In more extreme circumstances, this creates risk calculations that are very different from the steady state. This also creates dilemmas for governments regarding required force distributions to either maintain a specific chokepoint or protect national shipping interests.
Firms are already considering the impacts of conflict adjacent to the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s petroleum sails. A near-term return to the status quo may produce short-term uncertainty in shipping, with only marginal impacts on global commerce. However, the term “marginal” can still include billions of dollars, as shown by the March 2021 Ever Given grounding in the Suez. Conversely, a replay of the 1984-1988 Tanker Wars, or complete closure of the waterway, paints a very different picture.
In light of current events, leaders need to understand how the network has changed and be prepared to act accordingly. To define chokepoint risk, consider six factors:
- Navigation (are there underwater obstructions or dangerous currents)
- Environmental (high waves or storms)
- Geopolitical (are adjacent nations stable and in control)
- Criminal (is there a high incidence of piracy)
- Density (is this a high traffic waterway)
- Economic activity (is this a regional or global economic corridor)
Looking closest to the closure, Bab al-Mandeb, located near Yemen, may expect an increase in lawlessness. Already poorly governed, regional frictions are sure to spread to Yemen, and those transiting the lower Red Sea should expect increased threats from both piracy and warring factions. There may be a decrease in traffic as vessels no longer need to move between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, but the Red Sea remains an important corridor for commercial and military traffic between Western nations and the Middle East. Consequently, while the current fight is through Hormuz, it is necessary to maintain maritime patrols in the vicinity of the Bab al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden. [...]
Where policy makers must firmly fix their gaze is the Turkish Straits. Ongoing conflict in the Black Sea Region (BSR) has already increased the risk between the Black and Aegean seas. Globally recognized as a wheat corridor between Ukrainian fields and the world, it is less appreciated that the BSR provides over 3 percent of global petroleum reserves, a figure likely to skyrocket in volume and value amid major market shifts. Expect to see a 5 percent increase in maritime traffic transiting through Istanbul.
Since the 1936 Montreux Convention, Turkey, whose military nearly doubles that of any European NATO ally, has deftly managed its control of the straits to stabilize geopolitical tensions in the region. But the heightened importance of the strait underscores the need for other interested parties to work together to support continued commerce. Bulgarian and Romanian forces, exempt from Montreux restrictions, must work with their Turkish NATO allies to monitor Black Sea activity, while the US 6th Fleet maintains vigilance in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Seas.
The heightened importance of the waterway makes it an attractive target for malign actors, although Russia is less of a threat since much of the oil is theirs. Ankara is aware of these risks and should consider hosting regional exercises with NATO allies as a show of unified deterrence.
by Michael Kidd, Breaking Defense | Read more:
Image: Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Indra Beaufort[ed. See also: Golden Dome $1.5T Defense Budget Request (BD); and, How the National Security Strategy Gets Made (Statecraft).]
