Ani DiFranco

The sky is gray
The sand is gray
And the ocean is gray

And I feel right at home

In this stunning monochrome
Alone in my way 

I smoke and I drink
And every time I blink
I have a tiny dream

But as bad as I am
I'm proud of the fact
That I'm worse than I seem

What kind of paradise am I looking for?
I've got everything I want and still I want more
Maybe some tiny shiny key
Will wash up on the shore...

Lyrics

Caring for All

"Hit them where they’re strong.” That’s the political approach Karl Rove, veteran Republican campaign strategist, employed to convince the majority of the American people to vote for George W. Bush for President not once, but twice. It’s a brilliant political strategy because it forces the opposition to defend strengths they had all but taken for granted, and in the process, expose their own weaknesses.

So, when the Trump team published an op-ed last week attacking Medicare-for-All, they were admitting the strength of this policy as a clarion call for Democrats this Midterm election. Hit them where they’re strong.

The Trump administration knows that Medicare-for-All is popular policy. A recent poll showed that seventy percent of all Americans support the policy, including a full eighty-five percent of Democrats (a slim majority of Republicans even polled in favor). And in a year where Democratic turnout, driven by, well, everything that’s happened since 11/9/2016, is likely to be high, Trump will do anything to turn out his base or risk losing his majorities in both houses of Congress. How do you turn them out? Do exactly what Trump has done for his entire, albeit short, political career: Scare them. Psychology tells us that loss aversion—the fear of losing a thing you already have—is a more powerful motivator than the potential for gain. For an op/ed bashing Medicare-for-All, this leads to a classic Trumpian play: take a policy that guarantees universal access to healthcare for all Americans, and spin it as a scary policy that will actually take away your healthcare.

Let’s get the obligatory fact-checking out of the way, shall we?

The Trump op-ed says “the Democrats’ plan means that after a life of hard work and sacrifice, seniors would no longer be able to depend on the benefits they were promised.” In fact, current versions of the plan would actually add benefits to Medicare, like dental and vision, and would make care more affordable for seniors by eliminating most co-pays and deductibles.

Here, Trump plays to the refrain we’ve heard about Medicare for a long time now from both sides of the aisle: Medicare is becoming unsustainable. That’s true. But it’s exactly why we need Medicare-for-All.

How can including more people in Medicare both strengthen it and add benefits? While that may sound counterintuitive, there’s a perfectly good explanation. To be sustainable, any insurance system requires there to be more money paid into the insurance pool than is drawn out. Older people are usually sicker than their younger counterparts. That means their healthcare costs are higher, and they cost the system more. Younger people are usually healthier, and spend far less on healthcare every year. Right now, aside from a few other special groups, Medicare only covers those over 65—those who, by dint of age, are sicker and most costly. Young people are left to the private market or Medicaid. Moving younger, healthier people (and their insurance dollars) onto Medicare increases the pool of money in the system, making sure there’s enough for seniors, too. So, yes, by putting more money into the system from people who use less healthcare, Medicare-for-All will actually make Medicare more sustainable, and improve benefits for older folks.

Because Medicare-for-All will cover comprehensive benefits and eliminate most out-of-pocket costs, it will also do away with the need that too many seniors have for the “Medicare Advantage” plans Trump refers to. (“The first thing the Democratic plan will do to end choice for seniors is eliminate Medicare Advantage plans for about 20 million seniors.”) These are essentially private managed care plans that fill the gaps in traditional Medicare: they charge lower out-of-pocket costs, or they offer additional benefits like dental coverage. In exchange for filling these gaps, these plans reduce the choice seniors really want: the choice in what doctors you see. This is where traditional Medicare shines today, and where Medicare-for-All would shine tomorrow: nearly all doctors would accept Medicare-for-All (similar to Medicare today), greatly increasing the choices Americans have when it comes to their healthcare.

Medicare-for-All won’t outlaw private health insurance. (“Democrats outlaw private plans…”) Current versions of the proposal only prohibit sale of private plans that offer duplicate coverage of services already covered under Medicare-for-All. And because the benefits under these proposals are generous, this makes private insurance simply unnecessary for most people. This makes the system more efficient: free-market dogma assumes that private companies will always be more efficient than the government, but that’s just not true when it comes to health insurance. In fact, private health insurance is way less efficient than Medicare today. First, every insurance corporation has its own overhead costs. So instead of one overhead in a single-payer system like Medicare-for-All, you have redundant overhead costs for every single insurer in the system. That creates more overhead overall, inflating the costs of healthcare. Second, insurance corporations have one primary goal: make money. So while traditional Medicare has administrative overhead around 2%, private insurers can skim up to 15% off the top of every healthcare dollar, which either goes straight to profits or covers the other costs of running healthcare like a big business. That’s how their CEOs make tens of millions of dollars, after all. That’s money we all pay—a source of deep inefficiency.

And let’s face it, nobody really likes their insurance company, anyway. Most of the time, even if you have Cadillac private health insurance, you usually have to pay a copay every time you see your healthcare provider, rack up bills until you hit your deductible, and fight with your insurer to cover major costs like hospital stays or surgery. Private insurance is a headache.

Medicare today isn’t perfect either, but the fact remains that Medicare-for-All would provide better coverage than pretty much any private plan today.

And Medicare-for-All costs less than our current system. If this sounds too good to be true, take a moment to remind yourself just how broken and expensive our current non-system already is. Reminder: our healthcare costs per person are almost double what other high-income countries pay. One in six dollars spent in the American economy is spent on healthcare.

But none of that will stop you from hearing, over and over, scary-sounding numbers about how expensive Medicare-for-All will be. Republican attack ads fixate on what the plan will add to the federal government’s budget—but not how much it will save the average American family. Everyone knows that you can’t figure out whether something is ‘worth it’ just by looking at its price. For example, if you’re in the market for a new car because your old one costs you $1500 a month in repairs, you can’t just fixate on the price tag for the new one. You have to consider the trade-in value of your old car—plus what you’ll save on repairs.

And so it is with Medicare-for-All: healthcare costs would go up for the federal government, but costs would go down even more for employers, state governments, and most importantly, families (remember: you wouldn’t need to pay premiums to private insurance companies anymore). Even estimates from the Koch-funded Mercatus Center have shown that Medicare-for-All would save the American people literally trillions of dollars. So yes, Medicare-for-All is expensive. But it’s a lot cheaper than the current system.

A major way that Medicare-for-All saves money is by repairing the broken incentives in our current system. Today’s system rewards big hospitals and big insurers with massive profits when they collude to keep prices high. They use their size to negotiate pay rates for services and procedures in bulk that drive small providers and insurers out of the market. That’s caused massive consolidation among both hospital systems and insurance providers. Who suffers? People—the ones who get healthcare and the ones who provide it. Independent physicians can’t compete with the big health systems, and doctors are increasingly being driven to work for huge conglomerates that take away their autonomy. This loss of competition also jeopardizes the ability of healthcare workers to secure fair working conditions and a living wage. Meanwhile, patients suffer because profit-seeking oligopolies on both sides of a healthcare payment leave us with less choice and higher costs.

Medicare-for-All solves the consolidation problem by taking the profit motive out of the insurance system and setting fair reimbursement rates for everyone, which neutralizes the monopoly power of hospitals and brings down costs. And by allowing the single payer—Medicare—to enforce fair labor standards, Medicare-for-All supports the workers who actually provide our healthcare. Negotiating bulk discounts on prescription drugs to stand up to the pharmaceutical industry and save Americans money is just icing on the cake.

by Dr. Abdul El-Sayed & Micah Johnson, Current Affairs |  Read more:

Image: uncredited

'Do Not Track,' the Privacy Tool Used by Millions of People, Doesn't Do Anything

When you go into the privacy settings on your browser, there’s a little option there to turn on the “Do Not Track” function, which will send an invisible request on your behalf to all the websites you visit telling them not to track you. A reasonable person might think that enabling it will stop a porn site from keeping track of what she watches, or keep Facebook from collecting the addresses of all the places she visits on the internet, or prevent third-party trackers she’s never heard of from following her from site to site. According to a recent survey by Forrester Research, a quarter of American adults use “Do Not Track” to protect their privacy. (Our own stats at Gizmodo Media Group show that 9% of visitors have it turned on.) We’ve got bad news for those millions of privacy-minded people, though: “Do Not Track” is like spray-on sunscreen, a product that makes you feel safe while doing little to actually protect you.

“Do Not Track,” as it was first imagined a decade ago by consumer advocates, was going to be a “Do Not Call” list for the internet, helping to free people from annoying targeted ads and creepy data collection. But only a handful of sites respect the request, the most prominent of which are Pinterest and Medium. (Pinterest won’t use offsite data to target ads to a visitor who’s elected not to be tracked, while Medium won’t send their data to third parties.) The vast majority of sites, including this one, ignore it. (...)

“It is, in many respects, a failed experiment,” said Jonathan Mayer, an assistant computer science professor at Princeton University. “There’s a question of whether it’s time to declare failure, move on, and withdraw the feature from web browsers.”

That’s a big deal coming from Mayer: He spent four years of his life helping to bring Do Not Track into existence in the first place.

Why do we have this meaningless option in browsers? The main reason why Do Not Track, or DNT, as insiders call it, became a useless tool is that the government refused to step in and give it any kind of legal authority. If a telemarketer violates the Do Not Call list, they can be fined up to $16,000 per violation. There is no penalty for ignoring Do Not Track.

In 2010, the Federal Trade Commission endorsed the idea of Do Not Track, but rather than mandating its creation, the Obama administration encouraged industry to figure out how it should work via a “multistakeholder process” that was overseen by W3C, an international non-governmental organization that develops technical standards for the web. It wound up being an absolutely terrible idea.

Technologists quickly came up with the code necessary to say “Don’t track me,” by having the browser send out a “DNT:1" signal along with other metadata, such as what machine the browser is using and what font is being displayed. It was a tool similar to “robots.txt,” which can be inserted into the HTML of a web page to tell search engines not to index that page so it won’t show up in search results. The “stakeholders” involved in the DNT standard-setting process—mainly privacy advocates, technologists, and online advertisers—couldn’t, though, come to an agreement about what a website should actually do in response to the request. (The W3C did come up with a recommendation about what websites and third parties should do when a browser sends the signal—namely, don’t collect their personal data, or de-identify it if you have to—but the people that do the data collection never accepted it as a standard.)

“Do Not Track could have succeeded only if there had been some incentive for the ad tech industry to reach a consensus with privacy advocates and other stakeholders—some reason why a failure to reach a negotiated agreement would be a worse outcome for the industry,” said Arvind Narayanan, a professor at Princeton University who was one of the technologists at the table. “Around 2011, the threat of federal legislation brought them to the negotiating table. But gradually, that threat disappeared. The prolonged negotiations, in fact, proved useful to the industry to create the illusion of a voluntary self-regulatory process, seemingly preempting the need for regulation.”

by Kashmir Hill, Gizmodo |  Read more:

Image: Angelica Alzona (Gizmodo Media Group)

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Tom Gauld
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The Bookish Life

The village idiot of the shtetl of Frampol was offered the job of waiting at the village gates to greet the arrival of the Messiah. “The pay isn’t great,” he was told, “but the work is steady.” The same might be said about the conditions of the bookish life: low pay but steady work. By the bookish life, I mean a life in which the reading of books has a central, even a dominating, place. I recall some years ago a politician whose name is now as lost to me as it is to history who listed reading among his hobbies, along with fly-fishing and jogging. Reading happens to be my hobby, too, along with peristalsis and respiration.

Like the man—the fellow with the name ­Solomon, writing under the pen name ­Ecclesiastes—said, “Of the making of many books there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh.” So many books are there in the world that no one can get round to even all the best among them, and hence no one can claim to be truly well-read. Some ­people are merely better-read than others. Nobody has read, or can read, everything, and by everything I include only the good, the beautiful, the important books.

The first question is “How can one tell which books qualify as good, beautiful, important?” In an essay of 1978 called “On Reading Books: A Barbarian’s Cogitations,” Alexander ­Gerschenkron, a Harvard economist of wide learning, set out three criteria: A good book must be interesting, memorable, and rereadable. This is as sensible as it is ­unhelpful. How can one know if a book is ­interesting until one has read it; memorable until time has or has not lodged it in one’s memory; rereadable until the decades pass and one feels the need to read it again and enjoys it all the more on doing so?

Not much help, either, is likely to be found in ­various lists of the world’s best books. In 1771 a man named Robert Skipwith, later to be Thomas Jefferson’s wife’s brother-in-law, asked Jefferson to compile for him a list of indispensable books. ­Jefferson obliged with a list of 148 titles, mostly Greek and Roman classics, and some intensely practical treatises, among them a book on horse-hoeing husbandry. The Guardian not long ago published a list of the world’s one hundred best nonfiction books in English, and while nearly every one seemed eminently worthy, one could just as easily add another hundred books that should have been on such a list, and this does not include all the world’s splendid works of fiction, drama, and poetry, and not merely in English alone. In 1960, Clifton Fadiman, then a notable literary critic, produced a work called The Lifetime Reading Plan, a work of 378 pages, which I have chosen never to read, lest it take up the time I might devote to a better book.

Such lists reveal a yearning for a direct route to wisdom. Brace yourself for the bad news: None is available. If one wanted to establish expertise in a restricted field—economics, say, or art history, or botany—such a list might be useful. But for the road to acquiring the body of unspecialized knowledge that sometimes goes by the name of general culture, sometimes known as the pursuit of wisdom, no map, no blueprint, no plan, no shortcut exists, nor, as I hope to make plain, could it. (...)

What is the true point of a bookish life? Note I write “point,” not “goal.” The bookish life can have no goal: It is all means and no end. The point, I should say, is not to become immensely knowledgeable or clever, and certainly not to become learned. Montaigne, who more than five centuries ago established the modern essay, grasped the point when he wrote, “I may be a man of fairly wide reading, but I retain nothing.” Retention of everything one reads, along with being mentally impossible, would only crowd and ultimately cramp one’s mind. “I would very much love to grasp things with a complete understanding,” Montaigne wrote, “but I cannot bring myself to pay the high cost of doing so. . . . From books all I seek is to give myself pleasure by an honorable pastime; or if I do study, I seek only that branch of learning which deals with knowing myself and which teaches me how to live and die well.” What Montaigne sought in his reading, as does anyone who has thought at all about it, is “to become more wise, not more learned or more eloquent.” As I put it elsewhere some years ago, I read for the pleasures of style and in the hope of “laughter, exaltation, insight, enhanced consciousness,” and, like Montaigne, on lucky days perhaps to pick up a touch of wisdom along the way.

The act of reading—office memos, newspaper articles on trade and monetary policy, and bureaucratic bumpf apart—should if possible never be separable from pleasure. Twenty or so years ago there was a vogue for speed-reading. (“I took a speed-reading course and read War and Peace in twenty minutes,” Woody Allen quipped. “It involves Russia.”) But why, one wonders, would you wish to speed up an activity that gives pleasure? Speed-reading? I’d as soon take a course in speed-eating or speed-lovemaking. Yet the notion of speed generally hovers over the act of reading. “A real page-turner,” people say of certain novels or biographies. I prefer to read books that are page-stoppers, that cause me to stop and contemplate a striking idea, an elegant phrase, an admirably constructed sentence. A serious reader reads with a pencil in hand, to sideline, underline, make a note.

Nor, I suspect, is the bookish soul likely to read chiefly on a Kindle or a tablet. I won’t go into the matter of the aesthetics of book design, the smell of books, the fine feel of a well-made book in one’s hands, lest I be taken for a hedonist, a reactionary, and a snob. More important, apart from the convenience of Kindles and tablets—in allowing for enlarged print, in portability if one wants to take more than one or two books along when traveling—I have come to believe that there is a mysterious but quite real difference between words on pixel and words in print. For reasons that perhaps one day brain ­science will reveal to us, print has more weight, a more substantial feel, makes a greater demand on one’s attention, than the pixel. One tends not to note a writer’s style as clearly in pixels as one does in print. Presented with a thirty- or forty-paragraph piece of writing in pixels, one wants to skim after fifteen or twenty paragraphs in a way that one doesn’t ordinarily wish to do in print. Pixels for information and convenience, then, print for knowledge and pleasure is my sense of the difference between the two. (...)

In the risky generalization department, slow readers tend to be better readers—more careful, more critical, more thoughtful. I myself rarely read more than twenty-five or thirty pages of a serious book in a single sitting. Reading a novel by Thomas Mann, a short story by Chekhov, a historical work by ­Theodor Mommsen, essays by Max Beerbohm, why would I wish to rush through them? Savoring them seems more sensible. After all, you never know when you will pass this way again.

A great help in leading the bookish life is to recognize that as a reader, you might be omnivorous, but you can never be anywhere near omniscient. The realization removes a great deal of pressure. Some of this pressure derives from the claim of recent years that there is a much wider world than the Western one most of us grew up and were educated in. If one is not to be thought parochial in one’s interests, the argument holds, one is responsible for knowing not Western culture alone but also the cultures of the Far and Near East. Yet when I think of all I haven’t read in or about Western culture, I am perfectly prepared to take a pass on Islam,Hinduism, Shintoism, Buddhism, and the rich store of Chinese Confucian and contemplative literature. These and more will have to wait until I have read Pindar, Terence, Hume’s History of England, Taine, Zola, and a few hundred other such items, not to speak of the books I should like to reread. They’ll have to wait, it begins to look, until the next life, which, I like to think, will surely provide a well-stocked library. If it doesn’t, I’m not sure I want any part of it. Hell of course will have a library, but one stocked exclusively with science fiction, six-hundred-odd page novels by men whose first name is Jonathan, and books extolling the 1960s. (...)

Which brings me to the clutter that books can bring into a home. Books Do Furnish a Room is a truism as well as the title of the tenth novel in ­Anthony Powell’s twelve-volume Dance to the Music of Time novel cycle, but it needs to be added that books can also take over a room—and not one room alone. Harry Wolfson, the Harvard scholar and philosopher, is said to have used both his refrigerator and oven to store books. I tell you this so your feelings shouldn’t be hurt if, had you happened to have known him, Professor Wolfson failed to invite you to dinner.

I have myself twice sold off large numbers of my books. I had hoped to keep my own collection of books within respectable bounds—down, say, to the two or three hundred of the books I most love—but have found that impossible. I also instituted a failed policy of telling myself that for every book I brought home, I would get rid of one already in my possession. Meanwhile, over the years, I seem to have acquired two thousand or so books. Publishers and people send me books. Like an incorrigible juvenile delinquent who can’t stay out of pool halls, I wander into used bookshops and do not often emerge empty-handed. Books in my apartment continue to multiply. Some of them, I suspect, do it overnight, in the dark, while I am asleep.

by Joseph Epstein, First Things |  Read more:

Image: Plum leaves via Creative Commons

Junk Merchants

With America's political order settling into a seemingly permanent state of crisis-on-autopilot, it is just a matter of time before the paper economy follows suit. Last week’s dramatic Wall Street selloffs saw the Dow Jones roster shed around 4 percent of its collective value. Tech stocks, always at the frothiest tip of investment bubbles, took an especially pronounced beating. Jeff Bezos, the Amazon impresario, lost (as of last Wednesday) a cool $9.1 billion in net worth, more than triple Mark Zuckerberg’s bracing $2.5 billion market bath.

But just as reliably as investors clamor to a stampede of wealth destruction, market savants and the shills of the business press adjourn to their Bloomberg terminals and CNBC podiums to issue reassuring directives about the soundness of the market’s overall direction, bumpy selloffs and localized panics notwithstanding. When a similar downturn wracked Wall Street in February, Bloomberg editor Robert Burgess insisted that all was well, so far as underlying fundamentals and such were concerned: corporate profits were outperforming expectations, the WTO had revised its global growth forecasts upward, and traditional shelters against panic such as Treasury bonds were not seeing appreciable gains.

All of which proved true enough—until it didn’t. The October market swoon has, in fact, already seen boosts in Treasuries and gold prices, suggesting that this bout of jitters might have some basis in broader economic conditions. More worrying still is the massive overleveraging of the corporate economy, which according to a recent report by Burgess’s employer, has seen more than $1 trillion in investment money careening toward junk-bond status. Indeed, the main reason all this merger-driven debt hasn’t received a forthright junk rating is due to the reliably corrupt practices of the industry-captive debt-rating racket. In their survey of the fifty largest mergers-and-acquisition deals of the past year, Bloomberg’s Molly Smith and Christopher Cannon noted that “by one key measure, more than half of the acquiring companies pushed their leverage to levels typical of junk-rated peers. But those companies . . . have been allowed to maintain investment-grade ratings by Moody’s Investors Service and S&P Global Ratings.”

But of course, few economic commentators are talking about the sink hole of shitty debt opening up beneath the Dow Jones trading floor—any more than they were inclined, circa 2007, to wonder whether housing prices would succumb to the laws of gravity. No, the flight of investment capital merely marks the onset of a fresh round of inflation jitters among our titans of finance, as the Fed prepares to further nudge up interest rates. After operating with a virtually unlimited supply of free money over the past decade, the masters of our financial universe are adapting to a reconfigured investment environment the best way they know how—by hoovering up all available cash and going home to count their T-bills. (...)

Such wishful trend-spotting may play well on cable news outlets, where it gets teed up alongside Trump’s pronouncement that the Fed has gone “crazy” in its bid to rein in the flow of free money to Wall Street. But the pundit sideline of market phrenology, like Trump’s camera-ready tantrums, pointedly overlooks the stubborn structural forces that are now causing our heroic capital flows to seize up in concert. It’s not simply the M and A sector, but the paper economy at large, that’s been on a stupendous debt binge since the serial corporate tax cuts the Trump administration has visited on the financial sector for no good earthly reason. (Apart, that is, from the seeming across-the-board allergy to tax liability shared by both the president and his hidden-genius son-in-law.) Wall Street has indeed been so flush with unearned pelf that its single largest expenditure has been in corporate stock buybacks—a boondoggle for the investment class, to be sure, but a key accelerant of inequality in the actually existing productive economy. (...)

In other words, whether last week’s stampede proves to be the overture to worse market reckonings to come, or what our thought leadership class is now fond of calling a blip, it already stands out in the annals of investment chicanery for its sheer gratuitous awfulness. The stock market has never had anything more than a notionally symbolic relationship to the underlying conditions of the American economy, but here at the summit of neoliberal policy delusion, it’s been re-engineered into a full-blown monument to social cruelty for its own sake—something too crass and gruesome even to qualify as a conceptual art installation. The scandal won’t so much be in the magnitude of the next great recession, when and if it comes, but rather in the predatory status quo we’ve come to accept as the picture of economic health.

by Chris Lehmann, The Baffler | Read more:
Image: Russ Allison Loar

Dmitri Cavander, Living Room at Night, December 2002
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Printer Makers Are Crippling Cheap Ink Cartridges Via Bogus 'Security Updates'

Printer maker Epson is under fire this month from activist groups after a software update prevented customers from using cheaper, third party ink cartridges. It’s just the latest salvo in a decades-long effort by printer manufacturers to block consumer choice, often by disguising printer downgrades as essential product improvements.

For several decades now printer manufacturers have lured consumers into an arguably-terrible deal: shell out a modest sum for a mediocre printer, then pay an arm and a leg for replacement printer cartridges that cost relatively-little to actually produce.

Unsurprisingly, this resulted in a booming market for discount cartridges and refillable alternatives. Just as unsurprisingly, major printer vendors quickly set about trying to kill this burgeoning market via all manner of lawsuits and dubious behavior.

Initially, companies like Lexmark filed all manner of unsuccessful copyright and patent lawsuits against third-party cartridge makers. When that didn’t work, hardware makers began cooking draconian restrictions into printers, ranging from unnecessary cartridge expiration dates to obnoxious DRM and firmware updates blocking the use of “unofficial” cartridges.

As consumer disgust at this behavior has grown, printer makers have been forced to get more creative in their efforts to block consumer choice.

HP, for example, was widely lambasted back in 2016 when it deployed a “security update” that did little more than block the use of cheaper third-party ink cartridges. HP owners that dutifully installed the update suddenly found their printers wouldn’t work if they’d installed third-party cartridges, forcing them back into the arms of pricier, official HP cartridges.

Massive public backlash forced HP to issue a flimsy mea culpa and reverse course, but the industry doesn’t appear to have learned its lesson quite yet.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation now says that Epson has been engaged in the same behavior. The group says it recently learned that in late 2016 or early 2017, Epson issued a “poison pill” software update that effectively downgraded user printers to block third party cartridges, but disguised the software update as a meaningful improvement.

The EFF has subsequently sent a letter to Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, arguing that Epson’s lack of transparency can easily be seen as “misleading and deceptive” under Texas consumer protection laws.

“When restricted to Epson’s own cartridges, customers must pay Epson’s higher prices, while losing the added convenience of third party alternatives, such as refillable cartridges and continuous ink supply systems,” the complaint notes. “This artificial restriction of third party ink options also suppresses a competitive ink market and has reportedly caused some manufacturers of refillable cartridges and continuous ink supply systems to exit the market.”

Epson did not immediately return a request for comment.

Activist, author, and EFF member Cory Doctorow tells Motherboard that Epson customers in other states that were burned by the update should contact the organization. That feedback will then be used as the backbone for additional complaints to other state AGs.

by Karl Bode, Motherboard |  Read more:

Image: Shutterstock
[ed. Of course they are (but who installs printer updates, anyway?)]

In Conversation: Peter Dinklage

In a hotel room high above midtown Manhattan, Peter Dinklage is discussing, among other things, his present — that’d be HBO’s My Dinner With Hervé, in which he plays the late Fantasy Island star Hervé Villechaize. (Based on a real-life encounter between Villechaize and writer-director Sacha Gervasi, the TV-movie premieres on October 20.) And on the sidewalk down below, a group of fans is waiting, clutching mementos of his past. That is, they’re hoping the actor will sign their Game of Thrones memorabilia when he leaves. (The show, in which he plays Tyrion Lannister, wrapped shooting its final season this past summer.) “I take more of an issue with fame than Hervé did,” says the 49-year-old Dinklage, who’s aware of the ways in which Villechaize’s celebrity was a precursor to his own. “It’s a dance, but one you can never really control. As an actor, the best you can do is try to bring some honesty into your parts and hope people will follow.”

What did Hervé represent to you when you first became aware of him?

Well, Hervé and I had nothing in common but our height, but I remember thinking, He’s underused. I’d become aware of him around the same time everybody else did: I saw Fantasy Island. It was a wild show, like a combination of The Twilight Zone and The Love Boat. And I’d seen The Man With the Golden Gun. Later, when I became a teenager, my thinking about him got translated with a bit more anger, like he was being used a certain way because of his size. But the funny thing is, I think I minded that much more than Hervé did, because he seemed to have genuine joy in being on Fantasy Island. And who was I as a young person living in New Jersey to judge that? Hervé was complicated, and this was the first time I’d ever played someone who’d been a living, breathing person. It challenged my judgments. (...)

Were you aware as a teenager of the idea of acting as a way to own the attention you were getting? Or did you only realize that later?

I think probably I was aware of it. Not wanting unwanted attention but commanding it on my terms. I don’t know. It’s hard to trace back the psychology. What goes through a kid’s mind? But it’s about having your hand on the dial. You’re turning it up when you want and turning it down when you want. As an actor, you can do that. And for someone the least bit physically different, I guess you want to be in control of that dial. But as a kid, I just loved the creative joy of acting and, yes, the attention — on my terms.

I read the commencement speech that you gave at Bennington.

Oh, God.

It was lovely.

Most terrifying thing I’ve ever done. I had never been asked to give a speech before.

There are parts in that speech where you talk about the lessons you took from your immediate postcollege life, when you were in New York and struggling to be an actor. It’s clear that you’ve figured out what those lean years mean for the larger story of your life. I’m curious if you have any sense, now that you’re done filming, of what the Game of Thrones years mean for you and your path?

Even though it’s only been a couple of months since we finished, I would like to think that I already have some capacity to look back on it. I’m glad the show happened in my life when it happened. I’m glad I wasn’t much younger or older. I’d done a lot of work before getting the show that I think informed what I wound up doing on Game of Thrones, and, hopefully, I still have a lot of work left in me, which will be informed by Game of Thrones. The show was a beautiful experience — doesn’t happen all the time. But it was such a long shoot, so it’s hard to separate the TV show from my life.

Tell me more about that.

It was my life, far away in Ireland. People think I’ll miss the TV show — yes, of course I’ll miss it, but I also lived in a foreign country for many years and developed deep roots. That’s a big part of me, and suddenly it’s just like, Yep, that’s over. Back home now. Wait, what? Really? Actors do these things and then we move on or go back home. You keep in touch — or lose touch — with the group of people you were very close with. It’s strange. I wonder how healthy that is. Probably it’s unhealthy.

How did you find being an American in Europe over the last few years? Did people keep asking you to explain our politics?

Oh, sure. They basically have the opinion of “what’s wrong with you people? What’s up with you people and the guns?” My experience is that people have nothing but love and respect for our country — a lot of them dream of coming here and working here, especially in the film community — but gun culture is a big question mark. The longer you stay away from America, the more it can look like the Wild West.

But as far as the arc of your career, you’re not in the part of it where you’re trying to establish yourself and —

That’s still happening.

Is it?

I think so. (...)

Do you see your path leading to a place where you don’t act anymore?

No, no. If somebody like Jonathan Glazer or David Fincher or Spike Jonze calls up, I’ll be there in a heartbeat. But for the most part, I’d like to help create from the beginning.

What you were saying before about the strangeness of saying good-bye to the people with whom you’ve worked so intensely — when you were wrapping on Game of Thrones, how emotionally conscious were you of the experience coming to an end?

On a personal level? With the character?

Both. How did you say good-bye?

It’s always anticlimactic for the character’s last day. Nothing is shot chronologically, so you don’t get some big mountaintop scene or anything. It’s just, “That’s a wrap on Peter Dinklage.” But as anticlimactic as it was, my last day was also beautifully bittersweet. A lot of people whom I love were on set that day. Even if they weren’t working, they came to set, which was beautiful. I tried to do the same thing when other [Game of Thrones] actors were wrapping out. If it was their day, you would go to set to say good-bye. It was really hard. I won’t say their name or their character’s name, but one of the young people on the show wrapped this past season and everybody was a wreck. This person had grown up on the show, you know? They were a child and now they were an adult. And then they’re done. It’s like we were witnessing this person saying good-bye to their childhood. I know Game of Thrones is just a TV show, la-di-da, but it was our life.

What about Tyrion? Was it hard to say good-bye to the character?

I don’t know if I’m [a] Method [actor] in that way. I was a little Method with Hervé — staying in that voice. But you can’t really be Method for nine seasons of a TV show. You’d go nuts. And there’s a difference between being Method and indulgent. You can smell that ego thing a mile away. It’s good to stay in the zone, but if it’s about showing off your peacock feathers, I’m not buying it. Acting is a trick. I wouldn’t say it’s difficult. Elements of it are. For me, the fame thing is. But the work itself — we’re not digging ditches for a living. I think acting is one of the professions where everybody who’s doing it wants to be doing it. That’s not true for every job.

I know this is a cliché, but if you can find consistent enjoyment in your work, you’ve solved one of the keys to life.

Yeah, that reminds me of the Jim Jarmusch film, Night on Earth. Gena Rowlands plays this high-powered Hollywood executive, and Winona Ryder plays her cab driver from the airport. At the end, she offers Winona Ryder the lead in her movie, and Winona’s character is like, “No, I’m not interested.” “What? Everybody wants to be a famous actress.” “I like being a cab driver.” I think about that. How beautiful is that?

by David Marchese, Vulture | Read more:
Image: Bobby Doherty

Paul Allen (Jan., 1953 - Oct., 2018)

‘A giant in Washington history’: Paul Allen, co-founder of Microsoft and owner of Seahawks, dead at 65

[ed. Breaking news. See also: Microsoft's Odd Couple and Dan Savage's Open Letter to Paul Allen on Lidding I-5, Righting a Wrong, and Leaving a Legacy. Wikipedia: Paul Allen.]

Mold Eats World

Long before the storm came, and floodwaters barged into her home, Joan Bennett remembers how she would go into the woods and find beautiful mushrooms. She dug them up, and, with her mother’s permission, planted the fungi in her family’s basement. It was the late 1950s, not long after her family moved from Bay Ridge, Brooklyn, to Westchester County, just north of New York City, and Bennett would have died if any of her friends from high school knew what she was doing. Through trial and error, Bennett learned that if you watered fungi like any old flowering plant, the organisms turned to slime and died. These clandestine attempts at cultivating mushrooms, trying to find the right conditions to make them flourish, were some of the earliest experiments she conducted—the prescientific days, she says, just messing around. In retrospect, it was one of her first steps on a lifelong path that would weave together a love of science and a love of fungi.

In 1963, while she was applying to graduate schools after getting a degree in biology from New Jersey’s Upsala College, Bennett received a course catalog from the University of Chicago. Flipping through the catalog to see what courses were offered by the botany department, the words “fungal genetics” caught her eye. She decided she wanted to be a fungal geneticist, a decision that put her at odds with the prevailing values of both molecular biology and womanhood at the time. Instead of finding a husband and having kids and doing, as she says, “whatever it was that women were supposed to do back in the 1950s,” or focusing on E. coli or phage—two trendy organisms in that field at the time—she became a scientist who studied mold.

Mold is a filamentous form of fungi that often resembles bruise-dark discolorations or cottony tufts of blue or white threads. There is, as the Centers for Disease Control notes, “always a little mold everywhere”—the types number in the hundreds of thousands, creating the flavor of blue cheese or appearing on shower curtains and loaves of bread. Over the past few years, though, the American public has increasingly seen mold as a toxic presence in their homes.

In that context, many people view mold as unsightly, unhealthy, potentially lethal. Mold is scary.

This is not a totally new reputation for mold, and it can be malevolent: certain species produce aflatoxins that can contaminate foods with some of the most carcinogenic compounds known to science. But for most of Bennett’s life, she has seen mold as a positive force. She recognizes its marvelous creations: cheese, soy sauce, rice wine, and all sorts of drugs, ranging from cholesterol-lowering statins to penicillin, the landmark antibiotic. Her relationship with it took a turn after Bennett, like so many of us, saw it blanket almost every surface inside her house, clinging to curtains and carpets, lurking inside and around walls and floors and everything in between. What Bennett saw, and experienced, changed the trajectory of her life. Thanks to our changing climate, we almost certainly will be living with more mold, in one way or another, in the future. “There’s so much more flooding than there used to be,” says Bennett, who is now 76 and a distinguished professor at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, New Jersey. “Rivers that haven’t flooded for 100 years are flooding every 5 years. The sea level is rising and it’s getting warmer.”

It’s an overcast Tuesday in September, with the humidity nearing 100 percent and a category 4 hurricane called Florence barreling toward the Southeast United States. All signs point toward damp, moisture-laden conditions, ideal for incubating molds. Most people avoid both molds and the ecological crevices that they inhabit—underneath floorboards, below kitchen sinks, in basements and crawlspaces. But Bill Sothern seeks them out. Sothern, 72, is a former Army medic turned certified industrial hygienist, a New York-based professional who assesses the health and safety of homes and workplaces. Today he and I are speeding down the Brooklyn-Queens Expressway in a gold Volvo packed with metal canisters, vacuum pumps, and Air-O-Cell sampling cassettes. We’re heading to his first inspection site of the afternoon: an apartment occupied by a 35-year-old woman who claims she’s getting sick on account of sharing her living quarters with mold. “The landlord is going to be there,” Sothern warned me. “He is our adversary.”

Sothern runs Microecologies, a firm based in East Harlem that conducts indoor air-quality investigations. All day long, his cell phone rings as he fields calls from people in and around New York City asking him to verify their concerns about mold contamination. The vast majority of the time, Sothern says, he and his staff of ten find their clients’ health concerns about mold to be well-founded. Visible or measurable amounts of mold in damp, indoor environments have been associated with an increased risk of pulmonary disorders such as asthma, according to the World Health Organization. Beyond that, the field is dogged by controversy at every turn. Among mainstream scientists and industrial hygienists, the consensus is that although some molds produce the unhealthy substances known as mycotoxins, they are not ordinarily found in high enough concentrations to cause health problems in humans.

“The dose that would be required to provoke a toxic effect in humans would be so high that it would be unreasonable,” Sothern explains. “That’s where the scientific mainstream is. You go outside that and you make a lot of people skeptical about you.” The process of getting rid of mold can attract opportunists, but he sees himself as one of the good guys—someone who acknowledges legitimate fears and collects evidence. That evidence, Sothern admits, is mostly anecdotal. Of the connection between health outcomes and infestations of Stachybotrys, which is commonly known as toxic black mold, he says, “There’s just no data.”

by Peter Andrey Smith, Topic | Read more:
Image: Christopher Gregory

[ed. Its effects might be mostly anecdotal but try selling a house with mold and you will definitely experience major headaches.]

Building a Telecaster

via: YouTube

via:

Ibanez John Petrucci JPM100 P2
via

More Evidence That All Weed Is the Same

Walk into any cannabis dispensary in the US and you’ll be presented with dizzying options for getting stoned. When it comes to bud, you can select from strains like “Green Crack,” “Alaskan Thunderfuck,” or “Granddaddy Purp.” Next to these names on the menu will likely be some stats about the concentration of THC and CBD, the two main psychoactive chemicals in cannabis. These numbers offer a sense of standardization and confidence in how that product will affect you.

There’s just one problem: It’s probably bullshit.

As detailed by researchers from the University of British Columbia in a paper recently published in Scientific Reports, many strains of cannabis have almost identical levels of THC and CBD in them. Susan Murch, a chemist at the University of British Columbia, and her colleagues Elizabeth Mudge and Paula Brown examined 33 cannabis stains from five different licensed growers in British Columbia. The researchers then did a chemical analysis of these strains to see the concentrations of 13 known cannabinoids, including THC and CBD.

“The main THC and CBD composition was not different among 24 of the 33 strains we tested,” Murch told me in an email. “However all of the strains have different names from different producers, so for 73 percent of strains, the name does not really mean that they are different based only on the THC and CBD.”

Murch told me that many of the strains she and her colleagues studied were marketed with claims of "quite different" levels of CBD and THC. She said the disparity between the percentage of cannabinoids used for marketing and the actual level of cannabinoids can result from a number of factors, such as the analytical method used, variation across the plant, degradation from storage, or incorrect packaging. (...)

Historically, underground breeders with limited access to different types of cannabis plants would breed them together to produce new strains with higher CBD or THC content. Yet due to a lack of formal tracking of this process, many plants with similar genomes ended up being bred, which led to a loss of genetic diversity among the cannabis plants. According to the researchers, this is a likely reason why nearly three-quarters of the strains they analyzed had identical levels of THC and CBD.

“People have had informal breeding programs for a long time,” Murch said in a statement. “In a structured program we would keep track of the lineage, such as where the parent plants came from and their characteristics. With unstructured breeding, which is the current norm, particular plants were picked for some characteristic and then given a new name.”

In other words, the lack of information about the origin and chemical composition of most cannabis strains made it difficult to tell whether two strains with different names were really all that different, chemically speaking. Cannabis retailers market bud based on the total amounts of THC and CBD in the flower based on the assumption that the complete chemical composition of the plant can be derived from these values. As the researchers noted in their report, however, “anecdotal evidence suggests that strains with similar THC/CBD content have different effects on human physiology.”

In other words, there’s seems to be far more chemical factors that determine the nature of a high other than CBD and THC. In fact, as the researchers discovered, most strains have nearly identical levels of CBD and THC, so the differences in effects across strains can mostly be attributed to other cannabinoids.

“What we are more interested in is the unknown CBD metabolites that distinguish some of the strains,” Murch added. “We are working to figure out what these unknowns might be.”

by Daniel Oberhaus, Motherboard | Read more:
Image:Daniel Oberhaus/Motherboard

A gecko took charge of a hospital phone in Hawaii and made "a bazillion" calls with "his tiny gecko feet."
@Claire_Simeone/Twitter

via: TMN

The War on Drugs

If the U.S. Doesn’t Control Corporate Power, China Will

Last week, Bloomberg broke the news of a hack by the Chinese military of critical hardware assembled by an American company in China, affecting Apple, Amazon, and the U.S. Defense Department. While there is controversy over the story, no one doubts two key facts. Chinese hacking of Western corporations and governments is systemic, and China has a virtual monopoly over the manufacture of high-technology products, which it uses to its own advantage.

The same day as Bloomberg published the expose, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence gave a speech discussing China. Espionage, he said, was just one of a range of tricks China uses. Others include tariffs, forced technology transfers, arm-twisting of corporate leaders to lobby the U.S. government, and censorship of Hollywood through enticing Western media companies with promises of reaching Chinese audiences.

Pence was, in part, justifying President Donald Trump’s new tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars of Chinese goods. But he went beyond tariffs, outlining a strategy that includes investment limits, military patrols, and requests to companies. Pence called on Google to stop developing its search and tracking technology for the Chinese market. He even argued that U.S. corporate focus on the short term, “the next quarter,” gave an advantage to China. In other words, a deeply conservative Pence sounded like liberal stalwart Sen. Elizabeth Warren in arguing the Chinese are using America’s own short-term-oriented financial system against it. Companies, he was saying, have moral obligation above shareholder value.

That’s a strange argument to come from a Republican vice president. But it points to how China is exploiting the laissez-faire model of industrial organization Washington has enabled for decades.

As the consensus in D.C. shifts toward taking on an increasingly aggressive China, ideas about how corporations relate to the state will also have to change—or else undermine their new stated national framework.

Straightforwardly illegal hacking by China is common (although it’s hardly the only country to do it). For instance, in 2016, security researchers found that data on about 700 million Android phones and other devices programmed with Chinese firmware was being surreptitiously sent to China. Recently, Chinese state-backed chipmakers stole designs from Micron and Samsung. The Chinese have taken all kinds of intellectual property including information on smartphone-testing robots, Monsanto corn seeds, and the formula for the white pigment that goes into Oreo stuffing.

But just as common as and perhaps even more important than hacking are legal or quasi-legal methods. Chinese companies are, according to one Defense Department report, “flooding Silicon Valley with cash” to simply acquire secrets. Two years before hacking Micron, the Chinese tried to buy it. This year, Chinese automaker Geely secretly bought 10 percent of German carmaking giant Daimler, using shell companies to avoid detection, with U.S.-based Morgan Stanley doing the banking work for the deal.

Chinese state-backed companies have access to a massive legal budget, which affords them the ability to use U.S. courts to destroy American business leaders who challenge unfair deals. As a counterterrorism official pointed out in April, “When you go to a board of directors or a CEO and say, “Hey, I know you have two bids, you have Cisco or Oracle, and then you have the Chinese company which is 40 percent cheaper,’ it’s hard to explain to them and hard for them to explain to their constituents that they’re going to pay 40 percent more for a U.S.-based company because it doesn’t threaten national security.”

This exploitation of America’s corporate weaknesses is new. As Barry Lynn relates in his book Cornered, for much of the 20th century, the United States simply did not outsource production to its enemies or geopolitical competitors such as China or the Soviet Union, even if it was profitable to do so. Washington even made sure that friends couldn’t gain too much power over its political economy, ensuring that, say, Japanese allies did not gain a monopoly over flash memory.

But starting in the 1980s, U.S. lawmakers weakened the essential controls the state put on the financial system. This was not just led by anti-tax advocates like Grover Norquist and anti-government politicians like President Ronald Reagan, but also by a set of neoliberals in the Democratic Party led by President Bill Clinton, who used the theories of economist Lester Thurow to declare the era of big government over. Clinton promoted a vision of a globalized world with no nation-states impeding the free flow of capital and goods. This lack of assertive public power allowed private power to take its place, as corporations merged and organized trading flows without having to worry about the demands of public institutions.

This trade revolution built on top of an earlier intellectual revolution, one put forward by economists Milton Friedman and Michael Jensen, that shifted the basis of the American corporation to shareholder value as the prime goal of industrial organization. By focusing solely on shareholder value, investment bankers, economists, and a new breed of CEOs changed the commitment of corporations to environmental rights, workers, and local communities. They also made it so that U.S. companies felt no obligation to their own country’s national security goals. General Electric Co. Chairman Jack Welch reflected these new values in 1998 when he said, “Ideally, you’d have every plant you own on a barge to move with currencies and changes in the economy.” More recently, Google has backed away from working with the U.S. military, but it is happy to work with the Chinese government on censorship and tracking software for China’s citizens.

This lack of corporate commitment to national security didn’t seem like that big of a problem in the late 1990s, when U.S. businesses seemed impossible to dislodge. China was, after all, a poor country. But the Chinese, as Americans did in the 19th century, used this cost advantage to begin drawing large amounts of Western investment and know-how. Western companies, pressed by Wall Street, made China the factory of the world, especially for high-tech products. The strategy seemed to work for both countries, at least at first. Corporate profits boomed. China became a middle-income country, with exports of over a hundred billion dollars of computers and electronics to the U.S. annually. As investment flowed, the American state weakened, and Wall Street and the Chinese state strengthened.

Soon, however, problems appeared in this the frictionless commercial utopia. China acquired a virtual monopoly in the supply chain of high-tech goods and became much more powerful politically and financially. Toward the end of the 2000s, the Chinese government shifted its strategy from seeking investment from Western companies to displacing them. After the 2008 financial crisis undermined Western credibility, the Chinese began wielding power over Western corporations, which by now had to do business in the country. (...)

So Trump’s new China strategy of ending reliance on the Chinese manufacturing base couldn’t come soon enough. Trump, Pence announced, was finally standing up to China, with tariffs, more military spending, and freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea. The message is clear: Western companies should begin moving supply chains out of China.

While the speech was timed perfectly with revelations of the hack, it’s hard not to see a basic disjunction in the way the U.S. government weakly relates to Western corporations, which in turn prioritize short-term thinking that advantages China. After all, much of what Pence called out was simply what companies do voluntarily. Technology transfers are done for profit, and selling into China is lucrative. General Motors sells more cars in China than in the United States. China is now the second-largest market for the iPhone. Even though the country bans Facebook, Chinese ad buyers, including the government, are collectively the largest spenders of advertising on Facebook in Asia, adding $5 billion to the company’s bottom line.

And Trump, with his aggressive anti-China rhetoric and tariffs, hasn’t really changed corporate behavior. Nor have open threats by the Chinese that they will cut off key supply chain inputs, or even threaten specific companies, including and especially one of the crown jewels of the globalized economy, Apple. According to Apple’s 2017 annual report to investors, Apple has increased its amount of long-lived production assets in China by nearly 30 percent since Trump came into office. Broadly, the trade deficit with China under Trump is going up, not down.

The only way to organize a system resilient to Chinese intrusions is to make it clear that the era of big government is back, and that Wall Street is no longer able to force companies to think short-term. If China is using U.S. corporations to lobby and control the American state, then weakening the ability of corporations to lobby is the only answer. If China is using American divisiveness against Americans, then the only answer is to make America less divided. The U.S. government, not short-term-focused financiers, has to be the boss. The era of big government must come back.

by Matt Stoller, Foreign Policy |  Read more:

Image: In Pictures Ltd./Corbis via Getty Images