Subaru Socialists and the Great Disappointed

One of the most thought-provoking books I’ve read in the past year is Noam Scheiber’s “Mutiny: The Rise and Revolt of the College-Educated Working Class.” Scheiber presents a series of incisively reported profiles of young people who did everything they were asked to do but still found themselves working at a Starbucks or in an Amazon warehouse. Their discontent, Scheiber concludes, isn’t explicitly economic or cultural or political but, rather, is what happens when people with degrees realize that what they thought was a temporary postgraduate job will almost certainly become their career. There is no dream job coming; the bridge is the road and the final destination. Combine that realization with the harsh reality of retail jobs, plus a revival of class solidarity and labor politics—thanks, in part, to Bernie Sanders—and the result is a highly educated and credentialled political movement that has swept leftist candidates into office across the country.

This new voting bloc has two similar but distinct components. There are what I call the Subaru Socialists: college-educated millennials in their thirties and early forties who earn a somewhat steady income but not what they expected. These voters arrived at their politics via the Great Recession, Occupy Wall Street, and the continual escalation of housing prices in urban areas—all of which heightened the contrast between what they were promised when they took on student debt and their current circumstances. Then there are the Great Disappointed, a younger set. They don’t have strong memories of the 2008 financial crash, as their millennial elders do, but they came of age during the pandemic and saw that seemingly invincible institutions could, in fact, sputter and fail when placed under duress. Like the Subaru Socialists, these twenty-two-to-thirty-year-olds aren’t exactly happy with the return on their educational investment. But their political views have seemingly coalesced less around the economy than around the war in Gaza, which serves as a character test for any politician who asks for their vote.

Pundits have many things to say about Subaru Socialists and the Great Disappointed, and almost all of it is at least partially true. Given that these voters are mostly white college graduates between the ages of twenty-five and forty, they are indeed “privileged” in the most boring sense of that word. They probably do spend a lot of time online. Many of them live in historically Black or immigrant neighborhoods where rent is cheaper, at least until enough of them move in and start opening coffee shops that play Stereolab or whatever. Economically, they might not be particularly worse off than their boomer parents were at the same point in their lives. They vote at a high rate for their age, which is why they need to be taken seriously.

Many skeptics see a contradiction in high-achieving, mostly white young voters employing rhetoric about labor and solidarity. Every big Election Night for the leftists comes with the same eye-rolling complaint from centrists and the right: “Oh, great, some gentrifiers who went to Sarah Lawrence are cosplaying socialism and pretending they’re working class.” But all voting blocs come with some supposed contradictions; poor, non-college-educated voters regularly prefer candidates who support tax cuts for billionaires, for example. What this usually means is that the apparent contradiction isn’t particularly relevant for those voters or very revealing about their preferences. And a whole lot of people under the age of forty-five no longer believe that indicators such as wages, unemployment, or the number of college degrees that are handed out in a given year have much to do with a healthy economy. They are concerned with the consolidation of wealth, the price of housing, the cost of child care, and student debt. And, absent an upheaval of the entire political establishment in this country, they don’t really see why anything would get better, even if they might admit that things are not so bad for them personally right now.

There’s another term for people who make an O.K. salary at a normal job but sometimes struggle to afford housing and child care: the middle class. No term in American politics is quite as slippery or misshapen. I imagine that the majority of Subaru Socialists in their thirties would resist the label, even if they make the median household income for their neighborhood and work a steady job that allows them to put away a modest amount of money each month in a retirement account. This resistance comes from a variety of sources, but it’s largely cultural: “middle class” suggests cul-de-sacs in the suburbs, moderate politics, and a career. The manager of a Starbucks or an enterprising but disgruntled gig-economy worker might pull down enough money to land in the middle class, but they will not feel the homogenizing stability and somewhat stultifying comfort they likely associate with the phrase.

During one of the many iterations of her Presidential campaign, Kamala Harris started talking about something she called an “opportunity economy” that would lift the “middle class” out of despair. I recall thinking that I had no idea who she meant by the middle class: was she talking about postal workers and teachers in the Midwest whose communities had been ravaged by opioids and deindustrialization? Was she talking about nurses in New Jersey who were being priced out of their homes?

Harris was probably trying to talk to Subaru Socialists and the Great Disappointed. Her policy proposals during the “middle-class” phase of her campaign involved federal assistance on down payments for a first home, child tax credits for parents of newborns, and help if you wanted to start a small business. They might have benefitted someone living in the suburbs of Detroit, for instance—someone who graduated from Michigan State, say, and cobbles together about sixty-five thousand dollars a year through a retail job and Uber driving but dreams of opening her own coffee shop and starting a family. If that person heard Harris talking about “the middle class,” would she have assumed that Harris was talking about her? [...]

The problem for the Democratic establishment is that the Subaru Socialist does not believe that Harris and those like her have any interest in helping her out, even if they advance a slate of proposals that will undeniably get her closer to opening that coffee shop and starting that family. This helps to explain why the Biden Administration gets so little credit from the left for an economic policy drafted by former Elizabeth Warren staffers, or why nobody seems to care that Lina Khan, who currently chairs the board of the New York City Economic Development Corporation under Zohran Mamdani, actually held a much more important position under Biden. Absent a truly transformative and well-marketed idea such as universal health care, there’s nothing an establishment candidate can do to satisfy the Subaru Socialists, because the bad deal they were sold as children—study, go to college, and you’ll find yourself in a better place than your parents—has led to a fundamental discontentment with the way things are.

by Jay Caspian Kang, New Yorker | Read more:
Image: George Wylesol
[ed. Sounds about right. See also: What if our biggest problems aren’t economic? (Noahpinion) which argues that most political fixes are usually economic in nature (healthcare reform, tax credits, inflation, class inequality, etc.) when dissatisfaction might be more about material scarcity. That is, a sense of longing for a more cohesive society that provides more opportunities for status, growth and respect (and not just nationally, but globally too, eg., Palestine). Basically, life-fulfillment issues.]