Attention is Power (and the Problem)

Democrats Are Losing the War for Attention. Badly.

On Monday, Donald Trump is going to take the oath of office for the second time. During his first administration, there were questions around how he would instrumentalize policy in the government, how he would raise money. We’re used to talking about that with politicians.

But there was also the separate question — of how Trump wields and uses attention.

He’s a master at it. And I’d say he has a disciple, an ally, in Elon Musk. Musk is probably the most attentionally rich person in the world alongside Donald Trump, and Musk’s attentional riches might be more important now than his financial riches.

And so if you’re going to think about politics predictively, you have to scrutinize how attention is being spent, amassed and controlled. And that’s what this conversation is about. It’s a curtain raiser on the attentional regime we’re about to enter.

My friend Chris Hayes is best known as the host of MSNBC’s 8 p.m. show, “All In With Chris Hayes.” But he just wrote a great book called “The Sirens’ Call: How Attention Became the World’s Most Endangered Resource.”

I’ve read most of the books on attention out there. This one is, I think, the best at understanding the value of attention today. Because it isn’t just endangered — it is the world’s most valuable resource. And the people who are on top of the world right now understand its value. (...)

Ezra Klein: Chris Hayes, welcome to the show.

Chris Hayes: Really great to be here.

So you’ve got a cable news show. You’re an attention merchant. What is different about the way attention felt and worked in the early 2000s when you were starting out, when I was starting out, and the way it feels and works for you now?

That’s a great question. One is there’s so much more competition. The notion now is that at every single moment when you are competing for someone’s attention, you are competing against literally every piece of content ever produced.

I love this thing that happened a few years ago where “Suits,” which was a network show, had become the most-watched show on Netflix. It never would have occurred to me back in 2013 that I might be fighting for eyeballs with someone watching “Suits.”

But at every single moment that you are trying to get someone’s attention now, the totality of human content is the library of your competition. And that was not true in 2000. (...)

You talk in the book about attention now being the most valuable commodity, the most important commodity, the commodity that so many of the great modern businesses, among other things, are built on. Like Google and Meta.

I still think we’re realizing attention was undervalued. Or maybe that its most important value isn’t selling it off to advertisers. So I’ve been thinking a lot about Elon Musk, who emerges in your book as a slightly pathetic figure trying to fill this howling void he has for attention.

Yes, the book was written before I think he got a second chapter.

Elon Musk overpaid for Twitter at $44 billion. It is not a business, as he has said himself, worth $44 billion. On the other hand, the amount of attention that he is capable of controlling and amassing and manipulating through Twitter, cannot be traded directly for $44 billion dollars. But it’s clearly worth more than $44 billion dollars.

So how do you think about this translation that we’re seeing happen right now between attention as a financial commodity and attention as having more worth, frankly, than the money it would fetch on the open market?

Yes, I think he backed into the purchase of Twitter based on a kind of howling personal void.

But in the same way that Donald Trump backed into the same insight borne of his personality and his upbringing in the New York tabloid world, he figured out something that has been obviously tremendously valuable in dollar terms. One of the really important ironies here, which I think does map onto labor, is that the aggregate of attention — like lots of attention or the collective public attention — is wildly valuable.

Volodymyr Zelensky is a great example of this. The president of Ukraine understands that attention on Ukraine’s plight is essentially the engine for securing the weaponry and resources his country needs to defend itself.

And yet even though the aggregate of attention is very valuable, in market terms, our individual attention, second to second, is fractions of pennies.

And that was exactly what it was like with labor. When Marxists would say labor is a source of all value, they were right in the aggregate. Take away all the workers and the Industrial Revolution doesn’t happen. But to the individual worker in the sweatshop, the little slice of labor that you’re producing is both everything you have as a person and worth almost nothing in the market.

And I think we have the same thing with attention, where it’s really valuable, pooled and aggregated. Each individual part of it that we contribute is essentially worthless, is pennies — and then subjectively, to us, it’s all we have.

I think attention is now to politics what people think money is to politics. Certainly at the high levels.

There are places where money is very powerful, but it’s usually where people are not looking. Money is very powerful when there’s not much attention. But Donald Trump doesn’t control Republican primaries with money — he controls them with attention.

I keep having to write about Musk, and I keep saying he’s the richest man in the world. But it’s actually not what matters about him right now. It’s just how he managed to get the attention and become the character and the wielder of all this attention. And that’s a changeover I think Trumpist Republicans have made, and Democrats haven’t.

Democrats are still thinking about money as a fundamental substance of politics, and the Trump Republican Party thinks about attention as a fundamental substance of politics.

I really like this theory. I think there are a few things: One, I think you’re totally right to identify that it’s sort of a sliding scale between the two. Which is to say: For politics that get the least attention, money matters the most.

So in a state representative race, money really matters — partly because no one is paying attention to who the state rep is. Local media has been gutted. Money can buy their attention. You could put out glossy mailers. There’s a lot you could do. The further up you go from that, to Senate to president, the more attention there is already, the less the money counts.

And you saw this with the Harris campaign. They raised a ton of money, and they spent it the way that most campaigns spend it, which is on trying to get people’s attention, whether that’s through advertising or door knocking — but largely attention and then persuasion: I’m running for president. Here’s what I want to do. Here’s why you should vote for me.

Now you can do that at billions of dollars’ worth of advertising, and everything is just like drops of rain in a river because there is so much competition for attention.

What Trump and Musk figured out is that what matters is the total attentional atmosphere. That in some ways, it’s kind of a sucker’s game to try to pop in and be like: I got an ad. Hey, hey, do you like tax cuts? What do you like?

All that is just going to whiz past people. The sort of attentional atmosphere — that’s where the fight is.

And that’s what Musk’s Twitter purchase ended up being — an enormous, almost Archimedean, lever on the electorate.

I think this is right. I think there’s another distinction between Democrats and Republicans here. Which is that I think Democrats still believe that the type of attention you get is the most important thing.

If your choice is between a lot of negative attention and no attention, go for no attention. And at least the Trump side of the Republican Party believes that the volume, the sum total of attention, is the most important thing. And a lot of negative attention: not only fine — maybe great, right? Because there’s so much attentional energy and conflict.

Kamala Harris and Tim Walz and before them, Joe Biden — before the changeover, they were just terrified of an interview going badly. And Trump and Vance — they were all over the place, including in places very hostile to them.

Vance had a ton of interviews that went badly.

But they were everywhere. Because they cared about the volume of attention and were completely fine with the energy that negative attention could unlock.

I think this is the key transformational insight of Donald Trump to politics.

Generally, in politics, you want to get people’s attention for the project of persuading them. “Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears,” Mark Antony says before he proceeds to attempt to persuade them.

What Trump figured out is that in the attention age, in this sort of war of all against all, that just getting attention matters more than whatever comes after it.

And one way reliably to get people’s attention is negative attention — if you insult people, act outrageously. There was a commercial model for this — which is the shock jocks of the 1980s and ’90s that we grew up with. They were in a competitive attentional marketplace in local places.

Shock jocks said outrageous things. They weren’t trying to get someone to vote for them. They just wanted you to know that they were running the morning zoo. (...)

OK, but now I think we need to have a moment of caution. Donald Trump won the popular vote by like 1.5 percentage points, which is a terrible win. And yet there’s just no doubt Trump has won some kind of cultural and attentional victory that is much bigger in its feeling than the actual electoral victory they won.

I’m not sure this works as well in politics, but in terms of changing the culture, his win has changed the culture immediately in a way that I would not have foreseen. It does not reflect, if you just told somebody the election results — I don’t think they feel the vibe shift.

There is something happening where it is not proven to be a replicable strategy — that the old logic that we were just talking about the Democrats having, and being outdated, still does hold in a lot of races.

In terms of influence, I think negative attention is incredibly effective. You can just call it trolling politics.

The idea of trolling and the reason that trolling exists is it’s easier to get negative attention than positive attention. It creates a conundrum for the other side. Which is: Do you ignore them while they say horrible stuff? Or do you engage them and give them what they want?

And I think this kind of trolling politics, which was really Donald Trump’s insight, is the most transformational part of politics now. And you’re 100 percent correct: The media management around Democrats involves so much risk aversion. If the choice is negative attention or no attention, we take no attention every time. And that is the wrong choice. (...)

There’s a certain personality type that is OK with that negative charge. A lot of people would not have been willing to absorb the personal polarization Musk has decided to absorb to become as significant as he is.

Trump is very similar. I think most people would rather be well-regarded but somewhat forgettable to a large group of people — rather than absolutely hated by half the country in order to be quite loved by the other half. And I think that’s something in people.

What I’m asking is: Does politics now select for a kind of attentional sociopath?

I think it does select for a potential sociopath. I would push back a little bit in this respect, though. I don’t know how much of the negative feedback gets to Donald Trump and Musk —

But he’s sitting there watching MSNBC and getting mad at it, or CNN. He’s a guy who actually seeks out stuff to make him angry.

Yes, but I guess what I’m trying to say is I think it bothers him and Musk, too. I guess I just don’t buy that it rolls off their back. They’re kind of obsessed with it, also. So that fixation is manifest differently. But the idea that they’re sort of Zen-like: Well, you know, people are just going to hate.

That’s not what’s going on psychologically. I worry, actually, that politics now selects for a kind of sociopathic disposition. Or just a very broken and compulsive one.

I have the show-off demon in myself and from the time I was very young wanted people to pay attention to me. I don’t love that part of me. I don’t think that’s the best part of me. I think that my relationship to it is a little fraught and intentionally managed. And I don’t think that I would be a better person if I let that beast run loose.

And I worry that the incentives are to basically do that, both for everyone individually, in politics and culture, and also in the collective public sphere.

Let me say that the thing that I think is the deepest problem here: Fundamentally, the most competitive attentional regimes select for the parts of people that are in the aggregate — and over time, the most reactionary. (...)

We’ve been, I think, talking about attention mostly in terms of social media here. I want to talk about another way: that attention and the way we think about stories changed in this period. Which is reality television — which is the other side of this that Trump comes out of.

One thing that has felt true to me about Trump’s second term, much more than the first, is that it feels like reality television. It is all these secondary characters with their own subplots and their own arcs: What’s going to happen with Pete Hegseth? And over here is Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. and Musk.

In the first term, Trump was the only character of the Trump administration. Now he’s playing a role that feels to me much more like the host — like sometimes he comes out and somebody actually is voted off the island. It’s like: Well, Matt Gaetz is gone now. Or so and so has gone. People get fired, or he settles the big plot of that week.

He’s going to side with Musk and Ramaswamy on H-1B visas — or he comes in to announce a new plot, like Greenland. He’s not the only figure — he’s the host, the decider. Compared with other administrations, even compared with his first, this one is feeling programmed in a very different way. (...)

Does that resonate for you?

It does resonate. If you’ve ever talked to people in reality television, they have selected for people with very flawed personalities, borderline personality disorder, narcissism. Because that produces conflict and conflict produces drama, and conflict is what keeps attention.

And those people like attention. Not all of them — but the ones they pick, right? You pick people on reality shows who like attention, who are willing to absorb negative attention to be the star.

Exactly right. And you don’t pick people who are sort of shy and go along to get along. Because what does that get you? So that model I think explains a lot about the personalities who are selected for in the context of intense attentional competition.

In terms of the programming, I totally agree — although I do think it’s instinctual for him. I don’t think it’s that plotted out. But I do think fundamentally he thinks that he needs the attention at all times. And he just has an intuitive sense of that. And Greenland is a perfect example.

There were a thousand of them in the first Trump administration. There will be a thousand more. What do you do with it? Is it attention-getting to be like: The incoming president wants to take over Greenland? Yes, it is. Is he serious? I don’t know. Is it a good idea? No, it’s not.

Should we debate it? Should we talk about it? I don’t know. But we’re all just now inside the attentional vortex of the Greenland conversation. And he’s done that again and again and again. (...)

That connects to the next layer, which is the obsession with what’s called the mainstream media, the legacy media. All of which is understandable. But it’s increasingly a conversation that a relatively small part of the country is a part of, and they’re still laser focused on that. And they’re laser focused on it in terms of not making news.

I think about this phrase all the time, “not making news.” As opposed to “making news.” “Making news” means getting people’s attention. “Not making news” means not getting people’s attention.

And the goal of a lot of Democrats in their communication is to “not make news.” And Donald Trump’s goal is always to “make news.”

In a way, the fact that I keep hearing Democrats call this a media problem rather than say an attention problem —

Reflects exactly the problem. 

by Ezra Klein and Chris Hayes, NY Times |  Read more:

Image: Mathieu Larone

[ed. A little longer than usual but this seems like an important topic. Do read the whole thing. And, for a really great burn: I knew one day I’d have to watch powerful men burn the world down – I just didn’t expect them to be such losers (Guardian). *Cringe*]