise. The biosimilar’s maker, Amgen, launched two versions of the drug, which treats a host of conditions including rheumatoid arthritis. They were identical in every way but this: One was priced at about $1,600 for a two-week supply, 55% off Humira’s list price. But the other was priced at around $3,300, only about 5% off. And OptumRx, one of three powerhouse brokers that determine which drugs Americans get, recommended option No. 2: the more expensive version.
As Murdo Gordon, an Amgen executive vice president, explained in an earnings call, the higher price enabled his company to give bigger rebates, or post-sale discounts, to Optum and other intermediaries. Most of that money would be passed on to insurers, and patients, he said. Gordon did not mention that the higher-priced option would leave some patients paying much more out-of-pocket, undermining the whole rationale for generic drugs.
The Optum-Amgen announcements perfectly elucidated why, after years of thundering against drugmakers, Congress and the administration have now focused on regulating the deal-makers known as pharmacy benefit managers, or PBMs. Sen. Bernie Sanders’ health committee grilled a panel of PBM and pharmaceutical executives Wednesday in preparation for a vote on PBM legislation, expected Thursday.
The three biggest PBMs — OptumRx, CVS Caremark, and Express Scripts — control about 80% of prescription drug sales in America and are the most profitable parts of the health conglomerates in which they’re nestled. CVS Health, the fourth-largest U.S. corporation by revenue on Fortune’s list, owns CVS Caremark and the insurer Aetna; UnitedHealth Group, a close fifth, owns Optum; and Cigna, ranking 12th, owns Express Scripts. While serving as middlemen among drugmakers, insurers, and pharmacies, the three corporations also own the highest-grossing specialty drug and mail-order pharmacies.
“John D. Rockefeller would be happy to be alive today,” said David Balto, a former Federal Trade Commission attorney who represents clients suing PBMs. “He could own a PBM and monopolize economic power in ways he never imagined.” (...)
All this makes the PBMs ripe targets for politicians of both parties. Yet the complexity and obscurity of their role in the drug marketplace have skeptics wondering whether legislation advancing in the House and Senate will actually help patients or lower prices at the pharmacy counter.
“We may try to make things better and actually make things worse,” Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) said at Wednesday’s hearing.
Matt Stoller, in his post The Red Wedding for Rural Pharmacies, gave the 50,000 foot description of how PBMs work and how they abuse their monopoly position. A key section:
PBMs handle the drug benefit piece of insurance plans. They maintain a list of drugs for insurance companies, they negotiate drug prices, and they manage reimbursements to pharmacies.
It gets worse. PBMs all own mail-order pharmacies, and they are increasingly mandating that patients use those mail-order pharmacies instead of the local pharmacy around the corner. Moreover, PBMs now have so much power they are able to claw back money randomly from pharmacies months after a drug was dispensed, using something called a Direct and Indirect Remuneration fee. (DIR fees are only used for Medicare plans, but that is still 37% of the market.) For independent pharmacies, DIR fees are impossible to plan for, they are opaque, and they end up raising prices for consumers.The original idea behind PBMs is they would be able to get enough bargaining power by representing multiple insurance companies that they could negotiate to bring down drug prices. And accumulate bargaining power they did, merging until three PBMs control 80% of the insurance market. They are also vertically integrated with insurance companies and drug store chains. The top three PBMs are owned by CVS, United Health, and Cigna.
Unfortunately, because of an exemption from anti-kickback laws, PBMs don’t use their bargaining power to reduce consumer prices. Instead, they force pharmaceutical firms to compete over who will give the PBM the biggest kickback, which in the industry is known as a rebate. Take insulin. In 2013, Sanofi gave a 2-4% kickback to PBMs to prefer their product to customers. In 2018, that number went up to 56%. In other words, more than half of the price of insulin is going to a middleman who does nothing more than push around paper.
The many bad practices of PBMs are legendary. PBMs often force customers to buy more expensive drugs over their generic counterparts, likely because they get kickbacks when customers do so. This ends up making this obscure group of firms a lot money. The combined revenue of the top three firms, who comprise just a small part of the U.S. health system, is larger than the entire amount France spends on all medical care for its entire population.
By Arthur Allen, a KFF Health News Senior Correspondent, previously worked for Politico, and before that was a freelance writer for publications such as The New York Times, The Washington Post, Smithsonian, Lingua Franca magazine, The New Republic, Slate, and Salon. Earlier in his career, he worked for The Associated Press. Originally published at KFF Health News
For two decades, patients and physicians eagerly awaited a lower-cost version of the world’s bestselling drug, Humira, while its maker, AbbVie, fought off potential competitors by building a wall of more than 250 patents around it.
When the first Humira biosimilar — essentially a generic version — finally hit the market in January, it came with an unpleasant surprise. The biosimilar’s maker, Amgen, launched two versions of the drug, which treats a host of conditions including rheumatoid arthritis. They were identical in every way but this: One was priced at about $1,600 for a two-week supply, 55% off Humira’s list price. But the other was priced at around $3,300, only about 5% off. And OptumRx, one of three powerhouse brokers that determine which drugs Americans get, recommended option No. 2: the more expensive version.
As Murdo Gordon, an Amgen executive vice president, explained in an earnings call, the higher price enabled his company to give bigger rebates, or post-sale discounts, to Optum and other intermediaries. Most of that money would be passed on to insurers, and patients, he said. Gordon did not mention that the higher-priced option would leave some patients paying much more out-of-pocket, undermining the whole rationale for generic drugs.
The Optum-Amgen announcements perfectly elucidated why, after years of thundering against drugmakers, Congress and the administration have now focused on regulating the deal-makers known as pharmacy benefit managers, or PBMs. Sen. Bernie Sanders’ health committee grilled a panel of PBM and pharmaceutical executives Wednesday in preparation for a vote on PBM legislation, expected Thursday.
The three biggest PBMs — OptumRx, CVS Caremark, and Express Scripts — control about 80% of prescription drug sales in America and are the most profitable parts of the health conglomerates in which they’re nestled. CVS Health, the fourth-largest U.S. corporation by revenue on Fortune’s list, owns CVS Caremark and the insurer Aetna; UnitedHealth Group, a close fifth, owns Optum; and Cigna, ranking 12th, owns Express Scripts. While serving as middlemen among drugmakers, insurers, and pharmacies, the three corporations also own the highest-grossing specialty drug and mail-order pharmacies.
“John D. Rockefeller would be happy to be alive today,” said David Balto, a former Federal Trade Commission attorney who represents clients suing PBMs. “He could own a PBM and monopolize economic power in ways he never imagined.” (...)
All this makes the PBMs ripe targets for politicians of both parties. Yet the complexity and obscurity of their role in the drug marketplace have skeptics wondering whether legislation advancing in the House and Senate will actually help patients or lower prices at the pharmacy counter.
“We may try to make things better and actually make things worse,” Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) said at Wednesday’s hearing.
by Yves Smith, Matt Stollar, Arthur Allen, Naked Capitalism | Read more:
Image: Game of Thrones, Red Wedding
