: You have been a visiting scholar at Harvard University for the past six months and have therefore witnessed Trump’s return to power firsthand. What was your reaction to his re-election, and how would you assess his first few weeks in office?
: I don’t have a particularly strong opinion on Trump’s re-election: I wouldn’t say I like or dislike him. That being said, I do have a general impression [总体感觉] of him which is that, in some sense, Trump’s victory represented a kind of “course correction” [拨乱反正] in American politics. In other words, America’s problems— social, economic and political—had become so entrenched [积重难返] that they could no longer be fixed by “politics as usual” [无法通过常规的政治过程纠正]. As a result, voters turned to Trump, an unconventional politician, to push through bold and drastic [大刀阔斧] reforms.
To be honest, as a Chinese observer, many of Trump and Musk’s actions in recent weeks have really shocked me [震撼]. You could say it has been a real eye-opener [大开眼界] for me. For example, Trump openly expressed his desire for Canada to become America’s 51st state and even floated the idea of annexing Greenland. Yet just a few months ago, the Biden administration was accusing China of “undermining the rules-based international order”. It is astonishing [让我很吃惊] how the once-sacred [被奉为圭臬] norms of international politics can apparently be discarded overnight, replaced by the law of the jungle [弱肉强食]. Frankly, I have lost a lot of respect for the US because of these childish political antics [政治儿戏].
Moreover, Musk’s push to reform the federal government through DOGE with the support of Trump reminds me of the actions of two Soviet leaders. First, Khrushchev, who, in his secret speech at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, exposed many of Stalin’s dark deeds [众多黑幕]. Although this consolidated his political position in the post-Stalin era, it permanently damaged the Soviet Party’s domestic authority and international moral standing, with the Sino-Soviet split being the most direct result. [Similarly,] Musk and Trump’s tireless [不遗余力] efforts to expose the so-called “deep state” are certainly beneficial to the new administration, but the damage they are inflicting on America’s institutions and moral authority is irreversible and incalculable, with potentially terrifying consequences.
Second, Gorbachev, who believed the Soviet Union was in terminal decline, forced through bold reforms [推出了力度极大] based on his “new thinking”. He intended to address issues through reform to put the Soviet Union back on track. However, due to the huge scale of the reforms and insufficient preparation, he ended up unintentionally bringing about the USSR’s collapse. Similarly, Trump, seeing America’s problems, also wants to bring in bold and drastic reforms [大刀阔斧改革], but his radical [激进] approach is likely to lead to internal unrest or even civil war [内战]. In conclusion, I have serious doubts about such radical [激进] reforms, and I also question whether they are truly motivated by America’s interests or just the self-interest of these individuals [他们的私利].
2. Deterring Trump: Meeting Strength with StrengthQuestion 2: Let’s say you yourself were faced with someone like Trump, how would you respond to his threats and tariffs? How would you deter him from pursuing his pressure tactics while earning his respect?
Mao Keji: Trump is a businessman by nature; he is used to cost-benefit analyses, but less sensitive [敏感] to long-term strategic planning. Therefore, I feel the best strategy for responding to his pressure is to demonstrate that you are both able and willing to impose costs [on him]. At the same time, showing weakness or displaying anxiety in front of him will not get you any sympathy. On the contrary, it will only invite further aggression [会招致他得寸进尺的攻击].
Unfortunately, Canada, Denmark, Germany and Ukraine have all proven this point. As obedient [言听计从] allies who have always followed Washington’s lead, they trusted the US too much and never had a strategy for counteracting or resisting it. In the face of Trump’s threats, they were helpless [束手无策] and ultimately suffered humiliating blows [遭到侮辱性的敲打]. To me, this is a lesson in realism [这是一种非常现实主义的领悟]: surrendering just invites further humiliation [投降是自取其辱]; only by resisting to the very end can one turn the situation around [必须抵抗到底，才能翻转局面]. Therefore, while maintaining respect and decorum towards him, I would demonstrate China’s firm will and ability to retaliate against the US. This would ensure he takes decisions in full awareness that the costs of squeezing China will far outweigh the benefits, thereby deterring him from engaging in risky behaviour [采取冒险行动].
3. Trump’s Return: Consensus and Disagreement in China
Question 3: Sinification, as you know, focuses on China’s intellectual elite and their perspectives on the world. How have Chinese scholars and analysts—particularly those of your “post-90s” (90后) generation—reacted to Trump’s return? What key points of consensus and disagreement have you observed so far?
Mao Keji: Many of us, myself included, have not been particularly surprised by Trump’s return. In fact, it even seemed inevitable: if it weren’t Trump, someone else like him would have emerged. This is because we all believe that many of America’s domestic issues have become too deeply-entrenched to be fixable [积重难返]. Meanwhile, the Biden administration has shown that neither the Democrat nor Republican establishment can resolve these issues through conventional political processes.
There is actually very little disagreement among young Chinese intellectuals on the point that America’s internal problems are deeply entrenched and difficult to resolve. However, there are often disagreements on whether Trump’s reforms have the potential to save America [拯救美国]. Optimists believe that Trump and Musk have put together a strong [组合力度很大] package of reforms, backed by strong determination [决心很强] and an unprecedented level of support from the public. With the added boost from AI, there is a real possibility that America could be saved through radical reforms, [they claim]. Many people believe that, considering Trump’s isolationist strategy, the US could just withdraw into its North American comfort zone, settling into a new role as a regional hegemon, while gradually replenishing its strength [修复综合国力].
However, pessimists argue that the US’s overall power is fundamentally tied up [深深嵌入] in the global system, including the dollar’s status as the world’s dominant currency, its ability to attract top talent from around the world, and its ability to absorb global capital. Therefore, if Trump were to pursue isolationism forcefully and strip the US of its resource-extracting global hegemony [剥离汲取资源], [the pessimists believe that] the country would face a precipitous decline due to its inability to sustain itself [维持而断崖式坠落], potentially even resulting in a Soviet-style implosion [内爆].
There’s a quote from the The Three-Body Problem Trilogy that I really like: “Weakness and ignorance are not barriers to survival, but arrogance is.”
Although the United States appears to be in decline, it remains, by any measure, the world’s leading power. After all, the fact that an unconventional reformer like Trump could emerge suggests that the American system does indeed possess a strong capacity for self-correction. That’s my view anyway.
At the same time, I pay particular attention to the technological forces behind Trump [特朗普背后的技术力量], as they may well bring about new and unexpected changes. I would rather overestimate [the impact of] Trump’s reforms than risk underestimating them.
Many establishment think tanks and media outlets in the US display real arrogance, which comes from assuming that their values are superior [基于价值观的傲慢]. In contrast, I sometimes feel that the perspectives of Trump, Vance and others are more grounded [接地气], and more worth paying attention to.
4. Trump’s Impact on China: Threat or Opportunity?
Question 4: Some Chinese scholars view Trump’s return to power as detrimental to China’s national interests, while others see it as an opportunity. What is your perspective?
Mao Keji: Trump’s second term has only just begun, and no one knows what’s going to happen next. Although he hasn’t done much deliberate China-bashing [敲打中国] recently, once he has resolved the Russia-Ukraine issue and dismantled [清理完] the Deep State, he will have his hands free to deal with China.
During his first term, Trump followed a similar script. This is why the many Chinese people who see his re-election as beneficial to China may be celebrating a bit too soon.
To be honest, I don’t particularly care whether Trump is beneficial or harmful to China. He is only a marginal variable [边际变量] for China.
China is a vast country with a large population and a massive industrial base. In many cases, so long as its domestic affairs are well managed, there is no need to fear a volatile international situation [外部环境风云变幻].
From a dialectical perspective, the most beneficial thing Trump did for China during his first term was launching the trade and tech war. This was a wake-up call that made China realise the urgency of developing independent and controllable technological pathways [技术路线] and accelerating its transition towards smart technologies [智能化].
Without Trump’s policy of extreme pressure, no Chinese government department or domestic enterprise would have been able to drive the transition to domestic alternatives [国产替代的转型]. Doing so would not only have been costly but [the outcome would also have] been highly uncertain. As a result, China might still be, at this crucial moment in time, neglecting the development of critical industries and allowing risks to accumulate, with potentially irreversible and catastrophic consequences [无法挽回的灾难性后果].
Many things that seem beneficial to China may not actually be that significant [没有那么大的作用], while other things that seem highly detrimental may, in fact, serve as powerful stimuli for growth. Ultimately, whether something is beneficial or harmful depends on how [well] China can absorb external shocks. At the end of the day, strengthening China’s capabilities and focusing on domestic priorities is probably more important than anything else. There is no need to fixate on Trump.
5. The World in 2029 and 2049
Question 5: Looking ahead, what do you think the US and the world will look like in four years’ time? And by 2049?
Mao Keji: Predicting what will happen in the four years of Trump’s second term is extremely difficult, but for now, one thing seems certain: the US’s global influence will shrink significantly. This is perhaps the clearest trend [最鲜明倾向] to emerge so far from Trump’s second term.
If Trump’s policymaking continues at its current pace, then by the end of his four years, the US alliance system, the dollar’s status as a global currency, America’s influence over multilateral institutions, its military presence across the world, and even its ideological and media dominance will all be significantly diminished. This is a deliberate choice by the Trump administration, most likely based on the belief that the costs of maintaining these global arrangements outweigh their benefits to the US.
At the same time, Trump’s retreat may be a calculated one, effectively reviving the 19th-century doctrine of spheres of influence. That means a return to an era akin to that of the warring states period, in which great powers can simply draw circles on a map to determine the fate of smaller nations.
Such a world, where the law of the jungle reigns [丛林秩序], may seem inconceivable. However, Trump’s encouragement of European defence autonomy, his tacit acceptance of Russia’s actions, his territorial ambitions concerning Canada and Greenland, and even his blunt remark that he would “leave Bangladesh to PM Modi”, all suggest a [growing] tendency towards a world carved-up [into spheres of influence] [全球割据]. This is something that cannot be ignored.
Domestically, the next four years in the US are equally difficult to predict [扑朔迷离]. As mentioned earlier, although I believe Musk, with Trump’s backing, could indeed carry out some important reforms, I remain highly sceptical of their radical [激进的方式] approach. It even reminds me a little of China’s Cultural Revolution in the sense that a small group of political outsiders [少数体系边缘人], with the tacit approval of their leader, has gained access to the core of government and power [进入权力核心] and is exploiting widespread social dissatisfaction to rally large numbers of ordinary people—especially those from the lower rungs of society and young people with little experience of the world—to launch a fierce assault on the existing system. At the moment, it seems that much of what DOGE is doing—exposing shocking “dirt” [黑料] on social media—is less about genuinely pushing for reform and more about maintaining the “revolutionary legitimacy” of this movement, ultimately creating a cycle of self-reinforcing and escalating fervour [狂热].
As Trump continues to use attacking the Deep State as an excuse to dismantle the federal government, growing numbers of people may find the situation [increasingly] intolerable and join the ranks of a fierce opposition to Trump [选择加入激烈反对的阵营]. This could create an unprecedented level of division within American society. I don’t know how this situation will ultimately end, but rifts in society, combined with economic turbulence and growing international pressures, undoubtedly present a thorny challenge.
As for how I envisage 2049, the world one generation from now, I haven’t given this much thought until now. I don’t think I’m very good at imagining things that far off. However, since you asked, I will try my best to provide an answer.
Unless there is a geopolitical disaster like a nuclear war or a science-fiction-like scenario such as a robot uprising, and assuming current trends continue on a linear path, it is highly probable that by 2049 China will have overtaken the United States as the world’s largest economy. From now until then, as long as China focuses on managing its own affairs effectively, it should naturally achieve this leap due to its sheer size, thereby circumventing [today’s] tricky structural “contradictions” [结构性矛盾] between the US and China. [But] this should not be seen as a unilateral geopolitical victory for China over the US.
What will China look like by 2049? Over a billion people (let’s hope China’s population is still of that size!), fully industrialised and automated, and living in a socialist system that prioritises the public interest [公众利益]. At that point, China could become the first truly advanced socialist nation in human history, fulfilling Karl Marx’s great prophecy from two centuries ago.
I look forward to seeing China achieve further institutional innovations [更多制度创新] and material advancements, thereby contributing to the betterment of human civilisation [为全人类的文明进步多做一点贡献] and making the world a better place.
by Thomas des Garets Geddes and Mao Keji, The China Academy |
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Image: uncredited
