Wednesday, February 17, 2021

The Grizzly Maze

Timothy Treadwell was the sort of guy most Alaskans loved to hate. For starters, Treadwell was an outsider, a Californian from the weird-wacky end of the scale, a guy sporting a shock of blond hair and a backward baseball cap, with the outdoors skills you’d expect of a former Malibu cocktail waiter. Then there was the way Treadwell acted around bears. Lots of Alaskans would like to get a bear in their rifle sights; Treadwell sang and read to the grizzlies on the rugged Katmai Coast, and gave them names like Thumper, Mr. Chocolate, and Squiggle. He would walk up to a half-ton wild animal with four-inch claws and two-inch fangs, and say, “Czar, I’m so worried! I can’t find little Booble.” In Alaska, that kind of behavior makes a man stand out—and not in a good way.

Treadwell had been a fixture along the Katmai Coast for 13 years, camping out each spring and summer, alone, in the heart of bear country, deliberately seeking out the animals. He told the story of how this came about in his book, Among Grizzlies. By Treadwell’s account, he was born into a middle-class family on Long Island, New York. He wasn’t really a bad kid, but a handful. All along, he sensed a kinship with animals; he “donned imaginary wings, claws, and fangs.” As an adolescent, he did more than his share of drinking, wrecked the family car, and managed to get arrested. After high school, he left home for California, where he became “an overactive street punk without any skills, prospects, or hopes.” He slid into hard-core drug use and was plucked back from the edge by a Vietnam vet with a heart of gold, who slapped him into shape and pointed him toward Alaska and bears.

There he discovered his true purpose in life: watching over those noble and imperiled creatures. The way he told it, he had stumbled onto a peaceable kingdom where the bears seemed neither ferocious nor afraid of man—a childhood dream made real. Photos and videos document the breathtaking proximity to the animals that he was able to achieve. Not only did they not attack, but they seemed to give a collective ursine shrug and accept him as a somewhat odd-smelling and harmless hanger-on.

Crawling on all fours, singing and talking in that sort of odd, high voice normally reserved for babies and small dogs—”Hey, little bear, love you, aren’t you beautiful, that’s right, love you”—Treadwell sidled up to wild bears, his camera and video recorder whirring, and he filled notebooks with observations, scrawled in wavering schoolboy print. Some of the animals, he maintained, seemed to actually enjoy his company. A wounded bear he named Mickey slept near his tent for weeks and recovered; mother bears would leave their cubs nearby when they went off to forage as if asking him to babysit. By his own admission, he even went so far as to plant a kiss on one bear’s nose after it licked his fingers.

Treadwell had found love, so powerful it bordered on obsession. He called the objects of his affection grizzlies, but they were and are considered by Alaska biologists to be brown bears, the coastal version of the species Ursus arctos. The inland variation is commonly known in North America as grizzly (Ursus arctos horribilis). The distinction between grizzlies and brown bears is, most Alaskans would argue, the difference between pit bulls and Labrador retrievers. But Treadwell chose to call his bears grizzlies for reasons any publicist could explain, and justified it in print by rightly claiming they were the same species.

In the history of the Katmai National Park and Monument, stretching back over 85 years, not one person had been seriously mauled, let alone killed, by a bear. Still, these huge animals are far from harmless. At least twice, Treadwell was reduced to a quaking ball of nerves. In one case, witnessed from a distance by a bear-viewing guide in the mid-’90s, an older male bear who was courting a female lost his temper at Treadwell and stopped just short of knocking his head off. Another time, threatened by a bear trashing his tent, Treadwell made a radio call in a total panic to a local air service, asking for an immediate fly-out from the area.

Treadwell never carried a gun and maintained that even if firearms had been legal in the park, he still wouldn’t have carried one. Early on he swore off nonlethal means of protection, like the newly developed (and highly effective) portable electric fences, and even pepper spray. The spray he did use once, when he felt he had no other choice, hosing a bear he’d named Cupcake; he was so distressed by the bear’s apparent agony that he vowed he’d never use repellent again. Fear, he decided, wasn’t the message he wanted to send. Good intentions were the only shield he needed.

‘You’re going to get yourself killed’

At the end of each of those first few summers, Treadwell returned to Malibu. He and Jewel Palovak, his friend and co-author, put serious time into discussing how they might turn his burgeoning passion for bears into something more. Treadwell sold photos at crafts fairs, and he began doing free presentations for elementary school students.

He loved the children as much as they loved him. With his own kidlike enthusiasm, jumping up and down and having the kids repeat bear facts after him, he was a natural. What’s more, the youngsters were learning about bears, and coming to care about them too. Thus the idea of Grizzly People was born: a grass-roots, nonprofit organization with a professionally designed website, dedicated to protecting the bears, studying them and educating people. Palovak claims that Treadwell reached about 10,000 school-children a year. The letters from excited kids and grateful, impressed teachers poured in.

Not everyone approved of what he was doing. Regulations for Katmai stipulate viewing distances of no less than 50 yards for brown bears. Both Treadwell’s personal videos and professional productions featuring him document distances far closer than that, which angered and alarmed conservationists. Several local people resented this surfer boy with wraparound shades telling them what to do with their bears. As to his claims that the bears were endangered, not even the most greenie locals would go along with such an idea.

The bear science establishment disdained his methods; one researcher described Treadwell’s interaction with bears in the field as “his own private Jackass show,” a reference to the sophomoric MTV program that features a series of mindless, often death-defying stunts. Longtime state bear biologist Sterling Miller recalls admonishing Treadwell to be more cautious.

Treadwell wrote back saying that he would personally “be honored” to end up as grizzly scat—though that was not exactly the word he used. Says Miller, “Given his attitude, I believed it wouldn’t be long before he was so honored.”

Tom Walters, the plain-spoken head of bear-viewing guides at Katmai Wilderness Lodge, of which he is also a part owner, says, “I told him straight out, years ago, he was going to get himself killed.”

Strange season

Amie Huguenard saw Timothy Treadwell in Boulder, Colorado, at a slide show and lecture he gave in 1996 at the University of Colorado campus. She was smitten by his passion and commitment and later wrote to him. One thing led to another, and they became romantically involved. At the time of their first meeting, she was in her early 30s, a surgical physician’s assistant, attractive in a wholesome, fit way.

She had spent a couple of weeks with Treadwell in Alaska in the two summers before 2003. This year’s visit was different; there was an evident strain. For one thing, this late in the season—the end of September—it was a challenge to keep warm and dry while camping in the autumn rains with the first snows around the corner. Then there were the bears. Treadwell’s camp, a short distance from the shore of Upper Kaflia Lake, was on a grass-crowned knoll amid a labyrinth of tunneled trails that bears had worn through the dense brush over centuries. Treadwell called this place the Grizzly Maze. Huguenard’s anxiety at being there showed on a video that Treadwell shot; in one sequence, she sits in the brush with a female bear and cubs ten feet away. Then one bear shifts even closer. Huguenard’s face is taut and unsmiling. She wanted to pull back, not push to get so close.

She was frightened. They argued. Treadwell tried to reassure her. You can practically hear him saying, “Everything’s fine. It’s only Tabitha.” But in fact, everything wasn’t fine. Five miles away as the crow flies, bear biologist Matthias Breiter was camped out with a small party of photographers. The bear dynamics he observed were both chaotic and unusual. In a normal year, the half-mile of creek before him might have had 15 bears working for fish; this year, more than 60 showed up. The crowding led to conflict. “You’d usually see four fights a week,” says Breiter. “It was ten a day. Real, all-out fights. The level of aggression was far above normal.”

by Nick Jans, Reader's Digest |  Read more:
Image: Willy Fulton


Jan Tarasin “PRZEDMIOTY” 2003
via:

Joni Mitchell

Listening to these bare-bones sketches, I suddenly understood how the sonic and harmonic ambition of that record wasn’t surface-level affectation but written into the fabric of the songs themselves from the start. Hissing’s complexity wasn’t just 1970s excess, it was a masterpiece of word, sound and thought in Swiss-watch alignment. (...)

Discovering Prince was an obsessive Joni fan – covering her, writing her into his lyrics, unsuccessfully pitching songs to her – blew the whole issue out of the water. Who needs the white rock canon, anyway? Not Joni, for one. Given she was as close musically and personally to Charles Mingus and Herbie Hancock as to Bob Dylan or Carly Simon, isn’t it great that her lineage can be traced through Prince, Chaka Khan and Kate Bush to Outkast, Frank Ocean, James Blake? 


Joni Mitchell: how rock misogyny made me into a militant fan (Joe Muggs, The Guardian)

[ed. From: “The Hissing of Summer Lawns” Demos released recently. Just a guitar and piano.] 

Coronavirus: Links, Discussion, Open Thread

So far there have been three waves of coronavirus cases in the US. The first wave was the beginning, when it caught us unprepared. The second wave was in July, when we got sloppy and lifted lockdowns too soon. The third wave was November through January, because the coronavirus is seasonal and winter is its season (also probably the holidays). From Johns Hopkins CRC:


A fourth wave may hit in March, when the more contagious B117 strain from the UK takes over. Expect more shelter-in-place orders, school shutdowns, and a spike in cases at least the size of July's, maybe December's. That will last until May-ish, when the usual control system (more virus -> stricter lockdowns -> less virus -> looser lockdowns -> more virus) moves back into the "less virus" stage. Also coronavirus is seasonal and summer isn't its season. Also by that time a decent chunk of the population will be vaccinated. The worst consequences of the UK strain should burn themselves out by late spring.

Prediction: 75% chance that there will be a new wave peaking in March or April, with a peak at least half again as high as the preceding trough.

[EDIT: some people link new studies saying the B117 strain is less virulent than previously believed, and the US has been getting much better at vaccination since I checked, probably my prediction above is too high and we should worry less about this]

We should also be concerned about a fifth wave (possibly overlapping with the fourth wave; they may not have obviously separate peaks). Virologists have identified two new strains, one in South Africa, one in Brazil, which probably have "immune escape" - the ability to infect people who have already gotten, recovered from, and developed antibodies to the original strain (or been vaccinated against it). Both strains already have a few cases in the US. It will take them a few months to spread to the point where they're relevant, but they should eventually be the majority of new cases.

Prediction: 66% chance that sometime this year, the South African and Brazilian strains - or other new strains with similar dynamics - will be a majority of coronavirus cases in the US.

Some sources describe these strains as "vaccine resistant". This is a matter of degree. The UK strain is probably very slightly vaccine-resistant (most sources are describing it as not vaccine resistant, but if you look closely this is another "well we can't prove it is" situation, and the best point estimates suggest some tiny amount of extra resistance which probably doesn't make a big difference.). The South African strain is significantly vaccine resistant. The Brazilian strain is too new to know much about, but seems to be very similar to the South African strain and I would be surprised if its numbers differed very much.

In terms of preventing sympomatic infections, the best current data suggests that the Novavax vaccine is 96% effective against Coronavirus Classic, 86% effective against UK, and 60% effective against South Africa. AstraZeneca is something like 80% effective against Classic, 65% effective against UK, and the South African study was kind of bungled but our best guess is "seems pretty bad". Johnson and Johnson is 66-72%+ effective against Classic and 57% effective against South Africa. Pfizer/Moderna hasn't been tested against South Africa in real life yet, but lab studies suggest slightly decreased efficacy.

The good news is that vaccines which protect inconsistently against infection are probably still good at protecting against severe disease and death. For example, although the J&J vaccine is only 66-72% effective at preventing people from getting symptomatic disease, it's 85% effective at preventing severe disease, and (at least so far in studies) 100% effective at preventing deaths. In fact, most vaccine studies have shown 100% efficacy at preventing deaths. Probably some of this is that the trials are underpowered to detect rare outcomes, but the vaccines really do seem good at this, even with strains that have some level of vaccine resistance. Also, although I don't know of any studies investigating this, it makes sense to think that vaccinated people would also be less likely to transmit the virus to others if they do get it.

Prediction: 55% chance that later, when we have great evidence on this, we’ll find that P/M, Novavax, AZ, and J&J all cut deaths from all extant strains by at least four-fifths.

When the fifth wave strikes in late spring/early summer, some of the population (~50%?) will be vaccinated, another part of the population (~25%?) will have had the disease already, and the rest (~25%?) will be completely vulnerable. The new strains will probably cause a limited number of mild cases among the vaccinated/resistant, and a larger number of more severe cases among the vulnerable. Either way, the presence of the larger vaccinated/resistant contingent could potentially make this less severe than previous waves. Also, we may have learned more about treating severe COVID (with eg ivermectin, fluvoxamine), which might further decrease deaths. (...)

R in most US states right now is closely clustered around 1. Mutant strains are more contagious, enough to bring the R0 up to 1.5 or so. But having a lot of the population vaccinated will bring it back down again. Also, I'm acting like there's some complex-yet-illuminating calculation we can do here, but realistically none of this matters. It's not a coincidence that all US states are closely clustered around 1. It's the control system again - whenever things look good, we relax restrictions (both legally and in terms of personal behavior) until they look bad again, then backpedal and tighten restrictions. So we oscillate between like 0.8 and 1.2 (I made those numbers up, I don't know the real ones). If vaccines made R0 go to 0.5 or whatever, we would loosen some restrictions until it was back at 1 again. So unless we overwhelm the control system, R0 will hover around 1 in the summer too, and the only question is how strict our lockdowns will be.

In autumn, if we haven’t already vaccinated everyone there’s a risk things will get worse again because of the seasonal effect. Also, for all we know maybe the virus will have mutated even further and become even more vaccine resistant. Now what?

Vaccine companies say it should be pretty easy to create a vaccine targeted to the South African strain. Remember, it only took them two days to invent the original coronavirus vaccine. This one should be even easier, since we already know the principles involved. The vaccine is basically taking a part of the coronavirus' chemical code which functions as a "password" and telling it to the immune system so it can break its password and defeat it. The mutant coronaviruses haven't done anything fancy, they've just changed their password. The vaccine companies can plug in the new password to the vaccines they already have, and they'll work against the mutant strains.

But even if they have it tomorrow, that's...what? Another four months for studies, one month before the FDA is able to meet to discuss an approval (you can't rush meetings!), two months to ramp up production, and five months of Distribution Hell while we argue about who should be first in line and prosecute people for distributing vaccines too quickly. So maybe by this time next year you get a vaccine against the South African strain. And by that point the virus will have just changed its password again and we'll be right back where we started.

The problem is, all the virus has to do is change its chemical "password" - a simple one-step process. The people fighting the virus have to go through the entire FDA approval, production, and distribution pipeline each time - a seven million step process. This puts us at a bit of a handicap.

Best-case scenario, here's how we respond:

by Scott Alexander, Astral Codex Ten |  Read more:
Image: Johns Hopkins

30 by 30: Send Your Ideas


'America, send us your ideas': Biden pledges to protect 30% of US lands by 2030 (The Guardian)
Image: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

Tuesday, February 16, 2021

Vince Taylor and His Playboys

[ed. Brand New Cadillac. Clash version here.]

Trading in Atoms For Bits

All forms of exchange necessarily depend on differences in voltage.
—Fernand Braudel

The history of digital cash consists of scientific discoveries from the 1970s, hardware from the 1980s, and networks from the 1990s, shaped by theories from the previous three centuries and beliefs about the next ten thousand years. It speaks ancient ideas with a modern twang, as we might when we say “quid pro quo” or “shibboleth”: the sovereign right to issue money, the debasement of coinage, the symbolic stamp that transfers the rights to value from me to thee. Digital cash has the hovering, unsettled realness (not reality) of all money, a matter of life and death that is also symbolic tokens, rules of a game, scraps of cotton blend and polymer, entries in a database, promises made and broken, gestures of affection and trust. The long history we are discussing here is at its heart the history of a debate about knowledge, an epistemological argument conducted through technologies.

It is a debate broadly familiar to anyone who has taken an interest in the nature of money, or even looked idly at a banknote for a bit: how do I know that money is real? I want to phrase the question in this somewhat awkward way to capture how it can be reasonably answered. We can ask it at the level of a particular token of money—how do I know this money is real?—with the feel and texture of a note, the security threads, watermarks, and ultraviolet inks. We can ask it at the level of some type or variety of money, perhaps expressed as a preference for one currency as more “solid” than another, for instance, or for cash over credit, or gold over both: how do I know this kind of money is real? Finally, we can ask it at the level of money as such—what is money that it has value for us, and how do we know that value? How do I know that money is real?

I’m sure the reader has already noticed that this set of questions is fundamentally confused: “real” sometimes means “valuable,” sometimes “reliable,” “genuine,” or “authentic.” They muddle different kinds of knowledge together, from the empiricism of handling cash, to the accumulated experience of shared social norms about money, to beliefs and bets about the future based on all manner of conviction, habit, and hope. They conflate fundamentally unlike things into the category of “money.” I hope this very confusion is useful in showing us the kinds of realness that co-exist in even ordinary cash experience—holding a US twenty-dollar bill, for instance, with its ostensible realness scaling up from your fingertips all the way to the stable monetary sovereignty of the nation, however distant it may be. I want us to dwell on this, because attempts to resolve these uncertainties (what do you mean by money, by real money, by valuable money?) constitute the long history of digital cash. How do I know that a digital object is unique—that it is genuine and not a copy? How do I know that it is worth something? How do I know that any of this is real (and real in what sense)?

For digital cash, the answers to these questions lay in the future, in two senses: its creation relied on technologies of trust and proof that barely existed or were in the process of being developed, and it needed predictions and stories of the future to drive adoption and acceptance in the present. The two central future narratives of early digital cash experiments were crisis and transcendence.

Devotees of metallic money—of cash backed by gold and silver, and coins made of them—cherish the bodily, empirical knowledge that metal gives: the way it warms in the palm and between the fingers, the chime of a round of pure silver cast onto a marble tabletop. It is just elementally there, with its “magnificent stupid honesty” (as H. G. Wells once described the gold standard). “Do you take silver?” customers of Bernard von NotHaus’s American Liberty Dollar coinage scheme would ask checkout clerks, before they performed “the Drop”: releasing the coin into someone’s hand so they could feel the weight of the silver, as a prelude for their buying into its value. In 1974, Von NotHaus had coauthored “To Know Value—An Economic Research Paper,” a manifesto outlining a rationale for a new, deflationary, gold-based financial system, which he would go on to build over the following decades with various companies and mints that issued coins as a “private voluntary barter currency.” The distinction was a delicate one. Von NotHaus’s Liberty Dollar coins were technically “medallions,” collectibles that were not, not, they repeated emphatically, trying to pass as legal US currency. Why would they want to? Already in 1974, he was predicting runaway inflation and tyrannical crackdowns; his money was envisioned as a way out of government-induced crises.

Likewise, his “eLibertyDollars” were not posing as dollars as such—as legal tender—but were instead just digital “warehouse receipts.” These receipts could be redeemed for a quantity of precious metal stored in a warehouse outside Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. They were seldom redeemed, though. They are better understood as the right to transact part of an ingot of silver sitting on a pallet somewhere, without needing to handle or physically subdivide it. On the internet, the receipts could be bought, sold, speculated on, and used as collateral (until the business was raided by the FBI and the US Secret Service in 2007). They were an example of a digital gold currency (DGC). DGCs had names like IntGold, e-Bullion, the Aspen Dollar, Pecunix, GoldMoney, and E-Gold; they were one of the two main threads of digital cash’s development, and by far the most consequential prior to Bitcoin. Their model of money was the token, and their future was crisis. (...)

DGCs preceded companies like PayPal by years, and the biggest among them were handling billions of dollars of transactions in their currencies annually by the early 2000s. They pioneered mobile transactions and micropayments in units as small as ten-thousandths of an ounce of gold. Their framework for digital currency was tokens corresponding to specific portions of specific bars of metal in safe deposit boxes and secure warehouses from London to Idaho to Dubai. Another subtle distinction arises here. The tokens worked as pointers to the gold, which you need never see or touch. What you were really transacting with DGCs was the right to transact that gold in the future. To spend this “currency” was to assign the rights, in whole or in part, to someone else.

by Finn Brunton, Cabinet |  Read more:
Image: uncredited

Monday, February 15, 2021


Joseph Fuchs
via:

Move Fast and Break Things

Taking an expansive view of future prospects for the business, forward-thinking CEO Rick Benson was reportedly hoping Thursday that his company would be able to capture a new audience by making their signature product worse in every conceivable way. “Let’s face it, this industry moves fast and we have to be ready to cater to new users by altering every single thing that was popular in the first place,” said Benson, confirming his intention to court additional demographics by ensuring the next version was buggier, slower, and contained a more counterintuitive interface. “We can’t be afraid to innovate and push boundaries, which is why I’ve instructed our development team to get to work, taking a look at what’s been working for the last few years and then destroying from there.” Benson added that the company would be sure to retain their current audience by walking back some of the most horrific changes to their product in a couple years.

by The Onion |  Read more:
Image: uncredited

Zero-Sum Thinking on Race and Wealth


Over a two-decade career in the white-collar think tank world, I’ve continually wondered: Why can’t we have nice things?

By “we,” I mean America at-large. As for “nice things,” I don’t picture self-driving cars, hovercraft backpacks or laundry that does itself. Instead, I mean the basic aspects of a high-functioning society: well-funded schools, reliable infrastructure, wages that keep workers out of poverty, or a comprehensive public health system equipped to handle pandemics — things that equally developed but less wealthy nations seem to have.

In 2010, eight years into my time as an economic policy wonk at Demos, a progressive policy research group, budget deficits were on the rise. The Great Recession had decimated tax revenue, requiring more public spending to restart the economy.

But both the Tea Party and many in President Barack Obama’s inner circle were calling for a “grand bargain” to shrink the size of government by capping future public outlays and slashing Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare. Despite the still-fragile recovery and evidence that corporations were already paring back retirement benefits and ratcheting down real wages, the idea gained steam.

On a call with a group of all-white economist colleagues, we discussed how to advise leaders in Washington against this disastrous retrenchment. I cleared my throat and asked: “So where should we make the point that all these programs were created without concern for their cost when the goal was to build a white middle class, and they paid for themselves in economic growth? Now these guys are trying to fundamentally renege on the deal for a future middle class that would be majority people of color?”

Nobody answered. I checked to see if I was muted.

Finally, one of the economists breached the awkward silence. “Well, sure, Heather. We know that — and you know that — but let’s not lead with our chin here,” he said. “We are trying to be persuasive.”

The sad truth is that he was probably right. Soon, the Tea Party movement, harnessing the language of fiscal responsibility and the subtext of white grievance, would shut down the federal government, win across-the-board cuts to public programs and essentially halt the legislative function of the federal government for the next six years. The result: A jobless recovery followed by a slow, unequal economic expansion that hurt Americans of all backgrounds.

The anti-government stinginess of traditional conservatism, along with the fear of losing social status held by many white people, now broadly associated with Trumpism, have long been connected. Both have sapped American society’s strength for generations, causing a majority of white Americans to rally behind the draining of public resources and investments. Those very investments would provide white Americans — the largest group of the impoverished and uninsured — greater security, too: A new Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco study calculated that in 2019, the country’s output would have been $2.6 trillion greater if the gap between white men and everyone else were closed. And a 2020 report from analysts at Citigroup calculated that if America had adopted policies to close the Black-white economic gap 20 years ago, U.S. G.D.P would be an estimated $16 trillion higher.

by Heather C. McGhee, NY Times | Read more:
Image: Margaret Bourke-White/The Life Picture Collection — Getty Images, via Art Resource, NY
[ed. It occurs to me that probably over half the country isn't old enough to remember a pro-active government, nimble enough to confront and solve the big problems of its day. Ever since Reagan in the 80s (government is not the solution to our problems; government is the problem), and hacks like Newt Gingrich and Grover Norquist (I'm not in favor of abolishing the government. I just want to shrink it down to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub) Republicans have been steadily strangling government's ability to function, increasing its inefficiencies, and thereby making their point retroactively. To see what good government can do, look no further than this example.]


Lucas van Valckenborch (1595)

What Happens If China Makes First Contact?

Last January, the Chinese Academy of Sciences invited Liu Cixin, China’s preeminent science-fiction writer, to visit its new state-of-the-art radio dish in the country’s southwest. Almost twice as wide as the dish at America’s Arecibo Observatory, in the Puerto Rican jungle, the new Chinese dish is the largest in the world, if not the universe. Though it is sensitive enough to detect spy satellites even when they’re not broadcasting, its main uses will be scientific, including an unusual one: The dish is Earth’s first flagship observatory custom-built to listen for a message from an extraterrestrial intelligence. If such a sign comes down from the heavens during the next decade, China may well hear it first.

In some ways, it’s no surprise that Liu was invited to see the dish. He has an outsize voice on cosmic affairs in China, and the government’s aerospace agency sometimes asks him to consult on science missions. Liu is the patriarch of the country’s science-fiction scene. Other Chinese writers I met attached the honorific Da, meaning “Big,” to his surname. In years past, the academy’s engineers sent Liu illustrated updates on the dish’s construction, along with notes saying how he’d inspired their work.

But in other ways Liu is a strange choice to visit the dish. He has written a great deal about the risks of first contact. He has warned that the “appearance of this Other” might be imminent, and that it might result in our extinction. “Perhaps in ten thousand years, the starry sky that humankind gazes upon will remain empty and silent,” he writes in the postscript to one of his books. “But perhaps tomorrow we’ll wake up and find an alien spaceship the size of the Moon parked in orbit." In recent years, Liu has joined the ranks of the global literati. In 2015, his novel The Three-Body Problem became the first work in translation to win the Hugo Award, science fiction’s most prestigious prize. Barack Obama told The New York Times that the book—the first in a trilogy—gave him cosmic perspective during the frenzy of his presidency. Liu told me that Obama’s staff asked him for an advance copy of the third volume.

At the end of the second volume, one of the main characters lays out the trilogy’s animating philosophy. No civilization should ever announce its presence to the cosmos, he says. Any other civilization that learns of its existence will perceive it as a threat to expand—as all civilizations do, eliminating their competitors until they encounter one with superior technology and are themselves eliminated. This grim cosmic outlook is called “dark-forest theory,” because it conceives of every civilization in the universe as a hunter hiding in a moonless woodland, listening for the first rustlings of a rival.

Liu’s trilogy begins in the late 1960s, during Mao’s Cultural Revolution, when a young Chinese woman sends a message to a nearby star system. The civilization that receives it embarks on a centuries-long mission to invade Earth, but she doesn’t care; the Red Guard’s grisly excesses have convinced her that humans no longer deserve to survive. En route to our planet, the extraterrestrial civilization disrupts our particle accelerators to prevent us from making advancements in the physics of warfare, such as the one that brought the atomic bomb into being less than a century after the invention of the repeating rifle.

Science fiction is sometimes described as a literature of the future, but historical allegory is one of its dominant modes. Isaac Asimov based his Foundation series on classical Rome, and Frank Herbert’s Dune borrows plot points from the past of the Bedouin Arabs. Liu is reluctant to make connections between his books and the real world, but he did tell me that his work is influenced by the history of Earth’s civilizations, “especially the encounters between more technologically advanced civilizations and the original settlers of a place.” One such encounter occurred during the 19th century, when the “Middle Kingdom” of China, around which all of Asia had once revolved, looked out to sea and saw the ships of Europe’s seafaring empires, whose ensuing invasion triggered a loss in status for China comparable to the fall of Rome.

This past summer, I traveled to China to visit its new observatory, but first I met up with Liu in Beijing. By way of small talk, I asked him about the film adaptation of The Three-Body Problem. “People here want it to be China’s Star Wars,” he said, looking pained. The pricey shoot ended in mid-2015, but the film is still in postproduction. At one point, the entire special-effects team was replaced. “When it comes to making science-fiction movies, our system is not mature,” Liu said.

I had come to interview Liu in his capacity as China’s foremost philosopher of first contact, but I also wanted to know what to expect when I visited the new dish. After a translator relayed my question, Liu stopped smoking and smiled.

“It looks like something out of science fiction,” he said. (...)

Seti researchers have looked for civilizations that shoot outward in all directions from a single origin point, becoming an ever-growing sphere of technology, until they colonize entire galaxies. If they were consuming lots of energy, as expected, these civilizations would give off a telltale infrared glow, and yet we don’t see any in our all-sky scans. Maybe the self-replicating machinery required to spread rapidly across 100 billion stars would be doomed by runaway coding errors. Or maybe civilizations spread unevenly throughout a galaxy, just as humans have spread unevenly across the Earth. But even a civilization that captured a tenth of a galaxy’s stars would be easy to find, and we haven’t found a single one, despite having searched the nearest 100,000 galaxies.

Some seti researchers have wondered about stealthier modes of expansion. They have looked into the feasibility of “Genesis probes,” spacecraft that can seed a planet with microbes, or accelerate evolution on its surface, by sparking a Cambrian explosion, like the one that juiced biological creativity on Earth. Some have even searched for evidence that such spacecraft might have visited this planet, by looking for encoded messages in our DNA—which is, after all, the most robust informational storage medium known to science. They too have come up empty. The idea that civilizations expand ever outward might be woefully anthropocentric.

Liu did not concede this point. To him, the absence of these signals is just further evidence that hunters are good at hiding. He told me that we are limited in how we think about other civilizations. “Especially those that may last millions or billions of years,” he said. “When we wonder why they don’t use certain technologies to spread across a galaxy, we might be like spiders wondering why humans don’t use webs to catch insects.” And anyway, an older civilization that has achieved internal peace may still behave like a hunter, Liu said, in part because it would grasp the difficulty of “understanding one another across cosmic distances.” And it would know that the stakes of a misunderstanding could be existential.

First contact would be trickier still if we encountered a postbiological artificial intelligence that had taken control of its planet. Its worldview might be doubly alien. It might not feel empathy, which is not an essential feature of intelligence but instead an emotion installed by a particular evolutionary history and culture. The logic behind its actions could be beyond the powers of the human imagination. It might have transformed its entire planet into a supercomputer, and, according to a trio of Oxford researchers, it might find the current cosmos too warm for truly long-term, energy-efficient computing. It might cloak itself from observation, and power down into a dreamless sleep lasting hundreds of millions of years, until such time when the universe has expanded and cooled to a temperature that allows for many more epochs of computing.

by Ross Andersen, The Atlantic |  Read more:
Image: Liu Xu/Xinhua/Getty
[ed. See also: here, here, here, and here.]

Saturday, February 13, 2021

Clubhouse Is the Anti-Twitter

Clubhouse, the exclusive group-voice-chat app that launched last year to fanfare from the venture capital set, erupted into the headlines this week when Tesla CEO Elon Musk and Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg dropped in for conversations with other tech luminaries. “Elon Musk’s Clubhouse banter with Robinhood CEO triggers stampede for Clubhouse app,” Reuters reported. “Clubhouse’s Moment Arrives,” Platformer’s Casey Newton declared. Both cameos strained the app’s capacity; Zuckerberg’s apparently broke it, at least briefly.

There was also backlash: The Information editor-in-chief Jessica Lessin pointed out that these events’ organizers blocked many journalists from attending; the New York Times reporter Taylor Lorenz suggested they were excluding female journalists in particular.

Meanwhile, Twitter has been testing a rival feature called Spaces, in hopes that it will soon have a moment of its own. The stage is set for a showdown between two social media companies whose target audiences substantially overlap. But their founding ideas are fundamentally different, in ways that could shape how their respective products evolve.

The Pattern
Open vs. closed social networks

A decade ago, Twitter was hailed by some pundits as a democratizing force for its role in movements like the Arab Spring. That narrative has since been complicated, muddled, and contradicted many times over, and you’re more likely to hear today that Twitter, Facebook, and other social platforms are destroying democracy rather than fomenting it. But there’s another, broader sense in which Twitter has always been at least somewhat democratic. The structure of Twitter’s platform is essentially flat and open, in the sense that pretty much anyone can join, tweet, reply to anyone else, and have at least a remote chance to reach a massive audience.

Twitter is also loosely democratic in the sense that the platform runs in large part on the wisdom of the crowd — or mob rule, to take the darker view. Twitter amplifies the tweets that get the most engagement, regardless of who wrote them, and regardless of who’s doing the retweeting or favoriting. That means that a relative unknown with 42 followers can tweet a snarky reply to an account with 42 million followers and get more favorites than the original, at least in theory. It means a grassroots movement like #MeToo or Black Lives Matter can break through to mainstream audiences without the approval of official gatekeepers — and, on the flip side, that bots and trolls with frog avatars can run rampant with messages of racism and misogyny.

Having power and high social status in real life — commanding respect, deference, special privilege wherever you go — does not necessarily earn one the same treatment on Twitter. Yes, you’ll probably have more followers than ordinary folk, and you’ll have sycophants who fave your bad jokes or shower you with flattery in pursuit of your good graces. But you’ll also have a target on your back. Any misstatement on your part is likely to be ruthlessly dissected and mocked by people you’ve never met. You can get ratioed or even become the butt of a trending topic on the basis of a bad tweet, and there’s very little you can do to stop it.

None of this is to say that Twitter is truly democratic or egalitarian — nor that it would be entirely a good thing even if it were. Blue checkmarks, follower counts, and various forms of platform manipulation and bias all reinforce power dynamics and inequalities. And some of the same dynamics that make it conducive to activists speaking truth to power, or comedians dunking on a blowhard’s hypocrisy, are also part of what make it a breeding ground for targeted harassment, misinformation, and state-backed influence campaigns, among other ills. On a quotidian level, they simply make Twitter a stressful and divisive place, with lots of rude assholes and posturing and infighting.

I frame Twitter this way as a lens through which to view its contrasts with Clubhouse. Along many of the same axes on which Twitter can be characterized as flat and open, Clubhouse is hierarchical and closed — more oligarchic than democratic. That is almost surely intentional, and indeed a big part of its appeal to some.

Exclusivity has been a theme of Clubhouse from the outset. The app launched in April 2020 in a private beta-test mode, courting tech investors and celebrities as early adopters partly on the promise that they’d be able to talk to each other without the chaos and din of Twitter and other platforms. It’s based around user-generated groups and discussion panels, which happen live and exclusively via voice chat, sometimes in front of an audience. Nearly a year after its launch, Clubhouse is big, fast-growing, and making continual headlines — and yet it’s still private: You have to be invited by an existing member to get in, so just being on it remains something of a status symbol in some circles. It’s also still only available on iOS. (...)

But the exclusivity in this case is by no means an accident; it’s central to the platform’s dynamics. The app is built around “rooms,” which are group chats convened by specific users around a specific topic at specific times. There are also “clubs,” or private groups, whose founders are empowered to set and enforce membership terms. The rooms, in both concept and design, bear a striking resemblance to expert panels at an industry conference. (Too often, they’re all-male panels.) Clubhouse, at this juncture in its development, feels like the answer to the question, “What if SXSW, but an app?”

As with Discord, another fast-growing voice-based platform, this structure is conducive to conversation in a way that the leading social platforms — Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Twitter — aren’t. It guards against what danah boyd calls “context collapse,” in which you think you’re talking to a certain group of people with a shared set of assumptions, but you’re also reaching different people who might interpret your words in a very different way. The medium of live voice interaction also lends itself to the rote social courtesies of normal human interaction, unlike Twitter.

Within each room, there is a hierarchical division of roles. It is run by one or more moderators, who own the “stage” and get to control who can speak, and when. If you’re in the audience, you have to raise your hand and hope they call on you if you want to say anything. They don’t have to call on anyone they don’t want to hear from; if they hear from you and decide they don’t like you, they can mute your microphone or even boot you from the room. There is a hierarchy even within the audience: Those who are followed by one or more moderators appear at the top, the equivalent of a front-row seat, and tend to be more likely to get called on. (It’s also possible to have rooms that function more like a group chat, like Houseparty without the video, but those haven’t been Clubhouse’s main draw so far.)

by Will Oremus, One Zero | Read more:
Image: Jakub Porzycki/NurPhoto via Getty Images
[ed. See also: Clubhouse Is Suggesting Users Invite Their Drug Dealers and Therapists; and The Case for Twitter Spaces (One Zero); and, Clubhouse, a Tiny Audio Chat App, Breaks Through (NYT).]

How Vulnerable is the World?

One way of looking at human creativity is as a process of pulling balls out of a giant urn. The balls represent ideas, discoveries and inventions. Over the course of history, we have extracted many balls. Most have been beneficial to humanity. The rest have been various shades of grey: a mix of good and bad, whose net effect is difficult to estimate.

What we haven’t pulled out yet is a black ball: a technology that invariably destroys the civilisation that invents it. That’s not because we’ve been particularly careful or wise when it comes to innovation. We’ve just been lucky. But what if there’s a black ball somewhere in the urn? If scientific and technological research continues, we’ll eventually pull it out, and we won’t be able to put it back in. We can invent but we can’t un-invent. Our strategy seems to be to hope that there is no black ball.

Thankfully for us, humans’ most destructive technology to date – nuclear weapons – is exceedingly difficult to master. But one way to think about the possible effects of a black ball is to consider what would happen if nuclear reactions were easier. In 1933, the physicist Leo Szilard got the idea of a nuclear chain reaction. Later investigations showed that making an atomic weapon would require several kilos of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, both of which are very difficult and expensive to produce. However, imagine a counterfactual history in which Szilard realised that a nuclear bomb could be made in some easy way – over the kitchen sink, say, using a piece of glass, a metal object and a battery.

Szilard would have faced a dilemma. If he didn’t tell anyone about his discovery, he would be unable to stop other scientists from stumbling upon it. But if he did reveal his discovery, he would guarantee the further spread of dangerous knowledge. Imagine that Szilard confided in his friend Albert Einstein, and they decided to write a letter to the president of the United States, Franklin D Roosevelt, whose administration then banned all research into nuclear physics outside of high-security government facilities. Speculation would swirl around the reason for the heavy-handed measures. Groups of scientists would wonder about the secret danger; some of them would figure it out. Careless or disgruntled employees at government labs would let slip information, and spies would carry the secret to foreign capitals. Even if by some miracle the secret never leaked, scientists in other countries would discover it on their own.

Or perhaps the US government would move to eliminate all glass, metal and sources of electrical current outside of a few highly guarded military depots? Such extreme measures would meet with stiff opposition. However, after mushroom clouds had risen over a few cities, public opinion would shift. Glass, batteries and magnets could be seized, and their production banned; yet pieces would remain scattered across the landscape, and eventually they would find their way into the hands of nihilists, extortionists or people who just want ‘to see what would happen’ if they set off a nuclear device. In the end, many places would be destroyed or abandoned. Possession of the proscribed materials would have to be harshly punished. Communities would be subject to strict surveillance: informant networks, security raids, indefinite detentions. We would be left to try to somehow reconstitute civilisation without electricity and other essentials that are deemed too risky.

That’s the optimistic scenario. In a more pessimistic scenario, law and order would break down entirely, and societies would split into factions waging nuclear wars. The disintegration would end only when the world had been ruined to the point where it was impossible to make any more bombs. Even then, the dangerous insight would be remembered and passed down. If civilisation arose from the ashes, the knowledge would lie in wait, ready to pounce once people started again to produce glass, electrical currents and metal. And, even if the knowledge were forgotten, it would be rediscovered when nuclear physics research resumed.

In short: we’re lucky that making nuclear weapons turned out to be hard. We pulled out a grey ball that time. Yet with each act of invention, humanity reaches anew into the urn.

Suppose that the urn of creativity contains at least one black ball. We call this ‘the vulnerable world hypothesis’. The intuitive idea is that there’s some level of technology at which civilisation almost certainly gets destroyed, unless quite extraordinary and historically unprecedented degrees of preventive policing and/or global governance are implemented. Our primary purpose isn’t to argue that the hypothesis is true – we regard that as an open question, though it would seem unreasonable, given the available evidence, to be confident that it’s false. Instead, the point is that the hypothesis is useful in helping us to bring to the surface important considerations about humanity’s macrostrategic situation.

The above scenario – call it ‘easy nukes’ – represents one kind of potential black ball, where it becomes easy for individuals or small groups to cause mass destruction. Given the diversity of human character and circumstance, for any imprudent, immoral or self-defeating action, there will always be some fraction of humans (‘the apocalyptic residual’) who would choose to take that action – whether motivated by ideological hatred, nihilistic destructiveness or revenge for perceived injustices, as part of some extortion plot, or because of delusions. The existence of this apocalyptic residual means that any sufficiently easy tool of mass destruction is virtually certain to lead to the devastation of civilisation. (...)

It would be bad news if the vulnerable world hypothesis were correct. In principle, however, there are several responses that could save civilisation from a technological black ball. One would be to stop pulling balls from the urn altogether, ceasing all technological development. That’s hardly realistic though; and, even if it could be done, it would be extremely costly, to the point of constituting a catastrophe in its own right.

Another theoretically possible response would be to fundamentally reengineer human nature to eliminate the apocalyptic residual; we might also do away with any tendency among powerful actors to risk civilisational devastation even when vital national security interests are served by doing so, as well as any tendency among the masses to prioritise personal convenience when this contributes an imperceptible amount of harm to some important global good. Such global preference reengineering seems very difficult to pull off, and it would come with risks of its own. It’s also worth noting that partial success in such preference reengineering wouldn’t necessarily bring a proportional reduction in civilisational vulnerability. For example, reducing the apocalyptic residual by 50 per cent wouldn’t cut the risks from the ‘easy nukes’ scenarios in half, since in many cases any lone individual could single-handedly devastate civilisation. We could only significantly reduce the risk, then, if the apocalyptic residual were virtually entirely eliminated worldwide.

That leaves two options for making the world safe against the possibility that the urn contains a black ball: extremely reliable policing that could prevent any individual or small group from carrying out highly dangerous illegal actions; and two, strong global governance that could solve the most serious collective action problems, and ensure robust cooperation between states – even when they have strong incentives to defect from agreements, or refuse to sign on in the first place. The governance gaps addressed by these measures are the two Achilles’ heels of the contemporary world order. So long as they remain unprotected, civilisation remains vulnerable to a technological black ball. Unless and until such a discovery emerges from the urn, however, it’s easy to overlook how exposed we are.

Let’s consider what would be required to protect against these vulnerabilities.

by Nick Bostrom and Matthew van der Merwe, Aeon |  Read more:
Image: Jonas Bendikson/Magnum

Friday, February 12, 2021

Fauci Says All Americans Could Start to Get Vaccinated in April

On Thursday, Dr. Anthony Fauci, the nation’s top infectious disease expert, made a prediction that was like music to the ears of millions of Americans who aren’t eligible for COVID-19 vaccination yet.

“If you look at the projection, I would imagine by the time we get to April, that will be what I would call, for [lack] of better wording, ‘open season,’” Fauci told NBC’s “Today” show. “Namely, virtually anybody and everybody in any category could start to get vaccinated.”

April? That’s less than 50 days away. The U.S. vaccination campaign started 60 days ago, on Dec. 14. Since then, just 11.3 million Americans — mostly health workers, with a few seniors sprinkled in — have received both doses of either the Pfizer or Moderna vaccine. Another 24 million Americans have gotten their first shot and are awaiting their second.

The news has been filled with headlines about crashing appointment websites, struggling seniors and governors complaining about supply shortages. Meanwhile, we’ve only just started vaccinating Americans 65 or older; most essential workers aren’t even eligible yet.

So is Fauci offering false hope when he says that “anybody and everybody in any category” will be able to sign up for vaccination starting in April? Or is his projection realistic?

The answer, if you actually examine the numbers, is surprising — and encouraging. It turns out April isn’t out of the question at all.

The first thing to consider is the current pace of vaccination, which is faster than you might think. “If you compare now to what we were doing just literally a month ago,” Fauci said Thursday, “the escalation has really been considerable.”

He’s right. On Jan. 11, the U.S. was administering an average of 632,000 doses per day. Now we’re averaging 1.6 million. That’s not just a two-and-a-half-fold increase. It’s also more, already, than the revised goal of 1.5 million doses per day President Biden set two short weeks ago after critics said his previous target of 1 million doses per day was too low.

The next thing to consider is where supply is heading next. (Hint: it’s heading upward.) “As we get into March and April, the number of available doses will allow for much more of a mass vaccination approach, which is really much more accelerated than what you’re seeing now,” Fauci said Thursday.

Initially, logistical bottlenecks were slowing vaccination; many states were administering less than half the doses they’d received. But now that some of those knots have been untangled, the national share of available doses administered has climbed to 68 percent, with several states clearing 80 or even 90 percent.

Supply, in contrast, is what’s holding us back today; at the moment, doses administered are consistently outpacing doses distributed for the first time since the rollout began. But as Fauci said, this should change soon. Since Biden took office, the number of doses being sent to states has increased by 28 percent to 11 million doses a week, according to White House COVID-19 coordinator Jeffrey Zients. Starting Thursday, the administration will boost that number by another 5 percent, with 1 million doses going directly to 6,500 retail pharmacies and another 1 million going directly to 250 community health centers serving hard-to-reach groups such as homeless people, migrant workers and public housing residents.

Production is picking up too. At first, Pfizer and Moderna promised to deliver 100 million doses each by the end of March. But Pfizer recently added 20 million doses to that pledge — then announced it could ship all 200 million doses purchased by the U.S. before the end of May, or two months earlier than expected, because vaccinators can squeeze six or even seven doses out of vials that were supposed to contain just five.

At the same time, Moderna is “asking U.S. regulators to approve what it says could be a remarkably simple proposal to speed up the immunization of Americans against the coronavirus: Fill empty space in its vials with as many as 50 percent more doses,” according to the New York Times. If the change is approved, which could happen this month, it would theoretically allow Moderna to ship tens of millions of additional doses by the end of March and another 150 million by June.

To put that in perspective, about 68 million doses have been distributed over the last 60 days. Over the next 50 days — that is, by April — the U.S. could be getting 175 million more.

And that’s not even counting the single-dose Johnson & Johnson vaccine, which the U.S. Food and Drug Administration is expected to approve this month, with 100 million doses to follow before July. Or the Novavax and Astra Zeneca vaccines, which could also be available by April. Or the fact that on Thursday, the Biden administration announced that it had secured another 200 million doses from Pfizer and Moderna to be delivered in "regular increments" by the end of July — bringing the grand total from just those two manufacturers to 600 million doses, or enough to fully vaccinate every adult in America (and then some).

Administering so many additional millions of doses will be a challenge, but Fauci sounded confident Thursday. “I would imagine, and in fact, I’m fairly certain, that as we get into and toward the end of April, you’ll see … pharmacies, community vaccine centers, mobile units really stepping up the pace of vaccination,” he said. “Hopefully as we get into the early spring we’ll have a much greater acceleration of dosage.”

by Andrew Romano, Yahoo News |  Read more:
Image: Alex Wong/Getty Images
[ed. Competence matters. Vote wisely.]

Chick Corea (1941-2021)

Chick Corea, Jazz Pianist Who Expanded the Possibilities of the Genre, Dead at 79 (Rolling Stone); and, Chick Corea, Jazz Fusion Pioneer, Has Died Of Cancer At 79 (NPR); Chick Corea: Hear 12 Essential Performances (NYT).]

[ed. Return to Forever was never far from my turntable. Some additional great videos in the articles.]

Thursday, February 11, 2021


via:

Negative Interest Rates Are Coming, but There Is No Chance That They Will Work

We’ve sometimes addressed why negative interest rates are a bad idea. A corroborating data point: Sweden ditched its negative interest rate experiment in 2019, and said in mumbled economese that it didn’t do what it was supposed to do.

One of the many times we debunked the official rationale for negative interest rates was in a 2016 post, Economists Mystified that Negative Interest Rates Aren’t Leading Consumers to Run Out and Spend. We’ll hoist at length:
It been remarkable to witness the casual way in which central banks have plunged into negative interest rate terrain, based on questionable models. Now that this experiment isn’t working out so well, the response comes troubling close to, “Well, they work in theory, so we just need to do more or wait longer to see them succeed.”

The particularly distressing part, as a new Wall Street Journal article makes clear, is that the purveyors of this snake oil talked themselves into the insane belief that negative interest rates would induce consumers to run out and spend. From the story:
Two years ago, the European Central Bank cut interest rates below zero to encourage people such as Heike Hofmann, who sells fruits and vegetables in this small city, to spend more.

Policy makers in Europe and Japan have turned to negative rates for the same reason—to stimulate their lackluster economies. Yet the results have left some economists scratching their heads. Instead of opening their wallets, many consumers and businesses are squirreling away more money.

When Ms. Hofmann heard the ECB was knocking rates below zero in June 2014, she considered it “madness” and promptly cut her spending, set aside more money and bought gold. “I now need to save more than before to have enough to retire,” says Ms. Hofmann, 54 years old.

Recent economic data show consumers are saving more in Germany and Japan, and in Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden, three non-eurozone countries with negative rates, savings are at their highest since 1995, the year the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development started collecting data on those countries. Companies in Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Japan also are holding on to more cash.

The article then discusses that these consumers all went on a saving binge..because demographics! because central banks did a bad job of PR! Only then does it turn to the idea that the higher savings rates were caused by negative interest rates.

How could they have believed otherwise? Do these economists all have such fat pensions that they have no idea what savings are for, or alternatively, they have their wives handle money?

People save for emergencies and retirement. Economists, who are great proponents of using central bank interest rate manipulation to create a wealth effect, fail to understand that super low rates diminish the wealth of ordinary savers. Few will react the way speculators do and go into risky assets to chase yield. They will stay put, lower their spending to try to compensate for their reduced interest income. Those who are still working will also try to increase their savings balances, since they know their assets will generate very little in the way of income in a zero/negative interest rate environment.

It is apparently difficult for most economists to grasp that negative interest rates reduce the value of those savings to savers by lowering the income on them. Savers are loss averse and thus are very reluctant to spend principal to compensate for reduced income. Given that central banks have driven policy interest rates into negative real interest rate terrain, this isn’t an illogical reading of their situation. Ed Kane has estimated that low interest rates were a $300 billion per year subsidy taken from consumers and given to financial firms in the form of reduces interest income. Since interest rates on the long end of the yield curve have fallen even further, Kane’s estimate is now probably too low.
Back to the current post. Aside from the effect on savings (that economists expected negative interest rates to induce savers to dip into their capital to preserve their lifestyles and make up for lost interest income), a second reason negative interest rates hurt, or at least don’t help spending is by sending a deflationary signal. If things might be cheaper in a year, why buy now?

The one wee bit of good news is the Fed doesn’t think negative interest rates are a sound idea. In fact, since 2014 (the year of the taper tantrum), and probably a bit earlier, the central bank realized that it had driven interest rates too low and it was keen to get out of the corner it had painted itself in. But it has yet to work out how to do that without breaking a lot of china.

by Yves Smith, Naked Capitalism |  Read more:
[ed. Let's hope this gets nipped in the bud. See also: All you need to know about negative interest rates (The Guardian).]

Covid Brought Booze to Your Door—and Made Delivery Worth Billions

The lockdowns early last year were like a cruel reversal of “a guy walks into a bar” jokes for the alcohol industry. Instead of fun scenarios where anything could happen, people were stuck at home, bars were closed, and in the U.S. most consumers had no idea how to buy booze online. Financial results for alcohol companies were constrained, and their supply chains had to be redirected away from bars, sporting events, and concerts to whatever homebound consumers they could reach. There was even a shortage of the aluminum cans needed for some beers as they scrambled to adjust.

Then, something funny did happen: Alcohol producers, held back from the e-commerce revolution in the U.S. by laws that date to the 1930s, suddenly saw online sales skyrocket. Beverage makers started to open up to technology platforms rolled out by startups such as Thirstie Inc. and Speakeasy Co., and consumers began to catch on that they could get alcohol without venturing out of lockdown. On Feb. 2 one of those upstarts, Drizly Inc., agreed to sell itself to Uber Technologies Inc.—the ride-hailing company that’s ventured into food delivery— for $1.1 billion. (...)

Alcohol may be a more natural fit for online sales than many consumer products. The weight of bottles, cans, and cartons means that some people would rather not carry them home themselves. And the large variety of products and packaging types—more than 1 million—means an online store can offer the kind of inventory a typical retailer can’t. “It’s like books with Amazon; you can build a store that can only exist on the internet,” Drizly CEO Rellas says.

Yet for years, the ability to buy alcohol online in the U.S. has been constrained. In 1933, when Prohibition was repealed, the 21st Amendment broke up the power of bootleggers by dictating that no one party would control producers, distributors, and retailers of alcohol. To complicate matters further, each state adopted its own version of the so-called three-tier system. To this day—with minor exceptions such as small breweries, distillers, and vineyards—alcohol producers can’t connect directly with U.S. consumers but must send their products through separately owned distributors and retailers. That’s caused the industry to miss out on the entire direct-to-consumer revolution that’s changed the way many brands connect to their customers.

“For the most part there’s no such thing as DTC alcohol,” says Franklin Isacson, founding partner of Coefficient Capital, a consumer-goods-focused venture capital firm. “Warby Parker can cut out the middleman and the distributor and give you a better price. But if you go to smirnoff.com, the sale still goes to a distributor, who takes it to a liquor store, who delivers it to you.” (...)

Still, brands such as Haus that can get around the three-tier system are the exception. So digital middlemen have cropped up to try to deliver those kinds of advantages without destroying the three-tier status quo. Aside from Drizly, Speakeasy, and Thirstie, there’s also Bevshop, Cask & Barrel Club, and Passion Spirits.

These companies have to jump through intricate legal hoops to comply with the three-tier regulations. With Drizly (referred to as “Uber for booze,” even before Uber bought it), consumers download its app and add products to a shopping cart, and Drizly appears to deliver them. But Drizly never touches the alcohol, because the drivers are mostly employed by the liquor stores. About 20% of Drizly’s deliveries are by third-party couriers, and Uber will now be one of them, Rellas says. Drizly operates in 32 states with legalized alcohol e-commerce and doesn’t deliver across state lines.

Thirstie, which works with major brands including Bacardi, Jagermeister, Macallan, and those owned by drinks giant Constellation Brands Inc., is known as the “Shopify for booze,” as it uses a model that allows a consumer to look up his favorite brands and creates the illusion that he’s buying from their websites. Instead, the customer is moved to a technology platform powered by Thirstie that orders the bottle from the supplier, which sends it to a distributor, which then sends it to a licensed retailer who makes the delivery to the consumer.

by Tiffany Kary, Bloomberg |  Read more:
Image: Brad Trone/Bloomberg Businessweek

The Pandemic Has Created a Demand For Bespoke ASMR Videos


The Pandemic Has Created a Huge Demand For Bespoke ASMR Videos (Vice)
Image: via: