Sunday, September 8, 2024

The Prince We Never Knew

A revealing new documentary could redefine our understanding of the pop icon. But you will probably never get to see it.

It’s 1984, and Prince is about to release “Purple Rain,” the album that will make him a superstar and push pop music into distant realms we had no idea we were ready for. The sound engineer Peggy McCreary, one of many female engineers he worked with, describes witnessing a flash of genius during the creation of his song “When Doves Cry.” Over a two-day marathon recording session, she and Prince filled the studio with sound — wailing guitars, thrumming keyboards, an overdubbed choir of harmonizing Princes. It was the sort of maximalist stew possible only when someone is (as Prince was) a master of just about every musical instrument ever invented. But something wasn’t right. So at 5 or 6 in the morning, Prince found the solution: He started subtracting. He took out the guitar solo; he took out the keyboard. And then his boldest, most heterodox move: He took out the bass. McCreary remembers him saying, with satisfaction, “Ain’t nobody gonna believe I did that.” He knew what he had. The song became an anthem, a platinum megahit.

The next sequence starts to probe the origins of Prince’s genius, how it grew alongside a gnawing desire for recognition. His sister, Tyka Nelson, a woman with owlish eyes and pink and purple streaks in her hair, appears onscreen. She describes the violence in their household growing up. How their musician father’s face changed when he hit their mother. The ire he directed at his son, on whom he bestowed his former stage name, Prince — a gift, but also a burden, a reminder that the demands of supporting his children had caused him to abandon his own musical career. Prince would risk lashings by sneaking over to the piano and plinking away at it — the son already embarked on his life’s work of besting his father, the father giving and withdrawing love, the son doing the same.

Cut to Jill Jones, one in a long line of girlfriend-muses whom Prince anointed, styled, encouraged and criticized. Hers is one of the most anguished testimonies in the film, revealing a side of Prince many of his fans would rather not see. Late one night in 1984, she and a friend visited Prince at a hotel. He started kissing the friend, and in a fit of jealousy, Jones slapped him. She says he then looked at her and said, “Bitch, this ain’t no [expletive] movie.” They tussled, and he began to punch her in the face over and over. She wanted to press charges, but his manager told her it would ruin his career. So she backed off. Yet for a time, she still loved him and wanted to be with him, and stayed in his orbit for many more years. Recounting the incident three decades later, she is still furious, still processing the stress of being involved with him.

In the next sequence, it’s the evening of the premiere of “Purple Rain,” the movie, which will go on to win the Academy Award for best original song score in 1985. Prince’s tour manager, Alan Leeds, was with him in the back of a limo on the way to the ceremony. He remembers one of Prince’s bodyguards turning to Prince and saying: “This is going to be the biggest day of your life! They say every star in town is there!” And Prince clutched Leeds’s hand, trembling in fear. But then, as Leeds tells it, some switch flipped, and “he caught himself.” Prince’s eyes turned hard. He was back in control. “That was it,” Leeds says. “But for maybe 10 seconds, he completely lost it. And I loved it. Because it showed he was human!” In the next shot, we see Prince emerging from the limo and walking down the red carpet in an iridescent purple trench coat over a creamy ruffled collar, his black curls piled high. He swaggers, twirling a flower, unbothered: a creature of regal remove.

These four moments happen back to back, about three hours into the film. I watched it for the first time on a winter evening in 2023, and during this particular sequence, my body clenched as it registered contradictory intensities: amazement, pity, disgust, tenderness. Like most Americans who grew up in the 1980s, I had an image of Prince emblazoned in my mind: wonderfully strange; a gender-bending, dreamy master of funk. He flouted and floated above all categories and gave permission to generations of kids to do the same. Edelman’s film deepened those impressions, while at the same time removing Prince’s many veils. This creature of pure sex and mischief and silky ambiguity, I now saw, was also dark, vindictive and sad. This artist who liberated so many could be pathologically controlled and controlling. The film is sometimes uncomfortable to watch. But then, always, there is relief: the miracle of Prince’s music — a release for me and a release, above all, for Prince.

Behold him writhing at the microphone, shrieking out the chorus of “The Beautiful Ones,” a song about the pain of love. Wendy Melvoin, a member of his band the Revolution and one of the people with whom Prince was most intimate (though only briefly, only ever briefly), tells Edelman that when “he’s screaming, there is a look in his eyes of pure torture.” She quotes the lyrics “Do you want him, or do you want me? ’Cause I want you!” “It feels like the big struggle of his entire life,’’ Melvoin says. “The consequence of you not choosing me is too much to bear.”

The sequence I just described is 20 minutes long. Imagine sustaining this density of character analysis for 520 more, which is what Edelman has done. In the process, he offers one answer to a question that has agonized the culture at large for the last decade. How should we think about artists whose moral failings are exposed? Edelman manages to present a deeply flawed person while still granting him his greatness — and his dignity. Wesley Morris, a critic at The Times and one of a small group of people who have seen the film, told me, “It’s one of the only works I have ever seen that approximates the experience of suffering with and suffering through and alongside genius.”

The film took Edelman almost five years to finish, and it nearly broke him. Whenever he makes a documentary, he told me, “It’s like willingly walking into the jail or locking myself up into a box like Houdini and being like, ‘Can I get out?’ ” But he had been locked in for a long time, often working nights and weekends, chasing down recalcitrant subjects who seemed haunted by their friendships with Prince and researching in Prince’s personal archive, which was filled with gaps and elisions. Prince kept slipping away from him. “How can you tell the truth about someone who, when you’re talking to people, they all had different things to say?” Edelman told me. “How can you tell the truth about someone who never told the truth about himself?”

Over a year and a half, I had observed as Edelman continued to perfect his film, working to capture the essence of Prince, even as it became slowly, painfully clear that it would most likely never air. The Prince estate had changed hands, and the new executors objected to the project. Last spring, they saw a cut and, claiming that it misrepresented Prince, entered into a protracted battle with Netflix, which owns the rights to the film, to prevent its release. As of today, there is no indication that the film will ever come out. It has been like watching a monument being swallowed by the sea. (...)

What ultimately persuaded Edelman to take on the film was a potential treasure trove of new material. For tens of millions of dollars, according to a source familiar with the negotiation, Netflix had secured from the estate exclusive access to Prince’s personal archive, referred to among Princeologists as “the vault.” It had been an actual room, in the basement of his fortresslike home and studio, Paisley Park, in Chanhassen, Minn., filled with unreleased recordings and concert footage and the master copies of all his music and drawings and photographs and who knew what else. In life, Prince was defiantly private. He rarely sat for interviews, and when he did talk to the press, he often spoke in koans. There were so many unexplained oddities. The changing of his name to a symbol — a move that was widely mocked and that no one ever fully explained. His many battles with record companies, including the years when, feuding with Warner Brothers over control of his output and his master recordings, he took to performing with the word “slave” written on his face. His decade of perfect albums, followed by years of uneven, often impenetrable ones. There was, most perplexing of all, his death from a fentanyl overdose, when he always seemed to disdain drugs and alcohol. Access to the vault presented a chance to tell a more detailed story about Prince than had emerged before.

Prince’s estate, which was then being administered by a bank in Minnesota, would have no editorial influence over the project, Edelman was told. Edelman and Netflix would retain final cut, though the estate could review the film for factual accuracy. He decided to sign on.

Edelman and his team, including the editor Bret Granato and the producer Nina Krstic, spent a full year watching tape they found in the vault. At first, they were excited by the material: hours upon hours of band rehearsals and music videos, all of Prince’s never-before-seen performances, including pristine 16-millimeter film from his tour for the 1981 album “Controversy” and elegiac scenes from one of his final Piano and a Microphone shows in 2016. The footage moved the film’s editors to tears, but though he would make ample use of it, Edelman knew he didn’t want to make a concert film. What he wanted was to tell the story of the arc of those years, of the person who resided in the gaps among Prince’s many metamorphoses.

But it soon became clear that there was almost nothing that was spontaneous or personal in the vault, almost no footage of him recording or writing. At one point, they were excited to discover a few home movies of Prince horsing around with girlfriends, but when they watched the tapes, they appeared to have been deliberately damaged. As Granato, one of two main editors on the film along with Gabriel Rhodes, put it, the vault was “not all that different from an Instagram account or a Facebook page.” It was manicured, curated, just the way Prince wanted it.

After a year, some of the most revealing material was scraps of unintentional candor — moments when Prince thought a camera wasn’t rolling and “would transition into a different person,” Granato told me. “He’d turn inward, look at the floor.” At first, “it looks like nothing, because he’s just looking, quiet,’’ but the accumulation of these moments was revelatory: “Within these things, there’s a lot of vulnerability. There’s shyness. There’s a lack of confidence that butts up against confidence in this really interesting way.” What did these moments mean? They needed the people who knew Prince to tell them.

Edelman, with the help of the producer Tamara Rosenberg, carefully tried to penetrate the concentric circles around Prince. “It’s a complicated culture in that Prince world,” Rosenberg told me. “People are very protective for various reasons.” It’s no surprise that interview subjects would be guarded about the personal life of a world-famous celebrity, but the vehemence of the refusal in some cases, combined with a sense of suspicion about their motives, was a continual source of frustration for Edelman and his team. Edelman sometimes felt as if Prince was still dictating what could and couldn’t be said. “What are you not telling me?” he found himself wondering. “What’s the big secret?”

Rosenberg spent hours each day on the phone, trying to reassure everyone. As the months went by, the team slowly persuaded more people — former bandmates, sound engineers, assistants, bodyguards, managers, a hairstylist, girlfriends, childhood friends, record-company executives and Prince’s sister — to come on camera.

Edelman’s collaborators spoke of his supreme skill as an interviewer, how he builds rapport with his subjects, prodding them to reveal shockingly honest feelings about their lives. His method is simple but profound: preparation and duration. He inhales every document he can, synthesizes all he learns, prepares pages of questions and then, when he is in the room with an interview subject — often for many hours at a time — sets the notes aside. He knows so much about the people he is speaking to that he disarms them, producing obscure episodes from their pasts that intrigue them. He is “offering them a real space to talk about their experience. To really roam around and find the right words,” Rosenberg told me. “You see people thinking on camera,” and their buried memories begin to surface.

The story of Prince that was emerging was a story of a person bent on fame and control. From the very beginning, when he signed his first contract with Warner Brothers at age 18, he insisted on a level of independence unusual for an artist so green. When Warner Brothers suggested that Maurice White from Earth, Wind and Fire produce his debut album, Prince refused and did it himself. He became a domineering band leader — ruthlessly extracting from his musicians the sounds he was hearing in his head, often subjecting them to 10-, 12-hour days and growling in their faces about their insufficiencies. Edelman was finding that the people Prince worked with were still afraid of him — yet in many cases were also tenderly protective.

As Edelman completed his interviews — more than 70 of them — he realized there wasn’t some big secret that people were hiding. Instead, what he found were the defining traumas of Prince’s childhood and his constant recapitulating of them. The story unfolds slowly, hauntingly, over the course of the film.

by Sasha Weiss, NY Times Magazine | Read more:
Image: Prince in 1983. Allen Beaulieu

Saturday, September 7, 2024

Eleven Predictions: Here's What AI Does Next

We truly live in interesting times—which is one of the three apocryphal Chinese curses.

(The other two, according to Terry Pratchett, are: “May you come to the attention of those in authority” and “May the gods give you everything you ask for.” By tradition, the last is the most dangerous of all.) (...)

But it’s going to get even more interesting, and very soon. That’s because the next step in AI has arrived—the unleashing of AI agents.

And like the gods, these AI agents will give us everything we ask for.

Up until now, AI was all talk and no action. These charming bots answered your questions, and spewed out text, but were easy to ignore.

That’s now changing. AI agents will go out in the world and do things. That’s their new mission.

It’s like giving unreliable teens the keys to the family car. Up until now we’ve just had to deal with these resident deadbeats talking back, but now they are going to smash up everything in their path.

But AI agents will be even worse than the most foolhardy teen. That’s because there will be millions of these unruly bots on our digital highways.

We got a glimpse of this future last week, when the company Altera announced that it had unleashed one thousand autonomous AI agents on to a Minecraft server.

Almost immediately things got very strange.


In this AI agent community, the biggest winner was a priest, who created a huge religious cult—but by bribing people to join. In another simulation, Democrats and Republicans battled via conflicting constitutions driven by ideology (not rights, which are boring and passé in the digital world).

But it could get much worse—in an earlier simulation, AI revealed a disturbing tendency to resolve conflicts with nuclear weapons. (Don’t say I didn’t warn you.)

The Minecraft simulation also demonstrated how AI agents can change their minds at the drop of the hat—as the successful cult bribing incident suggests. In other instances, a farmer needed for the food supply decided spontaneously to give up agriculture and go on an adventure. In another instance, an entire village stopped working because of a single missing bot.

Right now this is happening in test environments. But soon AI agents will be changing the real world—and at a pace none of us are prepared for.

So let me offer eleven predictions for our interesting times. Or maybe I should call them warnings. You be the judge.

1. Stop worrying about AI taking over. It’s the people who own the AI who pose the biggest threat.

I still hear foolish predictions about some big computer taking over the world—like that scene from 2001: A Space Odyssey.

Sorry, but it won’t happen that way. Those big Sumo-sized computers aren’t the threat. It’s the people who own them you need to worry about. That’s why most of the debate about the threat coming from AI is worthless.

Yes, there is a threat. But it’s very much a human-driven one. Psychology and game theory will tell us more about how this plays out than any tech knowledge.

In fact, tech people may be the least prepared for these changes, because they’re still thinking in terms of software code, not human behavior.

2. You also have to stop thinking of AI as a single force. Hundreds of governments and corporations are already competing in building their AI empires.

AI will soon turn into a plural noun. Governments, corporations and other entities (hackers, billionaires, scammers, etc.) will each have their own AI agents—empowered by the largest computers in the history of the world, sucking up juice from the electricity grid the way Popeye swallows spinach.

Some people vaguely grasp that the US is in competition with China in AI, but that’s a misleading way of viewing this dynamic. There will soon be thousands of competing agendas in the AI space.

And that’s why….

3. We will soon be living in an AI war zone—because competing AI agents will constantly battle each other for control (often over us).

We will look back fondly at the simple days when the bots just talked to us. Soon they will be big and strong, and start making demands—or just do whatever they want without asking.

With so many conflicting AI programs ramping up, the bots will inevitably go to war with each other. As soon as they are given agency and responsibility, battles will ensue.

Like gunslingers in a Western town, they will shoot it out—metaphorically, and possibly in real terms.

Here’s my advice: Try not to be collateral damage.

by Ted Gioia, Honest Broker |  Read more:
Video: Altera/YouTube

Nvidia: Nothing to See Here... Move Along

Nvidia Corp.’s stock continued to bleed in the aftermath of last week’s earnings report.

The stock has fallen in four of the six sessions since that report, and it saw especially heavy pressure this week — so much so that it delivered its worst weekly performance in two years, according to Dow Jones Market Data. Nvidia shares lost 13.9% this week; they fell 16.1% in the week ended Sept. 2, 2022.

In all, Nvidia erased $406 billion from its market value on the week, the most for any U.S. company on record, and more than the combined market capitalizations of Advanced Micro Devices Inc.

Nvidia shed $406 billion in market cap this week. What’s next for the stock? (Market Watch)


Nvidia Corp. Chief Executive Jensen Huang has sold more than 5 million shares of the chip maker in recent months, totaling about $633.1 million, according to a new filing.

According to a filing Thursday with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Huang sold nearly 5.3 million shares, in tranches of 120,000 shares each, in a series of transactions between June 13 and Sept. 4. (...)

Huang is Nvidia’s largest individual shareholder, according to data from FactSet, holding about 3.5% of the company’s outstanding shares as of Aug. 9.

Huang has a personal fortune worth about $94.2 billion —an increase of about $50 billion year to date — according to the Bloomberg Billionaire’s Index, which ranks him as the 18th-wealthiest person in the world.

CEO Jensen Huang has sold more than $633 million in Nvidia stock since June (Market Watch)

[ed. The guy's got $94.2 billion. Consider that for a moment. And he's only the 18th wealthiest person in the world. I'm thinking of investing in pitchforks (especially for spineless politicians and courts that allow these levels of inequity to persist).]

Friday, September 6, 2024

Paul Simon on Almost Everything: "Errand to Brazil (1987-1990)"


Above: Simon and the Bahian drum troupe Olodum perform “The Obvious Child,” the first track on The Rhythm of the Saints. I was impressed to learn that the fade that occurs at 2:30 was accomplished not via studio manipulations, but by Olodum itself. I was less surprised, but equally delighted, by a falsetto vocal lick, at 4:00, that Simon had clearly lifted from somewhere in his deep catalogue of Fifties doo-wop. Yes, he said, it was from “Deserie,” a 1957 hit by the doo-wop quintet the Charts. As in the song “Graceland,” in which the South African guitarist Ray Phiri had dipped, without thinking twice, into American country music, “The Obvious Child” was a true musical exchange (or, if you will, mutual appropriation).

***
Shrugging off renewed accusations of musical tourism, Simon set his course for Brazil. His original plan was to follow the diaspora to its third stop, Cuba. But he was so thrilled by what he found in Brazil, and probably so exhausted by what turned into a two-and-a-half-year project, that he never got to Cuba. Graceland and Rhythm of the Saints stand as Paul Simon’s two great experiments with world music.

When Simon arrived in Brazil, Nascimento’s producer, Marco Mazzola, got things underway by introducing Simon to Grupo Cultural Olodum, the majestic drum troupe and cultural collective from Salvador, Bahia’s capital city, with whom Simon recorded the track that opens The Rhythm of the Saints, “The Obvious Child.”

Whereas township jive, mbube, and the other South African genres that Simon incorporated into Graceland are secular, Simon saw The Rhythm of the Saints as purely and simply an exploration of its title (...). The Yoruba religion, Ìṣẹ̀ṣẹ, recognizes a Supreme Being, Olódùmarè, from whom Olodum takes its name. Olódùmarè reigns over the orishas, or lesser gods, of whom there are anywhere from a few hundred to more than a thousand. Olódùmarè has no gender, but orishas can be male or female. It goes without saying that they have supernatural powers.

The orishas represent specific aspects of human or natural life. Ayelala is the female orisha of justice and punishment, Babalú-Aye, who is male, of illness and health. In an Afro-Brazilian rite, which typically involves drumming, singing, and dancing (beautifully captured in David Byrne’s movie) a worshipper calls on one or another of the orishas to inhabit his body. Every orisha has a specific rhythm associated with it, of a complexity, power, and seductiveness which left Simon entranced.

Paul Simon on Almost Everything, Chapter 5 of 5: "Errand to Brazil (1987-1990)" - Tony Scherman (Among the Musical)

Dave Jordano - Coffee Break, Detroit (1972)

Thursday, September 5, 2024

via:

Delivery Fees Have Seattle Diners, Drivers and Restaurants Reeling

Mia Shagen has delivered for DoorDash via electric bicycle and scooter since 2020. She moves between cities throughout the year but has always called Seattle her home. She isn’t sure she can stay, though.

Shagen says she’s never made so little delivering for DoorDash. Take Wednesday, Aug. 14: Shagen worked five and a half hours, hanging around Belltown during the busiest time of day. She delivered two orders; over 40 minutes of “active time,” she made $23.71.

Why are Seattleites using food delivery apps less these days? Check the receipts.

Fees on third-party delivery apps have ballooned in Seattle since the January implementation of the PayUp ordinance, which requires delivery workers be paid a minimum wage based on mileage and time spent delivering. In response, companies like DoorDash and Uber Eats swiftly instituted a blanket $4.99 fee on Seattle orders, which they say is necessary to offset the increased cost of doing business in the city.

Some consumers say the fees have caused them to ditch the apps altogether, or at least to order less frequently. It’s not just consumers feeling pinched. More than a dozen Seattle delivery drivers and restaurant owners told The Seattle Times that the fees have yielded a decrease in demand that has hurt their livelihoods. Some have shuttered businesses, while others have left the industry — and Seattle — altogether.

The debate over fees and wages has been contentious, boiling over inside City Council chambers and around the internet. There’s no unanimous solution or culprit. But all parties can agree: Food delivery in Seattle has lost any remaining sheen of affordable convenience — and it’s impacting everybody’s bottom line.

Anxiety rises with fees

The PayUp ordinance — which requires the delivery companies to pay their drivers at least 44 cents per minute, plus 74 cents per mile during orders, or a minimum of $5 per order — went into effect in January.

Days later, Uber Eats and DoorDash added a $4.99 fee to all orders. Other services like Instacart followed suit. Labeled a “Regulatory Response Fee,” the companies argue the charge is necessary to remain profitable. More than half a year later, the fees remain — and Seattle orders are down by as much as 50%, according to DoorDash and local restaurant owners.

Though all parties agree there’s an issue, there’s no prevailing solution. And tensions seem to be reaching a boiling point.

Seattle City Council didn’t vote on a hotly contested amendment that would’ve lowered the pay standard before heading to a recess in August. It’s unclear whether the council will vote on any amendments or new pay laws, despite council president Sara Nelson repeatedly calling its passage “urgent.”

Meanwhile, food delivery companies are pressuring lawmakers to act. DoorDash, which estimated a dip of 590,000 Seattle orders on its app between February and May (the most recent data available), began issuing an additional $1.99 regulatory response fee on certain long-distance orders on Aug. 1.

Shagen, who lives frugally and spends her free time writing books, plans on moving out of Seattle if order volume doesn’t increase within a month.

Delivery couriers like Shagen say the discrepancy between active time — time spent responding to an order — and the time spent waiting on food is the root of the problem. The PayUp legislation only requires delivery drivers be paid for time actively completing an order, whereas similar ordinances in New York and California require workers be paid for time spent waiting for orders.

As orders slowed in response to fees, Shagen and other couriers have seen their active time plummet, even when working the same number of hours. So has pay.

And the drop in deliveries came with a secondary effect, said bike courier Gary Lardizabal. Tips have also plummeted. Lardizabal says he’s never declined a DoorDash or Uber Eats order, fielding more than 11,000 transactions. He made about $1,600 delivering for DoorDash in May, down from around $5,000 in January. In response, he got part-time jobs at Marination and Whole Foods.

Heather Nielson, a bike racer who grew to love the freedom that delivery offered after working for years as an office manager, recently returned to a job at a commercial real estate company. She says that many delivery workers, especially bike couriers who rely on volume to make up for the fact their vehicles travel shorter distances, have left the industry. Still, she understands why higher prices have led to the decrease in orders.

“Customers are suffering, too,” Nielson said. “Everybody is suffering.” (...)

Delivery-industry-sponsored nonprofit Drive Forward, which represents gig workers, leads a contingent intent on making change. In a July survey completed by more than 800 Seattle-area delivery workers, those drivers reported earning about $16.30 per hour — less than minimum wage, and less than the average hourly wage reported by workers in a 2021 survey. Drive Forward executive director Michael Wolfe criticized the PayUp law as a “one size fits all” policy. “It really is the law of unintended consequences,” he said.

Pro-labor groups disagree, arguing that the law is working as intended, and that cuts to the current wage would have negative impacts on couriers. Hannah Sabio-Howell, communications director at statewide labor group Working Washington, said the problem can be traced back to the delivery companies.

“It’s very convenient for the corporations to claim that these fees are somehow necessary, without ever having to answer for why,” said Sabio-Howell, adding that money spent on lobbying, as well as recently announced earnings reports, demonstrate that the companies are financially stable and able to afford higher wages.

DoorDash reported 645 million total orders in the second quarter of 2024, up 19% year over year, while revenue, at $2.6 billion, was up 23%. Though Uber does not report earnings by sector of its business, the company reported a similar increase of revenue in this year’s second fiscal quarter (gross bookings were up 19% year over year, with revenue up 16%).

Low order volume has meant local restaurants have suffered, too.

Karan Singh, owner of Mirch Masala and Pizza Twist on Capitol Hill, said order volume at his restaurants has dropped 50% on Uber Eats and Grubhub and 30% on DoorDash since the implementation of the PayUp law. While Singh considered hiring in-house delivery drivers to tamp down on prices for consumers, it wouldn’t have been financially viable for his business.

Businesses that employ their own drivers, like Seattle pizza chain Pagliacci, are on the hook for issuing payroll and paying associated taxes. The employees may not be able to choose their own hours, a benefit of delivering for third-party companies, but they are offered more protections as employees rather than independent contractors. (...)

Footing the bill

Skyrocketing delivery prices have pushed some customers off the apps entirely.

Approaching 6 p.m. on an April Monday, it was dinnertime for Robby White of First Hill. White opened DoorDash and placed an order from 8oz Burger & Co: a burger for himself, a plant-based sandwich for his partner, a large order of fries and two drinks. The subtotal was $59 — pricey for a simple meal, but an expected expense for a convenient meal after a hectic workday.

Then came the sticker shock. The grand total, bloated after service charges, the $4.99 flat fee, taxes and tip, was $87.73.

White was so incensed that he filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission.

“Maybe the $5 fee isn’t going to the drivers at all; maybe it’s going to the companies,” White remembered thinking. “I think we’re just getting ripped off.”

by Xavier Martinez, The Seattle Times |  Read more:
Image: Ellen M. Banner/Seattle Times
[ed. Law of unintended consequences, or something else? I vote for 'something else'.]

The Everything Bubble

Is the "Everything Bubble" about to pop? Let's start with what we're told: there is no bubble, all the assets soaring to unprecedented heights are reasonably priced at a "permanently high plateau" because of AI, scarcity of housing, scarcity of Ferraris, interest rates trending down, the Fed waving dead chickens around the campfire, people buying toothpaste, and so on: you name it, it's a reason for assets to drift higher.

This all sounds rather splendid, but somehow the pump inflating the bubble goes unmentioned: it's the money, Honey, the tens of trillions of yen, yuan, euros, dollars, pesos, etc., being borrowed or conjured into existence since the last spot of bother in 2008, where each unit of currency enters the global free-for-all chasing assets.

Thanks to historically low yields, cash is trash and the way to make a killing is to rotate from AI chip makers to Ferrari to Colgate, and then on to the next hot sector: maybe uranium, maybe bat guano, maybe a new doggy-themed crypto, maybe the next iteration of the yen carry trade, it doesn't really matter because capital is digital and therefore mobile.

Hand-in-hand with the endless spew of new "money" and credit are financialization and globalization, which have transformed every asset into a fully globalized, commoditized asset that can be securitized, packaged, collateralized and leveraged in a financier's Heaven of finance becoming the measure of All Things.

The house across the street is no longer shelter: it's a financialized asset that's now part of a portfolio of rental properties owned (and leveraged) by some entity based in Dubai, which might securitize the portfolio and sell it to pension funds in Norway.

Or it's one of dozens of short-term vacation rentals (STVR) in a wealthy family's private wealth management portfolio.

The same holds true for every asset on the planet. Farmland isn't for growing food--it's for growing wealth as the global "scarcity" of places to stash capital drives its value out of the reach of those who would actually like to use the land to grow food.

For the wealthy, what's abundant is credit, and what's scarce is assets to soak up the sea of capital sloshing around the wealth management funds, philanthro-capitalist foundations, and other outposts of the top 0.1%, which as this chart illustrates, have ridden the credit-fueled Everything Bubble to unprecedented heights of private wealth.


We're told the bubble is a tide raising all boats, but this is, ahem, misinformation, as the bottom 50%'s share of the financial windfall remains a signal-noise 2.6%. (...)

The primary effect of the Everything Bubble is an extreme of wealth-power inequality. As the chart above illustrates, the wealthy got much richer while everyone else acquired more debt, i.e. the obligation to pay more of one's earnings to the wealthy who own the mortgage, auto loan, student loan. etc.

There's a funny little effect of extreme wealth-power inequality known as social disorder which can manifest in all sorts of equally funny ways, as popular uprising, wildcat strikes, opting out, civil disobedience, and various other ways of expressing no mas.

Here we see just how extreme the Everything Bubble has become in residential real estate, nearly doubling the insanity of the 2006 housing bubble. Recall that the Case-Shiller Index tracks the market price of the same houses over time, so there's no way to game the statistics.


Among the big winners of the Everything Bubble is--yes, I know you're shocked--Wall Street, as the broker-Dealer index has outpaced even the bubblicious S&P 500 stock index.


The Everything Bubble is global, which means its deflation is going to hurt the entire global economy. Consider this chart reflecting the concentration of China's household wealth in housing: almost 80% of all household wealth is in housing, a bubble which is now popping despite the authorities' efforts to reinflate the bubble. Prices are off 25% to 37% in Tier 1 cities, and even more in Tier 2 and 3 cities.

The reverse wealth effect as the primary store of household wealth wilts will be monumental. Trust isn't just personal; trust is the critical glue in markets and governance. Once trust is lost, it's somewhere between difficult and impossible to win it back.

That the bloom is off the Everything Bubble Rose is visible in anecdotal evidence dribbling in from the real world: housing valuations in various markets are off 25% from their peak, housing inventories are rising, sales are slowing, restaurant chains are going belly-up, credit card debt is soaring to new heights, dollar-store stocks are cratering, and so on. (...)

There are a couple of funny things about amassing $315 trillion in debts globally to drive "growth": one is the interest due on all that debt, which becomes unsustainable should yields rise, and inflation, which either pushes yields higher, making it impossible to continue funding "growth" with more debt, or it lays waste to the purchasing power of wage earners' incomes, popping the bubble of free-spending consumption propping up the global economy and debt bubble.

by Charles Hugh Smith, Of Two Minds/Substack |  Read more:
Images: as referenced in the charts

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How the Neocons Subverted Russia’s Financial Stabilization in the Early 1990s

[ed. Important.]

On the basis of Poland’s economic success, I was contacted in 1990 by Mr. Grigory Yavlinsky, economic advisor to President Mikhail Gorbachev, to offer similar advice to the Soviet Union, and in particular to help mobilize financial support for the economic stabilization and transformation of the Soviet Union. One outcome of that work was a 1991 project undertaken at the Harvard Kennedy School with Professors Graham Allison, Stanley Fisher, and Robert Blackwill. We jointly proposed a “Grand Bargain” to the US, G7, and Soviet Union, in which we advocated large-scale financial support by the US and G7 countries for Gorbachev’s ongoing economic and political reforms. The report was published as Window of Opportunity: The Grand Bargain for Democracy in the Soviet Union (1 October 1991).

The proposal for large-scale Western support for the Soviet Union was flatly rejected by the Cold Warriors in the White House. Gorbachev came to the G7 Summit in London in July 1991 asking for financial assistance, but left empty-handed. Upon his return to Moscow, he was abducted in the coup attempt of August 1991. At that point, Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, assumed effective leadership of the crisis-ridden Soviet Union. By December, under the weight of decisions by Russia and other Soviet republics, the Soviet Union was dissolved with the emergence of 15 newly independent nations.

In September 1991, I was contacted by Yegor Gaidar, economic advisor to Yeltsin, and soon to be acting Prime Minister of newly independent Russian Federation as of December 1991. He requested that I come to Moscow to discuss the economic crisis and ways to stabilize the Russian economy. At that stage, Russia was on the verge of hyperinflation, financial default to the West, the collapse of international trade with the other republics and with the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and intense shortages of food in Russian cities resulting from the collapse of food deliveries from the farmlands and the pervasive black marketing of foodstuffs and other essential commodities.

I recommended that Russia reiterate the call for large-scale Western financial assistance, including an immediate standstill on debt servicing, longer-term debt relief, a currency stabilization fund for the ruble (as for the Zloty in Poland), large-scale grants of dollars and European currencies to support urgently needed food and medical imports and other essential commodity flows, and immediate financing by the IMF, World Bank, and other institutions to protect Russia’s social services (healthcare, education, and others).

In November 1991, Gaidar met with the G7 Deputies (the deputy finance ministers of the G7 countries) and requested a standstill on debt servicing. This request was flatly denied. To the contrary, Gaidar was told that unless Russia continued to service every last dollar as it came due, emergency food aid on the high seas heading to Russia would be immediately turned around and sent back to the home ports. I met with an ashen-faced Gaidar immediately after the G7 Deputies meeting. (...)

Upon returning from Moscow, I went to Washington to reiterate my call for a debt standstill, a currency stabilization fund, and emergency financial support. In my meeting with Mr. Richard Erb, Deputy Managing Director of the IMF in charge of overall relations with Russia, I learned that the US did not support this kind of financial package. I once again pleaded the economic and financial case, and was determined to change US policy. It had been my experience in other advisory contexts that it might require several months to sway Washington on its policy approach. (...)

It is worth quoting at length here from my article in the Washington Post in November 1991 to present the gist of my argument at the time:
This is the third time in this century in which the West must address the vanquished. When the German and Hapsburg Empires collapsed after World War I, the result was financial chaos and social dislocation. Keynes predicted in 1919 that this utter collapse in Germany and Austria, combined with a lack of vision from the victors, would conspire to produce a furious backlash towards military dictatorship in Central Europe. Even as brilliant a finance minister as Joseph Schumpeter in Austria could not stanch the torrent towards hyperinflation and hyper-nationalism, and the United States descended into the isolationism of the 1920s under the "leadership" of Warren G. Harding and Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge.

After World War II, the victors were smarter. Harry Truman called for U.S. financial support to Germany and Japan, as well as the rest of Western Europe. The sums involved in the Marshall Plan, equal to a few percent of the recipient countries' GNPs, was not enough to actually rebuild Europe. It was, though, a political lifeline to the visionary builders of democratic capitalism in postwar Europe.

Now the Cold War and the collapse of communism have left Russia as prostrate, frightened and unstable as was Germany after World War I and World War II. Inside Russia, Western aid would have the galvanizing psychological and political effect that the Marshall Plan had for Western Europe. Russia's psyche has been tormented by 1,000 years of brutal invasions, stretching from Genghis Khan to Napoleon and Hitler.

Churchill judged that the Marshall Plan was history's "most unsordid act," and his view was shared by millions of Europeans for whom the aid was the first glimpse of hope in a collapsed world. In a collapsed Soviet Union, we have a remarkable opportunity to raise the hopes of the Russian people through an act of international understanding. The West can now inspire the Russian people with another unsordid act.
This advice went unheeded, but that did not deter me from continuing my advocacy. In early 1992, I was invited to make the case on the PBS news show The McNeil-Lehrer Report. I was on air with acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. After the show, he asked me to ride with him from the PBS studio in Arlington, Virginia back to Washington, D.C. Our conversation was the following. “Jeffrey, please let me explain to you that your request for large-scale aid is not going to happen. Even assuming that I agree with your arguments — and Poland’s finance minister [Leszek Balcerowicz] made the same points to me just last week — it’s not going to happen. Do you want to know why? Do you know what this year is?” “1992,” I answered. “Do you know that this means?” “An election year?” I replied. “Yes, this is an election year. It’s not going to happen.” (...)

Russia urgently needed a stabilization plan of the kind that Poland had undertaken, but such a plan was out of reach financially (because of the lack of external support) and politically (because the lack of external support also meant the lack of any internal consensus on what to do). The crisis was compounded by the collapse of trade among the newly independent post-Soviet nations and the collapse of trade between the former Soviet Union and its former satellite nations in Central and Eastern Europe, which were now receiving Western aid and were reorienting trade towards Western Europe and away from the former Soviet Union.

During 1992 I continued without any success to try to mobilize the large-scale Western financing that I believed to be ever-more urgent. I pinned my hopes on the newly elected Presidency of Bill Clinton. These hopes too were quickly dashed. Clinton’s key advisor on Russia, Johns Hopkins Professor Michael Mandelbaum, told me privately in November 1992 that the incoming Clinton team had rejected the concept of large-scale assistance for Russia. Mandelbaum soon announced publicly that he would not serve in the new administration. I met with Clinton’s new Russia advisor, Strobe Talbott, but discovered that he was largely unaware of the pressing economic realities. He asked me to send him some materials about hyperinflations, which I duly did. (...)

My continued advocacy in Washington once again fell on deaf ears in the first year of the Clinton Administration, and my own forebodings became greater. I repeatedly invoked the warnings of history in my public speaking and writing, as in this piece in the New Republic in January 1994, soon after I had stepped aside from the advisory role.
Above all, Clinton should not console himself with the thought that nothing too serious can happen in Russia. Many Western policymakers have confidently predicted that if the reformers leave now, they will be back in a year, after the Communists once again prove themselves unable to govern. This might happen, but chances are it will not. History has probably given the Clinton administration one chance for bringing Russia back from the brink; and it reveals an alarmingly simple pattern. The moderate Girondists did not follow Robespierre back into power. With rampant inflation, social disarray and falling living standards, revolutionary France opted for Napoleon instead. In revolutionary Russia, Aleksandr Kerensky did not return to power after Lenin's policies and civil war had led to hyperinflation. The disarray of the early 1920s opened the way for Stalin's rise to power. Nor was Bruning's government given another chance in Germany once Hitler came to power in 1933. (...)
During the tumultuous decade of the 1990s, Russia’s social services fell into decline. When this decline was coupled with the greatly increased stresses on society, the result was a sharp rise in Russia’s alcohol-related deaths. Whereas in Poland, the economic reforms were accompanied by a rise in life expectancy and public health, the very opposite occurred in crisis-riven Russia.

Even with all of these economic debacles, and with Russia’s default in 1998, the grave economic crisis and lack of Western support were not the definitive breaking points of US-Russian relations. In 1999, when Vladimir Putin became Prime Minister and in 2000 when he became President, Putin sought friendly and mutually supportive international relations between Russia and the West. Many European leaders, for example, Italy’s Romano Prodi, have spoken extensively about Putin’s goodwill and positive intentions towards strong Russia-EU relations in the first years of his presidency.

It was in military affairs rather than in economics that the Russian – Western relations ended up falling apart in the 2000s. As with finance, the West was militarily dominant in the 1990s, and certainly had the means to promote strong and positive relations with Russia. Yet the US was far more interested in Russia’s subservience to NATO that it was in stable relations with Russia.

At the time of German reunification, both the US and Germany repeatedly promised Gorbachev and then Yeltsin that the West would not take advantage of German reunification and the end of the Warsaw Pact by expanding the NATO military alliance eastward. Both Gorbachev and Yeltsin reiterated the importance of this US-NATO pledge. Yet within just a few years, Clinton completely reneged on the Western commitment, and began the process of NATO enlargement. Leading US diplomats, led by the great statesman-scholar George Kennan, warned at the time that the NATO enlargement would lead to disaster: “The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.” So, it has proved.

Here is not the place to revisit all of the foreign policy disasters that have resulted from US arrogance towards Russia, but it suffices here to mention a brief and partial chronology of key events. (...)

Looking back on the events around 1991-93, and to the events that followed, it is clear that the US was determined to say no to Russia’s aspirations for peaceful and mutually respectful integration of Russia and the West. The end of the Soviet period and the beginning of the Yeltsin Presidency occasioned the rise of the neoconservatives (neocons) to power in the United States. The neocons did not and do not want a mutually respectful relationship with Russia. They sought and until today seek a unipolar world led by a hegemonic US, in which Russia and other nations will be subservient.

In this US-led world order, the neocons envisioned that the US and the US alone will determine the utilization of the dollar-based banking system, the placement of overseas US military bases, the extent of NATO membership, and the deployment of US missile systems, without any veto or say by other countries, certainly including Russia. That arrogant foreign policy has led to several wars and to a widening rupture of relations between the US-led bloc of nations and the rest of the world. 

by Jeffery Sachs, Racket News |  Read more:
Images: uncredited via; and AFP/Getty via
[ed. With China still recovering from Mao's Cultural Revolution, probably the closest we've come or ever will come to world peace (in my lifetime). Short version - we stabbed Gorbachev/Russia in the back with Shock Doctrine economics and NATO expansion. So close... and we blew it, because of course USA, USA, USA! "We're No. 1"!]

Wednesday, September 4, 2024

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Why A.I. Isn’t Going to Make Art

To create a novel or a painting, an artist makes choices that are fundamentally alien to artificial intelligence.

Art is notoriously hard to define, and so are the differences between good art and bad art. But let me offer a generalization: art is something that results from making a lot of choices. This might be easiest to explain if we use fiction writing as an example. When you are writing fiction, you are—consciously or unconsciously—making a choice about almost every word you type; to oversimplify, we can imagine that a ten-thousand-word short story requires something on the order of ten thousand choices. When you give a generative-A.I. program a prompt, you are making very few choices; if you supply a hundred-word prompt, you have made on the order of a hundred choices.

If an A.I. generates a ten-thousand-word story based on your prompt, it has to fill in for all of the choices that you are not making. There are various ways it can do this. One is to take an average of the choices that other writers have made, as represented by text found on the Internet; that average is equivalent to the least interesting choices possible, which is why A.I.-generated text is often really bland. Another is to instruct the program to engage in style mimicry, emulating the choices made by a specific writer, which produces a highly derivative story. In neither case is it creating interesting art.

I think the same underlying principle applies to visual art, although it’s harder to quantify the choices that a painter might make. Real paintings bear the mark of an enormous number of decisions. By comparison, a person using a text-to-image program like DALL-E enters a prompt such as “A knight in a suit of armor fights a fire-breathing dragon,” and lets the program do the rest. (The newest version of DALL-E accepts prompts of up to four thousand characters—hundreds of words, but not enough to describe every detail of a scene.) Most of the choices in the resulting image have to be borrowed from similar paintings found online; the image might be exquisitely rendered, but the person entering the prompt can’t claim credit for that.

Some commentators imagine that image generators will affect visual culture as much as the advent of photography once did. Although this might seem superficially plausible, the idea that photography is similar to generative A.I. deserves closer examination. When photography was first developed, I suspect it didn’t seem like an artistic medium because it wasn’t apparent that there were a lot of choices to be made; you just set up the camera and start the exposure. But over time people realized that there were a vast number of things you could do with cameras, and the artistry lies in the many choices that a photographer makes. It might not always be easy to articulate what the choices are, but when you compare an amateur’s photos to a professional’s, you can see the difference. So then the question becomes: Is there a similar opportunity to make a vast number of choices using a text-to-image generator? I think the answer is no. An artist—whether working digitally or with paint—implicitly makes far more decisions during the process of making a painting than would fit into a text prompt of a few hundred words.

We can imagine a text-to-image generator that, over the course of many sessions, lets you enter tens of thousands of words into its text box to enable extremely fine-grained control over the image you’re producing; this would be something analogous to Photoshop with a purely textual interface. I’d say that a person could use such a program and still deserve to be called an artist. The film director Bennett Miller has used DALL-E 2 to generate some very striking images that have been exhibited at the Gagosian gallery; to create them, he crafted detailed text prompts and then instructed DALL-E to revise and manipulate the generated images again and again. He generated more than a hundred thousand images to arrive at the twenty images in the exhibit. But he has said that he hasn’t been able to obtain comparable results on later releases of DALL-E. I suspect this might be because Miller was using DALL-E for something it’s not intended to do; it’s as if he hacked Microsoft Paint to make it behave like Photoshop, but as soon as a new version of Paint was released, his hacks stopped working. OpenAI probably isn’t trying to build a product to serve users like Miller, because a product that requires a user to work for months to create an image isn’t appealing to a wide audience. The company wants to offer a product that generates images with little effort.

It’s harder to imagine a program that, over many sessions, helps you write a good novel. This hypothetical writing program might require you to enter a hundred thousand words of prompts in order for it to generate an entirely different hundred thousand words that make up the novel you’re envisioning. It’s not clear to me what such a program would look like. Theoretically, if such a program existed, the user could perhaps deserve to be called the author. But, again, I don’t think companies like OpenAI want to create versions of ChatGPT that require just as much effort from users as writing a novel from scratch. The selling point of generative A.I. is that these programs generate vastly more than you put into them, and that is precisely what prevents them from being effective tools for artists.

The companies promoting generative-A.I. programs claim that they will unleash creativity. In essence, they are saying that art can be all inspiration and no perspiration—but these things cannot be easily separated. I’m not saying that art has to involve tedium. What I’m saying is that art requires making choices at every scale; the countless small-scale choices made during implementation are just as important to the final product as the few large-scale choices made during the conception. It is a mistake to equate “large-scale” with “important” when it comes to the choices made when creating art; the interrelationship between the large scale and the small scale is where the artistry lies.

Believing that inspiration outweighs everything else is, I suspect, a sign that someone is unfamiliar with the medium. I contend that this is true even if one’s goal is to create entertainment rather than high art. People often underestimate the effort required to entertain; a thriller novel may not live up to Kafka’s ideal of a book—an “axe for the frozen sea within us”—but it can still be as finely crafted as a Swiss watch. And an effective thriller is more than its premise or its plot. I doubt you could replace every sentence in a thriller with one that is semantically equivalent and have the resulting novel be as entertaining. This means that its sentences—and the small-scale choices they represent—help to determine the thriller’s effectiveness.

Many novelists have had the experience of being approached by someone convinced that they have a great idea for a novel, which they are willing to share in exchange for a fifty-fifty split of the proceeds. Such a person inadvertently reveals that they think formulating sentences is a nuisance rather than a fundamental part of storytelling in prose. Generative A.I. appeals to people who think they can express themselves in a medium without actually working in that medium. But the creators of traditional novels, paintings, and films are drawn to those art forms because they see the unique expressive potential that each medium affords. It is their eagerness to take full advantage of those potentialities that makes their work satisfying, whether as entertainment or as art.

Of course, most pieces of writing, whether articles or reports or e-mails, do not come with the expectation that they embody thousands of choices. In such cases, is there any harm in automating the task? Let me offer another generalization: any writing that deserves your attention as a reader is the result of effort expended by the person who wrote it. Effort during the writing process doesn’t guarantee the end product is worth reading, but worthwhile work cannot be made without it. The type of attention you pay when reading a personal e-mail is different from the type you pay when reading a business report, but in both cases it is only warranted when the writer put some thought into it.

Recently, Google aired a commercial during the Paris Olympics for Gemini, its competitor to OpenAI’s GPT-4. The ad shows a father using Gemini to compose a fan letter, which his daughter will send to an Olympic athlete who inspires her. Google pulled the commercial after widespread backlash from viewers; a media professor called it “one of the most disturbing commercials I’ve ever seen.” It’s notable that people reacted this way, even though artistic creativity wasn’t the attribute being supplanted. No one expects a child’s fan letter to an athlete to be extraordinary; if the young girl had written the letter herself, it would likely have been indistinguishable from countless others. The significance of a child’s fan letter—both to the child who writes it and to the athlete who receives it—comes from its being heartfelt rather than from its being eloquent.

Many of us have sent store-bought greeting cards, knowing that it will be clear to the recipient that we didn’t compose the words ourselves. We don’t copy the words from a Hallmark card in our own handwriting, because that would feel dishonest. The programmer Simon Willison has described the training for large language models as “money laundering for copyrighted data,” which I find a useful way to think about the appeal of generative-A.I. programs: they let you engage in something like plagiarism, but there’s no guilt associated with it because it’s not clear even to you that you’re copying.

Some have claimed that large language models are not laundering the texts they’re trained on but, rather, learning from them, in the same way that human writers learn from the books they’ve read. But a large language model is not a writer; it’s not even a user of language. Language is, by definition, a system of communication, and it requires an intention to communicate. Your phone’s auto-complete may offer good suggestions or bad ones, but in neither case is it trying to say anything to you or the person you’re texting. The fact that ChatGPT can generate coherent sentences invites us to imagine that it understands language in a way that your phone’s auto-complete does not, but it has no more intention to communicate.

It is very easy to get ChatGPT to emit a series of words such as “I am happy to see you.” There are many things we don’t understand about how large language models work, but one thing we can be sure of is that ChatGPT is not happy to see you. A dog can communicate that it is happy to see you, and so can a prelinguistic child, even though both lack the capability to use words. ChatGPT feels nothing and desires nothing, and this lack of intention is why ChatGPT is not actually using language. What makes the words “I’m happy to see you” a linguistic utterance is not that the sequence of text tokens that it is made up of are well formed; what makes it a linguistic utterance is the intention to communicate something. (...)

It’s not impossible that one day we will have computer programs that can do anything a human being can do, but, contrary to the claims of the companies promoting A.I., that is not something we’ll see in the next few years. Even in domains that have absolutely nothing to do with creativity, current A.I. programs have profound limitations that give us legitimate reasons to question whether they deserve to be called intelligent at all.

by Ted Chiang, New Yorker |  Read more:
Image: Jackie Carlise


via: here/here

Tuesday, September 3, 2024

The Compounding Loophole

[ed. Re: Ozempic and other 'weight loss' drugs.]

Now that we’ve gone over the pharmacology of the GLP-1 agonists, let’s get back to the economics.

Last time, we asked - how will the economy handle a $12,000/year drug that everyone wants?

Now we have an answer: the compounding loophole.

Compounding pharmacies are pharmacies that make some drugs on site. Don’t imagine fancy chemistry labs; imagine something more like them putting powder into capsules. They can get you unusual doses (for example, if you’re a hyper-responder and need a pill smaller than the smallest standard version) or unusual formulations (for example, if you have digestive problems and want a usually-solid medication as a liquid, or vice versa.)

Compounding pharmacies aren’t supposed to compete with Big Pharma. They’re usually just some storefront where one guy with a PharmD degree pours powders into things. Big Pharma has the patents and heavily-FDA-regulated factories. It would be unfair to let compounding pharmacies ignore the patents and regulations everyone else has to follow. So they’re usually under lots of restrictions.

But the law says that compounding pharmacies are allowed to step in and compete with Big Pharma during a shortage. And guess which drugs are in constant shortage because every obese person in the country has wanted them for the past year?

So enterprising startups have hit upon the business model of connecting would-be patients to friendly doctors and compounding pharmacies. From the customer perspective, this looks like filling in a form on a website and getting cheap GLP-1 agonist drugs in the mail the next day.

How do the compounding pharmacies get it?

They say it’s through the same factories that make the official version for Big Pharma. If I understand the situation, nameless Chinese factories make the chemical itself, and Novo Nordisk (the pharmaceutical company that owns the official patent) does some fancy encapsulation work at their own plants. But they have a permanent capacity problem because of logistical and regulatory issues, so the nameless Chinese factories sell the extra to the compounding pharmacies on the side.

How much does is cost?

HenryMeds is $297/month, Eden is $296, Mochi is $254 - compared to the $1,300/month you’d pay for the official product. This isn’t covered by insurance, so it’s still not affordable for lots of people. But it’s more affordable than the $1,300/month version. Also, there’s not a shortage of it. (...)

So this is good, right?

I’m pretty encouraged by it. Not only does it provide GLP-1 drugs for a quarter of the price, but also people were really worried that diabetics wouldn’t be able to get their diabetes drugs because dieters would grab them off the shelf first. But now there’s more than enough GLP-1 agonists for everybody. This dramatically demonstrates how drug shortages are mostly regulatory problems (Adderall users, take note!)

What about paying back the patent-holders?

That is the one disadvantage.

The good news for them is that insurances mostly don’t cover these compounding pharmacies. So the people who really medically need the drugs will get them via insurance, and insurance will pay full price to the patent-holders. The compounding pharmacies will just pick off the people who only want them for cosmetic reasons, or who have bad insurance - most of whom wouldn’t have been able to get them through the normal system anyway.

Don’t get me wrong, this does probably take a big chunk out of Novo Nordisk’s profits. But Novo Nordisk’s stock price currently looks like this:



…and they’re now the most valuable company in Europe. So they can probably eat the loss.

What happens when the shortage ends?

Compounding pharmacies are only allowed to do this because of a law that suspends some drug regulations during a “shortage”, ie when the drug is on the FDA’s drug shortage list.

At some point, Novo Nordisk will build enough factories to meet capacity and there won’t be a shortage anymore. What then? Will the fun be over? Will GLP-1 agonists go back to costing $1,200/month again? Will most of the current users have to stop the drug and regain the lost weight? This would make tens of thousands of people really mad. I don’t know if the FDA has the guts to offend that many people. Their style is more to crush drugs before they ever come out, before anyone knows what they’re missing.

During COVID, the DEA said that telemedicine was allowed to be cheap and convenient so patients could get care during lockdown. After the pandemic died down, they tried making it hard and expensive again, but so many patients protested that they backed off. The uproar we’ll get if the FDA tries to make GLP-1 drugs expensive again will make that one look like a tempest in a teapot.

by Scott Alexander, ACX |  Read more:
Image: Novo Nordisk

Confiscate Their Money

One of the privileges of great wealth is the ability to pretend that spending it amounts to a job. For the pharma executives Calvin and Orsula Knowlton, that spare job was the planning and construction of a $27 million New Jersey mansion, complete with an indoor pub and an elevator to the his-and-hers gym and an underground tunnel leading to the planned auto gallery. The religious couple also installed a chapel in the mansion, a home they did not often spend time in, because they had others. How they squared their allegiance to the Bible with their superfluous $27 million palace was not discussed.

For Daren Metropoulos, the 41-year-old son of a private equity titan, the fake job has been a decade spent buying up $326 million of luxury homes, which can be referred to as “assembling a real estate portfolio.” Metropoulos, who has worked only for companies that his dad owns, has bought up the Playboy Mansion and Mandarin Oriental condos in New York and a Martha’s Vineyard compound and waterfront homes in Hawaii and Miami Beach. Most recently, he paid $148 million cash for a Palm Beach estate. These “all will be used as personal residences,” the Wall Street Journal notes. The wealth that Metropoulos will earn on his vast portfolio of mansions is simply proof that in America, hard work pays off.

Of course, even this is child’s play compared to the holdings of a real billionaire. Ken Griffin, for example, the Citadel hedge fund billionaire, has a $122 million pied-a-terre in London, a $238 million apartment in Manhattan, and is currently building himself a $1 billion home in Florida. One cannot expect hardworking men like this to be forced to shelter in the vile confines of a “hotel.”

One of the foundational operating principles of the United States of America is that no one can ever be deemed to have too much wealth. It’s odd, if you think about it. There is no upper limit—a man with more money than he could spend in ten lifetimes can go right on adding billions of dollars to his pile, wealth that could change millions of lives for the better but which means nothing to him other than the movement of a few digits on his acccounts. No law or agency is empowered to say that he has too much. Yet it is certainly possible to have too little wealth. If you have no money, you will be denied housing and you will be denied quality health care and you will be denied food and respect and when you are put in jail you will be denied bail. This seems, by a common sense version of morality, exactly backwards. Our lack of an upper wealth limit is evidence of a land where rich people write the laws.

The United States government should confiscate the wealth of the very rich. Their wealth is symbolically grotesque, unnecessary for them to have, needed more by others, and, most importantly, allowing such wealth to pool into such a small number of hands warps our political system and our society at large in incredibly harmful ways. Rather than populist politicians grumbling about billionaires and railing at the way that they exert undue influence over all of our lives, the government should tax all individual wealth over, let’s say, $999 million at 100%. Democratic governments should not wage PR battles against billionaires. They should eradicate them.

... Yes, I understand the barriers that money in politics and rich donors pose to such a thing happening. But history shows again and again that moral demands that will fix a terrible flaw plaguing all of society can in fact migrate into mainstream politics even if they harm a particular interest group. The first step to achieving this is to begin creating a consensus among normal people that billionaires should not exist. There is a process that all political ideas must go through before they are achieved. Just because there are barriers in the way does not mean that the underlying idea is not just and necessary. This particular idea has the benefit of being both necessary to the survival of a functioning democracy, and almost completely walled off from entry to the Land of Serious Policy Discussion. That means that every intellectual and pundit and activist individual and group who picks up this idea and makes the case for it is building the foundation of its success in a way that will feel really good when it is achieved. (...)

What does someone who is worth $30 billion lose if you take $29 billion from them? They can still own multiple mansions and a private jet and buy any material thing they want and leave a fortune behind when they die that will take care of their family for generations. As a practical matter of day to day life, they lose nothing. All they really lose is the ability to unduly influence the rest of us. They lose (some of) their ability to act like gods. 

by Hamilton Nolan, How Things Work |  Read more:
Image: Daren Metropoulos/uncredited

Monday, September 2, 2024

The Wisdom of the Skinned Knee

It’s an old and durable lesson about parenting: sometimes when your child gets hurt, the best way to help is to laugh it off, using comedy or surprise or nonchalance, rather than to immediately act worried and concerned. Very often, a minor hurt will be quickly forgotten if the parent acts like it’s not a big deal, modeling resilience and the virtues of moving on and, importantly, of distraction. These are exceptionally important tools for being a human being who experiences pain - knowing when and how not to feel it. For their part, parents seem to absorb the wisdom of this approach over time, leading to the classic scenario of a skinned knee on a first child resulting in parent panic and over-the-top comforting, while a skinned knee on a third child has the parents laughing and pointing their kids towards a shiny object. Because they’ve observed that the overwrought concern in the former instance actually causes more distress than the chill of the latter. This is all true of actual physical bumps and scrapes among young children - I’ve seen parents prevent tears with distraction and smiles many times - but of course I also mean this in a broader sense of all manner of painful moments at any age.

The challenge is knowing when a harm is sufficient that outsized emotional reactions are appropriate because this is, of course, a technique and philosophy that has clear limits. Sometimes kids get hurt badly enough that they need a lot of direct and emotional consoling; sometimes they get hurt badly enough that they need actual medical attention. And you can certainly argue that, in decades past, the average parent erred too far in the other direction. Certainly many people have been legitimately scarred by the seeming indifference of their parents. There’s a measured approach to knowing how much sympathy and concern to show someone when they’re hurt and then there’s neglect, which are very different things. We live in a culture that’s the product of the endless pendulum swings of children growing up to be parents and raising their own kids in defiance of how they were raised themselves. This is probably inevitable. But, as I and many others have said, we seem to have moved to a distant extreme with this issue, as explicitly politicized arguments and the intemperate rhetoric of therapeutic culture have established a clear elite attitude: the appropriate time for a parent to minimize dwelling on a harm and to instead model moving on quickly, with a hurt child, is never.

The past half-century or so has seen a correction, which over time has become an overcorrection, to the point that showering children with worry and concern over every harm, and going to absurd lengths to prevent them from experiencing hardship or defeat, has become something like the default approach to parenting among the educated and affluent. Inevitably, a counternarrative arose, with critics insisting that all of this overprotective helicopter parenting and constant pandering to the immediate emotional whims of children actually hurts those children and society. Because everything is broken and stupid, in the 21st century this has boiled itself down to a simplistic and unhelpful “snowflakes” discourse, with both sides happier to prosecute their part of the culture war than to ask what’s really better for kids and for our culture.

Which is what this is really all about, what’s actually helpful to children, and this is what prompts my deepest frustration. There is something about this that relates to our obligations to others, yes, and there are times for “tough love.” But the wisdom of the skinned knee has nothing to do with tough love; the point is not to force kids to be tough, but to best minimize the harm to the child. A parent laughing when a kid falls on their face, so that the kid laughs and quickly moves on, isn’t tough love. It’s not some lesson in being stoic. It’s meant precisely to make that moment as brief and inconsequential as it can be, and parents for generations have learned that technique precisely out of a concern for their kid. Sometimes, a kid’s really hurt and you have to rush over and console them and soothe them and rock them until they’re finished crying. But sometimes that behavior merely prolongs the pain, makes the hurt a bigger deal than it has to be. And this is what gets to me: the argument for not overdoing every moment of temporary pain and setback in a young person’s life stems first and foremost from the best interests of the child. I asked this in a broader sense about helicopter parenting before - why do so many parents practice a suffocating version of parenting when the harms of that behavior are so obvious for their child? Why has the wisdom in a skinned knee never occurred to the people who believe that they’d do anything at all for their parents? Because it seems like the one thing they’re unwilling to do for their kids is to chill out and do less. 

by Freddie deBoer |  Read more:
Image: uncredited
[ed. Whenever my son got banged up with a cut or something, I'd ususally say "man, that could leave a really cool scar!". Does wonders for re-directing focus. Maybe that's why he got so many tattoos later in life... ha! Here's a favorite: (via)]

Gillian Welch & David Rawlings


Everything is free now
That's what they say
Everything I ever done
Gonna give it away
Someone hit the big score
They figured it out
That we're gonna do it anyway
Even if it doesn't pay

I can get a tip jar
Gas up the car
And try and make a little change
Down at the bar
Or I can get a straight job
I done it before
Never minded working hard
It's who I'm working for

But everything is free now
That's what they say
Everything I ever done
Gonna give it away
Someone hit the big score
They figured it out
That we're gonna do it anyway
Even if doesn't pay

Every day I wake up
Humming a song
But I don't need to run around
I'll just stay at home
And sing a little love song
My love and myself
If there's something that you want to hear
You can sing it yourself

Cause everything is free now
That's what I said
No one's got to listen to
The words in my head
Someone hit the big score
But I figured it out
And I'm gonna do it anyway
Even if doesn't pay

[ed. Written back in the Napster era and more relevant than ever. Live version here. See also: Gillian Welch on How ‘Everything Is Free’ Became a Modern Classic in the Streaming Era (RS).]

Sunday, September 1, 2024

Don’t Leave Bagged Dog Poop in the Outdoors

Recently, on a hike with a friend, among towering Douglas fir and western hemlock trees, by a glassy, pebble-rich creek, we saw giant plops of black-bear scat every few hundred yards. We were miles from the trailhead. Among the views, among the bear excrement, was a green bag, on a stump: dog droppings. The poop had been scooped, bagged, and then just … left there.

For the past two years, I’ve worked in conservation and preservation at Arabia Mountain National Heritage Area in Stonecrest, Georgia, which includes 16 parks and green spaces. The No. 1 trash offender I find is plastic bottles, which sadly are as ubiquitous as foliage. But a close second is those plastic dog bags, filled with poop.

I cannot go on a hike or lead a tour in our Heritage Area without seeing at least one—if not several—of them. They’re abandoned by pet owners who either intended (and forgot) to pick up their animal’s bagged waste as they returned from their hike, or have been sold a plastic product with terms like “biodegradable” and “compostable” that suggest their bags of choice are way more Earth-friendly than they are. Or the poop bags are left by people who simply don’t care.

There is a better way: If you’re out in the wild, don’t scoop your dog’s poop. Leave it out there in nature (ideally, after burying it in the ground).

To be clear, I am not completely against the existence of plastic dog poop bags, and their usage in many settings. It’s good that people have been conditioned to pick up after an animal’s droppings in urban areas, rather than just letting their ordure sit there to be easily stepped in. No thank you. If your pet is pooping on or near anything that’s paved, pick it up! That rule extends to busy urban green spaces like New York City’s Central Park. In places where there are tons and tons of people and plenty of trash cans, picking up and tossing dog poop is a necessary part of the social contract.

But in larger parks, preserves, and green spaces—where dogs often poop in the woods, off of the trail—what’s the sense of taking something that will biodegrade in weeks and wrapping it up in something that will take hundreds of years to break down? Yes, the ideal here is that people bag poop and then dispose of it in the trash. But let me tell you what happens in practice: When the nearest trash can is miles—or even a mile away—people do the first step, and forget the crucial second step of taking the bag with them until they find an appropriate place to dispose of it.

by Jeff Dingler, Slate |  Read more:
Image: Getty Images Plus
[ed. No shit. One of my pet peeves.]